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1358456 · 4 years

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Final Dex Holder Preference List, 1st Edition

Heh. These titles are getting long. Dex Holder Preference List, so the same thing I’ve been doing for a long while every now and then. Final because... Generation VIII started, and I can’t see myself staying around for Generation IX. The end is near. And 1st Edition because So-boy and Shi-girl are brand new, so this only has my first impressions on them. As I see more of their data, their position is bound to change. So this is the start of the final series of the list. Think of it like the “Final Battle” type chapters in the Pokemon Special arcs that end up being something like “Final (最終) Decisive (決) Battle (戰) IX” or some sh*t.

If I recall, when Y debuted, she was ranked 8. When Moon debuted, she also ranked 8. So... where would Shi-girl rank?!

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Top Favorites

Platinum (1) ... Duh. 晝夜長川, 初志一貫, as usual. I think this is the third time I used these phrases for Platinum’s ranking in the Preference Lists. Thankfully she didn’t appear in SM/USM for random ass bullsh*t, so nice dodge there!

Y (2) Also not going to change ever. Thankfully she didn’t appear in SM/USM for pointless random ass bullsh*t, so... another dodge! Now, while Y’s ranking hasn’t changed for years, the phrases I used for Platinum can’t be used here because it wasn’t consistent (一貫) from the very beginning (初).

Red (3) Same as Y. Good thing he didn’t show up in SM/USM. ... I recall saying that I was going to experiment with a more “brutal” Red. ... It’s incoming in an SC update. But the update is for the end of the year, so... have to wait.

Blue (4) ... Good thing she didn’t show up in SM/USM! If anyone in the top 4 did, they would’ve all fallen enough that they’d still be in the top 4 in this exact order. ... Wait, what? Heh. There’s that much of a gap between the 4th and 5th. And while Blue may be 4th, she’s honestly in the same ranking as Red. They’re like a single entity. Blue (女) and Red (子) livin’ together and even married in some chapters, and it’s good (好)!

Moon (5) The power of overhaul. She’s back into the Top Favorites! ... Not that her ranking has changed at all. The Spirit of Vengeance! Undying devotion to serve Platinum, and undying hatred for her enemies mixed in would be quite interesting to write about! ... If I ever get to doing it...

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High Preferences

White (6) Hey, she’s back up here. Now that I’ve been convinced that she’s not really a laughing stock in a battle, she can do some cool stuff on screen for once. And overhaul~!

Emerald (7) I have to get used to the idea that after the overhaul, Emerald is the most combat effective Dex Holder among Generation III. ... Unless I choose to overhaul Ruby and Sapphire too, but... hm. Anyways. With the “new” overhaul a long ass time ago, he should be far more fun to use in battles. ... Whenever that’ll be.

Diamond (8) My interest in Heart is plummeting. But then again, my interest in all the others are plummeting too, so... I guess that’s pretty irrelevant. I feel like I could use him a lot more now that I’ve organized the headcanon chronology. And maybe I can come up with more headcanon entries as time passes! What if Platinum teaches him etiquette?

X (9) So close to being able to use him a lot more with Y in a cute and sweet setting and whatnot. I need to come up with more headcanon stuff for X & Y. Maybe he can teach her how to swim? ... Assuming he knows too? Can’t have both drowning at the same time. Heh.

Pearl (10) I want to focus a lot more on the united Sinnoh trio, where Diamond protects Platinum from closer while Pearl protects her by taking the offense. Like Platinum’s shield and sw... sigh...

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Low Preferences

Sapphire (11) Overhaul incoming along with Ruby as a united unit? Hmm... Currently, Sapphire and Ruby serve like a... middle zone. Point of neutrality, I guess?

Ruby (12) I have to find purpose for these two. Sapphire especially, but Ruby needs to be there too since those two are basically a single unit. But at this point, I’m kind of bored of these two.

Black (13) He’s freeeeeeeeee~! Hell, it’s about time. ... But... meh. I’m kind of bored with using him in a doomy setting with White, and I’m also kind of bored with using him in a fluffy setting with White.

Sword (14) Hey, new boy. ... A mix of Diamond and Ruby, and is ranked lower than both, since I don’t like Diamond’s passive traits, and Ruby’s seriousness doesn’t really complement it. More data required, of course, since the arc just started, but my first impressions for him aren’t that good. ... Also, because of the identical set hat with Shi-girl’s coat, his head kind of... blends in in the picture. Hahaha.

Gold (15) Oh how far he had fallen. His post-Cycle personality is kind of boring. He’s just “one of the good guys” now, and there are already a lot of them. But his pre-Cycle personality is that of an ass. So... heh...

Crystal (16) Her personality is very generic among the girls. So... she doesn’t really add anything.

Shield (17) Hey, new girl. ... I really don’t like those overly “bubbly” personalities. So... very bad first impressions. Hopefully she does something cool instead of freaking out little kids. ... That... sounds weird.

Rakutsu (18) He jumped up a bit because I find him roasting Black and White to be far more amusing than it should be. To the point where I might choose to have him exist in my stories, with him constantly roasting Black and White and every time he does, someone (usually Y) just shouts “GET F*CKED!” in the back.

Faitsu (19) So far, she’s just cute and amusing to watch, but... ehhh...

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Rock Bottom

Sun (RB) Was his only character development seriously reverted at the end? What a waste.

Yellow (RB) Generic personality, no development, bullsh*t powers. Yawn.

Silver (RB) Meh.

#preference

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sometipsygnostalgic · 6 years

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ways USM’s weird plot editing could have been improved:

-seeing necrozma in megalo tower before it reawakens, even if it was just a flashback of some kind like in XY

-ultra recon squad having more humor, especially in ultra moon where they’re both super stoic

-also make them not just appearing randomly and breaking up the pacing. make new scenes and encounters for them rather than putting them in front of another scene. and have them re-encounterable after the end of the story... they could have been battle tree trainers...

-have lillie participate in the rescue of nebby because you drew an awful lot of focus on her for her to do absolutely nothing. come on. saving a possessed nebby? this coulda been really cute

-dedicate a bit more time to lusamine’s change of character. maybe you could’ve had a scene with her in the aether paradise during the mina trial, which by the way is the only time you can see her truly contemplating what she’s done.

-give anabel and looker a better cameo

-don’t do That to exeggutor island.... you could have made it into a cool trial at the very least instead of 3 shitty pinsir.... or given a better reason for the scene being cut...

