#Childrens Online Privacy Protection Act

[mostlysignssomeportents]

Go back to the top of this article and reread that transcript of Rep. Buddy Carter grilling TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew. Now, Carter is a dunderhead, but he’s dunderheaded in a way that illuminates just how bad COPPA enforcement is, and has been, for 25 long years.

Carter thinks that TikTok is using biometric features to enforce COPPA. He imagines that TikTok is doing some kind of high-tech phrenology to make sure that every user is over 13 (“I find that [you aren’t capturing facial images] hard to believe. It is our understanding that they’re looking at the eyes. How do you determine what age they are then?”).

Chew corrects the Congressdunderhead from Georgia, explaining that TikTok uses “age-gating”: “when you ask the user what age they are.”

That is the industry-wide practice for enforcing COPPA: every user is presented with a tick-box that says “I am over 13.” If they tick that box, the company claims it has satisfied the requirement not to spy on kids.

But if COPPA were meaningfully enforced, companies would simply have to stop spying on everyone, because there are no efficient ways to verify the age of users at the scale needed for general operation of a website.

-How To Make a Child-Safe TikTok: Have you tried not spying on kids?

#privacy #corruption #coppa #Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act #gdpr #general data protection regulation #iab #tiktok #rep buddy carter #Shou Chew #commercial surveillance #ad targeting #ads #ad-tech #cold war 2.0 #sinophobia #ireland #eu #european federalism #corporate crime jurisdictions #defund the (corporate) police #age-gating

[liquorstorebnuuy]

Hello UK lawmaker who I'm told is likely watching me, an American citizen, now, I hope the FBI, ATF, and DOD didn't get too many coffee stains on the documents now also on your corkboard linked by red string

#online safety act #uk #usa #patriot act #furry #lgbtq #whoops another freedom-restricting regulation #made under the superficial guise of protecting chilren #when in reality the only reason it's referred to as protecting children #so that people opposed to having their rights and privacy stripped and removed #look ambivilent or worse to the protection of children #except this time its a rule so extremely overreaching #that this UK law would force companies to enforce said law #on non-UK citizens across the world #or else risk losing acess to the UK market

[liminalweirdo]

HERE'S WHAT YOU CAN DO:

email, call, or write your reps (this is the most important one) — use this tool to find your reps HERE IS A TEMPLATE that you can pull from.

Here is the text used in the petition that you can pull from to include in your email/letter to your reps:

I’m writing to urge you to reject the Kids Online Safety Act, a misguided bill that would put vulnerable young people at risk. KOSA would fail to address the root issues related to kid’s safety online. Instead, it would endanger some of the most vulnerable people in our society while undermining human rights and children’s privacy. The bill would result in widespread internet censorship by pressuring platforms to use incredibly broad “content filters” and giving state Attorneys General the power to decide what content kids should and shouldn’t have access to online. This power could be abused in a number of ways and be politicized to censor information and resources. KOSA would also likely lead to the greater surveillance of children online by requiring platforms to gather data to verify user identity. There is a way to protect kids and all people online from egregious data abuse and harmful content targeting: passing a strong Federal data privacy law that prevents tech companies from collecting so much sensitive data about all of us in the first place, and gives individuals the ability to sue companies that misuse their data. KOSA, although well-meaning, must not move forward. Please protect privacy and stop the spread of censorship online by opposing KOSA.

Here is an open letter from parents of trans and GNC kids that you can also add your name to/ pull from in writing your own letter

sign this petition

#stop kosa #kosa #kids online safety act #transgender #queer #lgbtq+ #trans #nonbinary

[titleknown]

So, while I've talked about this in other posts, I figured I may as well compile it in one post with this nifty propaganda poster (more on that later)

Long story short, they're bringing back KOSA/the Kids Online Safety Act in the US Senate, and they're going to mark it up next Thursday as of the time of this post (4/23/2023).

If you don’t know, long story short KOSA is a bill that’s ostensibly one of those “Protect the Children” bills, but what it’s actually going to do is more or less require you to scan your fucking face every time you want to go on a website; or give away similarly privacy-violating information like your drivers’ license or credit card info. 

Either that or force them to censor anything that could even remotely be considered not “kid friendly.” Not to mention fundies are openly saying they’re gonna use this to hurt trans kids. Which is, uh, real fucking bad. 

As per usual, I urge you to contact your congresscritters, and especially those on the Commerce Committee, who'll likely be the ones marking it up.

Those senators are:

Maria Cantwell, Washington, Chair

Amy Klobuchar, Minnesota

Brian Schatz, Hawaii

Ed Markey, Massachusetts

Gary Peters, Michigan

Tammy Baldwin, Wisconsin

Tammy Duckworth, Illinois

Jon Tester, Montana

Kyrsten Sinema, Arizona

Jacky Rosen, Nevada

Ben Ray Luján, New Mexico

John Hickenlooper, Colorado

Raphael Warnock, Georgia

Peter Welch, Vermont

Ted Cruz, Texas, Ranking Member

John Thune, South Dakota

Roger Wicker, Mississippi

Deb Fischer, Nebraska

Jerry Moran, Kansas

Dan Sullivan, Alaska

Marsha Blackburn, Tennessee

Todd Young, Indiana

Ted Budd, North Carolina

Eric Schmitt, Missouri

J.D. Vance, Ohio

Shelley Moore Capito, West Virginia

Cynthia Lummis, Wyoming

Again, it doesn't work unless you do it en-masse, so make sure to call ASAP and tell them to kill this bill, and if they actually want a bill to allow/get sites to protect kids, the Federal Fair Access To Banking Act would be far better.

Also, this poster is officially, for the sake of spreading it, under a CC0 license. Feel free to spread it, remix it, add links to the bottom, edit it to be about the other bad internet bills they're pushing, use it as a meme format, do what you will but for gods' sake get the word out!

Also, shoutout to @o-hybridity for coming up with the slogan for the poster, couldn't have done it without 'em!

#poster #cc0 #creative commons #internet censorship #internet freedom #us politics #american politics #KOSA #kids online safety act #censorship #scary

[sunny-day-jack-official]

URGENT! Stop KOSA!

Hey all, this is BáiYù and Sauce here with something that isn't necessarily SnaccPop related, but it's important nonetheless. For those of you who follow US politics, The Kids Online Safety Act passed the Senate yesterday and is moving forward.

This is bad news for everyone on the internet, even outside of the USA.

What is KOSA?

While it's officially known as "The Kids Online Safety Act," KOSA is an internet censorship masquerading as another "protect the children" bill, much in the same way SESTA/FOSTA claimed that it would stop illegal sex trafficking but instead hurt sex workers and their safety. KOSA was originally introduced by Sen. Edward Markey, D-Mass. and Bill Cassidy, R-La. as a way to update the 1998 Children’s Online Privacy Act, raising the age of consent for data collection to 16 among other things. You can read the original press release of KOSA here, while you can read the full updated text of the bill on the official USA Congress website.

You can read the following articles about KOSA here:

EFF: The Kids Online Safety Act is Still A Huge Danger to Our Rights Online

CyberScoop: Children’s online safety bills clear Senate hurdle despite strong civil liberties pushback

TeenVogue: The Kids Online Safety Act Would Harm LGBTQ+ Youth, Restrict Access to Information and Community

The quick TL;DR:

KOSA authorizes an individual state attorneys general to decide what might harm minors

Websites will likely preemptively remove and ban content to avoid upsetting state attorneys generals (this will likely be topics such as abortion, queerness, feminism, sexual content, and others)

In order for a platform to know which users are minors, they'll require a more invasive age and personal data verification method

Parents will be granted more surveillance tools to see what their children are doing on the web

KOSA is supported by Christofascists and those seeking to harm the LGBTQ+ community

If a website holding personally identifying information and government documents is hacked, that's a major cybersecurity breach waiting to happen

What Does This Mean?

You don't have to look far to see or hear about the violence being done to the neurodivergent and LGBTQ+ communities worldwide, who are oftentimes one and the same. Social media sites censoring discussion of these topics would stand to do even further harm to folks who lack access to local resources to understand themselves and the hardships they face; in addition, the fact that websites would likely store personally identifying information and government documents means the death of any notion of privacy.

Sex workers and those living in certain countries already are at risk of losing their ways of life, living in a reality where their online activities are closely surveilled; if KOSA officially becomes law, this will become a reality for many more people and endanger those at the fringes of society even worse than it already is.

Why This Matters Outside of The USA

I previously mentioned SESTA/FOSTA, which passed and became US law in 2018. This bill enabled many of the anti-adult content attitudes that many popular websites are taking these days as well as the tightening of restrictions laid down by payment processors. Companies and sites hosted in the USA have to follow US laws even if they're accessible worldwide, meaning that folks overseas suffer as well.

What Can You Do?

If you're a US citizen, contact your Senators and tell them that you oppose KOSA. This can be as an email, letter, or phone call that you make to your state Senator.

For resources on how to do so, view the following links:

https://www.badinternetbills.com/#kosa

https://www.stopkosa.com/

https://linktr.ee/stopkosa

If you live outside of the US or cannot vote, the best thing you can do is sign the petition at the Stop KOSA website, alert your US friends about what's happening, and raise some noise.

Above all else, don’t panic. By staying informed by what’s going on, you can prepare for the legal battles ahead.

