1 . 在西伯利亚熊前偃旗息鼓的民族外宣
不知道从何时开始,中国出现了一个蹊跷现象,就是网络环境中充斥着杀伐之气。其蹊跷之处在于现实中分明很胆小平和的人,一旦进入网络,其民族豪情和斗争气焰就无比高涨。
当然这很大一部分得益于我们政府宣传上的努力,因为知道民众生活艰难,心中怨愤,再不宣泄就会酿成隐患。好在本身也和周边国家矛盾不断,因此也就有了煽动的素材。不管有心无意,都要不时在媒体上挑起一些事端。就算没事发生,也可以翻一些旧账,拉出一些“历史仇恨”来,提醒大家“勿忘国耻”,以持续这火焰不灭。
并且这工具使顺手了,也就八面玲珑,皆可致用。好比国内发生一些伤害百姓的事件,引起民愤时,就可以抛出民族大义。例如食品安全吃坏了身体,疫苗作假打坏了孩子,大家满腔怒火时,媒体就开始摆弄“爱国”手段,频繁播报某某国家辱华了,或者日本教科书乱写了,如此一来争议焦点自然逐步转移,倒也屡试不爽。
正如前几十年的威胁有“帝,反,修”,今日又有“西方反华势力”,总之“颠覆势力”的阴影从没消散过,所以挑动民族仇恨也就成了官方的常规操作,无论西方列强还是左邻右舍,都被我们挞伐了无数遍。
由网络征讨的范围来看,中国显然是世界上民族主义最强的群体,他几乎与全世界为敌。但又有个怪诞之处,就是这个民族主义具有很强的选择性,会对某些国家十分克制,比如我们的邻邦俄罗斯。近几十年中,除了中苏交恶被批驳了一段时间“修正主义”之外,中国对其一直是和颜悦色。而且就算对方背叛了社会主义阵营,走了代议制的歪路。中国也不以为意,很快就与其“睦邻修好”,成为肝胆相照的老朋友。
中国最激烈的战场通常在纸面上,往往“笔杆子”比“枪杆子”更凌厉,然而一群锋芒毕露的民族主义对一个国家温言细语,必然是对方有让他们感到惊恐的实力,以至于政府文宣和红小兵们都小心翼翼,时刻避免着触怒这个脾气不太好的“友邦”。
2 . 沙俄如何在中国栽种恐惧 1 领土
要了解中国对俄罗斯的恐惧,就要彻底地分析这个民族。中国对俄罗斯的恐惧不仅仅存在于当朝政府,而是有久远的历史根由的。
早在叶卡捷琳娜二世时期,这位女帝就开始觊觎中国的领土,并在内部起草了《关于对华战争的意见》 ,宣称黑龙江流域原为俄国所有,但后来因为正筹备与奥斯曼帝国的战争而作罢。
此后中国与沙俄签订了第一份国际条约《中俄尼布楚条约》,俄罗斯也对中国的企图具备了大体雏形。沙俄意图吞并黑龙江的太平洋出海口,因此在 1858 年英法联军攻占中国期间威逼清廷签订《瑷珲城和约》,割占黑龙江以北、外兴安岭以南 60 多万平方公里领土及江东六十四屯地区。
1860 年英法攻占北京,沙俄再次趁机发难,以“调停人”的角色逼迫清政府签订了《中俄北京条约》,割占乌苏里江以东的外满洲(包括库页岛)约 40 万平方公里的领土,并获得海参崴这个太平洋出海口。
《北京条约》并不是沙俄的最终目的,而是为后续侵占土地提供条约根据。1864 年,新疆回民反清起义,沙俄军队趁机入侵中国西部(外藩),强占伊犁西北,陈兵塔城威逼清廷签署了他们起草的《中俄勘分西北界约记》,以此占据了唐努乌梁海西北。两国在此后的 1869 年又签订了《乌里雅苏台界约》,沙俄再次吞并唐努乌梁海西北 4 万平方公里地土,同一年还签订了《科布多界约》,将乌梁海十佐领割占。
唐努乌梁海正式易主是在 1921 年,苏俄红军进驻此地宣布其“独立”,为图瓦共和国。而又于 1944 年直接将其吞并。
时隔不久中国西北出现了动乱和割据政权,沙俄趁浩罕入侵新疆之际,立刻出兵进占伊犁。并在 1879 年胁迫满清签订《中俄交收伊犁条约》以割让伊犁以南及以西领土,以及赔款 500 万卢布。后来双方改订为《伊犁条约》,这个条约包括此后几年的五个子约一共割让塔城东北和伊犁,喀什噶尔以西约 7 万多平方公里领土。
以上所述的领土割占,是官方至今所承认的。自 1858 年起,中国在沙俄手中总计损失 161 万平方公里土地。这并不包括存在争议的《尼布楚条约》之前的领土归属,有很多人认为此前满清也曾割让百万平方公里土地,比如贝加尔湖沿岸地区,以及当今哈萨克斯坦的一部分,而他们的丧失都是沙俄直接侵占或以划分边界等手段导致的。
3 . 沙俄如何在中国栽种恐惧 2 屠杀
清朝对沙俄是异常忍让甚至可说是卑躬屈膝的,一方面是惧怕沙俄的军事实力,一方面还因为满清后期朝政不稳,因此在与沙俄接触的一两百年间竭力避免着战争冲突。而俄国真正给中国政府和民间带来的恐惧,是在此后对中国人的屠杀中种下的。其中最骇人听闻的是 1900 年庚子俄难中的“海兰泡大屠杀”和“江东六十四屯惨案”。
1900 义和团起义,沙俄瞅准时机,以“保护铁路”之名出动军队在黑河挑起事端,以执行其“黄俄罗斯计划”。 7 月 16 日,俄军逮捕了此地所有中国人。并于次日将中国人赶到黑龙江边,挥刀将中国人赶进水里。
俄军的目的是彻底抹灭这个地区的中国人,因此采用了异常残忍的手段。他们起初打算将中国人淹死在黑龙江里,然而有些人企图逃走,他们便组成阵列将其围住,逃跑者皆被刺刀捅死。一些妇女乞求他们放过婴儿,但官兵顺势就将婴儿挑在刺刀上捣碎。——整个事件其人性灭绝的程度让史学家们惊骇。据记载:此事过后,血肉狼藉,无论死活,皆投诸江。 海兰泡屠杀持续了 6 天,共杀戮 5000 多人,数日后黑龙江中死去的尸体上浮,以至于浮尸蔽江,水面浑浊,满目油腥。
而就在同时,俄军为了彻底解决《中俄北京条约》里中国侨民在江东六十四屯的居留权问题。将海兰泡的手法如法炮制,他们首先搜捕各屯的中国居民,驱赶其进入一座大屋中,然后点燃房屋将他们烧死。此后俄军沿路枪杀居民,最后将剩余的居民逼入江中,此次又杀死 2000 余名中国人。
两次屠杀共造成 7000 余中国人罹难。在此后的一个月中,俄军沿黑龙江和乌苏里江再发起多宗驱逐,袭击和屠杀中国人的行动。
在这两起事件之后,沙俄也顺利地将海兰泡和江东六十四屯的中国居民财产,耕地等悉数征收。
上述事件是沙俄帝制时期制造的灾难,此后的苏维埃执政时期,同样发生了对华侨的迫害。——列宁在执行新经济政策后,将几千名中国人划入有产阶级或资本家行列,很多人因此被判刑入罪。此后在斯大林“大清洗”时期,苏联当局把远东华侨当作“反革命民族分子”和“有害分子”逮捕、杀害或发配到西伯利亚高寒地带,海参崴这个中国人聚居区的华侨被尽数驱逐。
苏联不止对于中国人,同时对一切少数民族和他国侨民也采取了全面的打压。苏维埃政府褫夺了他们的财产和申诉权利,并罗织罪名将其发配边疆服劳役,此举让很多人死在了流放地,以至于各国侨民,尤其是中国侨民的数量锐减。
4 . 沙俄如何在中国栽种恐惧 3 掠夺
俄国一直对东部的出海口有所企图,因此在中国东北的活动最为频繁。 1945 年二战结束前夕,苏联红军以对日宣战为由进入东北,造成了这个地区深重的灾难。
在战争几近结束之前,国民政府与苏联就《中苏友好同盟条约》谈判,提出日本的在华资产应归属中国作为战争索赔。苏联表示支持,但此后却在与罗斯福的私下商议中要求恢复俄国在日俄战争中失去的东北特权,而更进一步的目的则是为了将东北的日本资产全部占有。
因此红军刚进入东北,就迅速将所有日资产业宣布为战利品接收。苏军立即开始拆卸工业设备,进行了贪婪的掠夺,当时的工业企业无一幸免,其中沈阳最重要的工业基地鞍山钢铁遭到了最严的破坏。东北的工业停顿,工矿,物资,粮食,牲口,甚至连铁路的枕木,都当作战利品运往苏联。
此外,苏联红军还对满洲的银行和金融储备机构的大量贵金属,包括黄金,铂金,白银,钻石,以及债券、纸币等一并席卷而去。完全无视国际法中海牙陆战章程中对被占领国的规则。
苏联数日驻军就抢夺了中国多年抵抗日军并作为战胜国的大部分成果。曾有老一辈见证人看到沈阳满目疮痍,说:“没有打仗,为什么破坏如此厉害”。后来才知道是苏联红军所为。
荒唐的是,中国并不是战败国和敌对国,但苏联同样把中国本土物资一并掠夺。苏军在对日本人进行掠杀俘虏的过程中,同时亦对东北的本土居民进行抢掠和强奸,其野蛮的行径比日军尤有过之,以致当地人对苏联红军的厌恶远超日本殖民者。
当时被苏军劫掠的并不仅限于东北,苏联对其他国家的做法也如出一辙。他们在德国亦是风卷残云,拿走一切能带走的,并索求巨额赔款,即便在东德投靠自己之后也是不依不饶。
此外苏军在其他被占领国家如波兰,爱沙尼亚,拉脱维亚,立陶宛,罗马尼亚,匈牙利,捷克和斯洛文尼亚等,亦进行着疯狂的掠夺,杀戮和强奸。
5 . 斯拉夫的侵略性
毫无疑问俄罗斯是这个世界上最具侵略性的种族,他们的文化中存在着强烈的民族情结,俄罗斯的历史本身就是侵略和吞并的历史。
斯拉夫民族曾被蒙古统治,他们本身的版图并不大,但却极富进取心,带有蒙古人游牧的特性和攻城略地的扩张意识,对于土地存在异常狂热的需求。
俄罗斯经历数百年才具有国家的雏形,通过一系列东西两向的疆土扩张,直到伊凡三世迎娶亡国的东罗马公主带来了斯拉夫与罗马文化的融合,让当时的莫斯科公国自称为“第三罗马”,这成为俄罗斯入主西方的标志。
俄罗斯此前向西的扩张止步于欧洲列强的抵御,因此只能向西伯利亚扩张。而对欧洲进行真正的蚕食,是在彼得一世时期,他希望重整俄罗斯在西方的疆域,因此悍然对瑞典发动了战争。在近二十年的战役中,俄国战败瑞典占领了芬兰湾,里加湾沿岸的土地,得到了波罗的海的出海口。
