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Article 1440

 A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary.

Case:  THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. ANASTASIA ABADILLA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-21334        December 10, 1924

Facts:

On January 25, 1892, Palad executed a holographic will party in Spanish and partly in Tagalog. Palad died on December 3, 1896, without descendants, but leaving a widow, the appellant Dorotea Lopez, to whom he had been married since October 4, 1885. On July 27, 1987, the Court of First Instance of Tayabas ordered the protocolization of the will over the opposition of Leopoldo and Policarpio Palad, collateral heirs of the deceased and of whom the appellants Palad are descendants.

After the death of Luis Palad the widow Dorotea Lopez remained in possession of the land and in the year 1900 married one Calixto Dolendo. On April 20, 1903, the aforesaid collateral heirs of Luis Palad brought an action against the widow for the partition of the lands here in question on the ground that she, by reason of her second marriage.

During the pendency of the action, the parties arrived at an agreement delivering the lands with lot nos. 3464 and 3469 to the Municipality of Tayabas as trustee while lot no. 3470 was left in the possession of Dorothea. The testator’s collateral heirs filed a claim over the lands contending that the trust instituted in the will was ineffective.

Issue: 

Whether or not the trust instituted in he will was effective

Ruling:

Yes.  It is a well-known rule that testamentary dispositions must be liberally construed so as to give effect to the intention of the testator as revealed by the will itself. Applying this rule of construction it seems evident that by the clause in question the testator proposed to create a trust for the benefit of a secondary school to be established in the town of Tayabas, naming as trustee the ayuntamiento of the town or if there be no ayuntamiento, then the civil governor of the Province of Tayabas.

If the trustee holds the legal title and the devise is valid, the natural heirs of the deceased have no remaining interest in the land except their right to the reversion in the event the devise for some reason should fail, an event which has not as yet taken place. From a reading of the testamentary clause under discussion it seems quite evident that the intention of the testator was to have income of the property accumulate for the benefit of the proposed school until the same should be established.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed in regard to lots Nos. 3464 and 3469 and is reversed as to lot No. 3470, and it is ordered that said lot No. 3470 be registered in the name of the claimant Dorotea Lopez. No costs will be allowed.

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Article 1390

The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:

(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

Consent, as an element of contracts, must be intelligent and free. If either attribute is impeded or impaired, the consent is said to be vitiated and the contract is voidable.

Case:

LUIS ASIAIN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENJAMIN JALANDONI, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-20435             October 23, 1923

Facts:

Asiain and Jalandoni owned adjacent haciendas in La Carlota, Negros Occidental. Asiain offered Jalandoni a portion of his hacienda for P55,000. Jalandoni paid P30,000 and had the sugarcane ground and land surveyed. Asiain filed an action to recover the sum of P25,000 or to obtain the certificate of title plus rent. The CFI judge annulled the contract and ordered the return of the land and title.

Issues: 

Whether or not rescission is proper based on the discrepancy in size. 

Ruling:

Yes. It was a gross sale in which there was a mutual mistake as to the quantity of land sold and as to the amount of the standing crop. The phrase "more or less" in the memorandum-agreement covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. This was a case of gross deficiency. The mistake with reference to the subject matter of the contract is such that, at the option of the purchaser, it is rescindable. Without such mistake the agreement would not have been made. Hence, the agreement is inoperative and void. The ultimate result is to put the parties back in exactly their respective positions before they became involved in the negotiations and before the accomplishment of the agreement.

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Article 1358

The following must appear in a public document:

(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein a governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;

(2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains;

(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person;

(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document.

All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by Articles, 1403, No. 2 and 1405. (1280a)

The  contracts  covered  by  this  article  are  valid  and enforceable though not embodied in a public document or  instrument  or  in  writing.  The  public  document  is required only for the convenience and greater protection of the parties and registration is needed only to make the contract effective as against third persons.