#stop KOSA #KOSA #censorship #us law #somethings wrong with sunny day jack #the groom of gallagher mansion #dachabo

[fullhalalalchemist]

it is 8/26/22 and all i can think about is the idea we might live to see the literal death of internet anonymity/privacy in the span of a few months because of AB2273 (California bill that might get passed into law by next week) and all be forced to upload our government ID's online since most social media companies are based out of Cali. lmao. and the fact that the bill wasn't even written by americans it was literally written by some random British royal and she paid the California legislative to sponsor the bill. what the fuck. oh and yes, they are playing this off as a "protecting the children" type BS. and yes, nearly every tech expert/internet/cybersecurity expert who's heard about this bill (and there's not many because it's a state law and not a federal law but it's an internet bill that will impact the entire web) is properly freaking the fuck out right now, as they should.

anyway, please call governor newsom (yes even if you dont live in Cali) and tell him to veto this horrible bill.

Phone: [phone]

call/email script posted under the cut

I am calling you today to urge you to vote NO on AB 2273, the California Age-Appropriate Design Code Act. Tech experts and internet safety experts are rightfully worried that this dangerous bill would end the free and open internet as we know it, as well as actively harm children.

It targets websites "accessed by kids", anyone under 18, which is every website on the internet. It's being sold as protecting privacy for kids, but it forces websites to verify everyone's ages, and the only way to do that is to submit your govt ID or scan your face to third-party sites. This will lead to warrantless surveillance of everyone. This is coming at a time where people are being charged with felonies for accessing abortion care online, and being fired for posting pro-LGBT content online. More surveillance will literally ruin people's lives and get people killed.

This will force websites to surveil everyone and kill encryption, and with increasing right-wing attacks on minorities, abortion, and LGBT, this could spell a death-sentence for people.

Professor Eric Goldman claims this law will destroy the entire internet, and he is right. We need privacy protection, but not like this. This destroys our privacy, our 1st amendment rights, and our human and civil rights. You can't block children from the internet, to protect them you need parental oversight, not governmental or private from companies.

VOTE NO on this bill if you care about privacy, the open internet, freedom, and stopping right-wing attacks on our democracy and human rights.

#ab 2273 #ab2273 #california #internet #earn it act #net neutrality #privacy

[n0vatsu]

Ok ik this isn’t smth I usually do but the internet is in danger and I need to take action

Recently KOSA has got its first pass and we need to stop it from becoming a law ppl r saying call or email your senators to oppose this bill and this is true but what if you’re asking what I don’t have one or what if I don’t live in USA or just can’t do anything since you are a minor well I am going to spread awareness of this petition so the people who are deciding this KOSA stuff can see this and possibly stop KOSA for good right now this petition only has around 10,000 signs and we need a lot more than that

“What is KOSA?”

KOSA aka online children safety act is a internet bill that claims that it will protect children from inappropriate stuff(18+ for ex) but actually It’s gonna end up banning all apps and sites that are “inappropriate” (tumblr for ex) and not only that it’s also gonna give your parents more access on what you are doing on the internet they are gonna view what sites you’ve been on and everything giving minors NO privacy on their phones for ex: you haven’t told your parents your part of the LGGTIA+ community welp this bill is gonna tell your parents that and you’re not ready yet

here is the petition

disclaimer: I did not started this petition I am just trying to spread awareness and attempt to save the internet

You could make a change, you could help stop KOSA and save the internet and save so many content creators from experience of this madness we won’t give up until KOSA is done for good remember anyone can take action to stop something that is wrong when either how to take a step is big or small

Here’s what I want you guys to do

1: sign the petition

2: reblog this post

3: tag your friends and get them to do the same thing

4: if you can, spread this petition (not this post) to other sites for ex: YouTube,Discord,TikTok, or whatever apps you use

5: do anything else that can spread this across the internet

repost this ik I said don’t repost my posts but this is an exception Idc just do whatever you can to spread this petition I am not losing everything over some dumb internet bill

-Tsutsujinothere

THIS IS NOT A JOKE KOSA WILL RUIN THE INTERNET!

#stop kosa #this is important and not a joke #Reblog this #important #you could save the internet #It’s not too late to take action #kosa bill

[mintpopz]

a brief post regarding KOSA.

KOSA (also known as Kids Online Safety Act) alongside others like it (such as the Online Safety Act in the UK, RESTRICT-IT, COPPA 2.0, etc.) Are planning to censor the internet. In particular, KOSA and Online Safety Act are very close to being passed through and made law.

Now, what do I mean when I say "censor the internet"? Well...

Under the guise of "Protecting children", these bigots trying to push the bill through congress want to censor LGBTQ+/queer content (including advice for trans and gay teenagers), abortion, gun violence, gore and violence, sexual/18+ content, suicide and depression help, and many more.

This bill also plans to effectively destroy free speech online, with the removal of end-to-end encryption. Furthermore, it also wants an ID for online posting and will reveal what kids are doing to their parents regardless. This would be extremely harmful especially for queer minors in the closet, or minors with abusive parents.

but what can YOU do to stop these bills?

You can Phone your senators, sign petitions, send emails, or spread the word through social media. We CANNOT let laws like KOSA and Online Safety Act censor queer people and destroy our queer cultures online. 2 senators have already disagreed with KOSA, one of them because of the phonecalls and feedback from people like US, which is proof that it's still worth fighting. the fight is far from over, but even the smallest of actions is one step closer to shutting this bill down. Both KOSA and Online Safety are in recess until September, so make this month count.

finally, here are some links to helpful sites/petitions and more information:

#aero talks #important #us politics #uk politics #kosa #stop kosa #online safety act #stop online safety act #fight for the future #lgbtqia

[cherryg]

The internet censorship is coming..(again)

There are two well known censorship bill known as KOSA and the EarnIt act.

These bills both promised that they will protect children but unfortunately these are misguided bills that says they’ll do something but then they will do the opposite or make things worse.

Both of these bills are serious threat to the LGBT community and will censor a lot of content especially there

the EarnItact will also get rid of NSFW content and deem it as illegal, and will also get rid of section 230

The KOSA act will let attorneys from Florida and Texas take control and decide what people could and could not watch and sue websites and anything they don’t like and will not protect children but mostly put many vulnerable teens and children at risk while going as far as to even censor important information like sex education, health issues, suicide prevention hotlines and many more

We have stopped these bills from passing before but the cofounder Richard Bluemenhal is clearly not giving up and trying hard and hard again to push these bills back on congress

Last year more than 90/100 human rights groups urged lawmakers and congress to not pass KOSA in the omnibus bill and it got shelved and the same then happened to Earn it last year on February/March

But now he is trying a third time,using and manipulating grieving parents and young people into supporting and lobbying his bills, whiles even accepting anti trans and LGBT groups into supporting his legislations. He’s trying to find any type of scandal a platform is currently facing and turn and twist it on behalf of his agendas.

He says he supports abortions and the LGBT community but his bills will censor those things he claims to support. He can’t have it both ways.

But he was stubborn enough to ignore every criticism and scrutiny he gets about the legislations, being childish and all.

Not to mention that they are also both privacy nightmares to everyone and globally too

That’s why it’s important that you call and email your representatives and lawmakers and urge them to drop Kosa and the earn it act

Let any human rights group you trust knows and tell anyone you trust about it weather it be a friend or family member.

For more information, click these links below ⬇️

You can also help us by joining our discord server on how to stop internet censorship

There also a petition made from Fightforfuture recently about the KOSA act

(Update # 2)

Hey guys I’m back to warn everyone about yet again another bad internet bill it’s called the safe tech act

This act is supported by 7 democratic senators including bluemenhal which is never a good sign with him when it comes to internet bills.

This is a misguided 230 reform and when reading it, all it shows is that these people have no understanding of 230 whatsoever.

It’s just another dangerous censorship bill that threatens everyone’s free speech. The creators claim that it’s won’t hurt free speech but it actually does and they do not understand how important 230 is in its current form right now!

Here is a good article explaining the safe tech act really well and why it’s dangerous :

Also talk to your representatives about this and why it’s bad and if you can, try to explain to them about why section 230 is important. Support digital advocacy, human rights and any other groups that supports free internet and expression and let them know about these legislators and their bad ideas!

Update 3

The EarnIt act is sadly coming back after failing two times, now they are trying a 3rd time.

This legislation is dangerous for privacy and free expression and speech. It will bring lots of surveillance and is just as bad as the restrict act.

https://act.eff.org/action/the-earn-it-act-is-back-seeking-to-scan-us-all

Now it’s being reintroduced by two senators and two representatives if you don’t know what this bill actually does there is more information about it here from these links : https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/earn-it-bill-back-again-seeking-scan-our-messages-and-photos

The second one is called KOSA (KidsOnlineSafteyAct),

now this bill has failed to pass last year because a lot of opposition from 90/100 human rights.

It claims it’s would protect kids but it’s actually has a lot of censorship and is very dangerous to lgbt/trans kids and many other kids that are in abusive households. It will actually hurt them instead of protecting them.

If that’s not bad enough it’s tragically gaining momentum and attraction by these child advocacy groups and being sponsored by Dove and Lizzo. And there has been petitions in supporting this unconstitutional bill, One of them having somewhere around 30k signs…

I really wish I could say I’m joking but this is sadly true.

If you want more info on KOSA here they are:

https://www.fightforthefuture.org/actions/censorship-wont-make-kids-safe/

Please everyone call your senators and representatives and tell them to oppose these bills. We really need help into fighting off these bill so we could keep a free opened internet!

#stop kosa #earn it act #im sorry #fuck censorship #net neutrality #lgbt rights #fight for your right #i’m so tired #trans rights #lgbtq #transgender #lgbt #safe tech act #section 230 #important #censorship #technology #politics #stop censorship #anti censorship #antifascism #government #congress #lgbtqia #activism #human rights

[mollyjimbly]

🚨🚨ATTENTION🚨🚨

Another Disgusting anti-LGBT bill, planning to censor queer content online.