-if the issue is you think it’s all a bit too complicated for kids to get through, you should have paid more attention at trimming down the earlier scenes in the game.... they’re not gonna be more bothered by the endgame cutscenes and character development than the early handholding and mountains of dialogue... wtf... now that stuff being there is pointless because you fail to follow through on it...

#usum spoilers #usum #ultra recon squad #pokemon

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backstorywithdanalewis · 4 years

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START (Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Treaty) podcast link https://www.buzzsprout.com/1016881/3708575

Dana Lewis / Host : (00:19) Welcome to another edition of backstory. Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (00:22) It will be, I know Privia that is a primer of that Russia that says trust, but verify. If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps, we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia have agreed to the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades Dana Lewis / Host : (00:45) echoes of the past or were those voices of presidents, Ronald Reagan, George H, w Bush, and most recently Barack Obama. Merely a pause in our race to world destruction. It's certainly mad mutually assured destruction between Russia and the United States of verdant up until now, only because of two nuclear treaties called start one and start to, in this backstory, we will speak with a former under secretary of defense and America and one of the key negotiators of start and they will both tell you unless president Trump renegotiates the treaty set to expire next year. We are at a dangerous precipice that may lead us into the unthinkable nuclear war. And now the chief negotiator of the strategic arms control treaty who says world wake up time maybe up joining me now is Rose Guatemala. Rose, how are you? Well thank you very much. I want to read off a little bit of your resume because I think we all have great experience in our fields, but when I read yours today, read back on it. Dana Lewis / Host : (01:52) I have to say it's beyond impressive. And to be able to speak to you in arms control is an amazing opportunity. I mean, I know you from Moscow when I was in used correspondent there, uh, and you were head of the Carnegie Institute, but since then you were the deputy secretary general of NATO. Uh, prior to that you were under secretary of state in 2014 you held the position of under secretary for arms control, verification and compliance from 2009 you were also the chief negotiator for the strategic arms control treaty. Knew that the new start treaty and there's more, you served on the national security council at the white house as director of Russia and Ukraine and Eurasia and you've also taught at Georgetown Soviet military policy. Wow. Have I left anything out? Well there are a few think tanks in there, but I think it's a, it's really kind of you, Dana. Thank you very much for this opportunity. It's great. I think you've had a remarkable career. Do you think everything that you've done that we're edging closer to a nuclear exchange with a nation state like Russia? Are you worried? I have to say what worries me. It seems Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (03:00) like we may be coming to the end of a 50 year cycle in a strategic nuclear arms control because we are coming to the end of the new start treaty and less the treaty is extended. Uh, it will go out of force in February of 2021. And so it is a concern of mine that we may be at a point where there are no more negotiated constraints on the large USM, Russian nuclear arsenals. And that could spell the beginning of a new arms race. Dana Lewis / Host : (03:34) You just wrote an article in the foreign affairs magazine coauthored by the Russian ambassador to Washington Anatoly Antonov. That's unusual to say the least. How did that come about that you work together? Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (03:48) Uh, I'm going to totally, and I were the chief negotiators of our respective countries for the new start treaty negotiations. So we work together very intensively for the 2009, 2010 period. We started the negotiations in April of 2009 and ended them one year later in April of 2010 and throughout that period we were working very intensively together. He's a a crack diplomat, an excellent negotiator, uh, sometimes a very tough nut to crack, but you can imagine we spent a lot of hours together during that year. Dana Lewis / Host : (04:21) But I mean, you probably spend hours together as rivals in a way each trying to get the best deal for their country. Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (04:29) Absolutely. There's a lot of fisticuffs involved in any nuclear arms negotiation in any negotiation. And each chief negotiator is trying to get the best deal for his or her country. So that goes without saying. But out of those, out of those tough fights comes I think a good mutual respect. Dana Lewis / Host : (04:47) So doesn't it say a lot that you former rivals in your own way sat down and wrote this piece together saying that start is in trouble? Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (04:59) I think it's been clear from the perspective of of the Russian government for some time that they wanted to see the new start treaty extended. And so, uh, even though on tole Anatoly is it very much an official position, nevertheless he could get the go ahead to work on this article. From my perspective, clearly I'm out of government at the moment, but I do feel that the new start treaty continues to serve us national security interests. And so that was my motivation for, uh, for sitting down and writing it with him. Dana Lewis / Host : (05:32) If you don't mind, I'll read a paragraph from it because I was struck by it. The Corona virus pandemics should serve as a powerful reminder of the fragility of the international system. This is exactly the wrong moment to undermine or weaken other key components of that system, especially in the nuclear realm. Extending the new start would demonstrate that the world's powers are capable of working together to reduce threats. Letting it go would be a chilling sign of just how dangerous the world has become. Pretty strong stuff. Speaker 4: (06:06) Cool. Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (06:07) Indeed. The core of the importance of new start is that it provides predictability about these terrifying strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation that could destroy the world many times over. But with them constrained in a, in a bilateral treaty that both sides are, uh, continuing to implement in very clear and firm ways. We have mutual predictability and under that kind of system, those kinds of worries recede. They are terrifying weapons, but they are kept under some control. Dana Lewis / Host : (06:44) Do you think America will simply extend the treaty as Russia has called on it to do because president Trump has called it a bad deal. Why does he do that? Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (06:53) Well, you'll have to talk to president Trump about that. I can imagine when he remarked on it to begin with, he may not have had a chance to consider all the implications if the treaty goes away. I also do know from what president Trump has said in the past that he is interested in his own nuclear arms reduction deal. And I believe that extension of new start and a new nuclear arms reduction deal with president Trump's name on it can go hand in hand. Dana Lewis / Host : (07:22) But we've never seen these negotiations from partisan politics before. Have we? It's never been a Republican deal or a Democrat deal. It's, it's been bipartisan. Has it not? Speaker 4: (07:33) Yeah, Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (07:34) that is the case. Very much historically, traditionally arms control treaties in the Senate gain to mind over 90 Senate votes. It wasn't the case with the new start treaty because bipartisanship is not as strong as it was historically in the United States for sure Capitol Hill or, or in the government. But I was proud that nevertheless, we were able to gain the Republican votes. We needed to get it across across the finish line. Uh, so I do think that there is still, uh, a, an interest in, uh, the treaty on both sides of the aisle. And so I hope that we can nevertheless find a way to drive forward on this issue. And also look at new deals and get new deals ratify. Dana Lewis / Host : (08:18) Can you explain to somebody who doesn't understand arms control and most people don't understand how these things actually work. They're just not a bunch of pieces of paper. I mean trust, but verify happens on the ground and it's so that both sides don't play this cat and mouse game with nuclear arms launch platforms and missiles and warheads. What actually happens? Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (08:40) It took a long time for us to get the Soviets back in the 1970s and eighties now the Russians to agree to it, but now we have inspectors on the ground who go into Russian nuclear facilities. They look at their missiles, they look at their submarines and bombers. They make sure that the obligations that the Russians have taken upon themselves in the treaty are actually being carried out. Dana Lewis / Host : (09:06) Why is that important? If all of a sudden the Russians started moving around a ballistic warhead or they move a missile onto another mobile launch, or I mean, what can happen if you're not engaged with each other and explaining to one another what you're trying to do in your staging of these fearsome scary arms. Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (09:25) The more uncertainty there is about what they're doing with their strategic nuclear arms, the more we have to worry, the more we have to do worst case planning, the more we have to even perhaps build up our nuclear forces, which is very, very expensive. We are currently in the course of modernizing our weapon systems and that's the right decision, but we're replacing them essentially one for one under the constraints that are in the new start treaty. If we have to start building up that could quickly get very, very expensive at a time when America has other things to spend resources on. So there are a lot of factors that go into, uh, what the, what the importance of an arms control Proteus. Dana Lewis / Host : (10:08) You've talked about and written about the dangers of a trust deficit and the need and a pandemic more than ever to resolve start. Can you explain what you meant? Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (10:17) Yes. A trust deficit comes from when you are uncertain about what's going on in their strategic nuclear forces. Now the Russians have a lot of mobile ICBM and they also have a lot of forests where they can hide those mobile ICMs. When we know exactly how many there are and exactly where they're deployed and our inspectors can go in and inspect that check on it, then we end up with um, a trust developing over time. It's not something you take for granted. You have to have the evidence, you have to have your own people checking on it. So that's when you have the trust to say, okay, I know where those systems are. We know how to target those systems. If heaven forbid, we have to target those systems. We understand what's going on day to day in the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. If that trust goes away, then we really have to start thinking about, well how are we going to, if we have to deal with an increase in readiness on the Russian side, what if during a crisis they bring their missiles to a higher level of readiness and we don't know where they are, what is that going to mean? Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (11:32) That means we have to think about having a lot more missiles. Maybe we have to think about having a lot more capability. And again, that's an expensive proposition and I think not where the American public would like to see resources going at the moment. Dana Lewis / Host : (11:47) President Trump is at the very least unpredictable. I don't want to get you into a political commentary, but I mean what the day after that treaty expires in 2021, if he doesn't automatically renew it Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (12:01) or extended, I want to make it clear that we're not going to fall off a cliff. The treaty has been in place, uh, now, uh, since 2011 and 2021, it will have been in place for 10 years. And the current, uh, levels of the U S and Russia nuclear arsenals are, are set at, uh, 700 delivery vehicles and 1,550 warheads. So those numbers will not change overnight. But one thing I think we all need to bear in mind is that the Russians have already pretty well completed the modernization of their own nuclear arsenal and it's being kept under these limits. The United States is now at a point, we're just starting to modernize our nuclear arsenal and over the next decade we're going to be doing that very important work. If those limitations have gone away, we are going to be chasing increases on the Russian side just as we're trying to modernize. And that makes it very, very difficult. It's better to keep a stable basis on their side so then we can modernize our forces and be comfortable that we're getting, we're getting the value for the big dollars we're putting into that modernization. Dana Lewis / Host : (13:16) I think your article with the Russian ambassador was a courageous wake up call and let's hope the white house has read it. Rose got a Mueller. Thank you so much. Rose Goettemoeller/START Negotiator: (13:26) Thank you Dana Speaker 5: (13:27) [inaudible]. Dana Lewis / Host : (13:35) And this year, the bulletin of atomic scientists moved the doomsday clock forward. It is now 100 seconds to midnight. The closest symbolic point from an apocalypse since 1953 presidents Trump and Putin, you need to extend start. Dana Lewis / Host : (13:54) Andy Weber was the assistant secretary of defense for nuclear chemical and biological defense programs and he is now a senior fellow at the council on strategic risks. And I first met Andy and I have to say Andy, 20 years ago this month when I was [inaudible] for NBC based in Moscow, we actually met in Kazakhstan. Uh, the former Soviet Republic were incredibly Andy's team and the American threat reduction program attached to the Pentagon had not only discovered the largest weaponized anthrax factory in the world, but they were with the agreement of the Kazak government dismantling. And then do, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it was seven stories. Two football fields, long facility. Yes. It was a massive facility designed to produce 300 metric tons of anthrax agent during a mobilization period. It's now just a green Greenfield. Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (14:52) We completely dismantled that facility Dana Lewis / Host : (14:54) ingredients for a Hollywood movie. But all true Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (14:59) can't make that stuff up. Dana Lewis / Host : (15:01) That anthrax was loaded into SSA team missiles aimed in the cold war at New York and Chicago and Los Angeles and Washington. And what an amazing thing that you helped discover and dismantle it the fast forward to the Obama administration and you were, I believe, involved in defense plans for the U S in the event of a biological attack on America. Does this covert 19 pandemics strike you as having some parallels and in what way? Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (15:31) Oh, definitely. There's a huge, uh, overlap and, and our policy was to embrace the overlap between natural disease outbreaks, pandemics, and a deliberate, uh, biological attack because so many aspects, uh, detection, diagnosis, um, response are overlapping. In fact, that's exactly why we created under the Obama administration, the global health security agenda to get the security and defense communities working together with the global health and development communities on this larger challenge of building up public health capacity around the world in order to protect ourselves from any kind of a biological threat. Dana Lewis / Host : (16:15) So, Andy, we should have been ready. Why were we not Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (16:20) well, it's hard to get governments to devote adequate resources to prepare us for rare events, even inevitable rare events. It's always easier to just put it off and put it off. And so I was part of a small group inside and outside the U S government and allied governments arguing for greater resources to prepare us for this, uh, inevitable biological threat. And, um, we often use that, that it might take an attack before we'll be able to get the resources and the political will that we need for this. And unfortunately that's what we're having now. So, um, it is, uh, it wasn't avoidable catastrophe. Dana Lewis / Host : (17:07) The Trump administration is now saying it came from a lab in Wu Han. Do you think it was an attack? Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (17:16) Oh, no, this definitely was not a biological attack or a biological weapon. The, um, group at the Wu Han Institute of virology with funding from, uh, Tony Fowchee, his Institute and other, um, governments had been, uh, investigating bat Corona viruses, going to caves in Southern China, collecting samples, blood, bringing them back to the laboratory for scientific study. So while it was definitely not deliberately released or designed for military purposes as a biological weapon, I don't exclude the possibility that a one of these scientists, um, became sick by exposure to this, uh, very lethal and transmissible, uh, highly contagious, um, Corona virus that we know originated in bats, um, whether in the laboratory or in the field, uh, going into caves and very high risk environments, um, catching bats and, and, uh, taking blood samples from them. Dana Lewis / Host : (18:25) Let's shift from the COBIT 19, the nuclear threats because at the height of the cold war, Russia had, you can, you can set me straight on numbers here, but around 39,000 nuclear way Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (18:41) together together, the United States and the Soviet union had over 70,000 nuclear weapons pointed at each other. Dana Lewis / Host : (18:48) The American peak was in 1965 with 31,000, 149, uh, weapons, I mean, vast, vast arsenals of weapons for what was known as mutually assured destruction and mad. And it was mad, wasn't it? Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (19:05) Yeah. And we've come down significantly since then, but we still have way too many nuclear weapons. And what I worry about is the potential for using these nuclear weapons is higher than at any point since the height of the cold war. Speaker 6: (19:21) Okay. Dana Lewis / Host : (19:22) We had two treaties after the fall of the Soviet union start one and start to the strategic arms reduction treaties negotiated in the early nineties, which essentially brought us down to even though you say there's too many, I mean we've come down to about 1500 warheads on each side. The model was trust, but verify. What do those treaties do to make sure we don't have a nuclear war? Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (19:48) Well, in particular the start treaties and the new start treaty that is still in effect and, and both sides agree that, um, we're all in compliance with it. It enables onsite inspections, uh, visits to each other's sites, data reporting on a regular basis. It gives us each transparency into our strategic nuclear arsenals that provides predictability and stability to our, uh, to our leaders who oversee our nuclear forces. Dana Lewis / Host : (20:19) How does it make it more predictable? Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (20:22) Because we know from the inspections as well as the frequent data exchanges, every time they move a warhead from a storage site, for example, to a, uh, an ICBM missile. So it, it, it adds a level of information sharing and verifiability, uh, that gives us confidence that they're adhering to the treaty limits. Dana Lewis / Host : (20:54) So there's some notice there is, is there so that you don't feel that one side doesn't feel that the other one is suddenly posturing aggressively. Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (21:02) Exactly. These are reciprocal treaties and they give us both transparency and that leads to stability on both sides. And that's, uh, something that enhances the security of both countries. The treaties have worked. Dana Lewis / Host : (21:16) So why is America allowing start to, to run out in February of 2021? There are no current negotiations, I think underway for a new treaty. Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (21:25) Well, that decision has not been made yet. It's still under review. And certainly, uh, president Putin has said he's willing, uh, without any conditions to extend, uh, to enact the automatic extension of five years from 2021 until 2026. And we should do that. It's time for the Trump administration to stop dithering and just do that. It's not a reward. It's in our heart, national security interest to do so. Dana Lewis / Host : (21:55) President Trump has called it a bad deal. Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (21:58) It's not a bad deal. He tends to criticize anything that was associated, uh, with the Obama administration. Anything that happened between 2009 to six, 2016 he defines as bad because president Obama was in power during those years. But this is a treaty that had strong bipartisan support. It was ratified by the U S Senate with many Republican votes. And it's in our hard national security interest to maintain it. Dana Lewis / Host : (22:31) Chapters of these negotiations and bits of the agreement go back to president George Bush, president George Bush, senior Ronald Reagan Republicans, by the way. Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (22:44) Exactly. And Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush understood the, the grave importance of nuclear weapons stability and predictability and how that served our national security interests. Dana Lewis / Host : (22:58) Other presidents have pulled cruise missiles out of deployment. And yet president Trump will spend billions on cruise missile, uh, cruise missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. And where can that lead us? W what's your concern? Well, Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (23:12) I think that's a terrible mistake. It leads us to a world that we're in now where both sides are talking about limited use of nuclear weapons, so-called low yield, nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons. And this is very dangerous because it weakens the taboo against using nuclear weapons. And there is no such thing in my view of a limited nuclear war. Once one side launches a nuclear weapon against the other, there will be an overwhelming response. And to think that you could control escalation and have only a few of these nuclear weapons launched back and forth, I think is the height of folly. Dana Lewis / Host : (23:56) You really think that that's a sober conversation that's taking place? Or is that just saber rattling? I mean not sober in any level anyway as far as I'm concerned. But is that, do people really believe in the administrations? Do you think on the Russian side and the American side that you could have a limited exchange of nuclear weapons? Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (24:15) Weapons? Yeah. Unfortunately that is embedded in the doctrines. So now with both countries, um, it's a reckless doctrine that we need to move away from. And it's not just what we say, but it's the types of weapons we have and we have too many of these ambiguous dual purpose weapons that can be either conventional or nuclear and it's impossible to discriminate if one is flying towards you, whether it even has a nuclear warhead or not, and that could lead to an accidental escalation into nuclear war. A crossing of that taboo, which is why I've been advocating and the council on strategic risks, has been advocating for the last several years for a new arms control regime that would begin to cap and eliminate these most dangerous types of nuclear weapons to bring more stability and actually to enhance deterrence. Dana Lewis / Host : (25:10) So everything you say makes perfect sense to somebody like me. Why is it seemingly a hard sell? Why hasn't the Trump administration just said yes, absolutely. Especially now in the middle of a pandemic when we've got our heads and resources focused on getting our economy back on its feet and dealing with a pandemic that is ravaging the world. W why wouldn't they immediately just jump and sign on and say, yes, we don't have time for new negotiations on a new nuclear treaty with Russia. Let's just go ahead and extend that treaty by two years, three years, five years. Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (25:47) Well, extending the new star treaty and in the beginning, the hard work on on a follow on treaty is not mutually exclusive. Let's extend the treaty for another five years and give us time to negotiate a new better arms control agreement. Perhaps even bring in China and other countries to it, but we can't do that in the nine months remaining. Dana Lewis / Host : (26:10) What is your fear if the treaty is allowed to run out in 2021 Andy Weber / Ass. Sec. Defense U.S. (fmr): (26:16) well, a lot depends on the electoral process. If Trump does nothing, the treaty won't expire until February 5th. So if a vice president Biden is elected president in November and enters office on the 20th of January, he will have two weeks to extend the treaty if, if nothing has been done to withdraw the United States from that treaty. So while that's not an ideal scenario, um, let's hope that at least that, uh, can happen. But time is short. Time is very short and, and the Trump team is going to work on trying to develop a new arms control agreement that includes China. And I applaud that. But let's have the stability of the new start treaty extension in the background of that, our extending new start treaty is not a reward to Russia. It's not a reward to China. It's something that is in our very deep national security interest. Andy Weber is such a privilege to speak to you always, and I think probably you're one of the great unsung heroes in terms of what you've done in terms of the reducing threats around the world and to America. Uh, it's great to talk to you and thank you. Well. Thank you, Dana, and thank you for bringing attention to these very important, but often ignored issues. That's our backstory edition number two. I hope you like it and follow me wherever you listen to podcasts. I'm Dana Lewis.

