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instead of philosophers they should start calling themselves sophophiliacs

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I actually think the linguist-lect is pretty different from the philosopher-lect, except that there's overlap in semantics. Most of the philosophy words I know I either know from reading a lot of SEP as a teenager or from my (limited but very fun) excursions into formal semantics. Linguists have a lot more words for talking about the form and function of language whereas philosophers seem to have more for talking about the structure of ideas. Cf. my favorite Wikipedia article of all time, much beloved to me when I was a newbie conlanger, list of glossing abbreviations.

Actually, there are a number of fun linguist-lect/philosopher-lect false friends. We also have an "analytic vs. synthetic" distinction, but it's totally unrelated—to be analytic is to have the property of conveying a grammatical information through syntax, and to be synthetic is to have the property of conveying grammatical information through morphology, i.e. prefixes, suffixes and so on. Math also has "analytic vs. synthetic" but it means yet a third unrelated thing. And we have "subjects" and "objects" but these are just syntactic roles.

Ok I think I've just started rambling. Oh, one more thing (for you and the tumblr masses): two words that I have regarded as kind of linguist shibboleths are markedness and disprefer. We are wont to say that something has "high markedness" therefore might be "disprefered" or so on. So if you see someone saying these things you should bet they are a linguist.

Hey tsnidaria anemone, can you teach me more philosophy words? I don't mean crazy ones from an ancient wizard, I mean regular type ones that I might use to say stuff in an annoyingly pedantic way to people in real life. I somehow didn't know "truth-apt" before you said it to me on here (I knew some other words for the same type of thing, like "proposition", but that's at least a little ambiguous because some people use "proposition" for "truth-apt thing" and some people use it for "function from possible worlds to truth values").

Anyway, can you please tell me more words that a stuffy tweed-wearing anglo-american might say in his post 1945 office?

i think you probably have most of it if you're a linguist. you just have to forget that you actually know what it all means and start pretending you do

but actually i think non-philosophers are confused by the way we use the word "normativity"

#linguistics

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Customer: YOU FOOL DMV: CONFRONTATIONAL Verdict: DENIED

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Could you explain your vendetta against self referencing + strange loops

I don't, I actually like self-reference quite a lot! I kind of think the whole Tarskian paradigm is an L tbh. We could be doing much cooler shit.

#anon #math

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Your right im allways speeping under carpet

I believe that the following philosophical argument in favor of the second order Peano axioms as ultimately "correct" works:

We know from Gödel that no effectively definable formal system can capture the full behavior of the "true" natural numbers. That is, it's impossible, as finitistic beings, to give a formal definition which precisely characterizes the standard natural numbers. We will always "leave out some details" in the definition, among these the Gödel sentence in the given system and so on.

This makes the meaning of the phrase "the standard natural numbers" itself philosophically problematic. In the context of a given meta-theory (say ZFC), we can take the standard naturals to be some particular meta-theoretic construction (say, the von Neumann ordinals). In this context, the incompleteness theorems as internalized in the meta-theory say that no effectively definable formal system as internalized in the meta-theory can prove all the true facts about our chosen standard model. But of course this doesn't save us, because the incompleteness theorems "on the outside" of the meta-theory say that it can't prove everything there is to know about the "true" external standard model of the naturals, whatever it is.

Of course this last part is possibly bullshit and may rely on some kind of Platonism to make sense. So to be a conservative as possible one should stick to just asserting the meta-theory-internal version of the incompleteness theorems. After that you can, if you want, let them inspire by implication a sort of fog of uncertainty in the reader about what fucked up epistemic shit is going on "outside" the meta-theory, even though that perhaps does not make sense (or perhaps it does...). Of course you can make "outside the meta-theory" make sense by internalizing the meta-theory in a meta-meta-theory, but then you just get the same situation one level up.

So, ok, the point is that you are never going to be able to write down a formal system that unambiguously defines what you mean by "the true standard model of the naturals", such that exactly the statements which can be derived from this system (=definition) are exactly the true ones. Which sucks! That's lame, because math is supposed to involved being precise about what we mean by shit.

There are a couple of ways out. One is to just take some effectively definable formal system like first order PA and say "this is what we mean by the naturals, we mean the shit that can be proved from this. Yeah that leaves a lot of stuff hanging, a lot of statements about arithmetic of-ambiguous-truth-value, but whatever". Because, you know, PA is not categorical, so it has many inequivalent models. Or you can say "I will take second order PA as internalized in ZFC (so basically, the von Neumann ordinals) as my definition of the naturals". Which I think is more powerful(?) but still suffers from the same problem when you look at it "from the outside" of ZFC. Actually, you can do that for any (expressive enough) meta-theory M, you can put second-order PA inside it and take that as your naturals.