此外,俄罗斯对曾占领东罗马的奥斯曼帝国存在一种侵略执念,他认为自己是被占领的基督教世界的拯救者。因此为争夺神圣罗马的继承权,俄罗斯将奥斯曼帝国视为了宗教上的宿敌。两国之间的战争跨度 200 多年,终于在彼得遗志的继承人叶卡捷琳娜这里战胜了土耳其,取得了黑海出海口。
俄罗斯对欧洲领土的欲望最强,因为这里同时也是宗教权利的核心。沙俄第一次著名的大型战役,就是和法国天主教争夺伯利恒主导权,从而将宗教问题上升为政治问题引爆的克里米亚战争。而这也是俄国争霸欧洲的序曲。此后数百年间,俄罗斯都与西方各国陷入互相征讨的胶着中。
6 . 俄罗斯的谋略和冒险主义
欧洲在文化和宗教上都对俄罗斯具有强烈的抵触心理,这是一种血统和气质上的对立。但让欧洲惧怕的是,这个民族偏又富有极大的韧性,正如他可以持续数百年地争夺宗教遗产。此外,俄罗斯在战争中极富谋略,尤其善于见缝插针和见机发难。
俄罗斯的眼睛窥伺着全世界,他观察各个国家的矛盾,从而寻找涉足的机会。如同克里米亚战争,就是趁拿破仑称帝让西方出现罅隙时插足欧洲的举动。而在二十世纪阿富汗与巴基斯坦就普什图尼斯坦出现争端时,俄罗斯就顺势把势力渗入了中东。
俄罗斯最成功的是对中国的入侵,几乎每次都把握着中国政局遭逢内乱或外患的时机,然后将其作为自己进军侵占的契机。
最典型的例子莫过于中日甲午战争,俄罗斯趁中日两国军力大损之际,立刻以拯救者的姿态强行进入东北,要求清政府“租借”旅顺和大连海口,以获取辽东半岛的不冻港,扩大自己的制海权。
而除了善于把握战略机会外,俄罗斯在外交上也十分狡黠,善于运用军事讹诈和合纵连横的手段。——在叶卡捷琳娜打算侵占土耳其之前,就曾与普鲁士,英国及丹麦签约,将土耳其孤立,此后才大举进军。而后趁英国和法国疲软无暇他顾之时,又建立了俄罗斯-奥地利联盟再度进击土耳其。
除叶卡捷琳娜的欧洲联盟外,最著名的连横策略就是二战前夕苏联和德国秘订互不侵犯条约,密谋了对波罗的海的瓜分,同时为苏联缓解了西面的压力。
而另一边苏联同样和轴心国之一的日本签订了《苏日中立条约》,承认伪满洲国,以换取日本对“蒙古人民共和国”的承认。
欧洲不止一次联手制约俄国,但也不止一次被俄国分裂。俄国在战略上最大的特点就是并不在乎对方的意识形态是否和自己合拍,只在乎对本国的利益。为此他可以和任何阵营结盟,也可以和任何阵营反目,他原本就不属于这世界的任何阵营。
而俄罗斯最让各国顾忌的一点是,他十分富于军事上的冒险精神。通常西方国家需要权衡利弊的问题,俄国都毫不介意大胆尝试。
这个国家既偏执又具备超常的动员能力,对目的和成果都很急切。他们建造了世界第一座核电站,也第一个进入太空领域。并且敢于第一个将马克思主义实现在国家政治层面。
彼得一世第一次入侵瑞典,就是一个很大的冒险主义决策。因为瑞典斯正值强盛,但俄罗斯不惜与其鏖战二十年夺得波罗的海的领土。
另一个军事上十分大胆的行动是在 1979 年,苏联为维持中东影响力而意图控制阿富汗,直接派军进入了这个国家并刺杀其总统。这个举动也让苏联陷入了泥潭。
而最著名的一次冒险行动是在古巴部署弹道导弹,其间俄罗斯在运送导弹的同时一直对美国谎称没有战略武器,以致在美国发现其真实目的后,立刻升级为一次核威慑的对抗。
冒险主义对俄国是一种突进战略,尽管这种战略不是每次都成功,但也确实让他们获得了丰厚的利益。尤其在古巴导弹危机中,尽管美国赢得了表面上的胜利,但私下撤走了位于土耳其和意大利的核武装部署。俄罗斯在没有失去原本任何利益的情况下解除了近在眼下的芒刺。
7 . 俄罗斯的民族性和信仰
俄罗斯的侵略性实际上一直被他们的宗族信仰所巩固和助长,哪怕经历不同的政体,经历数次文化和社会的革命。他们都围绕在这个信仰之下,这就是基于东正教精神的大俄罗斯主义。
俄罗斯很难与外族成为真正的胞襟,就在于他们强烈的斯拉夫宗族精神。这种精神源于他们对罗马教权的主观上的继承,让其具有了民族救世主义的信念,形成了他们“帝国转移”的宗教观。
所以俄罗斯对于拜占庭具有强烈的占有欲,他们认为自己是基督教唯一的正统,是将在宗教和政治上继承罗马财产的民族,是继东罗马和西罗马之后的第三个罗马。
但俄罗斯从来不是严格意义的神权国家。正如彼得一世曾改组过教会,无论是神权对政治的影响,还是政治对神权的利用。宗教在俄罗斯都是为了更深切地建立民族纽带。
因此基督教在这里蜕变为神圣帝国的理想,俄罗斯将他们的意志扩展到全人类来看待自己的征服和救赎。这是集体主义的,民族主义的信仰。即便不信教的俄罗斯人,也会不自觉将自己归属于东正教的氛围。即便是无政府主义者,也会将自己维系在俄罗斯的民族情结中。
俄罗斯建立了他们原生态的一元性宗教,在他们看来,多神论,多信仰,甚至多教派,都是不纯正的。锡安和伯利恒从东正教被确立之时就转移到了俄罗斯,再次占领君士坦丁堡就是新教统的确立。
他们站在民族主义的立场理解信仰,并不认为曲解了基督精神。他们将神授的权柄转化为世俗的权力意志,让他们成为手持刀剑与火焰的救世军。东正教的苦行,极端和冰冷对他们而言是一种精神体验,所以俄罗斯的救世情怀不是弥赛亚式的拯救,他带有更少的怜悯,带有清洗和净化的成分。
而这样的意志确实让他们得以建立功勋:俄罗斯曾推翻了蒙古的统治,成功在欧洲抗击拿破仑,同时在第一次和第二次世界大战中抵御了德国。这一切都助长着俄罗斯的民族认同。
俄罗斯的国徽就是他们帝国理念的象征。这个徽记除苏俄时期,一直沿用至今。——它的主体是一个双头鹰,一手握着权杖,一手握着象征基督权威的十字圣珠“ globus cruciger ”,这意味着对神圣罗马和拜占庭权威的继承。中间的骑士是杀龙者圣乔治,代表着勇武和胜利。双头鹰上各有一个冠冕,同时又被缎带连接到顶端的冠冕上,意味着神权与皇权在俄罗斯这里的统一。
这宣示着俄罗斯对世界的企图,他们会行使天赋神权对外族进行征服和主宰,并将自己的意志加于他们。
对外侵略不止一次让俄罗斯遭受重创,甚至导致政权的崩溃。但统治者更迭之后,俄罗斯依然故我地对外扩张。任何意识形态都没改变俄罗斯的民族精神。无论何种政体,无论男帝或是女帝,俄罗斯的战争意识和侵略主张都一以贯之地进行。就好像叶卡捷琳娜本身是普鲁士人,但他同样能领导俄国。即便是无神论的苏俄时期,斯大林的扩张计划也是沙文主义的。——正如基督教的统一必须是建立于东正教信仰的大一统。共产主义的大一统也应该是围绕着苏联斯拉夫民族的大一统。
所以领导俄罗斯的是永远是一种精神而不是宪章,每一代杰出领袖都会在战争中树立自己的权威,将自己的形象建立在英雄崇拜之上。彼得一世就是在征服了瑞典之后才被封帝。叶卡捷琳娜也以征服奥斯曼成为女帝。亚历山大一世抗击了拿破仑让俄国被誉为欧洲救世主。而斯大林更是淋漓尽致发挥了英雄主义的领袖艺术,在德国大军压境之时举行红场阅兵,然后士兵们直接开赴战场。
8 . 中国和俄国,截然不同的民族性
俄国和世界很多国家都发生过战争,毕竟他是一个在战争中建立的帝国。然而在战争后,他仍可以和奥地利交流,和德国交流,和英国法国交流,甚至和土耳其波兰交流,但唯独对中国会另眼相看。
历史中日耳曼文化和斯拉夫还有所交融,但中国对俄罗斯而言是完全的异族。俄罗斯对其是纯粹的予取予求的态度。这并不是单纯由民族力量决定的,而是这两个在地域上接壤的民族秉性截然不同。
最根本的区别在于两个民族对待信仰的态度,俄罗斯信靠宗教,信仰凝聚和激励着整个民族,给予他们神圣的加持。在他们看来,没有信仰引导的精神是不可想象的。
而中国恰恰是一个严厉打压宗教的国家。中国人大多是无神论,或者说功利性宗教。
通常归属于信仰的国家对于无信仰民族是很轻视的。虽然就功利来说中国人更精明,俄国人显得更单一,但最终吃亏的往往是中国。因为精明的人对利弊看得很重,而俄罗斯更具有原始的掠夺性,以至于很多时候难以用利益去衡量其行为。
中国的民族性格比较细腻,而俄罗斯比较粗犷。但耐人寻味的是,中国人对工作远没有俄罗斯严谨。俄罗斯的严谨和刻板在某种程度上和德国相若,他们往往表现出一种对细节极尽严苛的追求。
这种背反的倾向还表现在艺术领域,俄罗斯生来相信灵感的指引,并重视灵感在艺术中的表达,他们是充满浪漫和感性的。俄罗斯人热衷于舞蹈,文学,音乐和绘画。他们的文化是由社会一切群体所共同继承的,即便是普通民众,也会让表演,晚会,戏剧等节目融入他们的生活。
而中国的艺术传播土壤很贫瘠,更是不入主流的,艺术熏陶受限于中国的阶级分化。相较人文来说,中国更倾向于资本意识,一种剥离了文化的资本意识,在这一点上,中国比资本主义的西方走得更远。
这实际上和两国的政治传统有关:俄罗斯对西方文化抱有开明的态度,从彼得一世引进西方的技术,到叶卡捷琳娜对欧洲学术界的支持,俄罗斯的开放态度就从未停止。
这和中国政府保守的政治态度不同。正如同处一个时代的彼得大帝和康熙皇帝,就可以看到政治倾向导致的截然不同的国家走向。
因为俄罗斯具有难以切割的民族主义纽带,因此并不担心被西方思想“颠覆”。而中国的民众和统治阶层从来都是对立的,中国政府时刻担忧着民间的动乱。
所以在两国的民族情结上就产生了很微妙的对比。俄罗斯是文化开放的国家,然而在民族性上是排外的。中国政府很保守,但却是世界上最媚外的政府,洋人在中国都能享受到超国民的待遇。
所以在俄国基本不会看到外国人的聚居区,尤其是全世界都存在的唐人街,在俄罗斯是受到压制的。——俄罗斯联邦移民局多次宣称,俄政府不会允许外国移聚居区在其境内发展,“唐人街”也不会在俄罗斯出现。