Yet again another law that infringes on privacy. and anonymity.

The bill is KOSA

https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/1409

KOSA is a threat to LGBTQ+ youth.

It allows right-wing AGs to censor LGBTQ+ content in the name of "protecting kids".

This doesn't protect kids. This actually hurts kids even more.

It will snuff out LGBTQ+ spaces and makes the internet more of a dangerous place for them, more or less...

"Of course, like so many of these “bipartisan” anti-internet bills that have bipartisan support, the support on each side of the aisle is based on a very different view of how the bill will be used in practice. We went through this last year with the AICOA antitrust bill. Democrats supported it (falsely) believing that it would magically increase competition, while Republicans were gleefully talking about how they were going to use it to force websites to host their propaganda."

"Now, with KOSA, again you have Democrats naively (and incorrectly) believing that because it’s called the “Kids Online Safety Bill” it will magically protect children, even though tons of experts have made it clear it will actually put them at greater risk."

https://www.techdirt.com/2023/05/24/heritage-foundation-says-that-of-course-gop-will-use-kosa-to-censor-lgbtq-content/

KOSA will also undermine privacy in the name of "protecting children".

"This bill would effectively place many internet services behind an age verification wall, prevent anonymous surfing, and would require all users – adults or teens – to verify their age before they can access information or content.

The Computer & Communications Industry Association supports the enactment of comprehensive privacy legislation at the federal level, but has concerns about KOSA’s duty of care, vague requirements that would prevent teens from accessing critical information, and compliance provisions that conflict with current trends toward data minimization."

https://ccianet.org/news/2023/05/ccia-statement-on-unintended-consequences-of-kosa-legislation-would-place-most-internet-services-behind-age-verification-wall/

Age verification technology is just not secure enough for usage at the moment, leaks are likely to happen, it will be especially dangerous if the leaked Age verification information has a government ID linked to it. That would mean that malicious individuals may get a hold of personal addresses, bank details, basically you'll get doxxed by the government...

You may be asking, "well is there anything to do about it?"

Of course there is, but we really need your help spreading awareness around, because the bill is most likely to pass this July!

This website was put together by Fight for the Future. It has everything, from petitions to calls scripts. It's very easy to understand and use and one of the best links to spread. I urge you to use this when calling your members of congress. All you need to do is put in your phone number once and read off the script provided and it does the rest for you.

https://www.badinternetbills.com/

Signable petitions and open letters;

If you live in the states, call your state representatives;

Joinable Discord server;

More information;

I have to say again and I am not exaggerating, this is URGENT the bill could be passed THIS MONTH!

I am begging you, please OPPOSE KOSA!!

#long post but PLEASE READ!! #readable articles included under citations #lgbtq+ #lgbtqia #grimace shake #gay #lesbian #bisexual #pansexual #trans #nonbinary #asexual #aromantic #aroace #trans rights #transgender #mogai #neopronouns #gay rights #gen loss #hastune miku #genshin headcanons #honkai star rail #art #aesthetic #welcome home #pizza tower #fnaf movie #vocaloid #queer

[mostlysignssomeportents]

In 1998, Congress passed the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which prohibits online service providers from collecting the data of children under the age of 13 without parental consent.

COPPA is remarkable, first because it is one of the very, very few federal privacy guarantees enacted by Congress, an exclusive club whose founding member is the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, passed by Members of Congress panicked at the thought of video-store clerks leaking their porn rental histories.

But the other remarkable thing about COPPA is how poorly it is enforced.

In this regard, COPPA is very similar to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the EU’s 2016 landmark privacy law. The GDPR has many more moving parts than COPPA, as befits a general data-protection regulation, but at core, the GDPR seeks to incinerate the absurd fiction at the root of commercial surveillance: namely, that we “consent” to commercial surveillance by clicking “I agree” on long, unreadable terms of service.

Under the GDPR, companies that want to collect, sell or process your data need to explain themselves, clearly: they have to tell you what they’re collecting and how they plan on using it.

-How To Make a Child-Safe TikTok: Have you tried not spying on kids?

#privacy #corruption #coppa #Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act #gdpr #general data protection regulation #iab #tiktok #rep buddy carter #Shou Chew #commercial surveillance #ad targeting #ads #ad-tech #cold war 2.0 #sinophobia #ireland #eu #european federalism #corporate crime jurisdictions #defund the (corporate) police #age-gating

[anxiouscryptidpartner]

TLDR: KOSA will do more harm than good by censoring queer content and sex education. You can go here to contact your senators:

The long version:

In theory, the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) sounds good. Protecting children always does.

However, when you consider that states' Attorney Generals get to decide what is allowed, there is genuine concern that this bill could unintentionally limit young people's exposure to sex education and LGBTQ+ content. GLSEN, the American Association of School Librarians, Freedom Network USA, and over 90 other organizations have written a letter (https://cdt.org/insights/coalition-letter-on-privacy-and-free-expression-threats-in-kids-online-safety-act/) against this law.

According to Congress's website, there will be a committee meeting about KOSA this Thursday, July 27th, at 10am.

There is a link at the top of this post. Please go to it and contact your senators, by either letter, phone call, or both.

Image Description: A background of different hues of blue and stars. A frog is shown saying "The internet is for all!" Above it is green text that reads "Keep the internet accessible! Say no to KOSA!!!"

#kosa #anti kosa #call your reps #original content #keep the internet accessible #stop kosa #kids online safety act

[frostbitedoesart]

Hey! Do you have an original or fictional character that you'd really like to see get drawn?

Well, I'm giving out free bust shots in exchange for a couple of simple things.

For context, the Kid's Online Safety Act, or KOSA, is a bill meant to "protect children," by that I mean it will put the internet under heavy surveillance and censorship rules. What would be considered as dangerous for children would be completely determined by the government.

This is the government that has decided that conversations about race, sexuality, gender, and mental health are dangerous for kids. What does this mean, then?

It means that if you are a person of color, queer, or neurodivergent, this bill will do whatever it can to wipe you off the face of the internet.

Not only that, but people sixteen years of age or younger would be placed under HEAVY surveillance, which is an extreme breach of privacy.

If this bill passes, the internet will become operated like a fascist regime that hovers over children and completely censors the existence of anyone that isn't white, cishet, and neurotypical. We CANNOT let this happen.

All I ask of you is this: reblog this post, and DM me with proof that you've either signed all of the following petitions or have emailed your representatives. This costs you nothing except a little bit of your time.

Do this, and, as previously stated, I will draw you a bust shot of your original character or otherwise fictional character of your choice.

Here are some examples of what this art would look like:

This offer ends on Monday at 12 AM EST, the same day the bill goes to Senate to be discussed. All art will be completed and sent to the recipients by Monday evening.

#art #artists on tumblr #oc art #oc artwork #poc #people of color #queer #queer community #lgbt #lgbtq #lgbtq+ #neurodivergent #neurodivergent community #stop kosa #bad internet bills #internet censorship #internet freedom #internet #gay #lesbian #bisexual #pansexual #nonbinary #transgender #important #my art #traditional art #original character #illustration #frostbitedoesart

[alexthescaredenby]

i finished the KOSA

On the Subject of Safety 

Blaine/Alex Smith 

A paper on the harmful effects of the Kid’s Online Safety Act (informally known as KOSA) on the internet as a whole, as written by a minor. 

Censorship. Control. Tyranny. All of these will come to pass if we allow the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) to become law and cause the internet as we know it to cease to exist, completely and utterly. KOSA is a new bill that has been introduced by senators Blumenthal and Blackburn, which has the stated goal “to protect the safety of children on the internet” (found on the official website of the United States Congress, here.) This is either a lie, or an incredibly misguided attempt to do what it says it sets out to do. Though it is more likely a lie, or at the very least not the entire truth. First, I must note, if for no other reason than posterity and comprehensiveness, that the bill was introduced by both a Republican senator (Blackburn) and a Democratic senator (Blumenthal). It was also backed by twenty-one Democrats (Lujan, Baldwin, Klobuchar, Peters, Hickenlooper, Warner, Coons, Schatz, Murphy, Welch, Hassan, Durbin, Casey, Whitehouse, Kelly, Carper, Cardin, Menendez, Warren, Kaine, and Shaheen) and nineteen Republicans (Capito, Cassidy, Ernst, Daines, Rubio, Sullivan, Young, Grassley, Graham, Marshall, Hyde-Smith, Mullin, Risch, Britt, Lummis, Murkowski, Lankford, Crapo, and Hawley). That totals forty-two supporters of this heinous piece of legislature. Considering that there are one-hundred Senators, if you do some simple math, you will realize that fifty-eight Senators did not support KOSA. In the context of this monumental decision, that is a frighteningly close vote. If this bill were to pass, nearly all online fandom presence would be completely eradicated, and online privacy, as well as personal autonomy, would become nonexistent. And so, I say it again, KOSA supporters are just barely not the majority in the Senate, by a margin of sixteen individuals. Even though the rewrite of the bill is a slight improvement, at it’s core, KOSA is still a harmful internet censorship bill that will damage the very communities it claims to try protect. 