#@andyweber backstorywithdanalewis russia #@rosegottemoeller @andyweber start nucleararms

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kathryntrattner · 6 years

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Inside My Camera Bag

"A camera didn't make a great picture anymore than a typewriter wrote a great novel." -- Peter Adams

NOTE: This post contains affiliate links. This means that I’ll receive a small commission if you happen to purchase some of the gear I mention — at no extra cost to you.

I bought my first DSLR a few years ago on the recommendation of a friend. Robyn has been a wedding photographer for over ten years and when I started assisting her I didn't own anything but a point and shoot. Slowly I went from assisting to second shooting and that meant I needed my own gear. Hello Rebel! I read a ton of reviews but in the end I relied on Robyn to point me in right direction and I've continued to do so. Robyn and Darrell are always the first two people I ask for advice when it comes to camera gear.

But I'm still guilty of taking way too many photos with my phone. (I used my trusty iPhone for this shot) When Darrell and I got back from our first trip to San Francisco I realized I'd taken the majority of our vacation photos on my iPhone and I was really disappointed. There's only so much editing you can do with an app. It was a good learning experience for me though and since then I've been more active about putting my phone away and reaching for my camera instead.

A year ago I made the switch from the Rebel SL1 to the 6D and it's been a world of difference. I still love my Rebel, it's a great second camera for fencing tournaments and it fits easily in my purse. But I always reach for my 6D and 50mm lens first.

I've included the prism I broke because it was my absolute favorite and I've continued to use it. If you want to add something to your photos prisms are a great way to go. The harness was a gift from Darrell and it's been life changing! I use it when I shoot weddings or fencing tournaments and it's such an easy and comfortable way to wear two cameras or one camera and an extra lens. The Instax Mini camera is a must for anyone. My kids especially love having a hard copy photo so quickly and I've spent a ton on film but it's worth every penny.

I'm not a super tech-y person. I don't read manuals (I know, I'm terrible) and I tend to learn the lens/camera/whatever by trial and error. Also, lots and lots of YouTube videos. I've got a few other items, a tripod I inherited from my dad and the kit lenses that came with the Rebel, but this is the stuff I keep in my camera bag all the time. I use it all on a regular basis and I'm never disappointed with the results.

Canon EOS Rebel SL1 Digital SLR with 18-55mm STM + 75-300mm f/4-5.6 III Lens Bundle (Black)

Yongnuo YN-568EX II Master Flash TTL HSS for Speedlite Canon 5D 7D 60D 50D + WINGONEER diffusor

Canon EOS 6D 20.2 MP CMOS Digital SLR Camera with 3.0-Inch LCD and EF 24-105mm f/4L IS USM Lens Kit - Wi-Fi Enabled

Sigma 85mm f/1.4 DG HSM Art Lens for Canon EF (321954)

Canon EF 50mm f/1.4 USM Standard & Medium Telephoto Lens for Canon SLR Cameras - Fixed

Canon 24–105mm f/4L IS II USM Lens (White Box) Bundle

Canon EF-S 24mm f/2.8 STM Lens

SanDisk Extreme PRO 32GB UHS-I/U3 SDHC Flash Memory Card with up to 95MB/s- SDSDXPA-032G-AFFP

JJC MC-SDMSD24 Water-Resistant Holder Storage Memory Card Case for 12 SD cards + 12 Micro SD Cards

Samyo 7.8 Inch / 200mm Optical Glass Triangular Prism Triple Prism for Physics Teaching Light Spectrum Optics Kits

A&M Film and Photo Photography Prism - Includes Microfiber Carrying Bag

Fujifilm Instax Mini 90 Neo Classic Instant Film Camera

Fractal Filters Set

Clydesdale Pro Duel Camera Harness

Business cards by Moo

I have a few things on my wish list too. If you own any of them let me know what you think.

Canon EF 70-200mm f/4L USM Telephoto Zoom Lens for Canon SLR Cameras

Chromo Inc CI55000230 Macro Ring 48 LED Power Light for Canon, Sony, Nikon, Sigma Lenses

K&F Concept 58mm Slim Variable Fader ND2-ND400 Neutral Density ND Filter Adjustable ND2 ND4 ND8 ND16 ND32 to ND400 For Canon Rebel T5i T4i T3i T2i T1i T3 XSi XS Canon EOS 500D 400D 550D 650D 450D 350D 100D 700D 600D 1100D DSLR Camera with 18-55mm 70-300mm 75-300mm 55-250mm 28-105mm 70-210mm 100-300mm Lens + Lens Cleaning Cloth

Canon EF 100mm f/2.8L IS USM Macro Lens for Canon Digital SLR Cameras

#Camera Gear #prism #Canon #Rebel #Canon Rebel SL1 #Sigma #Sigma Art Lens #Canon 6D #inside my camera bag #fractal filters

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danaslewis · 4 years

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Limited Nuclear War? A new arms race? It’s getting to be dangerous. START is expiring.

https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/nuclear-start/id1512445640?i=1000474295501

Welcome to another edition of backstory.

President George W Bush 2: 0:22

I know there is a saying in Russia that says trust, but verify. If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps, we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia have agreed to the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades

Dana Lewis - host 1: 0:46

echoes of the past or were those voices of presidents, Ronald Reagan, George H, w Bush, and most recently Barack Obama. Merely a pause in our race to world destruction. It's certainly mad mutually assured destruction between Russia and the United States of verdant up until now, only because of two nuclear treaties called start one and start to, in this backstory, we will speak with a former under secretary of defense and America and one of the key negotiators of start and they will both tell you unless president Trump renegotiates the treaty set to expire next year. We are at a dangerous precipice that may lead us into the unthinkable nuclear war. And now the chief negotiator of the strategic arms control treaty who says world wake up time maybe up joining me now is Rose Gottemoeller, Rose, how are you? Well thank you very much. I want to read off a little bit of your resume because I think we all have great experience in our fields, but when I read yours today, read back on it.