Case:

MANUEL COUTO SORIANO V. BLAS CORTES

G.R. No. L-3628. August 30, 1907

Facts:

Manuel Couto Soriano filed petition in the Court of Land Registration asking that a tract of land therein described, situated in the city of Iloilo, be registered in his name. Blas Cortes appeared in the court below and opposed the petition, alleging that he was the owner of the land. Judgment was entered in favor of the petitioner and from that judgment Blas Cortes has appealed

Soriano  derives his title from Baldomero Sola by a deed dated the 30th of December, 1896, and recorded in the registry of property of Iloilo on the 2d of January, 1897. In this deed the grantor, Baldomero Sola, states that he acquired the property by purchase from Blas Cortes in the month of August, 1894.

There was no written evidence of such sale. That Baldomero Sola procured a possessory title to said land on the 23d day of November, 1896, is, we think, clearly proven. The documents relating thereto were recorded in the registry of property on the 30th of November, 1896. But these documents could not in any way constitute a written contract of sale between Blas Cortes and Baldomero Sola, although Blas Cortes was present when the proceedings were taken in the Court of First Instance and gave his assent thereto. It could not constitute the public document which is mentioned in article 1280, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code.

Issues:

Whether or not a verbal contact of sale of real estate was valid according to the law.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court principles in the case of Thunga Chui v Que Bentec, held that a contract is required by Article 1280 to be in writing was, nevertheless valid and produced legal effects between the parties although it was made verbally.

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Article 1326

Advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to make proposals, and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears.

Case:

TIBURCIO LEOQUINCO vs. THE POSTAL SAVINGS BANK, ET AL., 

Facts:

Leoquinco alleged that he was the highest bidder at a public auction held by the defendants on March 31, 1924, for the sale of a piece or parcel of land belonging to the Bank, situated at Navotas, Province of Rizal, having offered P27,000 for said property; that in Resolution No. 31 of the board of directors of the Bank, authorizing the sale of said property at public auction, as well as in the public notice announcing said sale, the board of directors have expressly reserved to themselves the right to reject any and all bids; that as such highest bidder at said auction, he wrote a letter to the defendants on May 9, 1924, advising that he was ready to tender payment for the land as soon as the deed of sale of the same in his favor is executed and delivered by the defendants; that the defendants refused to execute the deed in spite of requests made therefor by him; that said refusal caused him damages in the sum of P25,000 more or less. Plaintiff prayed that said defendants be ordered to execute and deliver the deed of sale of said land in his favor, and to pay him damages amounting to P25,000, and the costs.

Issue:

Whether or not the bank may refuse to execute and deliver the deed of sale.

Ruling:

Leoquinco  has no ground of action to compel them to execute a deed of sale of the land in his favor, nor to compel them to accept his bid or offer.  By taking part in the auction and offering his bid, the appellant voluntarily submitted to the terms and conditions of the auction sale, announced in the notice, and clearly acknowledged the right so reserved to the bank.

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Article 1294

If the substitution is without the knowledge of or against

the will of the debtor, the new debtor’s insolvency or non- fulfillment of the obligation shall not give rise to any liability on the part of the original debtor

Expromision is the initiative for the change does not emanate from the debtor and may be made even without his knowledge, since it consists in a third person assuming the obligation.

Substitution by Expromision. No liability for the new debtor’s insolvency can be enforced against the old debtor, because the latter did not have the initiative in making the change, which might have been made even without his knowledge.

Case: 

TIRSO GARCIA vs. KHU YEK CHIONG, ET AL.

Facts:

Khu Yek Chiong obtained a credit from the Mercantile Bank of China amounting to P115,294.41. Ang Gioc Chim-M. Escolar & Co. also obtained a credit from the same Bank amounting to P18, 805.08. Khu Yek Chiong, jointly and severally, with Ang Gioc Chim-M.Escolar & Co., guaranteed the obligations; Khu Yek Chiongdelivered to the bank 1,500 stock certificates to secure his payment. Khu Yek Chiong assumed the obligations of Ang Gioc Chim-M. Escolar & Co.