In this bill, a “child” is defined as any person under the age of thirteen, and a “minor” is defined as any person under the age of seventeen. A "parent” is defined as any legal adult who is the biological or adopted parent of a minor, or holds legal custody over a minor. “Compulsive usage” is defined as “any response stimulated by external factors that causes an individual to engage in repetitive behavior reasonably likely to cause psychological distress, loss of control, anxiety or depression”, “Covered platforms” are defined as “an online platform (i.e. Snapchat, Tumblr, Reddit, Twitter/X, Facebook, Instagram, etc.), online video game (i.e. Helldivers 2, Halo, Mario Kart, Civilization 6, etc.), messaging platform (i.e. Snapchat, 4chan, etc.), or video streaming service (i.e. Twitch, YouTube, etc.) that connects to the internet that is used, or is reasonably likely to be used, by a minor” with the exception of “an entity acting in its capacity of: a common carrier service subject to the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and all Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto, a broadband internet access service (as such term is defined for purposes of section 8.1(b) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation), an email service, a teleconferencing or video conferencing service that allows reception and transmission of audio and video signals for real-time communication, provided that it is not an online platform, including a social media service or social network; and the real-time communication is initiated using a unique link or identifier to facilitate access, or a wireless messaging service, including such a service provided through short messaging service or multimedia messaging service protocols, that is not a component of or linked to an online platform and where the predominant or exclusive function is direct messaging consisting of the transmission of text, photos or videos that are sent by electronic means, where messages are transmitted from the sender to a recipient, and are not posted within an online platform or publicly, an organization not organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members, any public or private institution of education, a library, a news platform where the inclusion of video content on the platform is related to the platform’s own gathering, reporting or publishing of news content or the website or app is not otherwise an online platform, a product or service the primarily functions as a business to business software or a VPN or similar service that exists solely to route internet traffic between locations. 

Geolocation is defined as “information sufficient to identify a street name and name of a city or town.” Individual-specific advertising to minors is defined as any form of targeted advertising towards a person who is or reasonably could be a minor, with the exception of advertising in the context of the website or app the advertising is present on, (i.e. an ad for Grammarly on a dictionary website), or for research on the effectiveness of the advertising. The rule of construction is stated to be that "no part of KOSA should be misconstrued to prohibit a lawfully operating entity from delivering content to any person that they know to be or reasonably believe is over the age of seventeen, provided that content is appropriate for the age of the person involved". To "know" something in the context of this bill is to have actual information, or to have information that is fairly implied or assumed under the basis of objective circumstances. A “mental health disorder” is defined as “a condition which causes a clinically significant disturbance or impairment on one’s cognition, emotional regulation, or behavior. “Online platform” is defined as any public platform that mainly provides a means of communication through the form of a public forum or private chatroom (i.e., Discord, Reddit, Tumblr, Twitter, TikTok, etc.). An “online video game” is defined as any video game or game-adjacent service, including those that provide an educational element, that allows users to create or upload content, engage in microtransactions, communicate with other users, or includes minor specific advertising (i.e., Happy Wheels, Adventure Academy, Meet Your Maker, etc.). “Personal data” is defined as any data or information that is linked or could reasonably be linked to a minor. A “personalized recommendation system (PRS)” is defined as any system that presents content to a user based on date and/or analytics from the user or similar users (i.e., a like-based system, a view-based system, a “for you” system, or a “people that watched also liked” system). Finally, “sexual exploitation or abuse” is defined as: coercion and enticement, as described in section 2422 of title 18, United States Code, child sexual abuse material, as described in sections 2251, 2252, 2252A, and 2260 of title 18, United States Code, trafficking for the production of images (child pornography), as described in section 2251A of title 18, United States Code, or sex trafficking of children, as described in section 1591 of title 18, United States Code. 

Before I continue with this paper, I would like to draw attention to the fact that nowhere in the defined terms does it define any form of physical, mental, or emotional violence towards minors, only sexual abuse or assault. This will become important later. 

Continuing with the bill, we arrive at the actual regulations, policies and laws proposed by the bill. Here begins Section 3 of the bill, or “Duty of care”. This section includes regulations on the online platform used by a minor, and the duties of it and its owner(s), creator(s), moderator(s), or manager(s). In this section, it is stated that a covered platform must, to the best of its reasonable ability, limit the following harms or dangers to any person who is known to be or reasonably believed to be a minor: 

Anxiety, depression, substance use disorders, suicidal disorders, and other similar conditions. 

Patterns of use that promote or encourage addiction-like behavior. 

Physical violence, online bullying, and harassment of the minor. 

Sexual exploitation or abuse. 

Promotion and marketing of narcotic drugs (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), tobacco products, gambling, or alcohol. 

Predatory, unfair, or deceptive marketing, or other financial harms. 

With the exception of: 

Any content that is deliberately, independently, and willingly requested or sought out by the minor. 

Any platform that provides resources or information to help mitigate the aforementioned harms to the minor. 

Again, I call attention to the fact that although physical violence is now mentioned and prohibited, it is done so by burying it in the middle of a wall of text. With as touchy of a subject as this is, one would think that more attention would be drawn to it. 

And now we get into the meat and potatoes of this rotten bill, with Section 4, or “Safeguards for minors”. In this section, it is stated that any covered platform shall provide any user who is known to be a minor or is reasonably believed to be a minor, with easy-to-use and readily accessible “safeguards” such as: 

Limiting the ability of other individuals to communicate with the minor. 

Restricting public access to the personal data of the minor. 

Limiting features that increase, sustain, or extend use of the covered platform by the minor, such as automatic playing of media, rewards for time spent on the platform, notifications, and other features that result in compulsive usage of the covered platform by the minor. 

Controlling personalized recommendation systems for the minor, and giving them the option to either opt out of the system entirely or to limit the types of content shown through the PRS. 

Restricting the sharing of GPS data of the minor sufficient for geolocation. 

As well as the options for the minor: 

Delete the account of the minor, as well as any data or content associated with the account, effectively removing any trace of the account’s existence from the platform, and the internet at large. 

Limit the amount of time spent on the platform. 

A covered platform shall also provide parents with the following tools: 

Requirements: 

The ability to manage a minor’s privacy and account settings, including the safeguards and options established under subsection (a), in a manner that allows parents to: 

View the privacy and account settings of the minor. 

In the case of a user that the platform knows is a child, change and control the privacy and account settings of the account of the minor. 

Restrict purchases and financial transactions by the minor, where applicable. 

View metrics of total time spent on the platform and restrict time spent on the covered platform by the minor. 

The bill also states that any minor(s) affected by the aforementioned systems should be given clear, prompt, and easily understood and accessible notice of if the systems have been applied, in what capacity they are applied in, and how they are applied.  

Default Tools: 

A covered platform shall provide the following tools and systems to both minor and parent(s) of that minor, and have them be enabled by default: 

A reporting mechanism, which is readily available and easily accessible and useable, to report any incidents or crimes involving the minor(s), as well as confirmation that such a report is received, and the means to track it. 

To respond to the report in a timely and appropriate manner, within a reasonable timeframe. 

An understanding and appreciation of the fact that a reasonable timeframe is: 

(A) 10 days (about 1 and a half weeks) after the receipt of a report, if, for the most recent calendar year, the platform averaged more than 10,000,000 active users monthly in the United States. 

(B) 21 days (about 3 weeks) after the receipt of a report, if, for the most recent calendar year, the platform averaged less than 10,000,000 active users monthly in the United States. 

(C) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), if the report involves an imminent threat to the safety of a minor, as promptly as needed to address the reported threat to safety. 

Accessibility : 

With respect to the aforementioned safeguards, a covered platform shall provide: 

Information and control options in a clear and conspicuous manner that takes into consideration the differing ages, capacities, and developmental needs of the minors most likely to access the covered platform and does not encourage minors or parents to weaken or disable safeguards or parental controls. 

Readily accessible and easy-to-use controls to enable or disable safeguards or parental controls, as appropriate. 

Information and control options in the same language, form, and manner as the covered platform provides the product or service used by minors and their parents. 

The bill also states that no part of the previous statements should be construed to prohibit or prevent a covered platform from blocking, banning, filtering, flagging, or deleting content inappropriate for minors from their platform, or to prevent general management of spam, as well as security risks. It also states that regarding PRSs, it shall be illegal for a covered platform to alter or distort any analytics or data gathered from their platform with the purpose of limiting user autonomy. Also included in this section is that no part of KOSA shall be construed to require the disclosure of a minor’s personal data, including search history, contacts, messages, and location. Also stated is that a PRS for a minor is allowed under the condition that it only uses data publicly available, such as the language the minor speaks, or the minor’s age, and that covered platforms are allowed to integrate third-party systems into their platform, if they meet the requirements laid out in the bill. 

And now our train arrives at Section 5, “Disclosure”. This section includes rules regarding the disclosure of policies, rules, and terms to a user that is a minor or is reasonably believed to be a minor prior to their registration with a covered platform. 

Registration or Purchase: 

Prior to registration or purchase of a covered platform, the platform must provide clear and easily understood information on the policies of the platform, its rules, regulations, etc. As well as any PRS used by the platform, and information on how to turn it and the parental controls on and off. 

Notification: 

Notice and Acknowledgement, Reasonable Effort, and Consolidated Notices: 

In the case of an individual that a covered platform knows is a child, the platform shall additionally provide information about the parental tools and safeguards required under section 4 to a parent of the child and obtain verifiable parental consent (as defined in section 1302(9) of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 6501(9))) from the parent prior to the initial use of the covered platform by the child. 

A covered platform shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirement described in subparagraph (A) if the covered platform is in compliance with the requirements of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.) to use reasonable efforts (taking into consideration available technology) to provide a parent with the information and to obtain verifiable parental consent as required. 