Dana 1: 1:52

I have to say it's beyond impressive. And to be able to speak to you in arms control is an amazing opportunity. I mean, I know you from Moscow when I was in used correspondent there, uh, and you were head of the Carnegie Institute, but since then you were the deputy secretary general of NATO. Uh, prior to that you were under secretary of state in 2014 you held the position of under secretary for arms control, verification and compliance from 2009 you were also the chief negotiator for the strategic arms control treaty. Knew that the new start treaty and there's more, you served on the national security council at the white house as director of Russia and Ukraine and Eurasia and you've also taught at Georgetown Soviet military policy. Wow. Have I left anything out? Well there are a few think tanks in there, but I think it's a, it's really kind of you, Dana. Thank you very much for this opportunity. It's great. I think you've had a remarkable career. Do you think everything that you've done that we're edging closer to a nuclear exchange with a nation state like Russia? Are you worried? I have to say what worries me. It seems

Rose Gottemoeller 3: 3:00

like we may be coming to the end of a 50 year cycle in a strategic nuclear arms control because we are coming to the end of the new start treaty and less the treaty is extended. Uh, it will go out of force in February of 2021. And so it is a concern of mine that we may be at a point where there are no more negotiated constraints on the large USM, Russian nuclear arsenals. And that could spell the beginning of a new arms race.

Speaker 1: 3:34

You just wrote an article in the foreign affairs magazine coauthored by the Russian ambassador to Washington Anatoly Antonov. That's unusual to say the least. How did that come about that you work together?

Speaker 3: 3:48

Uh, I'm going to totally, and I were the chief negotiators of our respective countries for the new start treaty negotiations. So we work together very intensively for the 2009, 2010 period. We started the negotiations in April of 2009 and ended them one year later in April of 2010 and throughout that period we were working very intensively together. He's a a crack diplomat, an excellent negotiator, uh, sometimes a very tough nut to crack, but you can imagine we spent a lot of hours together during that year.

Speaker 1: 4:21

But I mean, you probably spend hours together as rivals in a way each trying to get the best deal for their country.

Speaker 3: 4:29

Absolutely. There's a lot of fisticuffs involved in any nuclear arms negotiation in any negotiation. And each chief negotiator is trying to get the best deal for his or her country. So that goes without saying. But out of those, out of those tough fights comes I think a good mutual respect.

Speaker 1: 4:47

So doesn't it say a lot that you former rivals in your own way sat down and wrote this piece together saying that start is in trouble?

Speaker 3: 4:59

I think it's been clear from the perspective of of the Russian government for some time that they wanted to see the new start treaty extended. And so, uh, even though on tole Anatoly is it very much an official position, nevertheless he could get the go ahead to work on this article. From my perspective, clearly I'm out of government at the moment, but I do feel that the new start treaty continues to serve us national security interests. And so that was my motivation for, uh, for sitting down and writing it with him.

Speaker 1: 5:32

If you don't mind, I'll read a paragraph from it because I was struck by it. The Corona virus pandemics should serve as a powerful reminder of the fragility of the international system. This is exactly the wrong moment to undermine or weaken other key components of that system, especially in the nuclear realm. Extending the new start would demonstrate that the world's powers are capable of working together to reduce threats. Letting it go would be a chilling sign of just how dangerous the world has become. Pretty strong stuff.

Speaker 4: 6:06

Cool.

Speaker 3: 6:07

Indeed. The core of the importance of new start is that it provides predictability about these terrifying strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation that could destroy the world many times over. But with them constrained in a, in a bilateral treaty that both sides are, uh, continuing to implement in very clear and firm ways. We have mutual predictability and under that kind of system, those kinds of worries recede. They are terrifying weapons, but they are kept under some control.

Speaker 1: 6:44

Do you think America will simply extend the treaty as Russia has called on it to do because president Trump has called it a bad deal. Why does he do that?

Speaker 3: 6:53

Well, you'll have to talk to president Trump about that. I can imagine when he remarked on it to begin with, he may not have had a chance to consider all the implications if the treaty goes away. I also do know from what president Trump has said in the past that he is interested in his own nuclear arms reduction deal. And I believe that extension of new start and a new nuclear arms reduction deal with president Trump's name on it can go hand in hand.

Speaker 1: 7:22

But we've never seen these negotiations from partisan politics before. Have we? It's never been a Republican deal or a Democrat deal. It's, it's been bipartisan. Has it not?

Speaker 4: 7:33

Yeah,

Speaker 3: 7:34

that is the case. Very much historically, traditionally arms control treaties in the Senate gain to mind over 90 Senate votes. It wasn't the case with the new start treaty because bipartisanship is not as strong as it was historically in the United States for sure Capitol Hill or, or in the government. But I was proud that nevertheless, we were able to gain the Republican votes. We needed to get it across across the finish line. Uh, so I do think that there is still, uh, a, an interest in, uh, the treaty on both sides of the aisle. And so I hope that we can nevertheless find a way to drive forward on this issue. And also look at new deals and get new deals ratify.

Speaker 1: 8:18

Can you explain to somebody who doesn't understand arms control and most people don't understand how these things actually work. They're just not a bunch of pieces of paper. I mean trust, but verify happens on the ground and it's so that both sides don't play this cat and mouse game with nuclear arms launch platforms and missiles and warheads. What actually happens?

Speaker 3: 8:40

It took a long time for us to get the Soviets back in the 1970s and eighties now the Russians to agree to it, but now we have inspectors on the ground who go into Russian nuclear facilities. They look at their missiles, they look at their submarines and bombers. They make sure that the obligations that the Russians have taken upon themselves in the treaty are actually being carried out.

Speaker 1: 9:06

Why is that important? If all of a sudden the Russians started moving around a ballistic warhead or they move a missile onto another mobile launch, or I mean, what can happen if you're not engaged with each other and explaining to one another what you're trying to do in your staging of these fearsome scary arms.

Speaker 3: 9:25

The more uncertainty there is about what they're doing with their strategic nuclear arms, the more we have to worry, the more we have to do worst case planning, the more we have to even perhaps build up our nuclear forces, which is very, very expensive. We are currently in the course of modernizing our weapon systems and that's the right decision, but we're replacing them essentially one for one under the constraints that are in the new start treaty. If we have to start building up that could quickly get very, very expensive at a time when America has other things to spend resources on. So there are a lot of factors that go into, uh, what the, what the importance of an arms control Proteus.