Plaintiff Tirso Garcia was the receiver of bank upon liquidation, he filed this case for recovery of the said amounts from appellants upon liquidation. The court ruled in favor of plaintiff Tirso Garcia and ordered Khu Yek Chiong to pay plaintiff P115,294.41 with interest at 10%; both appellants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, P18,805.08 w/ interest at 10%; and that the stock certificates placed as security be sold at public auction. 

It was alleged that the contract between the bank and Ang Gioc Chim-M. Escolar & Co. was later novated and Khu Yek Chiong assumed, as sole debtor, all the obligations of Ang Gioc Chim-M. Escolar & Co. Appellants presented evidence such as letters from Ang Gioc Chim to the bank, letters from Khu Yek Chiong to the bank, and letters from the bank to Khu Yek Chiong inquiring if he had already assumed the obligations of the co-partnership.

Issue:

Whether or not the novation is valid

Ruling:

No. Khu Yek Chiong was alleged to have made a novation with the consent of the creditor, but this was not proven. Evidence shows that Khu Yek Chiong was willing to assume the obligations of Ang Gioc Chim-M. Escolar & Co. However, the letters shown by the defendants are useless in declaring novation without the consent of the creditor bank.

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SECTION 2 Loss of the Thing Due Article 1262

An obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred in delay. When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable even for fortuitous events, the loss of the thing does not extinguish the obligation, and he shall be responsible for damages. The same rule applies when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. (1182a)

Thing is lost when:

1. It perishes 2. Goes out of commerce 3. Disappear 4. Cannot be recovered

General Rule: The obligation is extinguished.

Exceptions: When the debtor is made liable for a fortuitous event 1. By provision of law, 2. If it is stipulated in the contracts and 3. When the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk

Instances when the law requires liability even in case of fortuitous event

The debtor is in default.

When the debtor has promised to deliver the same thing to two (2) or more persons who do not have the same interest.

Obligation arises from a crime. 

When a borrower has rent the thing to another who is not a member of his own household 

Case: 

ALFREDO N. CRUZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSE M. VALERO and LUZON SUGAR COMPANY  Defendants-Appellees.

Facts:

Alfredo Cruz was a sugar cane planter who adhered to the Luzon Sugar Company, a sugar center located in the province of Bulacan. Alfredo Cruz had a share amounting to 1,544.38 piculs of export centrifugal sugar, known as A sugar, which was exchanged for an equal amount of domestic centrifugal sugar, known as B sugar, deposited in the Luzon Sugar Company's warehouse within its compound, with the obligation on its part to deliver it to Alfredo Cruz on demand.

The Luzon Sugar Company failed to comply with its obligation. It contended that before December 28, 1941, it had in its warehouse a sufficient amount of centrifugal sugar manufactured by it and was in a position to deliver sugar to planters who wished to withdraw and take delivery thereof, but that on the last mentioned date, the central was bombed by Japanese airplanes and the warehouse damaged.

Issue:

Whether or not Alfredo Cruz is entitled to damages

Ruling:

No. The preponderance of evidence is to the effect that there was enough sugar to cover and deliver 1,081.79 piculs of domestic, reserve, and additional sugar belonging to appellant, who, according to the milling contract, was in duty bound to take delivery thereof at the warehouse. And it having been established that the Luzon Sugar Company compound was bombed on December 28, 1941, and the Japanese Army occupied it from January 1 to February 20, 1942; that some were taken by the Imperial Japanese Army and the remaining brought to Northern Luzon by said Army. As testified to by the appellant, there is no legal way of holding that the appellees are responsible for said sugar, molasses, tires and tubes, because the loss was due to the war or to a fortuitous event.

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Article 1230

The nullity of the penal clause does not carry with it that of the principal obligation.

The nullity of the principal obligation carries with it that of the penal clause. (1155)

General Rule

The nullity of the principal obligation also nullifies the penal clause, which is only an accessory to the principal obligation.

The Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Teofilo Evangelista

The municipality of Hagonoy filed a complaint against Teofilo Evangelista for being not complying the contract and the penal clause mentioned that he must pay surcharge(cargo) of 20%, that must Jose Evangelista without the Municipality approving at as well. on the 9th year Josefa died, and it was transferred to Teofilo Evangelista who request for an extension of the lease. however, the ordinance was passed granting him/his request.

The penal clauses in question being void because of the invalidity of the principal contracts of lease, and considering that the defendant cannot be held to have confirmed these contracts because they were not susceptible of confirmation, it is clear that the parties should be left where they are. The courts will aid neither of them to enforce any stipulation in these contracts. The municipality seeks the fulfillment of the penal clause, whereby the defendant promised to pay 20 per cent surcharge in case of noncompliance with the terms of the leases. The courts will not exercise their authority for the purpose of enforcing such penal clause.

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Section 2. Obligations with a Period

Art. 1198. The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period: 

(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he gives a guaranty or security for the debt; 

(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he has promised;

 (3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their establishment, and when through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately gives new ones equally satisfactory; 

(4)When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period; 

(5)When the debtor attempts to abscond. (avoid legal process) (1129a) 

GENERAL RULE: 

The obligation is not demandable before the lapse of the period. However, if any  of the five (5) cases stated above, the debtor shall lose every right to make use   of the period, then the stipulated period is disregarded and the obligation becomes demandable at once or immediately demandable.

This is based on the fact that the debtor might not be able to comply with his obligation.

Loss of Term - Obligation becomes immediately due and demandable even if the period has not yet expired. The obligation is thus converted into pure obligation.

Insolvency of the Debtor - The insolvency of the debtor that would deprived him of the benefit of the term need not be judicially declare in an insolvency proceedings. It is enough that he is in such a state of financial difficulty that he is unable to pay his debt.

Moratorium Law - These laws are precisely enacted because of the financial difficulties of debtors. Hence, the insolvency of a debtor does not deprived him of the benefits of moratorium.

Example:  

Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc. vs. Ponce 

Facts:

On June 24, 1950, Rita L.  Ponce executed in favor of plaintiff corporation a deed of mortgage over a parcel of land to secure the payment of a loan of P5,000 granted to her by said corporation, payable within six years with interest at 12 per cent per annum. On March 10, 1951, Rita L. Ponce with the consent of her husband Domingo executed another mortgage deed amending the first one, whereby the loan was increased from P5,000 to P6,190, the terms and conditions of the mortgage remaining the same. Rita and Domingo presented the two mortgage deeds for registration in the office of the register of deeds, but the said register after going over the papers noted defects and deficiencies and advised Rita and Domingo to cure the defects and furnish the necessary data.  Instead of complying with the suggestion and requirements, the two withdrew the two mortgage deeds and then mortgaged the same parcel of land in favor  of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) to secure a loan.

Ruling:

Although the original loan, including its increased amount, was payable within six years, and so did not become due and payable until the expiration thereof, the debtor lost the benefit of the period by reason of her failure to give and register the security agreed upon in the form of the two deeds of mortgage; and so the obligation became pure and without any condition. Consequently, the loan became due and immediately demandable.

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Obligations

Article 1166 The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivery of all its accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned. Kasama sa obligasyon na magbigay ng determinado o tinutukoy na bagay ang pagbibigay ng lahat ng accessions at accessories nito kahit na hindi sila nabanggit.

Accession – includes everything produced by a thing, as well as all incorporated or attached with it, may it be natural or artificial

Accessories – includes things that are united or attached as ornaments to the principal thing, for the latter’s use or perfection (i.e. spare tire of a car, television antennas, cellphone chargers, moviehouse chairs, etc.)

Note: Although the delivery of determinate thing includes all its accessions and accessories, the parties in the contract may stipulate that certain accessions or accessories may not be included in the delivery. Both parties have the freedom to stipulate such things.

In the case of  TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS (Executrix), petitioner and appellee, vs. FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.