A covered platform may consolidate the process for providing information under this subsection and obtaining verifiable parental consent or the consent of the minor involved (as applicable) as required under this subsection with its obligations to provide relevant notice and obtain verifiable parental consent under the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.). 

Guidance: the FTC may assist covered platforms with compliance with the rules and regulations in this section. 

A covered platform that operates a personalized recommendation system shall set out in its terms and conditions, in a clear, conspicuous, and easy-to-understand manner: 

An overview of how such personalized recommendation system is used by the covered platform to provide information to users of the platform who are minors, including how such systems use the personal data of minors; and 

Information about options for minors or their parents to opt out of or control the personalized recommendation system (as applicable). 

Advertising and Marketing Information and Labels: 

A covered platform that facilitates advertising aimed at users that the platform knows are minors shall provide clear, conspicuous, and easy-to-understand information and labels to minors on advertisements regarding: 

The name of the product, service, or brand and the subject matter of an advertisement; 

If the covered platform engages in individual-specific advertising to minors, why a particular advertisement is directed to a specific minor, including material information about how the minor's personal data is used to direct the advertisement to the minor; and 

Whether media displayed to the minor is an advertisement or marketing material, including disclosure of endorsements of products, services, or brands made for commercial consideration by other users of the platform. 

Resources for Parents and Minors: 

A covered platform shall provide to minors and parents clear, conspicuous, easy-to-understand, and comprehensive information in a prominent location regarding: 

Its policies and practices with respect to personal data and safeguards for minors. 

How to access the safeguards and tools required under section four. 

Resources in Additional Languages: 

A covered platform shall ensure, to the extent practicable, that the disclosures required by this section are made available in the same language, form, and manner as the covered platform provides any product or service used by minors and their parents. 

That concludes Section 5, and now our next stop is Section 6: “Transparency”. This section includes protocols for public transparency for covered platforms, including public reports on the status of potential harm to minors on their platforms.  

Scope of Application: the requirements of this section shall apply to a covered platform if: 

For the most recent calendar year, the platform averaged more than 10,000,000 active users monthly in the United States. 

The platform predominantly provides a community forum for user-generated content and discussion, including sharing videos, images, games, audio files, discussion in a virtual setting, or other content, such as acting as a social media platform, virtual reality environment, or a social network service. 

Transparency: The public reports required of a covered platform under this section shall include: 

An assessment of the extent to which the platform is likely to be accessed by minors; 

A description of the commercial interests of the covered platform in use by minors; 

An accounting, based on the data held by the covered platform, of: 

The number of individuals using the covered platform reasonably believed to be minors in the United States; 

The median and mean amounts of time spent on the platform by minors in the United States who have accessed the platform during the reporting year on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis; and 

The amount of content being accessed by individuals that the platform knows to be minors that is in English, and the top 5 non-English languages used by individuals accessing the platform in the United States; 

An accounting of total reports received regarding, and the prevalence (which can be based on scientifically valid sampling methods using the content available to the covered platform in the normal course of business) of content related to, the harms described in section 3, disaggregated by category of harm and language, including English and the top five non-English languages used by individuals accessing the platform from the United States. 

A description of any material breaches of parental tools or assurances regarding minors, representations regarding the use of the personal data of minors, and other matters regarding non-compliance. 

Reasonably Foreseeable Risk of Harm to Minors: the public reports required of covered platforms under this section shall include: 

An assessment of the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to minors posed by the covered platform, including identifying any other physical, mental, developmental, or financial harms. 

An assessment of how personalized recommendation systems and individual-specific advertising to minors can contribute to harm to minors. 

A description of whether and how the covered platform uses system design features that increase, sustain, or extend use of a product or service by a minor, such as automatic playing of media, rewards for time spent, and notifications. 

A description of whether, how, and for what purpose the platform collects or processes categories of personal data that may cause reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to minors. 

An evaluation of the efficacy of safeguards for minors under section 4, and any issues in delivering such safeguards and the associated parental tools. 

An evaluation of any other relevant matters of public concern over risk of harm to minors. 

 An assessment of differences in risk of harm to minors across different English and non-English languages and efficacy of safeguards in those languages. 

Mitigation: The public reports required of a covered platform under this section shall include, for English and the top 5 non-English languages used by individuals accessing the platform from the United States: 

A description of the safeguards and parental tools available to minors and parents on the covered platform. 

A description of interventions by the covered platform when it had or has reason to believe that harms to minors could occur. 

A description of the prevention and mitigation measures intended to be taken in response to the known and emerging risks identified in its assessment of system risks, including steps taken to: 

Prevent harm to minors, including adapting or removing system design features or addressing through parental controls. 

Provide the most protective level of control over privacy and safety by default. 

Adapt recommendation systems to mitigate reasonably foreseeable risk of harms to minors. 

A description of internal processes for handling reports and automated detection mechanisms for harms to minors, including the rate, timeliness, and effectiveness of responses. 

The status of implementing prevention and mitigation measures identified in prior assessments. 

A description of the additional measures to be taken by the covered platform to address the circumvention of safeguards for minors and parental tools. 

Reasonable Inspection: when conducting an inspection on the systemic risk of harm to minors on their platforms under this section, a covered platform shall: 

Consider the function any PRS on their platform. 

Consult relevant parties with authority on topics relevant to the inspection. 

Conduct their research based on experiences of minors using the platform that the study is being conducted on, including reports and information provided by law enforcement. 

Take account of outside research, but not outside data for the study itself. 

Consider any implied, indicated, inferred, or known information on the age of users. 

Consider the presence of both English and non-English speaking users on their platform. 

Cooperation With Independent, Third Pary Audit: To facilitate the report required by this section, a covered platform shall: 

Provide directly or otherwise make accessible to the third party conducting the audit all: 

Information and data that the platform has the access and authority to disclose that are relevant to the audit. 

Platforms, systems and assets that the platform has the access and authority to disclose that are relevant to the audio. 

Facts relevant to the audit, unaltered and correctly and fully represented. 

Privacy Safeguards: In this subsection, the term “de-identified” means data that does not identify and is not linked or reasonably linkable to a device that is linked or reasonably linkable to an individual, regardless of whether the information is aggregated. In issuing the public reports required under this section, a covered platform shall take steps to safeguard the privacy of its users, including ensuring that data is presented in a de-identified, aggregated format such that it is reasonably impossible for the data to be linked back to any individual user. A covered platform must also present or publish the information on a publicly available and accessible webpage. 

And now the next stop on our tour is Section 7: Independent Research on Social Media and Minors. This section details the interactions between the FTC and the National Academy of Sciences in the months following the passing of this bill, if and when it passes. It states that the FTC is to seek to enter a contract with the Academy, in which the Academy is to conduct no less that 5 separate independent scientific studies on the risk of harms to minors on social media, addressing: 

Anxiety, depression, eating and suicidal disorders. 

Substance use (drugs, narcotics, alcohol, etc.) and gambling. 

Sexual exploitation and abuse. 

Addiction like behaviors leading to compulsive usage. 

Additional Study: after at least 4 years since the passing of the bill, the FTC and the Academy shall enter another contract, in which the Academy shall conduct another study on the above topics, to provide more up to data information.  

Content of Reports: The comprehensive studies and reports conducted pursuant to this section shall seek to evaluate impacts and advance understanding, knowledge, and remedies regarding the harms to minors posed by social media and other online platforms and may include recommendations related to public policy. 

Active Studies: If the Academy is already engaged in any extant studies regarding the topics described above, it may base the studies required of this section off said study, if it is otherwise compliant. 

Collaboration: In conducting the studies required under this section, the FTC, National Academy of Sciences, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consult with the Surgeon General and the Kids Online Safety Council (KOSC). 

Access to Data: The FTC may issue orders to covered platforms to gather and compile data and information needed for the studies required under this section, as well as issue orders under section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 46(b)) to no more than 5 covered platforms per study under this section. Pursuant to subsections (b) and (f) of section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 46), the FTC shall also enter in agreements with the National Academy to share appropriate information received from a covered platform pursuant to an order under such subsection (b) for a comprehensive study under this section in a confidential and secure manner, and to prohibit the disclosure or sharing of such information by the National Academy. 

Next is a short Section 8: Market Research.  

Market Research by Covered Platforms: The FTC, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall issue guidance for covered platforms seeking to conduct market- and product-focused research on minors. Such guidance shall include: 

A standard consent form that provides minors and their parents a clear, conspicuous, and easy-to-understand explanation of the scope and purpose of the research to be conducted, and provides an opportunity for informed consent in the language in which the parent uses the covered platform; and 

Recommendations for research practices for studies that may include minors, disaggregated by the age ranges of 0-5, 6-9, 10-12, and 13-16. 

The FTC shall issue such guidance no later than 18 months (about 1 and a half years) after the date of enactment of this Act. In doing so, they shall seek input from members of the public and the representatives of the KOSC established under section 12.  

As we pull off interstate 8 we come into Section 9: Age Verification Study and Report. This is where the writers evidently started pounding shots of tequila at their desks, as some of the regulations in this section are completely asinine. Here we are told about a mandatory age verification system. Gone will be the days of being born in 1427 as a kid, now our age will be known to any covered platform. Is that what you want? 

Study: The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, in coordination with the FCC, FTC, and the SoC, shall conduct a study evaluating the most technologically feasible methods and options for developing systems to verify age at the device or operating system level. 

Such study shall consider: 

The benefits of creating a device or operating system level age verification system. 

What information may need to be collected to create this type of age verification system. 

The accuracy of such systems and their impact or steps to improve accessibility, including for individuals with disabilities. 