斯拉夫民族性中一直存在着与外邦的对立情绪,而政府也总是会为此背书。这和中国的外交观念完全相反,——政府会严防过激的对外情绪,朝廷会压制民间高涨的民族主义。中国政府畏惧不安定的局面,而俄罗斯却认为民族情绪必不可少。中国始终是纸面的民族主义,因为政府很怕惹火烧身。而俄罗斯从不担忧民族主义壮大,这正是他们国家巩固的基石。
民族性的区别更表现在对权力的态度上,中国和俄罗斯皆存在权力崇拜,尽管如今的俄国是代议制政府,但他们在某种程度上依然信奉集权对国家的领导。然而俄国人绝不会拥护一个懦弱的政府,一个不能代表斯拉夫精神的政府。而在中国这里,气节通常只存在于民间,政府总是息事宁人的一方。尤其是政府常年执行的弱民疲民政策,实际上是弱化民族精神的。俄罗斯人的气节,总是在整个民族推动的战斗和胜利中巩固。而中国人的气节,总在政府的一次次打压和背叛中消沉。
其实这正是历史中两个国家理念上的鸿沟。——俄罗斯是侵略和进取的东正教斯拉夫主义,而中国是处于守势的儒家道统。这样的民族意志对俄罗斯来说,不啻为一个送到嘴边的猎物。
9 . 俄罗斯强权光芒下的中国孔乙己
俄罗斯在历史上一直是一个让中国难堪的国家,他对中国的姿态异常高傲和野蛮。其实俄国和中国都明白,在民族性和价值观方面两者截然相反,所以永远不可能站在对等的地位。
要明白俄罗斯对中国的态度,除了海兰泡和江东六十四屯这类惨绝人寰的事件,最有代表性的就是日俄战争。这场战争的惨烈和造成的破坏触目惊心,日俄双方为争夺中国的利益都付出巨大代价。不过这段战争最让人注意的是两个交战国本身在第三方国家交战,却将中国视为一块可以肆意践踏的土地。两军过处烧杀抢掠,赤地千里,完全将满清朝廷和中国平民视若无物。
后来苏俄与中国共同站在了社会主义阵营,苏联仍将中国视为属国看待,在许多方面对中国的政治政策进行“指导”和干涉。在两国缺少理念共识之后,苏联也开始在各方面刁难中国。仅 1964 年 10 月至 1969 年 3 月,就挑起边境事件 4189 起,更在 1968 年越过乌苏里江侵入中国七里沁岛轧死和撞死渔民,随后又在 1969 年与中国发生了珍宝岛和铁列克提武装冲突。”
即便在今日,中国和俄罗斯保持着常态的外交和援助关系,俄罗斯也不时地在各个领域敲打着中国政府。
比如之前大使馆在网络上用中文庆祝海参崴的建城纪念日,并告诉大家,这座城的俄文名字意谓:“统治东方”。
还有正当中国外交部长访俄之际,宣布在中越争议区内为越南开采南海油田。或者在中越两国海域属权争执不下的时候卖潜艇给越南。以及在中国与印度发生边境冲突时卖战机给印度。
不过中国对俄国素来以忍让著称,即便发生了卖军火给敌对国的事,我们的外宣还是可以绕着弯子找出“俄罗斯卖给对方军火其实也不是什么坏事”这样的辩解辞。
中国历来的的宣传规则是:凡是不伤害自己的对象,大可声色俱厉,无所顾忌,因为心中知道是安全的。但对于会付诸行动伤害自己的人,就一定是噤若寒蝉,战战兢兢。甚至双方出现任何一点微小的罅隙,一定是中国尽力圆场,拼命维护。民间但凡发出一点不满,都要竭力封杀,并大骂这些群众“不顾大局”,“别有用心”。
我们政府对俄国正是一种十足的孔乙己式的卑怯和自欺欺人的态度。因为自己在俄罗斯这里吃瘪太多,面子上挂不住,因此只能一面装聋作哑,一面用些模棱两可的说辞来为自己开脱。就好比对日本,会大义凛然地说忘记历史等于背叛,而一旦提到俄国的侵略,就躲躲闪闪地说纠结于历史毫无意义。
而俄国也从不顾虑自己的行为会让中国丢脸,因为他知道中国自会找一个台阶下,至于这个台阶是否下得有些跌跌撞撞,丑态百出,俄国是并不在意的。
并且中国最大的标准就是毫无标准。对每个国家的态度是根据对自己的压迫来定义的。加上舞文弄墨的技艺首屈一指,甚至连自己都会相信那些编造的谎言。比如疫情期间,美国封锁海关,国内大骂“不讲道义”。但俄罗斯驱逐中国人,绥芬河口岸关闭,作为第一批禁止中国游客入境的国家,中国的反应就异常温婉。
而就连对方没有遵守约定,不按期交付卖给中国的导弹,媒体们都能总结出一个暖心的理由来。
既然国际是一个舞台,大家也就看着孔乙己的一举一动。一来二去,所有国家都明白了这个政府的秉性。中国和俄罗斯的关系甚至成为了各国对中国分析的参照,所以周边国家无论大小,对中国都异常强硬,正因为他们一直在从中国的历史角色中揣摩。
其实中国政府对俄罗斯的情结很复杂,他一方面明白中国不过是俄罗斯和他国利益的角逐场,是俄罗斯沙文主义的演武场。一方面又因为自身的外交一直陷于困顿,而唯一看在利益上还能对自己表示口头支持的大国就只有俄国,一旦与俄国交恶,中国的处境会变得十分孤立。
此外中国政府的不安还有一个深层理由,就是中国在历史上从来没有真正的支持者和利益共同者。——每每俄国入侵欧洲时,欧洲国家总会联合将其围堵。但在入侵中国时,其他国家不是袖手旁观就是与俄国一起瓜分利益。所以说中国的这份被孤立感是由来已久的。
目前俄罗斯对中国的企图是被利益按捺住的,因为中国一直在给俄罗斯输血,尤其在他受到全世界制裁的时候。然而中国一旦中断一切形式的支援或者说对这种支援无以为继,那么俄国的反复无常会立马显现。因为这终究是两个毫无渊源,也没有彼此认同感的国家。
10 . “爱国者”们的“爱俄罗斯”情结
世界上各个国家都经历过战争,且大部分都有被侵略的过往。但是唯独在中国这里,存在着长期为侵略者唱赞歌的举动。这在世界上任何一个民族都难以理解,估计作为征服者的俄罗斯自己都难以理解。——中国大概是他欺压过的最驯良的民族。
为什么至今仍有很多中国人崇拜俄罗斯,崇拜他们的历任领袖。这并不是因为俄国多具有魅力,也并不是俄罗斯对中国有多少实质性帮助。而是作为被侵略者对于强权的深刻恐惧,——俄罗斯割占了中国庞大的土地,掠夺了中国大量的财富,且以十分残忍的方式屠杀中国人。这一切已经形成了一个骨子里挥之不去的恐惧烙印。
中国的“爱俄罗斯”群体对俄罗斯的朝拜,和受害者为欺凌自己的政府摇旗呐喊是出于同一心理学动机,——企图通过对强者表示拥护而表明自己和他站在同一边。鞍前马后地侍奉,都是寄望于对自己的欺压会温和一些。
那些受到中国“尊敬”的老朋友,——斯大林,勃烈日涅夫,普京,他们冷峻的面孔会让这些人背脊发凉,如同西伯利亚的凛冽寒意,带来死亡和凌虐的恐惧。这让他们不由地跪下了膝盖,并在口头上表示崇拜。这就给自己的心理压力寻找到一个不那么卑微的出口,毕竟,“崇拜”比“臣服”“畏惧”等还是要好听一些。
所以说你可以看到无数人在网络中叫嚣“勿忘国耻”,但只要一联系到俄罗斯,这些言论就会被网络封禁,让这份“国耻”被自己私下吞回去。
当前某些中国官员和红小兵对沙俄的恐惧,或者说“崇拜”,已经达到历史顶峰。这的确是举世奇观,因为即便是割地赔款的大清,也没见历史记载过他的子民为沙俄唱赞歌,大家还是分辨得出这是民族仇敌。
不过在我们这一届政府,自从著名谀臣郭沫若先生赞颂斯大林开始,就示范了如何抛弃一个中国人的尊严,示范了如何打破了无耻卑贱的底线,示范了如何将人格中仅存的一丝气节彻底阉割。郭老先生的作为,即便在中国数千年的阉人行列中,也无人能望其项背。
并且,他的那些徒子徒孙们也就有了可以效尤的榜样。所以我们才有了今日如此之多的,继承着郭沫若遗志的,为俄罗斯唱赞歌的“爱国者”和“爱俄罗斯”者。
中国的朝廷中,历来缺的是岳飞,但永远不缺秦桧,就和现在声称骂俄国“是别有用心”的这群国贼一样,在强权到来之后,只会迅速跪服并协助对方瓜分中国。从宋朝到今日,正是应验了一句常言:自古如此。
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TE 2021年11月12日星期五
China’s other debt problem 中国的其他债务问题
Evergrande is not the only looming danger in China’s financial system
恒大并不是中国金融体系中唯一迫在眉睫的危险
Crony capitalism has flourished among the country’s small and mid-tier banks
裙带资本主义在该国中小型银行中蓬勃发展
Nov 13th 2021 |
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SCARES ABOUT toxic debt are an ever-present feature of China’s economy. The latest involves Evergrande, a troubled developer that threatens to cripple the property sector. The firm also has tentacles that reach into the darkest corners of the Chinese financial system, wrapping around banks and shadow lenders. Yet even as Evergrande catches the eye, another risk is emerging: crony capitalism at smaller banks.