Speaker 1: 10:08

You've talked about and written about the dangers of a trust deficit and the need and a pandemic more than ever to resolve start. Can you explain what you meant?

Speaker 3: 10:17

Yes. A trust deficit comes from when you are uncertain about what's going on in their strategic nuclear forces. Now the Russians have a lot of mobile ICBM and they also have a lot of forests where they can hide those mobile ICMs. When we know exactly how many there are and exactly where they're deployed and our inspectors can go in and inspect that check on it, then we end up with um, a trust developing over time. It's not something you take for granted. You have to have the evidence, you have to have your own people checking on it. So that's when you have the trust to say, okay, I know where those systems are. We know how to target those systems. If heaven forbid, we have to target those systems. We understand what's going on day to day in the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. If that trust goes away, then we really have to start thinking about, well how are we going to, if we have to deal with an increase in readiness on the Russian side, what if during a crisis they bring their missiles to a higher level of readiness and we don't know where they are, what is that going to mean?

Speaker 3: 11:32

That means we have to think about having a lot more missiles. Maybe we have to think about having a lot more capability. And again, that's an expensive proposition and I think not where the American public would like to see resources going at the moment.

Speaker 1: 11:47

President Trump is at the very least unpredictable. I don't want to get you into a political commentary, but I mean what the day after that treaty expires in 2021, if he doesn't automatically renew it

Speaker 3: 12:01

or extended, I want to make it clear that we're not going to fall off a cliff. The treaty has been in place, uh, now, uh, since 2011 and 2021, it will have been in place for 10 years. And the current, uh, levels of the U S and Russia nuclear arsenals are, are set at, uh, 700 delivery vehicles and 1,550 warheads. So those numbers will not change overnight. But one thing I think we all need to bear in mind is that the Russians have already pretty well completed the modernization of their own nuclear arsenal and it's being kept under these limits. The United States is now at a point, we're just starting to modernize our nuclear arsenal and over the next decade we're going to be doing that very important work. If those limitations have gone away, we are going to be chasing increases on the Russian side just as we're trying to modernize. And that makes it very, very difficult. It's better to keep a stable basis on their side so then we can modernize our forces and be comfortable that we're getting, we're getting the value for the big dollars we're putting into that modernization.

Speaker 1: 13:16

I think your article with the Russian ambassador was a courageous wake up call and let's hope the white house has read it. Rose got a Mueller. Thank you so much.

Speaker 3: 13:26

Thank you Dana

Speaker 5: 13:34

[inaudible].

Speaker 1: 13:35

And this year, the bulletin of atomic scientists moved the doomsday clock forward. It is now 100 seconds to midnight. The closest symbolic point from an apocalypse since 1953 presidents Trump and Putin, you need to extend start.

Speaker 1: 13:54

Andy Weber was the assistant secretary of defense for nuclear chemical and biological defense programs and he is now a senior fellow at the council on strategic risks. And I first met Andy and I have to say Andy, 20 years ago this month when I was [inaudible] for NBC based in Moscow, we actually met in Kazakhstan. Uh, the former Soviet Republic were incredibly Andy's team and the American threat reduction program attached to the Pentagon had not only discovered the largest weaponized anthrax factory in the world, but they were with the agreement of the Kazak government dismantling. And then do, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it was seven stories. Two football fields, long facility. Yes. It was a massive facility designed to produce 300 metric tons of anthrax agent during a mobilization period. It's now just a green Greenfield.

Andy Weber 2: 14:52

We completely dismantled that facility

Speaker 1: 14:54

ingredients for a Hollywood movie. But all true

Speaker 2: 14:59

can't make that stuff up.

Speaker 1: 15:01

That anthrax was loaded into SSA team missiles aimed in the cold war at New York and Chicago and Los Angeles and Washington. And what an amazing thing that you helped discover and dismantle it the fast forward to the Obama administration and you were, I believe, involved in defense plans for the U S in the event of a biological attack on America. Does this covert 19 pandemics strike you as having some parallels and in what way?

Speaker 2: 15:31

Oh, definitely. There's a huge, uh, overlap and, and our policy was to embrace the overlap between natural disease outbreaks, pandemics, and a deliberate, uh, biological attack because so many aspects, uh, detection, diagnosis, um, response are overlapping. In fact, that's exactly why we created under the Obama administration, the global health security agenda to get the security and defense communities working together with the global health and development communities on this larger challenge of building up public health capacity around the world in order to protect ourselves from any kind of a biological threat.

Speaker 1: 16:15

So, Andy, we should have been ready. Why were we not

Speaker 2: 16:20

well, it's hard to get governments to devote adequate resources to prepare us for rare events, even inevitable rare events. It's always easier to just put it off and put it off. And so I was part of a small group inside and outside the U S government and allied governments arguing for greater resources to prepare us for this, uh, inevitable biological threat. And, um, we often use that, that it might take an attack before we'll be able to get the resources and the political will that we need for this. And unfortunately that's what we're having now. So, um, it is, uh, it wasn't avoidable catastrophe.

Speaker 1: 17:07

The Trump administration is now saying it came from a lab in Wu Han. Do you think it was an attack?

Speaker 2: 17:16

Oh, no, this definitely was not a biological attack or a biological weapon. The, um, group at the Wu Han Institute of virology with funding from, uh, Tony Fowchee, his Institute and other, um, governments had been, uh, investigating bat Corona viruses, going to caves in Southern China, collecting samples, blood, bringing them back to the laboratory for scientific study. So while it was definitely not deliberately released or designed for military purposes as a biological weapon, I don't exclude the possibility that a one of these scientists, um, became sick by exposure to this, uh, very lethal and transmissible, uh, highly contagious, um, Corona virus that we know originated in bats, um, whether in the laboratory or in the field, uh, going into caves and very high risk environments, um, catching bats and, and, uh, taking blood samples from them.

Speaker 1: 18:25

Let's shift from the Covid19 to, the nuclear threats because at the height of the cold war, Russia had, you can, you can set me straight on numbers here, but around 39,000 nuclear way

Speaker 2: 18:41

together together, the United States and the Soviet union had over 70,000 nuclear weapons pointed at each other.

Speaker 1: 18:48

The American peak was in 1965 with 31,000, 149, uh, weapons, I mean, vast, vast arsenals of weapons for what was known as mutually assured destruction and mad. And it was mad, wasn't it?