How such a system or systems could verify age while mitigating risks to user privacy and data security and safeguarding minors' personal data, emphasizing minimizing the amount of data collected and processed by covered platforms and age verification providers for such a system. 

The technical feasibility, including the need for potential hardware and software changes, including for devices currently in commerce and owned by consumers. 

The impact of different age verification systems on competition, particularly the risk of different age verification systems creating barriers to entry for small companies. 

Report: No later than 1 year after the passing of KOSA, the agencies described in subsection (a) shall submit a report containing the results of the study conducted under such subsection to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. 

Section 10: Guidance. 

No later than 18 months (about 1 and a half years) after the date of enactment of this Act, the FTC, in consultation with the KOSC established under section 12, shall issue guidance to: 

Provide information and examples for covered platforms and auditors regarding the following, with consideration given to differences across English and non-English languages: 

Identifying features used to increase, sustain, or extend use of the covered platform by a minor (compulsive usage). 

Safeguarding minors against the possible misuse of parental tools. 

Best practices in providing minors and parents the most protective level of control over privacy and safety. 

Using indicia or inferences of age of users for assessing use of the covered platform by minors. 

Methods for evaluating the efficacy of safeguards; and 

Providing additional control options that allow parents to address the harms described in section 3. 

Outline conduct that does not have the purpose or substantial effect of subverting or impairing user autonomy, decision-making, or choice, or of causing, increasing, or encouraging compulsive usage for a minor, such as: 

Minute user interface changes derived from testing consumer preferences, including different styles, layouts, or text, where such changes are not done with the purpose of weakening or disabling safeguards or parental controls, such as the following, are exceptions to this: 

Algorithms or data outputs outside the control of a covered platform. 

The establishing of default settings that provide enhanced privacy protection to users or otherwise enhance their autonomy and decision-making ability. 

Guidance to Schools: No later than 18 months (about 1 and a half years) after the date of enactment of this act, the SoE, in consultation with the FTC and the KOSC established under section 12, shall issue guidance to assist to assist elementary and secondary schools in using the notice, safeguards and tools provided under this Act and providing information on online safety for students and teachers. 

Guidance on Knowledge Standards: No later than 18 months (about 1 and a half years) after the date of enactment of this act, the FTC shall issue guidance to provide information, including best practices and examples, for covered platforms to understand the Commission’s determination of whether a covered platform “had knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances” for purposes of this act. 

Limitation on FTC Guidance: No guidance issued by the FTC with respect to this act shall: 

Confer any rights on any person, State, or locality; or 

Operate to bind the FTC or any person to the approach recommended in such guidance. 

Enforcement Actions: In any enforcement action made to a covered platform in violation of this act, the FTC: 

Shall allege a violation of this act. 

May not base such enforcement action on, or execute a consent order based on, practices that are alleged to be inconsistent with guidance issued by the FTC with respect to this aact, unless the practices are alleged to violate a provision of this act. 

And now we’re almost on the home stretch, with Section 11, otherwise known as Enforcement. This section outlines, you guessed it, the enforcement of this act. 

Enforcement by the FTC: 

Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices: A violation of this act shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 

Powers of the Commission: The FTC shall enforce this act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this act. 

Privileges and Immunities: Any person that violates this act shall be subject to the penalties, and entitled to the privileges and immunities, provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.). 

Authority Preserved: Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit the authority of the FTC under any other provision of law. 

Enforcement by State Attorney General: 

Civil Actions: In any case in which the attorney general of a State has reason to believe that an interest of the residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely affected by the engagement of any person in a practice that violates this act, the State, as parens patrie (de facto parent of any citizens unable to defend themselves) , may bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of the State in a district court of the United States or a State court of appropriate jurisdiction to: 

Enjoin that practice. 

Enforce compliance with this act. 

On behalf of residents of the State, obtain damages, restitution, or other compensation, each of which shall be distributed in accordance with State law. 

Obtain such other relief as the court may consider to be appropriate. 

Notice: Before filing an action, the attorney general of the State involved shall provide to the Commission: 

Written notice of that action. 

A copy of the complaint for that action. 

Exemption: Clause (i) shall not apply with respect to the filing of an action by an attorney general of a State under this paragraph if the attorney general of the State determines that it is not feasible to provide the notice described in that clause before the filing of the action. 

Notification: In an action described in subclause (I), the attorney general of a State shall provide notice and a copy of the complaint to the Commission at the same time as the attorney general files the action. 

Intervention: On receiving notice, the Commission shall have the right to intervene in the action that is the notice's subject. 

Effect of Intervention: If the Commission intervenes in an action under paragraph (1), it shall have the right: 

To be heard with respect to any matter that arises in that action. 

To file a petition for appeal. 

Construction: For purposes of bringing any civil action under paragraph (1), nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent an attorney general of a State from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of that State to: 

Conduct investigations; 

Administer oaths or affirmations. 

Compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence. 

Actions by the Commission: In any case in which an action is instituted by or on behalf of the Commission for violation of this act, no State may, during the pendency of that action, institute a separate action under paragraph (1) against any defendant named in the complaint in the action instituted by or on behalf of the Commission for that violation. 

Venue; Service of Progress: 

Venue: Any action brought under paragraph (1) may be brought in either: 

The district court of the United States that meets applicable requirements relating to venue under section 1391 of title 28, United States Code. 

A State court of competent authority. 

Service of Progress: In an action brought under paragraph (1) in a district court of the United States, process may be served wherever the defendant: 

Is an inhabitant. 

May be found. 

And now we are going to hear about the Kids Online Safety Council we’ve been hearing so much about in the last few sections in Section 12: Kids Online Safety Council. 

Establishment: No later than 180 days (about 6 months) after the enactment date of this act, the Secretary of Commerce shall establish and convene the Kids Online Safety Council to provide advice on matters related to this act. 

The Kids Online Safety Council shall include diverse participation from: 

Academic experts, health professionals, and members of civil society with expertise in mental health, substance use disorders, and the prevention of harm to minors. 

Representatives in academia and civil society with specific expertise in privacy and civil liberties. 

Parents and youth representation. 

Representatives of covered platforms. 

Representatives of the NTIA, the NIST, the FTC, the DoJ, and the DHHS. 

(6) State attorneys general or their designees acting in State or local government. 

Educators. 

Representatives of communities of socially disadvantaged individuals (as defined in section 8 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637)). 

Activities: The matters to be addressed by the Kids Online Safety Council shall include: 

Identifying emerging or current risks of harm to minors associated with online platforms. 

Recommending measures and methods for assessing, preventing, and mitigating harms to minors online. 

Recommending methods and themes for conducting research regarding online harms to minors, including in English and non-English languages. 

Recommending best practices and clear, consensus-based technical standards for transparency reports and audits, as required under this a ct, including methods, criteria, and scope to promote overall accountability. 

And now for Section 13, Filter Bubble Transparency Requirements. Almost to the end! 

Definitions: In this section: 

The term “algorithmic ranking system” means a computational process, including one derived from algorithmic decision-making, machine learning, statistical analysis, or other data processing or artificial intelligence techniques, used to determine the selection, order, relative prioritization, or relative prominence of content from a set of information that is provided to a user on a covered internet platform, including the ranking of search results, the provision of content recommendations, the display of social media posts, or any other method of automated content selection. 

The term “approximate geolocation information” means information that identifies the location of an individual, but with a precision of less than 5 miles. 

The term “Commission” means the Federal Trade Commission. 

The term “connected device” means an electronic device that: 

Can connect to the internet, either directly or indirectly through a network, to communicate information in the direction of an individual. 

Has computer processing capabilities for collecting, sending, receiving, or analyzing data. 

Is primarily designed for or marketed to consumers. 

Covered Internet Platform: The term “covered internet platform” means any public-facing website, internet application, or mobile application, including a social network site, video sharing service, search engine, or content aggregation service. Such term shall not include a platform that: 

Is wholly owned, controlled, and operated by a person that: 

For the most recent 6-month period, did not employ more than 500 employees. 

For the most recent 3-year period, averaged less than $50,000,000 in annual gross revenue. 

Collects or processes on an annual basis the user-specific data of less than 1,000,000 users (about the population of Delaware) or is operated for the sole purpose of conducting research that is not made for profit either directly or indirectly. 

Input Transparent Algorithm: The term “input-transparent algorithm” means an algorithmic ranking system that does not use the user-specific data of a user to determine the selection, order, relative prioritization, or relative prominence of information that is furnished to such user on a covered internet platform, unless the user-specific data is expressly provided to the platform by the user for such purpose. 

Data Provided for Express Purpose of Interaction with Platform For purposes of subparagraph (A), user-specific data that is provided by a user for the express purpose of determining the selection, order, relative prioritization, or relative prominence of information that is furnished to such user on a covered internet platform: 

Shall include user-supplied search terms, filters, speech patterns (if provided for the purpose of enabling the platform to accept spoken input or selecting the language in which the user interacts with the platform), saved preferences, and the current precise geolocation information that is supplied by the user. 

Shall include the user's current approximate geolocation information. 

Shall include data affirmatively supplied to the platform by the user that expresses the user's desire to receive particular information, such as the social media profiles the user follows, the video channels the user subscribes to, or other content or sources of content on the platform the user has selected. 

Shall NOT include the history of the user's connected device, including the user's history of web searches and browsing, previous geographical locations, physical activity, device interaction, and financial transactions. 

Shall NOT include inferences about the user or the user's connected device, without regard to whether such inferences are based on data described in clause (i) or (iii). 