对不良资产的恐慌是中国经济的一个长期特征。最近的一次涉及恒大,一个陷入困境的、有可能缩小房地产部门的开发商。该公司还有触角伸向中国金融体系最黑暗的角落,包括银行和影子银行。然而,尽管恒大吸引了眼球,但另一个风险正在浮现:小银行的任人唯亲(裙带关系)的资本主义。
影子银行是指一些提供和传统商业银行类似的金融服务的非银行中介机构。投资银行和商业银行的业务要受到中央银行等机构的监管。但他们如果把一些业务以影子银行的方式操作,做成表外业务,这些资产在银行的损益表上是看不到的,就可以逃脱监管,迷惑迟钝的投资人
A government crackdown on leverage in property has pushed Evergrande to the brink of collapse. Other large developers are weighed down by $5trn of debts. Speculation is swirling that one of them, Kaisa, is also struggling to make payments (it has asked investors for “time and patience”). The turmoil may intensify as more debts come due. According to Nomura, a Japanese bank, the property industry must repay $20bn of offshore bonds in the first quarter of 2022, twice the level of this quarter.
政府对房地产行业去杠杆的打击已经将恒大推向了崩溃的边缘。其他大型开发商则被5万亿美元的债务压垮了。人们猜测其中一家,Kaisa(佳兆业,官网见图片),也在努力支付(它要求投资者"时间和耐心")。随着更多债务到期,动荡可能会加剧。日本银行野村证券(Nomura)表示,2022年第一季度,房地产业必须偿还200亿美元的离岸债券,是本季度水平的两倍。
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Foreign investors have been quick to grasp the risks. The yield on Chinese junk dollar-bonds has reached a crippling 24%, shutting most issuers out of the market. Some homebuyers are holding off purchases, worried about handing over deposits to weak firms. Building has stalled at many of Evergrande’s 1,000 or more projects.
外国投资者已经迅速掌握了风险。中国垃圾美元债券的收益率已经达到瘫痪的24%,使大多数发行人退出了市场。一些购房者推迟购房,担心将存款交给弱势企业。恒大1000多个项目中的许多项目都停滞不前。
垃圾债券是金融困难、有违约或不支付利息或向投资者偿还本金高风险的公司发行的债券。
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It is unclear who is exposed to losses, and to what extent. Many developers use shell companies, masking their debts, while stockmarket regulators have allowed them to keep investors in the dark. On November 8th the Federal Reserve warned that China’s property troubles threaten the global economy.
目前还不清楚谁面临损失,以及损失程度如何。许多开发商使用空壳公司来掩盖他们的债务,而股市监管机构允许他们让投资者蒙在鼓里。11月8日,美联储警告说,中国的房地产问题威胁着全球经济。
Losses on property loans will hurt the banking system, although by how much remains to be seen. But as we explain this week, lenders also face another danger. Crony capitalism has flourished among the country’s small and mid-tier banks. Because the biggest state-owned lenders prefer to make loans to other state firms, private companies and entrepreneurs have bought stakes in banks in the hope of getting preferential access to credit.
房地产贷款的损失将损害银行系统,尽管还有多少有待观察。但正如我们本周所解释的,贷款人也面临着另一个危险。裙带资本主义在该国中小型银行中蓬勃发展。由于最大的国有贷款机构更愿意向其他国有企业提供贷款,私人公司和企业家购买了银行的股份,希望获得优先获得信贷的机会。
Although the banks involved are often small they add up to a giant problem. The Economistcalculates that up to 20% of the commercial-banking system may have close links with tycoons or private businesses. There have already been blow-ups. In 2019 the collapse of a small lender caused a spike in interbank borrowing rates; several more failures have followed. Evergrande was until recently the owner of a captive bank in north-east China and is said to be under investigation for some 100bn yuan ($15.7bn) in related-party deals.
虽然涉及的银行通常很小,但它们加起来是个大问题。 据《经济学人》 估计,多达20%的商业银行系统可能与大亨或私营企业有密切联系。已经发生了爆炸。2019年,一家小型银行倒闭,导致银行间拆借利率飙升;之后又出现了几次失败。直到最近,恒大还是中国东北一家被俘银行的所有者,据说,该公司正接受约1000亿元人民币(合157亿美元)相关交易的调查。
For Xi Jinping, China’s leader, state control is the answer to both the property and banking threats. To keep building sites ticking over, local governments are taking control of some unfinished projects. At smaller banks many corporate shareholders are being forced out and replaced by local-government asset managers.
This reveals the limitations of Mr Xi’s economic philosophy. The expanding reach of state control may prevent a full-blown panic, because it shows that almost all banks are underwritten by the government. But it fails to acknowledge an important truth about the economy.
对于中国领导人习近平来说,国家控制是解决房地产和银行威胁的答案。为了保持建筑工地的运转,地方政府正在控制一些未完成的项目。在小型银行,许多公司股东正被迫退出,取而代之的是地方政府资产管理公司。
这揭示了习近平经济哲学的局限性。国家控制范围的扩大可以防止全面恐慌,因为它表明几乎所有的银行都由政府承保。但它没有承认有关经济的重要事实。
Many of the distortions that plague China’s markets were created by rigid state control. In plenty of private firms, insider dealing with lenders has been a way to cope with a state-dominated banking system that discriminates against them. Mr Xi may succeed in averting a sudden bad-debt crisis by reasserting state authority. But his reluctance to be bound by rules, treat state and private firms equally, and offer predictability to investors will ensure that the financial system is doomed to suffer yet more dangerous distortions in the future. ■
困扰中国市场的许多扭曲是由严格的国家控制造成的。在许多私人公司中,与贷款人进行内幕交易是应对国家主导的银行体系歧视他们的一种方式。习近平可能通过重申国家权威,成功地避免了一场突如其来的坏账危机。但他不愿受规则约束,平等对待国有和私营公司,也不愿意向投资者提供可预测性,这将使得金融体系在未来注定会遭受更危险的扭曲。■
Banyan 榕树
How the game of Go explains China’s aggression towards India
围棋比赛如何解释中国对印度的侵略
Bide one’s time, then show strength
静待时机,然后展示力量
Nov 11th 2021 |
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IN THE ANCIENT Chinese game of weiqi, better known in the West as Go, the objective is not to knock out your opponent. Taking turns to add one stone at a time to the board’s 361 spaces, what players firstly seek is to build the largest, strongest structures, and only secondly to weaken and stifle enemy ones. Better players shun contact, preferring to parry threats with counter-threats. Such unresolved challenges multiply, the advantage shifting to whoever poses the sharpest ones. Only when more stones than empty spaces fill the board can resolution of these tactical matters no longer be avoided.
在古代中国的围棋游戏中,也就是西方更熟悉的Go,目标是不淘汰你的对手。轮流在棋盘的361个空间中一次增加一枚棋子,玩家首先寻求的是建造最大、最坚固的棋局,其次要削弱和扼杀敌人的棋局。高端玩家会避免接触,而愿用反威胁来对付威胁。这种悬而未决的挑战成倍增加,优势转移到哪一方构成了最尖锐的挑战。只有当棋盘上的棋子空位多时,这些战术问题的解决才能不再避免。??最后一句看不懂
The contest between China and India has unfolded in similar fashion. The two have lately engaged in sabre-rattling and name-calling. But such tension has been rare during their seven-decade rivalry as modern nations. As in a game of weiqi, so long as India and China were focused on building their own core structures, each largely ignored the other.
中印之间的竞争也以类似的方式展开。两个国家最近的军事冲突剑拔弩张,并且在相互声讨。但是,在他们作为现代国家长达70年的竞争中,这种紧张气氛是罕见的。和围棋游戏一样,只要印度和中国专注于构建自己的核心结构,它们就基本上忽略了对方。
Far from their crowded coasts and plains, the Asian giants’ 3,500km-long border region remained an empty section of the board. It contained not people or resources but the world’s coldest, driest deserts and its highest mountains. India and China maintained overlapping claims, and their forces sometimes clashed, as in a brief war in 1962. But they both also judged that there was not enough at stake to fight a big war over. So territorial limits continued to be defined in many areas by a “Line of Actual Control” rather than an internationally recognised boundary. By mutual agreement their border patrols went lightly armed. They mostly avoided contact.
中印边境远离拥挤的海岸和平原,这个��洲巨人长达3500公里的边境地区仍然是一片空旷。这里有的不是人或资源,而是世界上最冷、最干燥的沙漠和最高的山脉。印度和中国坚持有重叠部分的领土主张,两国军队有时发生冲突,就像1962年的一场短暂的战争一样。但他们也都认为,这种冲突不至于发动一场大的战争。因此,在许多地区,领土界限继续由"实际控制线"而不是国际公认的边界来界定。根据双方协议,他们的边境巡逻队均携带了轻武器且大多避免接触。
As a democracy bound by rules, India has repeatedly sought to end the ambiguity by negotiating a permanent border. But perhaps because its strategists are steeped in the culture of weiqi, China has repeatedly rebuffed such efforts. For a player building formidable structures across the rest of the board, why foreclose on potential pressure points? Better to leave them open for use in the future, when you have more leverage and your opponent has more reason to fear you.
作为受规则约束的民主国家,印度一再试图通过谈判建立永久边界来结束这种边界的模糊状态。但也许是因为中国的战略家沉浸于围棋文化中,中国一再拒绝这种努力。对于一个在棋局上其他部分构建强大结构的玩家来说,为什么要foreclose取消对潜在压力点的抵押品赎回权呢?(这句话可能是想说,为什么要对潜在的问题避而不谈呢?)让它在未来发挥更大的作用岂不是更好,当你有更多的杠杆时,你的对手就会有更多的理由害怕你。
Under President Xi Jinping, China appears to have decided that this future is now. At several strategic spots along the border in the spring of 2020, Chinese troops marched into long-established patches of no-man’s-land, setting up permanent forward positions. When India sent in soldiers to challenge the intrusions, fisticuffs ensued. One clash left some 20 Indians and at least four Chinese dead. China has since refused any return to the status quo ante. This leaves it in control of lands India regarded as its own and, more seriously, in control of vantage points from which to threaten crucial roads and other Indian infrastructure.