With the stage set, a brief digression:

I think that, informally, we should all be able to agree on the following about the "true" set of natural numbers, if such a thing can be said to exist (and imo it sort of must, because it's implicitly invoked in a meta-way when we define formal systems to begin with, and so on):

1. The number 0 is a natural number 2. If n is a natural number, then the successor of n (that is, n+1) is also a natural number 3. If m and n are two natural numbers and they have the same successor (that is, n+1 = m+1), then m = n 4. There is no natural number whose successor is 0 5. If P is some property which might or might not hold of a natural number, and we know that P holds of 0, and we furthermore know that whenever P holds of one number it must hold for the next number, then we know that P must hold for every natural number

Some people are philosophical uncomfortable with the last one, but I think it's intuitively undeniable. Like imagine a fucking... guy hopping from one number to the next, and he never stops. Can you pick a number he never gets to? No you fucking can't. You believe in induction.

So, ok, back to models and shit: both first order and second order PA try to formalize this intuition, and the key way that they differ is in terms of what a "property" (mentioned in (5)) is. First order PA says that a "property" is a first order formula. This is very powerful because we can effectively define the set of first order formulas over a given language. They are finite objects and we can work with them direction. From this flows all the nice properties of first order logic, like completeness and so on. But this effectively definability also makes it susceptible to the incompleteness theorems, and so first order PA ends up "leaving stuff out".

Second order PA defers the notion of a "property" to the meta-theory. It basically says "a property is whatever you think it is, big guy ;)" to ZFC or whatever theory it's being formulated in. ZFC thinks a property is a ZFC-set. Meta theory M thinks a property is an M-set. And second order PA as formalized in M agrees. Mathematically this makes second order PA harder to study as an object in itself. But philosophically I think it's kind of desirable?

First of all because, at a basic level, "property" seems like a much more fundamental notion to me than "natural number", and one I am much more willing to accept an intuition based definition of. Like, I don't know what you mean if you say "the true natural numbers". That seems pretty wishy-washy! But if you say "the real-world, ordinary definition of 'a property'", I can kinda be like "yeah, properties of things. I know how to reason about those!". And then second order PA, because it's categorical, will tell me "great: since you know what a property is, here's what a natural number is". And that's something I can work with.

This was overly long-winded I think. But in other words, what I am basically advocating for is conceptualizing second order PA as a function from "notions of property" to "notions of the natural numbers". And because models of PA are unique up to isomorphism (in whatever (sufficiently powerful) meta-theory you formalize it in, not "from the outside" of course) this means you can take up SOPA as your definition of the natural numbers and then "lug it around with you" into whatever different foundational system or meta-theory you fancy. And when you lug it into the real world, where "properties" mean actual properties of things, you get the real, true natural numbers.

This is all purely philosophizing of course. But I think this is about the situation.

[max1461]

I believe that the following philosophical argument in favor of the second order Peano axioms as ultimately "correct" works:

We know from Gödel that no effectively definable formal system can capture the full behavior of the "true" natural numbers. That is, it's impossible, as finitistic beings, to give a formal definition which precisely characterizes the standard natural numbers. We will always "leave out some details" in the definition, among these the Gödel sentence in the given system and so on.

This makes the meaning of the phrase "the standard natural numbers" itself philosophically problematic. In the context of a given meta-theory (say ZFC), we can take the standard naturals to be some particular meta-theoretic construction (say, the von Neumann ordinals). In this context, the incompleteness theorems as internalized in the meta-theory say that no effectively definable formal system as internalized in the meta-theory can prove all the true facts about our chosen standard model. But of course this doesn't save us, because the incompleteness theorems "on the outside" of the meta-theory say that it can't prove everything there is to know about the "true" external standard model of the naturals, whatever it is.

Of course this last part is possibly bullshit and may rely on some kind of Platonism to make sense. So to be a conservative as possible one should stick to just asserting the meta-theory-internal version of the incompleteness theorems. After that you can, if you want, let them inspire by implication a sort of fog of uncertainty in the reader about what fucked up epistemic shit is going on "outside" the meta-theory, even though that perhaps does not make sense (or perhaps it does...). Of course you can make "outside the meta-theory" make sense by internalizing the meta-theory in a meta-meta-theory, but then you just get the same situation one level up.

So, ok, the point is that you are never going to be able to write down a formal system that unambiguously defines what you mean by "the true standard model of the naturals", such that exactly the statements which can be derived from this system (=definition) are exactly the true ones. Which sucks! That's lame, because math is supposed to involved being precise about what we mean by shit.

There are a couple of ways out. One is to just take some effectively definable formal system like first order PA and say "this is what we mean by the naturals, we mean the shit that can be proved from this. Yeah that leaves a lot of stuff hanging, a lot of statements about arithmetic of-ambiguous-truth-value, but whatever". Because, you know, PA is not categorical, so it has many inequivalent models. Or you can say "I will take second order PA as internalized in ZFC (so basically, the von Neumann ordinals) as my definition of the naturals". Which I think is more powerful(?) but still suffers from the same problem when you look at it "from the outside" of ZFC. Actually, you can do that for any (expressive enough) meta-theory M, you can put second-order PA inside it and take that as your naturals.