Opaque Algorithm: The term “opaque algorithm” means an algorithmic ranking system that determines the selection, order, relative prioritization, or relative prominence of information that is furnished to such user on a covered internet platform based, in whole or part, on user-specific data that was not expressly provided by the user to the platform for such purpose. 

Exception for Age-Appropriate Content Filtering: Such term shall not include an algorithmic ranking system used by a covered internet platform if: 

The only user-specific data (including inferences about the user) that the system uses is information relating to the age of the user. 

Such information is only used to restrict a user's access to content on the basis that the individual is not old enough to access such content (i.e., not allowing a 13-year-old to access pornography). 

Precise Geolocation Information: The term “precise geolocation information” means geolocation information that identifies an individual’s location to within a range of 5 miles or less. 

Search Syndication Contract, Upstream Provider, Downstream Provider: 

The term “search syndication contract” means a contract or subcontract for the sale of, license of, or other right to access an index of web pages or search results on the internet for the purpose of operating an internet search engine. 

The term “upstream provider” means, with respect to a search syndication contract, the person that grants access to an index of web pages or search results on the internet to a downstream provider pursuant to the contract. 

The term “downstream provider” means, with respect to a search syndication contract, the person that receives access to an index of web pages on the internet from an upstream provider under such contract. 

User Specific Data: The term “user-specific data” means information relating to an individual or a specific connected device that would not necessarily be true of every individual or device. 

Requirement to Allow Users to View Unaltered Content on Internet Platforms: Beginning on the date that is 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, it shall be illegal: 

For any person to operate a covered internet platform that uses an opaque algorithm unless the person complies with the opaque algorithm requirements. 

For any upstream provider to grant access to an index of web pages on the internet under a search syndication contract that does not comply with the requirements of paragraph (3). 

Opaque Algorithm Requirements: The requirements of this paragraph with respect to a person that operates a covered internet platform that uses an opaque algorithm are the following: 

The person provides notice to users of the platform: 

That the platform uses an opaque algorithm that uses user-specific data to select the content the user sees. Such notice shall be presented in a clear, conspicuous manner on the platform whenever the user interacts with an opaque algorithm for the first time and may be a one-time notice that can be dismissed by the user. 

In the terms and conditions of the covered internet platform, in a clear, accessible, and easily comprehensible manner to be updated no less frequently than once every 6 months: 

The most salient features, inputs, and parameters used by the algorithm. 

How any user-specific data used by the algorithm is collected or inferred about a user of the platform, and the categories of such data. 

Any options that the covered internet platform makes available for a user of the platform to opt out or exercise options under clause (ii), modify the profile of the user or to influence the features, inputs, or parameters used by the algorithm. 

Any quantities, such as time spent using a product or specific measures of engagement or social interaction, that the algorithm is designed to optimize, as well as a general description of the relative importance of each quantity for such ranking. 

The person makes available a version of the platform that uses an input-transparent algorithm and enables users to easily switch between the version of the platform that uses an opaque algorithm and the version of the platform that uses the input-transparent algorithm. 

Exceptions for Certain Downstream Providers: Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to an internet search engine if: 

The search engine is operated by a downstream provider with fewer than 1,000 employees. 

The search engine uses an index of web pages on the internet to which such provider received access under a search syndication contract. 

Search Syndication Contract Requirements: The requirements of this paragraph with respect to a search syndication contract are that: 

As part of the contract, the upstream provider makes available to the downstream provider the same input-transparent algorithm used by the upstream provider for purposes of complying with paragraph (2)(A)(ii). 

The upstream provider does not impose any additional costs, degraded quality, reduced speed, or other constraint on the functioning of such algorithm when used by the downstream provider to operate an internet search engine relative to the performance of such algorithm when used by the upstream provider to operate an internet search engine. 

Prohibition on Differential Pricing: A covered internet platform shall not deny, charge different prices or rates for, or condition the provision of a service or product to an individual based on the individual’s election to use a version of the platform that uses an input-transparent algorithm as provided under paragraph (2)(A)(ii). 

Enforcement by FTC: 

Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: A violation of this section by an operator of a covered internet platform shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)). 

Powers of Commision: Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the FTC shall enforce this section in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this section. 

Privileges and Immunities: Except as provided in subparagraph (C), any person who violates this Act shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.). 

Common Carriers and Nonprofit Institutions: Notwithstanding section 4, 5(a)(2), or 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44, 45(a)(2), 46) or any jurisdictional limitation of the Commission, the Commission shall also enforce this act, in the same manner provided in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, with respect to: 

Common carriers subject to the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto 

Organizations are not organized to carry on business for their own profit or that of their members. 

Authority Preserved: Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Commission under any other provision of law. 

Rule of Application: Section 11 shall not apply to this section. 

Rule of Construction to Preserve Personal Blocks: Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or prohibit a covered internet platform’s ability to, at the direction of an individual user or group of users, restrict another user from searching for, finding, accessing, or interacting with such user’s or group’s account, content, data, or online community. 

Skipping over Section 14, as it is incredibly short (don’t worry, it’s one line, and I’ll say it at the end), we arrive at Section 15, or “Rules of Construction and Other Matters”. 

Relationships to Other Laws: Nothing in this Act shall be construed to: 

Preempt section 444 of the General Education Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1232g (about 2.72 lb), commonly known as the “Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974”) or other Federal or State laws governing student privacy. 

Preempt the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (15 U.S.C. 6501 et seq.) or any rule or regulation promulgated under such Act. 

Authorize any action that would conflict with section 18(h) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(h)). 

Fairly Implied on the Basis of Objective Circumstances: For purposes of enforcing this act, in making a determination as to whether covered platform has knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that a user is a minor, the FTC shall rely on competent and reliable empirical evidence, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, including consideration of whether the operator, using available technology, exercised reasonable care. 

Protections for Privacy: Nothing in this act shall be construed to require: 

The affirmative collection of any personal data with respect to the age of users that a covered platform is not already collecting in the normal course of business. 

A covered platform to implement an age gating or age verification functionality. 

Compliance: Nothing in this act shall be construed to restrict a covered platform's ability to: 

Cooperate with law enforcement agencies regarding activity that the covered platform reasonably and in good faith believes may violate Federal, State, or local laws, rules, or regulations. 

Comply with a civil, criminal, or regulatory inquiry or any investigation, subpoena, or summons by Federal, State, local, or other government authorities. 

Investigate, establish, exercise, respond to, or defend against legal claims. 

Application to Video Streaming Services: A video streaming service shall be deemed to be in compliance with this act if it predominantly consists of news, sports, entertainment, or other video programming content that is preselected by the provider and not user-generated, and: 

Any chat, comment, or interactive functionality is provided incidental to, directly related to, or dependent on provision of such content. 

If such video streaming service requires account owner registration and is not predominantly news or sports, the service includes the capability: 

To limit a minor’s access to the service, which may utilize a system of age-rating. 

To limit the automatic playing of on-demand content selected by a personalized recommendation system for an individual that the service knows is a minor. 

To provide an individual that the service knows is a minor with readily-accessible and easy-to-use options to delete an account held by the minor and delete any personal data collected from the minor on the service, or, in the case of a service that allows a parent to create a profile for a minor, to allow a parent to delete the minor’s profile, and to delete any personal data collected from the minor on the service. 

For a parent to manage a minor’s privacy and account settings, and restrict purchases and financial transactions by a minor, where applicable. 

To provide an electronic point of contact specific to matters described in this paragraph. 

To offer clear, conspicuous, and easy-to-understand notice of its policies and practices with respect to personal data and the capabilities described in this paragraph. 

When providing on-demand content, to employ measures that safeguard against serving advertising for narcotic drugs (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), tobacco products, gambling, or alcohol directly to the account or profile of an individual that the service knows is a minor. 

And finally, we arrive at Section 16, the last Section, combined with Section 14, which I glossed over earlier. If any part of this act is deemed obsolete, ineffective, or unnecessary at any point in time, it may be removed from the act without any effect to the rest of it. Unless otherwise specified, all regulations in this act shall come into effect 18 months (about 1 and a half years) after the passing of this bill. 

As you can see, this bill makes an impressive amount of sense, and if it were simply used as intended, it would be wonderful. However, because we can never have nice things, legislators, politicians, and the common public have twisted this bill, warping it to serve their selfish desires. Firstly, Senator Blackburn, one of the people behind this whole thing, blatantly said to a camera that she was going to “use KOSA to protect kids from the transgender in this culture.” With the queer community already under fire from all sides, this is the last thing they need, as all it does is further demonize them, and paint them as evil, pedophilic freaks to be feared and hated. A lot of regulations outlined in this bill also provide a concerning amount of control over the children it claims to protect, and it isn’t giving it to the child. It’s giving it to their parents. The adults who, as much as we hate to admit it, don’t always have the best interests of their children at heart. And what’s more, now the conservative Republicans care about people with disabilities, but it’s only when they’re trying to push a different marginalized group off the net. However, as soon as we try to do something as simple as mandating wheelchair ramps for all government buildings, they say “we don’t have the money for that!”. Okay, since obviously you don’t understand basic common sense Mr. Conservative, let me explain this for you: let’s say that KOSA will be fully enforced on every single website out of the over 1 BILLION that currently exist. Let’s say that about half of those comply fully willingly with KOSA, just for the benefit of the doubt. That still lives 500 million noncompliant websites. Let’s say that with legal proceedings and other costs, it would cost 500 dollars in USD per website to bring those websites into compliance. It would cost 250 BILLION dollars in USD to bring 500 million websites into compliance. Now let’s do some math on the wheelchair ramp problem, I’ll use small businesses as an example, since that’s the main subject of complaints on this topic. There are 33,185,550 small businesses registered in the United States. With the average cost per linear foot of concrete ramp being 225 dollars in USD, and saying that every small business has 2 doors that need ramps that are 1 linear foot, that means that every small business would have to pay 450 dollars in USD to make their businesses accessible. Every 3-5 years, you’ll want to reseal that concrete, costing about 3-5 dollars in USD per square foot. That means that a one time expense of 450 dollars to build the original ramps (on average, grossly oversimplified, but you get it), with an recurring cost every 3-5 years of a mere 6-10 dollars in USD. It would cost 4e-9% of what it would cost to enforce KOSA to make every registered small business in the US accessible. That is less than 1% of the money it would cost to enforce KOSA. 