在习近平的领导下,中国似乎已经决定,这个未来时刻就是现在。2020年春天,在边境沿线的几个战略要地,中国军队挺进早已建立起来的无人区,建立了永久的前沿阵地。当印度派遣士兵来挑战入侵时,随之而来的是冲突。其中一次造成约20名印度人和至少4名中国人死亡。此后,中国一直拒绝恢复现状。这一举动使得它控制了印度视为自己的土地,更严重的是,控制了能威胁到关键道路和其他印度基础设施的有利地点。
From a weiqiperspective China’s boldness is understandable. In the 1980s its economy was roughly equal to India’s. It is now five times bigger, and churns out ever-more sophisticated weaponry while India relies on imports. China’s infrastructure has expanded towards its peripheries at a speed India has been unable to match.
从围棋的角度来看,中国的大胆是可以理解的。在20世纪80年代,中国的经济大致与印度持平。但现在中国的经济体总量五倍于印度,且在印度的武器依赖于进口的时候生产出越来越尖端的武器。中国的基础设施已经以印度无法比拟的速度向周边扩张。
As seen from Beijing, China’s southern neighbour looks weak in other ways. Its democracy is messy and inefficient. Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, looks like a puffed-up bluffer. And even as China extends strength by tightening its alliance with India’s arch-enemy Pakistan, Mr Modi dithers. In his dream of a Hindu golden age India needs no allies, only weaker satellites or rich friends. Despite fanfare over defence agreements with America or Japan or Australia, these remain largely notional. India’s army has little functional interoperability with any other.
从北京方面看,中国南方邻国在其他方面显得软弱无力。印度的民主是混乱和低效的。印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪看上去外强中干。尽管中国通过加强与印度宿敌巴基斯坦的联盟来扩大实力,但莫迪犹豫不决。在他梦想的印度教黄金时代,印度不需要盟友,只需要较弱的卫星或富有的朋友。尽管在与美国、日本或澳大利亚签订的防务协议上大肆宣传,但这些协议基本上仍是名义上的。印度军队与任何其他军队几乎没有职能上的相互联系。
In short, as the board fills up and one player emerges dominant, there should be no surprise for it to push the advantage. But China has not yet won. Even if his opponent is erratic, the global gameboard may prove wider, and India may turn out to have better-placed assets than Mr Xi realises.
简言之,当棋盘被填满、一个玩家呈现出主导地位,理所当然地应该推进优势。但中国还没有赢。即使他的对手不稳定,全球棋局也可能变得更宽广,而印度的筹码可能比习近平意识到的要好。
Despite Mr Modi’s failings India retains a big reserve of goodwill as a democracy and a decent global citizen; it would gain fast allies if it really tried to win them. India’s core strength may run deeper, too. Its relative smallness is deceptive: the eastern third of China, where 95% of Chinese actually live, is no bigger than India. As China’s economy matures, India’s remains packed with upward potential. Besides, unlike a game of weiqi this contest between two great and ancient nations will never simply stop. It will keep on going long after Mr Xi and Mr Modi finish playing.
尽管莫迪先生失败了,但印度作为一个民主国家和一个体面的全球公民,仍然保留着大量的善意储备;如果它真的试图赢得他们, 它会迅速结交的盟友。印度的核心实力也可能更深。其相对较小是具有欺骗性的:有95%的中国人居住在中国东部,中国的三分之一区域并不比印度大。随着中国经济的成熟,印度仍然充满着上升的潜力。此外,与围棋的比赛不同,两个伟大而古老的国家之间的比赛永远不会简单地停止。在习近平和莫迪结束比赛后,这一比赛将持续很长时间。
The spectral game 光谱游戏 (一种游戏)
China still steals commercial secrets for its own firms’ profit
中国仍在窃取商业机密,以牟取自身企业的利益
Despite saying it wouldn’t engage in cybertheft, it is ramping up its efforts
尽管中国自称不会参与网络盗窃,但实际上正在加大力度
Nov 11th 2021 |
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EARLIER THIS year Microsoft found that a group of hackers, which it called Hafnium, had broken into hundreds of thousands of computer servers around the world that were running the firm’s mail and calendar software. The cyber-thieves were stealing emails, documents and other data from small businesses, NGOs and local governments in an enormous, seemingly indiscriminate, cyber-attack. In July America, Britain, other members of NATO and the European Union all blamed China. America was more specific. It named China’s civilian intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS).
今年,微软发现一群黑客,所谓的Hafnium,闯入了世界各地数十万台运行该公司邮件和日历软件的计算机服务器。网络窃贼从小企业、非政府组织和地方政府窃取电子邮件、文件和其他数据,这是一次看似不分青红皂白的大规模网络攻击。今年7月,美国、英国、北约和欧盟其他成员国都指责中国。美国更是指名道姓。它指责中国民用?情报机构,国家安全部(MSS)。
Such co-ordinated condemnation of the Chinese government for allegedly hacking into foreign computer systems was unprecedented. But it was no surprise in the West that China appeared to be responsible (as always in such cases, it denied involvement).
中国政府对涉嫌侵入外国计算机系统的这种协同谴责是史无前例的。但在西方,中国似乎有责任并不奇怪(与往常一样,中国否认参与其中)。
In 2015, standing next to Xi Jinping at the White House, Barack Obama said the two presidents had agreed that neither country would “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property” for commercial gain. But cyber-experts say China remains hard at it. In September attacks allegedly mounted by the Chinese government included ones against Indian media firms, Microsoft’s Windows operating system and Roshan, a telecoms network in Afghanistan.
2015年,白宫里,奥巴马站在习近平的旁边说,两位总统都同意,两国都不会为了商业利益而"进行或明知故犯地支持网络盗窃知识产权"。但网络专家说,中国仍然对此持强硬立场。据称,9月份中国政府发动的袭击包括针对印度媒体公司、微软的Windows操作系统和阿富汗电信网络罗山(Roshan)的袭击。
Spy agencies everywhere hack into other countries’ computer systems. What irks Western governments is that China also steals commercial secrets to pass on to its companies, whereas there is no evidence that the West’s spies collude with business like this. Since Mr Xi took power in 2012, China’s hacking capabilities have grown.
各地的间谍机构侵入其他国家的计算机系统。令西方政府恼火的是,中国还窃取商业机密,将商业机密转嫁到其公司身上,而没有证据表明西方间谍与此类企业勾结。自习近平2012年上台以来,中国的黑客能力有所增强。
The Chinese army’s signals-intelligence wing, the Third Department, used to be in charge of such work. It attacked everyone from American military contractors to Google. In 2014 America’s Department of Justice formally accused five Chinese citizens from the Third Department’s Unit 61398 of “computer hacking, economic espionage and other offences” against American companies involved in nuclear and solar power as well as metal production. (Those charged were believed to be in China and have not appeared in court.) By then, however, control over hacking activities was being transferred to the MSS. The army is still hacking, but its targets are now mainly government ones.
中国军队的电讯情报部门—第三部(情报三部?),曾经负责这项工作。它攻击了从美国军事承包商到谷歌的每一个人。2014年,美国司法部正式指控第三部61398单元的5名中国公民对参与核能和太阳能以及金属生产的美国公司实施"电脑黑客、经济间谍和其他罪行"。(被告据信在中国,没有出庭。然而那时,黑客活动的控制权正在移交给国家安全部。虽然军队仍在进行黑客攻击,但其目标现在主要是政府目标。
The MSS was first publicly linked to the hacking of foreign companies in 2017. Its involvement was exposed by an anonymous blog called Intrusion Truth, which monitors such attacks. Several cyber-security firms endorsed its analysis. Later that year the American government charged three alleged MSS hackers in absentia for attacks on foreign firms. Two of the accused had been identified by the blog.
2017年国家安全部被首次曝光牵涉于与外国公司的黑客攻击。一个名为"入侵真相"的匿名博客揭露了其参与,该博客监控此类攻击。几家网络安全公司认可了其分析。同年晚些时候,美国政府以攻击外国公司为由,缺席起诉了三名国家安全部的黑客。博客已经确认了两名被告的身份。
Attributing cyber-attacks to China, let alone to specific government agencies, is tricky. Benjamin Read of Mandiant, an American firm that tries to keep tabs on who is hacking what, explains that he and his colleagues gather and analyse telltale tracks, such as the addresses of computers used to launch attacks. A single hacking incident usually does not leave enough information to identify the culprit: attackers can give their computers a false address. But that can be laborious, since, whenever they use a new address, the hackers must also reinstall all of the tools they use to carry out attacks. This creates an incentive to use addresses repeatedly, which facilitates the work of cyber-detectives.
将网络攻击归咎于中国,更不用说将网络攻击归咎于特定的政府机构,是很棘手的。 本杰明·里德的曼迪安特,一家美国公司,试图密切关注谁在黑客攻击什么,解释说,他和他的同事收集和分析泄露的痕迹,比如如用于发动攻击的计算机的地址。单个黑客攻击事件通常不会留下足够的信息来识别罪魁祸首:攻击者可能会给他们的计算机一个虚假的地址。但是,这可能是费力的,因为每当他们使用一个新的地址,黑客还必须重新安装他们用于实施攻击的所有工具。这是反复使用同一个计算机地址的动机,从而帮助网络侦探的工作。
Under military oversight, China’s cyber-attacks often seemed haphazard. Hackers were given lists of targets at the beginning of each month, but there appeared to be little supervision or co-ordination of their efforts. The MSS has integrated the process more closely with other intelligence-gathering operations, says Mr Read. One team might grab a target’s mobile-phone data from a telecoms firm, then hand the information to a different group that would use it to infiltrate the device.
在军事监督下,中国的网络攻击往往显得随意无常。黑客在每月初都得到目标清单,但他们的努力似乎几乎没有监督或协调。里德表示,MSS已经将这一过程与其他情报收集行动更紧密地结合起来。一个团队可能会从电信公司获取目标的手机数据,然后将信息交给另一组,这些组将利用这些信息渗透到设备中。
Computer experts at Chinese universities have long co-operated with cyber-theft operations conducted by the army and the MSS. Such people have been obvious targets for recruitment by China’s intelligence agencies as in-house talent. Now the government is expanding the potential supply of hackers by creating a vast new teaching and research facility in the central city of Wuhan, says Dakota Cary of the Centre for Security and Emerging Technologies at Georgetown University in Washington. The 40-square-kilometre campus, called the National Cybersecurity Centre, is under the direction of the Communist Party’s Cyberspace Affairs Commission, led by Mr Xi. The centre will produce its first graduates—1,300 of them—next year.