With the stage set, a brief digression:

I think that, informally, we should all be able to agree on the following about the "true" set of natural numbers, if such a thing can be said to exist (and imo it sort of must, because it's implicitly invoked in a meta-way when we define formal systems to begin with, and so on):

1. The number 0 is a natural number 2. If n is a natural number, then the successor of n (that is, n+1) is also a natural number 3. If m and n are two natural numbers and they have the same successor (that is, n+1 = m+1), then m = n 4. There is no natural number whose successor is 0 5. If P is some property which might or might not hold of a natural number, and we know that P holds of 0, and we furthermore know that whenever P holds of one number it must hold for the next number, then we know that P must hold for every natural number

Some people are philosophical uncomfortable with the last one, but I think it's intuitively undeniable. Like imagine a fucking... guy hopping from one number to the next, and he never stops. Can you pick a number he never gets to? No you fucking can't. You believe in induction.

So, ok, back to models and shit: both first order and second order PA try to formalize this intuition, and the key way that they differ is in terms of what a "property" (mentioned in (5)) is. First order PA says that a "property" is a first order formula. This is very powerful because we can effectively define the set of first order formulas over a given language. They are finite objects and we can work with them direction. From this flows all the nice properties of first order logic, like completeness and so on. But this effectively definability also makes it susceptible to the incompleteness theorems, and so first order PA ends up "leaving stuff out".

Second order PA defers the notion of a "property" to the meta-theory. It basically says "a property is whatever you think it is, big guy ;)" to ZFC or whatever theory it's being formulated in. ZFC thinks a property is a ZFC-set. Meta theory M thinks a property is an M-set. And second order PA as formalized in M agrees. Mathematically this makes second order PA harder to study as an object in itself. But philosophically I think it's kind of desirable?

First of all because, at a basic level, "property" seems like a much more fundamental notion to me than "natural number", and one I am much more willing to accept an intuition based definition of. Like, I don't know what you mean if you say "the true natural numbers". That seems pretty wishy-washy! But if you say "the real-world, ordinary definition of 'a property'", I can kinda be like "yeah, properties of things. I know how to reason about those!". And then second order PA, because it's categorical, will tell me "great: since you know what a property is, here's what a natural number is". And that's something I can work with.

This was overly long-winded I think. But in other words, what I am basically advocating for is conceptualizing second order PA as a function from "notions of property" to "notions of the natural numbers". And because models of PA are unique up to isomorphism (in whatever (sufficiently powerful) meta-theory you formalize it in, not "from the outside" of course) this means you can take up SOPA as your definition of the natural numbers and then "lug it around with you" into whatever different foundational system or meta-theory you fancy. And when you lug it into the real world, where "properties" mean actual properties of things, you get the real, true natural numbers.

This is all purely philosophizing of course. But I think this is about the situation.

#math #navel gazing

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grendel was a alligater

Beowulf was from Florida, no doubt in my mind

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do you think if he saw this post he would believe me? like the internet would seem like magic to him, people today would seem like wizards and shit. so for all he knows i really was born in the 1700s maybe thats just how it is, for all he knows once he's seen the internet and shit. but i'm just guessing.

I too was born in the 1700s but unlike that sucker i didn't keel over. doesn't bode well for his crusty old books.

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ever had anubody such ur wiener?

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anyway what if he was "manual cunt"

I too was born in the 1700s but unlike that sucker i didn't keel over. doesn't bode well for his crusty old books.

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I too was born in the 1700s but unlike that sucker i didn't keel over. doesn't bode well for his crusty old books.

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OP how DARE you hide that cum in your penis

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Deeply dispiriting post: testimony from a DOJ antitrust action reveals the entire book publishing industry is celebrity memoirs, established franchise authors like James Patterson, children's books, Bibles, and back catalogues (e.g. Lord of the Rings). Publishing new authors is not even a rounding error; you get the sense it's only done anymore out of a vague sense of obligation, and the moment one of the Big Five decides on the defect strategy, and stops doing that to save a few more bucks, it will end entirely.

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finally starting this classic!

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Peeing like a state

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Tag yourself, i'm Asheliigynne

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It's really concerning how a lot of "leftists" on here don't even understand the importance of collecting all seven chaos emeralds for achieving socialism. Doctor Eggman will always protect the interests of capital due to his class position and it's ridiculous that some of you don't see this. And it's pretty much basic Marxism that only with the power of the emeralds can the vanguard party achieve Super Vanguard status and vanquish capitalism for good.