Speaker 2: 19:05

Yeah. And we've come down significantly since then, but we still have way too many nuclear weapons. And what I worry about is the potential for using these nuclear weapons is higher than at any point since the height of the cold war.

Speaker 6: 19:21

Okay.

Speaker 1: 19:22

We had two treaties after the fall of the Soviet union start one and start to the strategic arms reduction treaties negotiated in the early nineties, which essentially brought us down to even though you say there's too many, I mean we've come down to about 1500 warheads on each side. The model was trust, but verify. What do those treaties do to make sure we don't have a nuclear war?

Speaker 2: 19:48

Well, in particular the start treaties and the new start treaty that is still in effect and, and both sides agree that, um, we're all in compliance with it. It enables onsite inspections, uh, visits to each other's sites, data reporting on a regular basis. It gives us each transparency into our strategic nuclear arsenals that provides predictability and stability to our, uh, to our leaders who oversee our nuclear forces.

Speaker 1: 20:19

How does it make it more predictable?

Speaker 2: 20:22

Because we know from the inspections as well as the frequent data exchanges, every time they move a warhead from a storage site, for example, to a, uh, an ICBM missile. So it, it, it adds a level of information sharing and verifiability, uh, that gives us confidence that they're adhering to the treaty limits.

Speaker 1: 20:54

So there's some notice there is, is there so that you don't feel that one side doesn't feel that the other one is suddenly posturing aggressively.

Speaker 2: 21:02

Exactly. These are reciprocal treaties and they give us both transparency and that leads to stability on both sides. And that's, uh, something that enhances the security of both countries. The treaties have worked.

Speaker 1: 21:16

So why is America allowing start to, to run out in February of 2021? There are no current negotiations, I think underway for a new treaty.

Speaker 2: 21:25

Well, that decision has not been made yet. It's still under review. And certainly, uh, president Putin has said he's willing, uh, without any conditions to extend, uh, to enact the automatic extension of five years from 2021 until 2026. And we should do that. It's time for the Trump administration to stop dithering and just do that. It's not a reward. It's in our heart, national security interest to do so.

Speaker 1: 21:55

President Trump has called it a bad deal.

Speaker 2: 21:58

It's not a bad deal. He tends to criticize anything that was associated, uh, with the Obama administration. Anything that happened between 2009 to six, 2016 he defines as bad because president Obama was in power during those years. But this is a treaty that had strong bipartisan support. It was ratified by the U S Senate with many Republican votes. And it's in our hard national security interest to maintain it.

Speaker 1: 22:31

Chapters of these negotiations and bits of the agreement go back to president George Bush, president George Bush, senior Ronald Reagan Republicans, by the way.

Speaker 2: 22:44

Exactly. And Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush understood the, the grave importance of nuclear weapons stability and predictability and how that served our national security interests.

Speaker 1: 22:58

Other presidents have pulled cruise missiles out of deployment. And yet president Trump will spend billions on cruise missile, uh, cruise missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. And where can that lead us? W what's your concern? Well,

Speaker 2: 23:12

I think that's a terrible mistake. It leads us to a world that we're in now where both sides are talking about limited use of nuclear weapons, so-called low yield, nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons. And this is very dangerous because it weakens the taboo against using nuclear weapons. And there is no such thing in my view of a limited nuclear war. Once one side launches a nuclear weapon against the other, there will be an overwhelming response. And to think that you could control escalation and have only a few of these nuclear weapons launched back and forth, I think is the height of folly.

Speaker 1: 23:56

You really think that that's a sober conversation that's taking place? Or is that just saber rattling? I mean not sober in any level anyway as far as I'm concerned. But is that, do people really believe in the administrations? Do you think on the Russian side and the American side that you could have a limited exchange of nuclear weapons?

Speaker 2: 24:16

Weapons? Yeah. Unfortunately that is embedded in the doctrines. So now with both countries, um, it's a reckless doctrine that we need to move away from. And it's not just what we say, but it's the types of weapons we have and we have too many of these ambiguous dual purpose weapons that can be either conventional or nuclear and it's impossible to discriminate if one is flying towards you, whether it even has a nuclear warhead or not, and that could lead to an accidental escalation into nuclear war. A crossing of that taboo, which is why I've been advocating and the council on strategic risks, has been advocating for the last several years for a new arms control regime that would begin to cap and eliminate these most dangerous types of nuclear weapons to bring more stability and actually to enhance deterrence.

Speaker 1: 25:10

So everything you say makes perfect sense to somebody like me. Why is it seemingly a hard sell? Why hasn't the Trump administration just said yes, absolutely. Especially now in the middle of a pandemic when we've got our heads and resources focused on getting our economy back on its feet and dealing with a pandemic that is ravaging the world. W why wouldn't they immediately just jump and sign on and say, yes, we don't have time for new negotiations on a new nuclear treaty with Russia. Let's just go ahead and extend that treaty by two years, three years, five years.

Speaker 2: 25:47

Well, extending the new star treaty and in the beginning, the hard work on on a follow on treaty is not mutually exclusive. Let's extend the treaty for another five years and give us time to negotiate a new better arms control agreement. Perhaps even bring in China and other countries to it, but we can't do that in the nine months remaining.

Speaker 1: 26:10

What is your fear if the treaty is allowed to run out in 2021

Speaker 2: 26:16

well, a lot depends on the electoral process. If Trump does nothing, the treaty won't expire until February 5th. So if a vice president Biden is elected president in November and enters office on the 20th of January, he will have two weeks to extend the treaty if, if nothing has been done to withdraw the United States from that treaty. So while that's not an ideal scenario, um, let's hope that at least that, uh, can happen. But time is short. Time is very short and, and the Trump team is going to work on trying to develop a new arms control agreement that includes China. And I applaud that. But let's have the stability of the new start treaty extension in the background of that, our extending new start treaty is not a reward to Russia. It's not a reward to China. It's something that is in our very deep national security interest.

Dana Lewis

Andy Weber is such a privilege to speak to you always, and I think probably you're one of the great unsung heroes in terms of what you've done in terms of the reducing threats around the world and to America. Uh, it's great to talk to you and thank you. Well. Thank you, Dana, and thank you for bringing attention to these very important, but often ignored issues. That's our backstory edition number two. I hope you like it and follow me wherever you listen to podcasts. I'm Dana Lewis.

#rosegottemoeller danalewis backstory andycweber andywber nucleararms START

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