长期以来,中国高校的计算机专家一直与军队和MSS开展的网络盗窃行动合作。 这些人显然是中国情报机构招募的内部人才的目标。华盛顿乔治敦大学安全与新兴技术中心的达科塔·卡里说,现在政府正在通过在中部城市武汉新建一个庞大的教学和研究设施来扩大黑客的潜在供应。这个40平方公里的校园被称为国家网络安全中心,由习近平领导的中共网络空间事务委员会领导。该中心明年将培养出第一批毕业生1,300人。
Growing numbers of people are needed to sift through the huge volumes of data that are stolen by the hackers. Mr Brazil of BluePath Labs reckons there are probably several hundred thousand analysts working on this already. “The economy and military have greatly benefited from technology theft,” he says. “Why stop just because those foreigners are feeling aggrieved?”
需要越来越多的人来筛选被黑客窃取的大量数据。 蓝路径实验室的巴西先生估计,可能已经有数十万分析师在研究这个问题。"经济和军队从技术盗窃中获益匪浅,"他说。"为什么仅仅因为那些外国人感到委屈就停下来呢?
America’s Federal Bureau of Investigation has been stepping up its efforts to curb the espionage. On November 5th an MSS officer was convicted in Ohio of conspiring to steal jet-engine technology from General Electric, an American conglomerate. In July two MSS spies living in China were formally accused of hacking into high-tech businesses around the world over the course of many years, most recently to steal pharmaceutical data related to covid-19 vaccines and treatments.
美国联邦调查局(FBI)一直在加大力度遏制间谍活动。11月5日,俄亥俄州一名MSS官员因密谋从美国通用电气公司窃取喷气发动机技术而被定罪。今年7月,两名居住在中国的MSS间谍被正式指控多年来侵入世界各地的高科技企业,最近一次是窃取与covid-19疫苗和治疗相关的药品数据。
Companies that worry about China’s hacking often use a private cyber-security firm to monitor their networks for subtle patterns indicating an attack, and try to cut it off before it goes too far. Encrypting as much data as possible helps them to minimise their losses. But it is extremely hard to fend off all cyber-spying. If China’s hackers really want to break into a network, are willing to work slowly and are able to operate stealthily, they will often succeed. The entreaties of Western governments will not deter them. ■
担心中国黑客攻击的公司经常使用一家私营网络安全公司来监控其网络,以发现显示攻击的微妙模式,并试图在攻击无法挽回之前切断攻击。加密尽可能多的数据有助于他们最大限度地减少损失。但是,要抵御所有的网络间谍活动是极其困难的。如果中国的黑客真的想打入一个网络,愿意慢慢工作、能够秘密操作,他们通常会成功。西方政府的恳求不会阻止他们。■
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New kids on the cell block
Behind bars, Hong Kong’s democrats remain popular
The city’s jails are filling up with dissidents
Nov 11th 2021 |
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SOME NEW inmates in Hong Kong’s prisons have reading wishlists that reflect interests beyond such common behind-bars topics as self-improvement and how to exercise in small spaces. Their requests include dystopian novels about totalitarianism, such as George Orwell’s “1984” and “Brave New World” by Aldous Huxley, or books about struggles against authoritarian rule, including Vaclav Havel’s “The Power of the Powerless” and “How To Feed A Dictator” by Witold Szablowski.
Such bookworms belong to a new breed of prisoner: the dissident. Before the pro-democracy demonstrations that roiled Hong Kong for much of 2019, few people were incarcerated for taking part in political protests. But the authorities have got tougher. More than 10,000 people have been arrested in connection with the unrest. Court proceedings have begun against a quarter of them. The government is building a megacourt to process a backlog of cases, including some involving a national-security law that was imposed in Hong Kong last year. Hundreds of people are now serving prison sentences or being held on remand for alleged offences related to the protests. Many Hong Kongers know someone in jail who has been accused of such crimes.
Conditions are better than in the mainland’s jails, where political prisoners are allowed little, if any, contact with the outside world and are often treated brutally. In Hong Kong, volunteers collect books and organise letter-writing campaigns for detainees. Online guides provide advice to correspondents about what not to write: avoid slogans from the protests and any references to violence or sexually explicit material. Instead, write about trivial news, tell jokes, describe movie plots and draw sketches, suggests one manual. A bookseller recently ran an eight-part workshop. Participants wrote letters to inmates and read prison literature by Nelson Mandela, Havel and activists from Hong Kong. Joshua Wong (pictured, entering prison), one of the best-known faces of the pro-democracy movement, has written that he is grateful for “every word and every sentence” mailed to him.
Sympathy for political detainees is widespread in Hong Kong. During a heatwave in May, a petition for the provision of cold water and more showers to those incarcerated garnered over 140,000 signatures. A cottage industry has emerged to help them in other ways. Some Hong Kongers transcribe popular YouTube videos for inmates, who cannot access the internet. Other pen-pals copy and paste posts from LIHKG, an online forum that attracts democracy enthusiasts, in order to create a physical newspaper for inmates. “As an avid user of LIHKG, these forum-post printouts are my Bible,” says a detainee quoted by a prisoner-rights group.
Well-known pro-democracy inmates pass the time by exercising, writing letters, helping fellow inmates with their appeals and publishing articles in local newspapers. Chow Hang Tung, a jailed barrister and human-rights activist, accepted her boyfriend’s proposal of marriage, which was sent to her by letter. It was later published in Ming Pao, one of Hong Kong’s leading newspapers. These young Hong Kongers are “learning to seek freedom in an environment where they have lost their freedom”, writes Chan Kin-man, an academic who served 16 months in jail for his role in the Umbrella Movement of 2014.
Imprisoned activists are scattered throughout the city’s jails to prevent them from communicating with each other. But officials still worry about their influence. In September an elite squad was used to quell a protest by 18 prisoners angered at the treatment of other inmates, including Tiffany Yuen, a district councillor who is on remand under the national-security law. They had been accused of acquiring a prohibited number of chocolates and hair clips. Bizarrely, officials feared they might give them to other inmates to win support for Ms Yuen. “This is how groups begin, like terrorist groups recruiting followers,” said Woo Ying-ming, the head of Hong Kong’s prisons. Even behind bars, officials keep Ms Yuen’s type under close watch. ■
This article was downloaded by calibre from https://www.economist.com/china/2021/11/11/behind-bars-hong-kongs-democrats-remain-popular
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Chaguan
China will stick to a zero-covid policy, for now
Harsh rules will enjoy support, as long as life feels safe for the majority
Nov 12th 2021 |
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NEARLY TWO years into the covid-19 pandemic, China’s propaganda machine is locked in a futile argument with the outside world. The row is about whether this giant country is paying too high a price for its “zero-covid” policy. China’s attempts to eliminate the virus, rather than merely manage it, are certainly costly. They have largely closed China’s borders for 19 months. Dozens of city districts, towns and counties are enduring lockdowns as the highly contagious Delta variant and an early cold snap cause a flare-up of infections. There are several hundred cases of the disease nationwide. Many of them are local transmissions rather than imports from abroad, underscoring Delta’s perils. Controls include roadblocks manned by police in protective suits, closed schools, cancelled trains and testing of millions of residents.
With officials facing punishment for cases on their watch, grassroots harshness abounds. The northern city of Heihe has declared a “people’s war”, with rewards of up to 100,000 yuan ($15,600) for residents who report such pandemic crimes as illegal hunting. A county in Inner Mongolia locked nearly 10,000 tourists in hotels for two weeks to smother an outbreak. Two pharmacies in suburban Beijing lost their licences for selling fever-reducing medicines to a couple without logging their names in a virus-tracking database. The customers, who had earlier visited areas with covid cases and later tested positive, are being prosecuted for failing to report to a fever clinic. Citing possible transmission risks, officials in cities including Chengdu, Harbin and Wuxi entered the homes of quarantined locals and killed their pet cats.
Officials reject foreign reports that call such measures unsustainable. “It’s simply not right to question China’s efforts to eliminate the virus,” complained Xinhua, a state news agency, citing the country’s “robust” economy and calling travel curbs a “minor inconvenience”. Hu Xijin, the editor of a tabloid newspaper, says foreigners are jealous of China’s virus-fighting record, and charges that America has eased pandemic controls because it values “money over life”. In fact, the two sides are talking past one another if they focus on how strict zero-covid policies are. It is more relevant to ask who feels the pain from those controls. They are best understood as a giant utilitarian experiment. To help the majority enjoy an orderly, covid-free existence, a hapless minority—notably those who catch the virus or are suspected of contact with carriers—must sacrifice individual liberties, privacy and dignity.
A focus on the interests of the majority resonates with many Chinese. They remember images of chaos in Wuhan last year, as the virus overwhelmed hospitals in that city of 10m. They know that the health system is weaker outside big urban centres. Many doctors in rural clinics lack university degrees. Intensive-care beds are rare. American-style pandemic policies could have led to millions of deaths. As for closed borders, which cause anguish to expatriates and Chinese with family overseas, they do not greatly pain the 87% of the population without passports.
Many citizens of democratic countries would not tolerate half the rules imposed on China in this pandemic. But the collective sacrifices of the Chinese have produced something remarkable. In a country of 1.4bn people, the official total death toll from the pandemic is under 6,000, compared with almost 808,000 excess deaths in America, which has less than one-quarter of China’s population. Some scepticism of China’s statistics is reasonable, given that officials in Wuhan, where the outbreak was first detected, concealed the virus for weeks in late 2019 and early 2020. Yet if large outbreaks were still being concealed today, control systems would start breaking down, for they rely on tracking and tracing fresh cases. Instead, life in much of China is relatively normal.
Strictness for the greater good continues to enjoy unmistakable public support. But Chinese leaders do face a risk whenever public opinion suspects that overly harsh lockdowns actually serve the interests of a minority, ie, officials eager to cover their backs. There are signs of disquiet. Chengdu, for instance, recently broadened its pandemic controls, testing 82,000 people whose mobile telephones had spent ten minutes within 800 metres of a suspected case. Other cities have started copying this approach. But on November 8th two leading epidemiologists and a doctor in Chengdu wrote an open letter warning pandemic officials that such mass testing must be guided by science, and risks causing panic. That officials keep talking about punishing rule-breakers is a sign of at least some public fatigue. It also risks driving the weary to hide from the authorities.
The party calls pandemic control proof that it loves the people
To maintain support, strict controls must be seen to benefit everyone, though a minority will feel the most hardship. Foreigners in China, yearning for borders to open, often suggest that the sight of normality in the rest of the world will soon make Chinese citizens restless. For now, state media keep such envy at bay by presenting the West as a death-stalked hellhole. An online video promoted this week by state media is filled with images of Donald Trump when he was America’s president, and the chaos abroad of those days. It calls American travellers “walking vectors of contagion”.