This bill would also enforce a strict “no horny” policy on damn near every website that you can think of. And as much as we like to demonize and vilify them, sex workers, porn actors, and hentai artists are people too, and some of them make a living off what they do. By enacting KOSA, you are driving the lives of more than 2 million people (about the population of Nebraska) into the dirt. KOSA places the value of a child’s innocence over those lives. Now, don’t get me wrong, I am absolutely against child pornography and exposing small children to porn, but we shouldn’t lock down everyone's access to explicit content to preserve 22.1% of the US population’s childlike innocence. KOSA also can lock those children into abusive and dangerous conditions and make the lives of orphans a living hell. By giving the parents of minors total control over their child’s account, you are allowing them to lock down their lives, and expose these children to, at best, harmful misinformation, extremism, and general naivety, and at worst, physical abuse and/or death. That’s another 600,000 lives ground into the dirt under the boot of “safety”. And that little bit about “parens patrie”? That basically means that if you can’t defend yourself (i.e. are homeless, an orphan, etc.), the government is your parent now. Growing up with a faceless, nameless entity in place of any parental figure is NOT a healthy way for a child to live. Again, that’s another 2,823,104 human beings crushed by KOSA. In total, out of just the three categories of people I listed here, over 4,883,104 human beings, with lives, emotions, thoughts, joys and pains, are being royally screwed over by this absolutely horrid bill. 

 We as a society are better than this. Come on people. What memo did I miss that decided that we only need equality for some people? Instead of bickering amongst ourselves like children, we should work together and solve our problems! Isn’t that what we all want!? But no, instead we fight over our inviolable rights as human beings like toddlers over a shovel in the sandbox, instead of behaving like civilized people. And what’s worse, it paints anyone who doesn’t fit the perfect ideal of an American citizen in shades of evil, demonizing and alienating them even more than they already are. What the hell are we doing here? Instead of waving our bureaucracy around, we should get off the chair and do something about it. How many times have we done something without taking a risk? That’s right, NEVER. 

If we claim to be champions of equality, yet only desire it for ourselves, we are just as bad as those whose actions we decry. So please, dear reader, I beg of you. Stop KOSA, stop censorship, stop tyranny if you value this world at all. 

#fuck kosa #stop kosa #kosa #abuse #danger #politics #American politics

[indelibleevidence]

FYI, the UK's Online Safety Act has just passed.

I wouldn't have realised if not for the email from the Open Rights Group. Here's their statement:

No one disputes that tech companies could do more to keep children safe online, but the Online Safety Bill is an overblown legislative mess that could seriously harm our security by removing privacy from internet users. The law will also damage the freedom of expression of many people in the UK.

While the UK government has admitted it’s not possible to safely scan all of our private messages, it has just granted Ofcom the powers to force tech companies to do so in the future. These are powers more suited to an authoritarian regime, not a democracy. They could harm journalists and whistle-blowers, as well as parents, domestic violence victims and children who want to keep their communications secure from online predators and stalkers.

The Bill also poses a huge threat to freedom of expression, with tech companies expected to decide what is and isn’t legal and then censor content before it’s even been published. This re-introduces prior restraint censorship for the written word back into UK law for the first time since the 1600s. In addition, young people, whom the law is supposed to protect, could be denied access to large swathes of the web, including resources that provide them with information and support.

Perhaps the biggest failure has been the lack of detail on how these extraordinary powers will be implemented. It’s down to Ofcom to sort this mess. In practice, they will struggle to successfully implement large parts of the law. We believe a fundamentally different approach is likely to be needed.

#uk politics #open rights group

[xxstarlight-lifexx]

Some quotes I have from people speaking out against KOSA, please reblog, tag people, cross-post on other platforms, and share with everyone you can, all quotes are fair use <3

“This law is a scam, created with the express purpose of persecuting LGBTQ+ people and silencing victims of abuse. That is the only possible outcome of these kinds of bills.

Oppose them on principle. Be skeptical whenever they are even brought-up.

This isn’t about safety—it is a takeover of THE major avenue to disseminate information in the modern world. It is more than censorship, it defines the avenues that thought may even take.

It will lead to identity verification companies like Clear or ID.me getting more of people’s private data and guaranteed, exclusive government contracts for surveillance and data collection, in violation of the spirit of the 4th Amendment, if not the letter.

It is also an absolute certainty that conservatives in positions of authority will use this program to persecute LGBTQ+ people, with the force of the State, under the guise of protecting children from pornography and "grooming". It has been an explicit misdirection tactic the right has invented to poison debate on trans rights issues and the (unconnected) growing evidence of sexual impropriety among the powerful, particularly conservatives.

Furthermore, I and most others will not abide by this law, if it is passed, and will take whatever actions necessary to safeguard our personal information via VPN, encryption, onion networking, etc., regardless of their permissibility.”

“This is a violation of basic rights on the Internet. Whatever happened to Freedom of Speech? Or are we just gonna ignore a literal Amendment in favor of “protecting the American children" while many of those children are the ones against this??”

“having full privacy on the internet may have saved my life growing up. don’t take away kid’s privacy, there’s already perfectly reasonable ways for parents to monitor kids.”

“I think that people have a right to privacy online, especially children. This doesn't seem like a bill that would actually protect children from anything, it would just make important resources more difficult to access, increase censorship online, and increase surveillance, all of which I oppose.”

“There are three things you never give out on the internet for your safety. 1) Name, 2) Face, and 3) Home. This bill guarantees that all three will be easily available to those who wish to hurt the children this bill falsely claims to protect. If you actually care about children, stop this bill. Listen to what those of us that actually use the internet are telling you. Children and adults deserve a private, anonymous space to be.”

“i'm a queer teen and i know full well the importance online spaces have in supporting lgbtq+ youth, especially ones who don't have supportive environments in person. censorship doesn't actually erase the information, it just makes it harder to access.”

“I’m writing to urge you to reject the Kids Online Safety Act, a misguided bill that would put vulnerable young people at risk.

KOSA would fail to address the root issues related to kid’s safety online. Instead, it would endanger some of the most vulnerable people in our society while undermining human rights and children’s privacy. The bill would result in widespread internet censorship by pressuring platforms to use incredibly broad “content filters” and giving state Attorneys General the power to decide what content kids should and shouldn’t have access to online. This power could be abused in a number of ways and be politicized to censor information and resources.

KOSA would also likely lead to the greater surveillance of children online by requiring platforms to gather data to verify user identity.

There is a way to protect kids and all people online from egregious data abuse and harmful content targeting: passing a strong Federal data privacy law that prevents tech companies from collecting so much sensitive data about all of us in the first place, and gives individuals the ability to sue companies that misuse their data.

KOSA, although well-meaning, must not move forward. Please protect privacy and stop the spread of censorship online by opposing KOSA.”

“Censorship doesn't keep kids safe. Censorship does not save abused children. Censorship does not save queer children. Censorship will not save any of us. Freedom for us all. Freedom for the internet. This shit cannot stand.”

“This bill is a massive overreach on civil liberties and freedom of speech in particular. It should not be within the government's purview to determine what content is acceptable, no matter which party is in power.”

“As we all know, the major threats to American children today are books, bathrooms, and the Internet.

Not getting shot in their own schools or attacked on their own streets.

Since graduating from the public school system in 2007, I haven't seen anything from elected officials to contradict this.”

“KOSA is a censorship bill in sheep’s clothing. It would erode Americans’ rights to privacy, especially that of vulnerable and marginalized Americans, and gather information about the whereabouts and identities of the children it play-acts at “protecting”.”

“This is a ridiculous law

KOSA is a giant bill that is pretending to be about child safety, but is actually overreaching government censorship. It is a violation of free speech and the 1st amendment.

This bill would require that internet users upload their government ID to access any site, and state attorney generals could sue to remove any site that contains content deemed "harmful" to children. The government will be able to censor ANYTHING - such as abortion info, LGBTQ+ resources, and any content relating to protesting or organizing. They will also be able to ID you if you search for any of these topics. This is the opposite of a free internet!”

“The law is pretty much just a trojan horse for censorship.”

“frankly i dont want to be put on a list the gov has of every queer person who opposes their anti-lgbt laws”

“I care about actually helping people instead of making a bill that is going to kill any ability for anyone to get help. That is going to be used to police anyone who disagrees with the absolute mess everything is right now. The conservative morals don’t allow for anyone not white, cuz, straight, or male; and I won’t have that enforced on the fucking public forum.”

#transgender #trans #non binary #nonbinary #lqbtq #pride #lesbian #gay #asexual #pansexual #bisexual #our queer experience #queer positivity #queer community #queer #say no to kosa #kosa act #kosa bill #stop kosa #kosa #bad internet bills #stop kids online safety act #kids online safety act #internet censorship #human rights #women's rights #trans rights #reproductive rights #abortion rights #society