In the Resolution Amending Decision

Appellant-movant contends that she is entitled to and should be awarded, not only the devised fishpond, but all the fruits or rents of said property from the death of the testatrix on October 5, 1956 up to the time said property will be delivered to her. Appellant, it be noted, did not expressly seek recovery of fruits or rents in her petition for delivery of specific legacy (devise) filed below. She started to mention also the fruits or rents in her amended motion for reconsideration of the court a quo's denial of said petition. And, thereafter she has raised the point in her third assignment of error in the present appeal.

This notwithstanding, Supreme Court believe that appellant should receive the fruits of the property given to her in devise. The provisions of law regarding devised proper are emphatic in stating that a devise of a specific things includes its fruits and income accruing after the testator's death, ordering that these shall be delivered with the thing devised.

The fruits or rents are accessions (Arts. 441, 442, Civil Code), strictly speaking, there was really no need to mention them in the petition or the decision. Article 1166 of the Civil Code applies: "The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned." The appellant is also entitled to, and appellee should deliver to her, the fruits or rents of the devised fishpond accruing after the testatrix's death. 

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CIVIL REGISTER

Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

 Facts:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman".

OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

Issue:

Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the live birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.

Ruling:

No. It is the statutes that defines who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. Currently, there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. A law has to be enacted by the legislative body laying down the guidelines governing the change of entries in birth certificate due to sex reassignment in order to enter the same in civil registry.

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CIVIL REGISTER

Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.

 Republic of the Philippines v. The Honorable Glicerio V. Carriaga, Jr., and Antonio Tan Lim

G.R. No. L-54159. March 18, 1988

 Facts:

On April 23, 1979, the private respondent, Antonio Tan Lim, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cotabato a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of his son Frederick Sespeñe-Lim: The father’s nationality should be changed from Chinese to Filipino. The father’s religion should be changed from Catholic to Islam. The father’s race should be brown not yellow. The date of marriage of the parents should be changed from February 1, 1958 to April 28, 1957.

The petition was filed for correction of entries under Rule 108, but the trial court had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action and/or the petition stated no cause of action. The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the changes made are corrections of clerical in nature and do not include substantial matters such as nationality or citizenship of a person.

The petition in this case was filed by the private respondent seeking relief under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which merely implements Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Petition argues that the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under Article 412 is confined to "innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like".

Issue:

Whether or not the supposed erroneous entries in the birth certificate of Frederick Sespeñe-Lim are mere clerical errors that can be changed or altered by means of a petition for correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court is of the honest opinion that the mistakes of Miss Panda, the midwife, in furnishing the nationality of the father in the case of the certificate of live birth of was an honest mistake. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. The opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that 'the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding'.

A petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary' There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be canceled or corrected, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. In the case at bar, not only have the procedural requirements been complied with but a trial was duly conducted wherein the private respondent was given the chance to present his evidence while the fiscal was likewise given every opportunity to present his apposition

Therefore, mistakes in the certificates of live birth should be corrected.

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EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, The Hon. Ariston L. Rubio, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; Victor Bundoc; and Clara Bundoc, 

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Facts:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.  The petition was granted in November 1982 that is after the death of Jennifer.

The natural parents of Tamargo filed a complaint for damages against their son's adoptive parents. Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed.

Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo’s petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

Held:

No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: “Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.”

In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

Supreme Court held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

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PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. 

Mandatory Character of Article 213 of the Family Code

Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson Gr. No. L-23482, August 30, 1968

 Facts:

Alfonso and Carmen were married on February 14, 1953. They had four children. On January 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and resided in Manila. On March 12, 1963 she filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself. However, through the assistance of their respective lawyers, the spouses reached an amicable settlement as to custody of the kids, support, and separation of property.

 On May 7, Carmen filed a motion with the JDRC alleging that the compromise agreement was the only way she could get custody of all the children. Alfonso opposed her motion for reconsideration and the CFI ordered her to return the two older children by June, on pain of contempt. Carmen went to the Court of Appeals and the CA certified the case to the Supreme Court. It is from this decision that the instant case springs. Carmen instituted certiorari proceedings with the CA against the CFI, saying the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the compromise agreement. The CA declared void the portion of the agreement pertaining to the custody of children.