To date, zero-covid’s worst effects have been felt by luckless minorities, from locked-down residents to those whose livelihoods depend on free movement within and outside China. Fear, and the stigma endured by those who catch the virus, have ensured compliance with orders. Harsh policies have bought China’s leaders time, as they wait for potent vaccines and antiviral drugs that might let them open up safely. Officials have arguably slowed an exit by refusing to approve foreign vaccines that are more effective than China’s, in their eagerness to prove the superiority of one-party rule over Western democracy. Further mutations of the virus may one day challenge China’s strategy. If they make lockdowns more frequent, the ranks of the unlucky will grow.■
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2021年11月6日
Orwellian and proud 奥威尔和自豪
Xi Jinping is rewriting history to justify his rule for years to come
Who controls the present controls the past
习近平正在通过改写历史来证明其接下来数年统治的正当性。他是一个控制着过去和将来的人。
Nov 6th 2021 |
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IN PREPARATION FOR a third five-year term as the Communist Party’s leader, Xi Jinping has been changing the rules of politics, business and society. He has also been pursuing another project that he sees as essential to his continued grip on power: rewriting the history of the party itself. Mr Xi wants to show his country that he is indispensable, a political giant on a par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping who is turning China into a global power by building on their legacy.
为给第三个作为共产党领导人的任期做准备,习近平一直在更改政治、经济和社会规则。他亦不断谋求那些对他继续掌权至关重要的其他事务:重写党的历史。习主席希望对他的国家展示出自己是一个不可或缺的、一个与毛泽东和邓小平比肩的政治巨人,毛和邓的政治遗产正在将中国变成一个世界强国。
On November 8th about 370 members of the political and military elite will gather in Beijing for an annual four-day meeting of the party’s Central Committee. The only advertised topic on their agenda is a resolution on the party’s history. It will be the third in the party’s 100-year existence. The first, in 1945, and the second, in 1981, were triumphs for Mao and Deng respectively, consolidating their grip on power at crucial junctures. Mr Xi’s ability to secure one of his own suggests that he has quelled any meaningful opposition to extending his rule at a party congress that is due to be held late in 2022. The resolution will be “an extraordinary demonstration of power”, says Jude Blanchette of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington.
在十一月八日,370余位政治和军事精英代表齐聚北京,参加为期四日的党中央一年一度的会议(也就是XX届X中全会)。在会议议程上唯一被宣传的议题是关于党的历史决议。在共产党的百年历史中,这是第三次。
第一次发生于1945年,第二次是1981年,通过这两次决议,毛和邓分别在关键时刻巩固了他们的政治地位。
习主席具备维持其政治地位的能力,这显示出他已经��息了所有对于其在2022年召开的党代会上关于延长他的统治的意义深远的反对。 华盛顿智囊团战略与国际研究中心的朱德·布兰切特说,这项决议将是"权力的非凡展示"。
The plenum is the second-to-last conclave of the Central Committee before the five-yearly congress, and a crucial one for setting its tone. Next year’s event will mark a decade of Mr Xi’s leadership. By loosely established convention, it would be his political farewell. But he is all but certain to secure another term. In the past year, once again, he has been working hard to silence critics and crush potential rivals, purging the security apparatus, promoting political allies and showing the party’s muscle by unleashing regulators on big private firms. Before the congress he will probably make his choice (in secret) of replacements for senior officials who are expected to retire at a meeting of the national legislature in March 2023. They include a new prime minister and domestic-security chief.
全会是五年一次的中央委员会的倒数第二次全体会议,也是确定会议基调的关键一次。明年的会议将对习近平领导的十年作出决议。按照毫无拘束力的惯例,这将是他的政治告别,但他几乎肯定会连任。在过去的一年里,他再次努力压制批评者、潜在的竞争对手、整肃安全机关、结交政治盟友,并通过对大型私人公司加强监管来展示党的实力。在大会召开之前,他可能会(秘密地)选定接替将于2023年3月在全国人大卸任的高级官员的人。他们包括一位新国务院总理和国内安全主管(不知道说的谁,不太可能是公安部部长吧?难道是纪委监察委主任?)。
The resolution on history has been circulated among senior officials, but its contents will not be made public until after the plenum ends on November 11th. Speeches by Mr Xi and the writings of official commentators offer clues. It is expected to celebrate the party’s achievements, minimise the horrors unleashed by Mao and suggest that Mao, Deng and Mr Xi have shared the same vision. The reigns of Mao and Deng will be presented as essential preliminary phases before the start of Mr Xi’s “new era”. Mao helped the Chinese people “stand up” after a century of humiliation by foreign powers. Deng set China on a path to “get rich” after centuries of poverty. Now Mr Xi is helping China to “get strong”. The resolution will hail Mr Xi’s judicious leadership in managing social, economic and national-security challenges, and suggest a continuing need for his wisdom.
关于历史的决议已经在高级官员中分发,但其内容要到11月11日全会结束后才会公布。但习近平的讲话和官方评论员的文章为内容提供了线索,预计它将庆祝党的成就,尽量减少毛泽东所发动的恐怖,并暗示毛泽东、邓小平和习近平有着相同的愿景。在习近平的"新时代"开始前,毛泽东和邓小平的统治是重要的初步阶段。毛泽东帮助中国人民在被外国列强羞辱了一个世纪之后"站起来"。邓小平使中国在几个世纪的贫困之后走上了"致富"的道路。现在,习近平正在帮助中国"变得强大"。决议将赞扬习近平在应对社会、经济和国家安全挑战方面发挥的明智领导作用,并表示中国仍然需要他的智慧。
Mr Xi’s predecessors used history differently in their resolutions. In 1945 Mao justified a purge of his enemies, blaming them for past mistakes so he could position himself as the unquestioned leader. In 1981 Deng’s resolution said that Mao had made serious mistakes and that the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 had been a “grave blunder”, causing chaos. By criticising Mao, albeit cautiously, Deng rebuilt public support for the party and freed his hand to pursue free-market reforms.
习近平的前任们在决议中操纵历史的方式有所不同。1945年,毛泽东通过政治敌人过去的错误来为清除敌人辩护,这样他就可以把自己定位为无可置疑的领导人。1981年,邓小平的决议说,毛泽东犯了严重的错误,1966-76年的文化大革命是一个"严重的错误",造成了混乱。邓小平尽管是谨慎地批评毛泽东,但他重建了公众对党的支持,并解放了双手,推行自由市场改革。
But history presents a different challenge to Mr Xi. On the party’s left wing are neo-Maoists who have long agitated for a restoration of their hero, and have criticised Deng, whom they blame for such problems as corruption and inequality. On the right are those who worry (very privately) that China is sliding back towards a Mao-style dictatorship and losing its commitment to Deng’s reforms.
但历史对习近平提出了不同的挑战。党内左翼人士是新毛派,他们长期以来一直鼓动恢复毛的英雄身份,并批评邓小平,他们指责邓小平的改革存在腐败和不平等等问题。右翼人士(非常私下)担心中国正滑向毛泽东式的独裁政权,并失去对邓小平对改革作出的努力。
Mr Xi has declared that neither Mao nor Deng should be used to “negate” the other. He does not want a history filled with mistakes and contradictions, nor one that raises questions about one-man rule. He believes the collapse of the Soviet Union was hastened by a failure to protect the legacies of Lenin and Stalin. He has campaigned vigorously against “historical nihilism”—essentially anything that casts the party’s past in an unfavourable light. Tomes that excavate Mao’s worst mistakes, once tolerated, are now strongly discouraged.
习近平宣称,毛泽东和邓小平都不应被用来"否定"对方。他不希望历史充满错误和矛盾,也不希望通过历史引发对一个人统治的质疑。他认为,苏联的解体是由于未能保护列宁和斯大林的遗产而加速的。他大力反对"历史虚无主义",本质上是反对以不利的眼光看待党的过去的东西。挖掘毛泽东最严重错误的书籍,曾经被容忍过,现在却被强烈封禁了。
A new official history of the party, published in February, gives a glimpse of Mr Xi’s preferred approach. It touches only briefly on the Cultural Revolution. It does not mention the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward that killed tens of millions, nor any casualties in the crushing of the pro-democracy protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The section on Mr Xi’s tenure takes up more than a quarter of the book. Mr Xi’s predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, are given much less space.
2月出版的新的官方党史,让人看到了习近平先生喜欢的方式。它只简短地提到了文化大革命。它没有提到大跃进造成的导致数千万人死亡的饥荒,也没有提到1989年天安门广场民主抗议活动被镇压时的任何伤亡。关于习近平先生任期的部分占了全书四分之一以上的篇幅。习近平的前任胡锦涛和江泽民的篇幅则少得多。
The new resolution will suggest that China needs Mr Xi in order to fulfil long-term goals such as turning the country into a “modern socialist nation” by 2035 and a “prosperous” and “strong” one by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic. It will probably mention his “common prosperity” campaign to reduce inequality and his “dual circulation” strategy to make the economy more resilient to external shocks like the pandemic and trade disputes with America. It is expected to describe a grim international environment, though America and its allies may not be named. And it will probably repeat the party’s ritual language about Taiwan, saying it must be reunited with the mainland. China’s failure to retake Taiwan has been a sore point for every leader since Mao. The resolution is sure to mention Mr Xi’s call for the “great revival of the Chinese nation” by 2049, which suggests that he aims to secure reunification before then. A specific promise is unlikely.
新决议将表明,中国需要习主席来实现长期目标,例如在2035年之前将中国变成一个 "现代社会主义国家",在2049年,即共和国成立100周年之前变成一个 "富强 "的国家。它可能会提到他的减少不平等的 "共同富裕 "运动,以及他的 "国际国内双循环 "战略,使经济对外部冲击(如疫情和与美国的贸易争端)有更强的抵御能力。预计它将描述一个严峻的国际环境,尽管可能不会提到美国及其盟友。而且它可能会重复该党关于台湾的仪式性语言,说它必须与大陆统一。自毛泽东以来,中国未能夺回台湾一直是每位领导人的痛点。决议肯定会提到习近平先生关于在2049年实现 "中华民族伟大复兴 "的呼吁,这表明他的目标是在那之前实现台湾统一。当然,在这个问题上获得具体的保证是不太可能的。
In anticipation of the plenum, the propaganda apparatus has begun cranking out fawning articles about Mr Xi’s wisdom, hoping, it would seem, to foster enthusiasm for the idea that he will carry on ruling. On November 1st People’s Daily, the party’s mouthpiece, began publishing a series of editorials under the title “Crucial decisions in the new era”. They hail the party’s achievements since it was founded in 1921, and praise Mr Xi’s contributions to them. From Mr Xi’s perspective, the resolution “not only has to look back over the past, but it has to look to the future”, says Joseph Fewsmith of Boston University. And according to Mr Fewsmith, Mr Xi thinks, “The future, c’est moi.”■
为了迎接全会的召开,宣传机构已经开始大肆宣扬习近平先生的智慧,似乎是希望培养人们对他将继续执政的热情。11月1日,党的喉舌《人民日报》开始以 "新时代的关键决定 "为题发表一系列社论。这些社论赞扬了该党自1921年成立以来所取得的成就,并称赞了习主席对这些成就的贡献。波士顿大学的Joseph Fewsmith说,从习主席的角度来看,决议 "不仅要回顾过去,而且要展望未来"。而根据Fewsmith先生的说法,习近平先生认为,"未来,就是我。
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Unpacific 非太平洋
China seeks to join the nuclear big league
中国寻求加入核大国联盟
The Pentagon warns that China is fast building up its nukes, as well as its conventional forces, to confront America
五角大楼警告说,中国正在迅速建立核武器和增强常备力量,以对抗美国
Nov 3rd 2021 | WASHINGTON, DC
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WHEN AMERICA and the Soviet Union raced each other to build ever-larger nuclear arsenals during the cold war, China ambled disdainfully. It did not detonate its first nuclear weapon until 1964, kept only a few hundred warheads compared with the tens of thousands piled up by the superpowers, and to this day maintains it will never be the first to use nukes in a war. Now China is sprinting to catch up.
