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A Puzzle

We are extraordinarily complex physical systems that are always operating lawfully in accordance with some as-yet-unknown equation.

A macroscropic fact about us is that we have mental states that correspond in some as-yet-unknown way to the physical details of our nervous systems.

There is a useful distinction between different types of mental states that goes under the phrase 'direction of fit'. The idea is basically this: Some of our mental states are meant to fit the world, and others are meant to make the world fit them. A belief attempts to match the structure of reality to our minds, to truly represent the world. A desire means to make the world conform to it.

In this broad class of world-fit-mind mental states, we have our ethical feelings. When somebody draws back to kick a puppy, my moral reaction wants their foot to stop in its track, to make the world such that the puppy does not feel any pain. There is, I think, no clear line between our ethical feelings and the rest of our world-fit-mind feelings. Some people prefer to exclude their retributive feelings and reactions of disgust from what they label their ethical feelings, and others do not. Much of ethical philosophy comes down to arguing about where we should draw this non-existent line in our normative feelings.

Many people become convinced that our ethical feelings are not just feelings, not just subjective preferences, but that they are also representing some truth. Not a truth about how the world is, but a truth about how the world should be. I am unsure of what the psychological explanation for this tendency to want to back our ethical feelings with objectivity, and would be very interested to learn more about it.

Despite this, it is clear that by the very nature of ethical feelings, as being the world-fit-mind type of mental state, they do not represent reality.

Our beliefs are about physical objects that have causal power, that can make things happen and allow us to make predictions to test their accuracy. But truths of ethics, if there were any, would not make anything happen. They would not be able to 'nudge' particles in any way. Even if it were objectively true that I should not kick a puppy, this truth will not somehow jump into the world and stop my foot from making contact with the puppy. What will stop my foot is my moral psychology, which is ultimately a matter of physics in action.

Moral realists have a problem here, and I think it is an insuperable one. It is a deep epistemological problem that can be summarized in the following slogan: If your beliefs are independent of their content, then your beliefs are unjustified.

Even if we grant that there are objective normative truths, we could not ever come to have justified beliefs in them. After all, these moral facts could not in any way influence our moral beliefs, which are fully explainable in principle as properties that emerge from the underlying laws of physics.

Inquisitor: Do you believe in the existence of moral truths?   - Yes. I: And what experiences do you anticipate on the basis of this belief?   - None. I: Well, in what way does this belief affect your predictions of future experiences?   - It doesn't. I: In that case, I am uninterested in your belief. As far as I can tell, it is utterly devoid of content.

So much for moral realism. But I think there is still a puzzle to be resolved.

Given that our ethical beliefs are entirely unconstrained by any moral reality, we should expect that any discussions/debates on moral issues will run their course entirely independent of any factual ethical content. That is, if you witness two people arguing over the ethicality of abortion, then you can be sure that their discussion is in no way guided by the factual truth about the ethicality of abortion. But anybody who has been involved in an ethical discussion has felt the tug of compelling rational argumentation. Is there a way to retain this notion of compelling rational ethical argumentation in the light of moral nihilism?

In case this is unclear, there is a fundamental problem with the notion of rational responses to ethical arguments. Rationality is the attempt to move towards truth. How can one have rational responses to arguments about a subject matter in which there is no truth content?

Perhaps there is some subtle way to retain a notion of rationality in ethics. Or perhaps this must be tossed out as well as the hope of moral truth.

#puzzle #ethics #moral nihilism #rationality

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"The problem with that, is that “evidence” doesn’t exist independently of its observers, and it’s highly subjective to interpretation.”

Theories can make predictions about what subjective experiences you will have. For instance, T1 predicts that I will see a red flash in a moment and T2 predicts that I will see a blue flash in a moment. These are predictions regarding subjective experience and I update my credence in these theories according to what color flash I see, if any at all. More generally, all the predictions of a theory can be expressed in terms of anticipated experience. What's more, when we have a common language with which to express subjective experiences, we can have multiple agents talk about a common prediction in terms of subjective experience in a way that sounds more objective.

For instance, on the basis of Newtonian gravity and my intention to toss my cup in the air, I predict that everybody in this coffee house will momentarily witness my cup accelerating downwards at a rate of 10 m/s/s. We have a common language in which we can agree that everybody in this coffeehouse has the same anticipated experience, and then run the test. If somebody's anticipated experience was different from the rest, then this can be adjudicated through multiple trials.