 Issue:

Whether or not the custody of the children should be awarded to Carmen Lacson.

 Ruling:

Yes. The custody of the children, they were all below 7 years of age at the time of the agreement and so the CA was correct in awarding the custody to the mother. The Court was also “loath to uphold the couple’s agreement regarding the custody of the children”, citing rights of the children to proper care not anchored on the solely on the whims of his or her parents. Courts must decide fitness of parents for custody.

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SUPPORT

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant’s fault or negligence.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda, 35 Phils 252

 FACTS:

Luisa Goitia de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her, inflicting injuries upon her lips, face and different body parts. As Goitia can’t desist her husband anymore from his repugnant desires, she was obliged to leave the conjugal home.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. 

Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD:

Art. 149: The Person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.

The rule laid down in Article 149 of the Civil code is not absolute

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are Articles 44 to 78 of the law of civil marriage of 1870.

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The husband may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. This is done to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of lewd designs and physical assault, she can claim support from the husband for separate maintenance.

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ADOPTION

Concepts and Purpose of Adoption

Santos-Yñigo, et al. v. Rep., 95 Phil. 244

Facts:

On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yñigo and his wife for the adoption of a minor named Marcial Eleuterio Resaba. It is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor have given their consent to the adoption in a document which was duly signed by them on March 20, 1950. Petitioners are financially and morally able to bring up and educate the minor.

By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor General who, in due time, filed a written opposition on the ground that petitioners have two legitimate children, a boy and a girl, who are still minors, and as such they are disqualified to adopt under the provisions of the new Civil Code.

The court found that said agreement was executed before the new Civil Code went into effect and while the petition may not be granted under this new Code, it may be sanctioned under the old because it contains no provision which prohibits adoption in the form and manner agreed upon by the parties. From this decision, the Solicitor General took the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the adoption agreement has binding effect.

Ruling:

No. The adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court. Rule 100 has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on adoption. This means that the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that made through court.

Some members of the Court have advanced the opinion that, notwithstanding the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure or the adoption of the present Rules of Court concerning adoption, those provisions of the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in nature cannot be considered as having been impliedly repealed. Our duty is to interpret and apply the law as we see it in accordance with sound rules of statutory construction.

The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

[alaizaloretizo]

PROOF OF FILIATION

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be roved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 

Ida Labagala vs. Nicolasa Santiago, Amanda Santiago and Hon. Court of Appeals, December 4, 2001, G.R. No. 132305

 Facts:

Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. The court decided in favor of the sisters.

Jose died intestate. His sisters then filed a complaint before the RTC for recovery of the 1/3 portion of said property which was in the possession of Ida C. Labagala (who claimed to be Ida C. Santiago, the daughter of Jose). The trial court ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the trial court, the said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter.

When appealed, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the trial court.  It took into account that Ida was born of different parents, as indicated her birth certificate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner’s filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession.

Ruling:

Yes. Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. A baptismal certificate. A baptismal certificate is not a conclusive proof of filiation. Use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree. Thus, she cannot inherit from him through intestate succession.

[alaizaloretizo]

THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

 April Martinez, et al. v. Rodolfo Martinez, G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005 G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005

Facts:

The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land by TCT No. 54334, as well as the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr., executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He then handed down the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. After the death of the spouses, one of their sons found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 15, 1996.

Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936 against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor against Manolo, which was elevated to the Department of Justice.

Spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. Spouses Martinez filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Mayor Rodolfo Reyes in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and that the matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. In his reply, Mayor Reyes alleged that the complaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement of the matter between the parties had not been exerted, but that none reached.

 Issue:

Whether or not Art. 150 of the Family Code or earnest efforts for amicable settlement is necessary before the filing of this case.

 Ruling:

No, Art. 151 of the Family Code provide, thus: “Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit:

“Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.”

Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151 of the Family code and that they failed to do so is erroneous.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 – which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule – and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

Second. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in the barangay chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file action.