当美国和苏联在冷战期间竞相建立越来越大的核武库时,中国不屑一顾。中国直到1964年才引爆其第一枚核武器,与超级大国堆积的数万枚核弹头相比,中国只保留了几百枚核弹头,而且至今仍坚称中国不会在战争中首先使用核弹。但现在,中国正在冲刺追赶。
In its latest annual assessment, the Pentagon says China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads, which last year it reckoned to be in the “low-200s”, could triple to about 700 by 2027 and will probably quintuple to about 1,000 or more by 2030. That is sharply higher than America’s previous forecast that the arsenal would double in size by then. Even so, it would still be smaller than America’s or Russia’s. Those countries each have about 4,000 warheads.
五角大楼在其最新的年度评估中说,中国的核弹头储备,去年它估计在 "低至200枚",到2027年可能增加两番至约700枚,到2030年可能增加五番至约1000枚或更多。这大大高于美国以前的预测,之前美国认为中国到那时武库的规模将增加一倍。即便如此,它仍将少于美国或俄罗斯的储备。这些国家各自拥有约4000枚弹头。
The report’s conclusions explain America’s alarm about China’s rapid military modernisation. Hitherto the greatest worry has been about its conventional arms, notably its growing ability to overwhelm and invade Taiwan, and stop America from coming to the rescue. Now the anxiety is spreading to the nuclear domain.
该报告的结论解释了美国对中国快速军事现代化的担忧。迄今为止,最大的担忧是它的常规武器,特别是它越来越有能力压倒和入侵台湾,并阻止美国前来救援。现在,这种忧虑正在向核领域蔓延。
Speculation about the build-up mounted in June and July, when researchers spotted that China was building hundreds of missile silos in Gansu, a western province, and in Xinjiang, its neighbour. Then the generals were stunned by China’s testing of a new weapon—a hypersonic glide vehicle mounted on a large rocket—that could deliver a nuclear warhead at high speed while evading anti-missile defences. The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, said it was close to being a “Sputnik moment”—the shock America felt when the Soviet Union sent the first satellite into orbit in 1957.
6月和7月,当研究人员发现中国正在西部省份甘肃和邻省新疆建造数百个导弹发射井时,人们对这种军事建设的猜测不断增加。然后,中国测试了一种新武器--安装在大型火箭上的高超音速滑翔飞行器--可以高速投掷核弹头,同时躲避反导弹防御系统,这让将军们感到震惊。参谋长联席会议主席马克-米利将军说,这接近于 "斯普特尼克Sputnik时刻"--当苏联在1957年将第一颗卫星送入轨道时,美国感到震惊。(Sputnik是苏联发射的第一颗人造卫星)
The Pentagon believes China is building fast-breeder reactors to make the necessary plutonium; may already have created a full “triad”, ie, the ability to launch nuclear weapons from the land, sea and air; and is expanding its early-warning systems, with help from Russia.
五角大楼认为,中国正在建造快速??反应堆以制造必要��钚;可能已经建立了完整的 "三合一"系统,即从陆地、海洋和空中发射核武器的能力;并且在俄罗斯的帮助下,正在扩大其预警系统。
All told, China is shifting to a “launch on warning” doctrine. Rather than rely on a minimal nuclear deterrent to retaliate after an initial nuclear attack, China would henceforth fire at the first sign of an incoming nuclear strike, even before the enemy warheads have landed. This posture is akin to that of America and Russia, notes James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank in Washington, “but increases the risk of inadvertent launch, such as a response to a false warning”.
总而言之,中国的核政策正在转向 "预警发射 "的理论。中国不再依靠最低限度的核威慑力在最初的核攻击后进行报复,而是在核攻击到来的第一时间开火,甚至在敌人的弹头落地之前。华盛顿智库卡内基基金会的詹姆斯-阿克顿指出,这种姿态类似于美国和俄罗斯的姿态,"但却增加了无意中发射的风险,例如对错误警报的反应"。
Some Chinese strategists have debated moving to “mutual assured destruction”—the doctrine that animated both superpowers in the cold war—and even discussed when it would make sense to be first to use nuclear weapons. They have also considered low-yield weapons that could be used in a limited manner, without initiating all-out nuclear war.
一些中国的战略家已经就转向 "相互确保摧毁"--这一在冷战中激励两个超级大国的理论--进行了辩论,甚至讨论了何时率先使用核武器才是合理的。他们还考虑了可以有限度地使用的低当量武器,而不会引发全面的核战争。
The nuclear expansion casts a new light on China’s island-building in the South China Sea, where it has constructed military bases on disputed reefs and atolls. Its current submarine-launched missiles need to sail far into the Pacific if the JL-2 missiles they carry are to reach the east coast of the United States. But the JL-3 missiles in development, intended for a new generation of “boomer” submarines, could fire from waters close to China. That would encourage China to create maritime “bastions” in the Gulf of Bohai and the South China Sea, modelled on those the Soviet Union established in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, whose waters were thickly defended by submarines, surface ships and aircraft.
核扩张为中国在南海的岛屿建设带来了新的启示,中国在有争议的珊瑚礁和环礁上建造了军事基地。中国目前的潜射导弹需要远航到太平洋,如果它们携带的是JL-2导弹则要到达美国的东海岸。但正在开发的JL-3导弹,是为新一代 "潮汐 "潜艇准备的,可以从靠近中国的水域发射。这将鼓励中国在渤海湾和南海建立海上 "堡垒",仿效苏联在巴伦支海和鄂霍次克海建立的 "堡垒",这些水域由潜艇、水面舰艇和飞机严密防守。
Why is China building up its nukes at a time when America and Russia have extended the New START treaty, which limits their arsenals, and when America is thinking of reducing the role of nuclear weapons by declaring that their “sole purpose” is to deter or retaliate against nuclear attack?
One reason is China’s worry that its arsenal is too small to survive an American first strike. Many could be destroyed by nuclear weapons or accurate conventional missiles; remaining ones might then be taken out by America’s anti-missile systems.
China is modernising its land-based missiles by building mobile launchers with solid-fuel rockets, which are easier to hide and quicker to fire than older models. It is also working on its triad. As well deploying more nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles, China has brought into service the H6-N bomber, which can carry an air-launched ballistic missile. And it has also deployed an earlier version of a hypersonic weapon, the DF-17 (pictured).
Xi Jinping, China’s leader, wants to build a “world-class” military force by 2049, the centenary of the Communist Party’s takeover, as part of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. A powerful nation, it seems, must have powerful nuclear forces—especially if it is going to stand up to America.
为什么中国在美国和俄罗斯延长限制其核武库的《新削减战略武器条约》之时,以及美国正在考虑通过宣布核武器的 "唯一目的 "是威慑或报复核攻击来减少核武器的作用之时,正在加强其核武?
其中一个原因是中国担心自己的武库太小,无法在美国的第一次打击中幸存。许多导弹可能被核武器或精确的常规导弹摧毁;剩下的导弹可能被美国的反导弹系统干掉。
中国正在对其陆基导弹进行现代化改造,建造带有固体燃料火箭的移动发射器,这种火箭比老式火箭更容易隐藏,发射速度更快。它还在研究其三合一系统。除了部署更多带有弹道导弹的核潜艇外,中国还将H6-N轰炸机投入使用,它可以携带一枚空射弹道导弹。它还部署了一种早期版本的高超音速武器DF-17(如图)。
中国领导人习近平希望在2049年,即中国共产党执政100周年之际,建立一支 "世界级 "的军事力量,作为 "中华民族伟大复兴 "的一部分。一个强大的国家,似乎必须拥有强大的核力量--特别是如果它要对抗美国的话。
As though China’s nuclear build-up were not enough to worry about, this year’s Pentagon report says that China’s work on “dual-use applications” call into question its compliance with the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention. Moreover, it says America “cannot certify” that China is meeting its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
似乎中国的核建设还不够让人担心,今年的五角大楼报告说,中国在 "双重用途 "方面的工作让人质疑其对《生物和毒素武器公约》(就是《禁止生物武器公约》)的遵守。此外,它说美国 "无法证明 "中国正在履行其在《化学武器公约》下的义务。
All this can only feed America’s anxiety about the rise of China, and reinforce the sense that it is in a new cold war. It also increases the risk of errors, or of an incident turning into a large confrontation—say, over America’s “freedom of navigation” patrols in the South China Sea. Perhaps most worrying is that China has thus far eschewed nuclear arms-control deals, and has shown little interest in hotlines and other risk-reduction mechanisms that helped to manage the contest between America and the Soviet Union.
Tellingly, the Pentagon report confirms the purpose of a telephone call that senior American defence officials and General Milley made to the PLA in October 2020 to reassure the Chinese that America was not about to attack them. As the report puts it, “these events highlighted the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.”
所有这一切只能助长美国对中国崛起的焦虑,并加强其处于新冷战的感觉。这也增加了出错的风险,或者事件演变成大规模对抗的风险--比如,关于美国在南中国海的 "航行自由 "巡逻。也许最令人担忧的是,中国迄今为止一直回避核军备控制交易,对帮助管理美国和苏联之间的竞赛的热线和其他风险减少机制也没有表现出兴趣。
有意思的是,五角大楼的报告证实了美国高级国防官员和米利将军在2020年10月给解放军打电话的目的,即向中国人保证美国不会攻击他们。正如报告所言,"这些事件突出了误解和误判的可能性"。
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