So here's what you do in the general case of two disagreeing agents: Each person lists out the experiences they anticipate (this can include experiences like searching Google to find a certain statistic and anticipating a certain range of values) in their common language, and then you see which predictions come true and update beliefs accordingly.

In addition, I think it’s perfectly rationally possible to adjudicate disputes like that in your example. A: "You aren't putting as much into this relationship as I am." B: "Your expectations of this relationship are too high."

What are the facts of the matter here? Is there a truth in this domain?

Both positions are a mixture of factual claims and value claims that first of all must become disentangled. For instance, a simple translation of A's statement might be: "I spend more time and effort thinking about this relationship than you do." This is a factual claim about reality that is either true or false. On the other hand, there is an implicit value claim, something like: "A good relationship involves an equitable distribution of effort and commitment among the partners." This claim has no truth value, except when interpreted as a description of A's values.

B is mixing a psychological claim about A's expectations with a normative claim about what the right expectation to have about a relationship is. Again, the first claim is a factual claim about which there is a correct answer. The second is again devoid of any truth value, and is best interpreted as B's articulation of what they value in a relationship. This, as a descriptive claim about B, could be false in case B is out of touch with their own psychology, or is deliberately misrepresenting it in order to manipulate A.

Given this, the dispute can be addressed on both levels. One addresses the factual aspect of the dispute as discussed above: translate into statements of anticipated experience, and update beliefs accordingly until consensus is achieved. How does one address a value dispute? This is tougher, but roughly speaking there are two paths; changing of one’s own values and changing of behavior to fit the other’s values.

What is reality?

What is reality? This is a question I have been asking myself a lot lately. I’ve had a number of disagreements with people, both personal and political, that have caused me to question my reality in a way I haven’t truly done since learning about Descartes’ skepticism in my freshman year. I see things a certain way, and with a certain degree of confidence (not 100%, but definitely over 90), and the people I talk to see the same situation as completely different, and are just as sure.

So what do we do when two people reasonably disagree about something? The most obvious answer would be: we can look at the evidence. The problem with that, is that “evidence” doesn’t exist independently of its observers, and it’s highly subjective to interpretation. Logical arguments aren’t likely to reveal the truth about reality either, as they must be based off of premises, whose truth must still be determined. Perhaps an appeal to authority? Which one? Maybe popular opinion should win out. Should it? Why? And who gets to pose the question, and how do we decide how to interpret the popular opinion?

I think, maybe, skepticism has gone too far. It saddens me to say that, as one of the values I cherish most is critical thinking. But perhaps the more critical thinking is that which involves rational, selective skepticism – not questioning everything, only specific things that seem to be more questionable than others. Still, how do we know what’s worth questioning?

Imagine being in a relationship with someone, and feeling like they aren’t putting as much into it as you are. You approach them with your concern, only to hear that they feel that your expectations of the relationship are too high.

Who’s right in this case? Assuming you both love each other and want to be together, most people would probably say that both of you are right, and both of you are wrong. They would suggest that instead of focusing on who’s right, you each try to change in the way your partner is asking. You can try to expect less, and they can try to do more. But isn’t there a fact of the matter about who’s right? Maybe it doesn’t matter, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist? It’s possible that you’re both right, but also possible that one of you is being completely unreasonable and just trying to get away with not having to put any work into the relationship.

What if we applied the same logic to social and political issues?

For example, you might think people talking about racism and feminism and demanding trigger warnings and specific pronouns are just “attention-seeking snowflakes” that need to stop complaining all the time. Meanwhile, they might see you as racist, sexist, privileged, and maybe just simply mean.

Is there a reality here? Does it matter? We might be unwilling to compromise, because it does matter. We care about which one of us is right. Why? I don’t know.

Or, maybe, we just don’t know what a compromise would look like. Maybe we really want to find a middle ground, but don’t know where to begin to search for it. Another, slightly less optimistic possibility is that people on different sides of social and political issues don’t really care about one another, and so they have much less motivation to try to work together. After all, if you didn’t love your partner, would you really want to stick around to try to work out a solution? Probably not. But unlike relationships, people can’t just “break up” from those with whom they disagree. We’re all stuck in this together.

Or are we?