presentation i made for a ppt night with some friends,, please laugh
2K notes · View notes
The sublime according to Immanuel Kant is the sense of awe that man feels when faced with the greatness of nature – when it shows its more peaceful side, but even more so when unleashing its dreadful forces, making each and every one of us feel our smallness, our extreme fragility, our finitude. Yet at the same time, right when becoming aware of that, we intuit the infinite and realize that our soul is capable of far more than our senses can grasp.
190 notes · View notes
Opiniões só serão aceitas se juntas vierem acompanhando fritas
161 notes · View notes
Wie nennt man den süßen Lieblingssnack von Kant?
Kantry roads, take me home...
62 notes · View notes
Melancholic withdrawal from the noise of the world, out of justified weariness, is noble.
108 notes · View notes
The Mind in Indian Philosophy I: Before Kant
It was Kant who said, in Critique of Pure Reason, that ‘all objects of an experience possible for us are nothing but appearances’. What did he mean? Well, cognition requires intuition but intuition is limited: it presents appearances, not ‘things in themselves’.
In claiming so, Kant tied metaphysics to epistemology, appealing to a distinction between objects drawn from our conceptual resources and the things we cannot know.
‘[T]he transcendental object that lies at the basis of appearances […] is and remains for us inscrutable; for although the thing itself is indeed given, we just do not have insight into it.’
However, Kant, by a long stretch, wasn’t the first philosopher to argue along these lines. Roots can be traced to classical Indian philosophy. In the Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhist traditions, for example, the mind’s connection to the external world has long been questioned.
From science and in our own lives, we know that mental faculties create different ‘appearances’ between us. Apparently, on average, an orange object appears redder to males and grass is greener to females; boa constrictors have infrared vision; that dress is either gold and white or blue and black. However, perhaps there is a true nature of each of these things, even if it cannot be cognised and known (Kant).
According to Nāgārjuna (b. 150 AD; pictured), a Madhyamaka Buddhist, there isn’t. Reality is empty and by banishing ‘objective thought’ upon our reflections we’re able realise this ‘ultimate truth’.
This Madhyamakan route can still be noncommittal: through it we remain sceptical about the world, neither ascribing reality nor rejecting reality in our beliefs (a view which may have inspired Pyrrho).
According to many other philosophers, though, it is possible to conceive of real ‘things’, committing one to realism. It might just be that the mind only provides windows with restricted views (cf. Locke’s distinction of primary and secondary qualities).
With our descriptions of the world, like in physics, we might just track certain patterns and structures without truly understanding the ‘why’s of reality (e.g., particles can be waves and in infinite places at once).
What do you think?
(Painting [c. 1750]: Nāgārjuna with Mahasiddhas [cropped]. [Rubin Museum of Art])
50 notes · View notes
Immanuel Kant's system of thought in Critique of Pure Reason, 1781
165 notes · View notes
The unconditional and boundless abhorrence of lies which Kant evinces on every occasion is due either to affectation or prejudice. In the chapter of his Doctrine of Virtue that deals with lies, he inveighs against them with every defamatory epithet, but does not quote a single adequate reason for their condemnation, which, after all, would have been more effective. Declamation is easier than demonstration, and moralizing easier than being sincere. Kant would have done better to launch his special indignation against the malicious joy at the misfortune of others; this, not lying, is the really devilish vice. For it is the very opposite of compassion and is nothing but impotent cruelty. Unable itself to bring about the sufferings it so gladly beholds in others, such cruelty thanks chance for having done so instead.
Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, 162
32 notes · View notes
Rules for Happiness: something to do, someone to love, something to hope for.
102 notes · View notes
Tried out the Cornell method of note taking today! Found it really helpful, would highly recommend giving it a try if you haven’t already!
25 notes · View notes
reading Kant's Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime
i wasn't aware i was reading the bible
history is not a subject fit for female brains, i wish we had known that before
16 notes · View notes
The stars are undoubtedly superb, as Freud remarked on reading Kant's cosmological proof of the existence of God.
samuel beckett, from three dialogues, 1949
50 notes · View notes
Kant, my behated, put down the pen
70 notes · View notes
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them:
the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason
17 notes · View notes
The Mind in Indian Philosophy II: Self and World
Last time, in Part I, we discussed how our minds represent things under the limiting conditions of sensibility. We began with the arguments of Kant on this topic; his philosophy of mind has many similarities with some much-older classical Indian philosophy.
Today we discuss some Indian philosophy of the self.
According to some philosophers, limitations of ourselves limit our knowledge of the external world. The basic idea is that if you change as a definite person—or if you never existed at all—the objects you perceive change as well because how you think, dream, and speak about objects is disunified.
For Arindam Chakrabarti (author of Realisms Interlinked; pictured), subjects and objects are intimately connected. A single ‘I’ of a mind must unify experiences over time to give nature to external reality (Nyāya-school arguments). A stable self achieves unification of objects by sustaining an objective time-order, carrying them in a coherent world in continued experience. So if a mind substantively changes and the single-self perspective dissipates, the objects housed in prior experience lose their structure.
Chakrabarti claims the mind can track the world because what is real about the world has the very nature of being knowable. Antirealists disagree and say this would render reality a product of the mind—a claim realists want to avoid! Sidestepping this challenge, Chakrabarti argues that subjects and objects must both be real for there to be real objects.
So are persisting subjects—selves—real?
Abhidharma Buddhist Vasubandhu claimed selves reduce to entities called ‘dhamas’. But these selves only hold ‘conventional’ existences. Pudgalavādins go further: they argue for the actual reality of persons. Nāgārjuna, in contrast, denied the existence of any fundamental object at all, including the self.
If there is no persistent self, there is no stable reality. As per Hume’s bundle theory, selves are just bundles of properties coming together. Objects, then, are bundles of properties coming together as well, appearing to us differently each time in representation under the limiting conditions of sensibility.
So here’s a scary thought.
Look at something you love, say, your pet. Ask: have you changed from five years or even 10 minutes ago? If you have, you better start firming up your reality; else you may have just lost a pet. The upshot is at least you gained a bundle of properties—and again; and again …
13 notes · View notes
Reality as it appears versus reality as it is
134 notes · View notes