Ideology 1: No Man is an Island | S. Zizek
Pippin is sympathetic to Manfred Frank’s rejection of “neustructuralism” as unable to account for subjectivity, meaning, but critical of Frank’s version of prereflexive self-acquaintance as crucial dimension of subjectivity. Pippin sees this dimension in the Kant-Hegelian reflexivity – autonomy – self-responsibility,  but what he fails to see is how this Kantian reflexivity opens up a space for the Lacanian subject of the unconscious.
The Freudian “unconscious” is inscribed into this very reflexivity; recall the case of someone whom I “love to hate,” like the villain in a Hitchcock film: consciously, I just hate his guts, yet unconsciously I – not love him, but – love to hate him, i.e., what is unconscious is the very way I reflexively relate to my conscious attitude. (Or the opposite case of someone whom I “hate to love” - like the hero in film noir who cannot help loving the evil femme fatale, but hates himself for loving her.) This is what Lacan means when he says that man’s desire is always a desire to desire: in exact formal replica of the Kantian reflexivity, I never simply and directly desire an object, I always reflexively relate to this desire, I can desire to desire it, I can hate to desire it, I can be indifferent to this desire of mine, just tolerating it neutrally…
The philosophical consequence of this reflexivity of desire is crucial: it tells us how the opposition conscious/unconscious is related to the opposition consciousness/selfconsciousness: the Unconscious is not some kind of prereflexive, pre-thetic, primitive substract later elaborated by conscious reflexivity; quite on the contrary, what is most radically “unconscious” in a subject is his self-consciousness itself, the way he reflexively relates to his conscious attitudes. Therein resides Lacan’s thesis: the Freudian subject is identical to the Cartesian cogito, or, more precisely, to its later elaboration in the Kant-Hegelian self-consciousness.
That is to say, for Hegel, “self-consciousness” in its abstract definition stands for a purely non-psychological self-reflexive ply of registering (re-marking) one’s own position, of reflexively “taking into account” what one is doing. Therein resides the link between Hegel and psychoanalysis: in this precise non-psychological sense, “self-consciousness” is in psychoanalysis an object – say, a tic, a symptom which articulates the falsity of my position of which I am unaware. Say, I did something wrong, and I consciously deluded myself that I had the right to do it; but, unaware to me, a compulsive act which appears mysterious and meaningless to me “registers” my guilt, it bears witness to the fact that, somewhere, my guilt is remarked.