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CASE DIGEST : EUTIQUIANO CUYUGAN vs. ISIDORO SANTOS - G.R. No. 10265. March 3, 1916

CIVIL CODE

Article 1365. If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property, but the instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the instrument is proper.

FACTS:

The plaintiff is the sole heir of his mother, Guillerma Cuyugan y Canda, deceased;

that in the year 1895 she borrowed the sum of P3,500 from the defendant and executed, at the same time, the document, Exhibit C, attached to the complaint, which purports on its face to be a deed of sale of the land described therein, with a reservation in favor of the vendor of the right to repurchase for the sum of P3,500;

that although the instrument purports on its face to be a deed of sale, it was intended by the parties merely to evidence the loan of the nominal purchase price and to serve as a security for the repayment of the amount of the loan;

ISSUES:

WON the parol evidence should be admitted in support of allegations versus that of an instrument in writing

RULING:

YES . PAROL EVIDENCE AFFECTING WRITINGS; ALLEGED “PACTO DE RETRO”. — Parol evidence is competent and admissible in support of allegations that an instrument in writing, purporting on its face to transfer the absolute title to property, or to transfer the title with a mere right to repurchase under specified conditions reserved to the vendor, was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan; and upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the courts in this jurisdiction have power to enforce the agreement or understanding in this regard, in accord with the true intent of the parties at the time when it was executed.

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CASE DIGEST: ISABEL RUBIO ALCASID, assisted by her husband DOMINGO A. ALCASID v. CA and RUFINA L. LIM. - G.R. No. 104751 October 7, 1994

CIVIL CODE:

ARTICLE 1337 : There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress

FACTS:

Petitioner is one of the co-owners of two parcels of land located in Calamba, Laguna. Private respondent offered to purchase from petitioner and her co-owners the abovementioned property. Petitioner was willing to sell her share for P4,500,000.00 and only if all her co-owners would sell their respective shares of the said land.

Petitioner engaged the services of Atty. Antonio A. Fernandez for the purpose of negotiating the sale, without knowing that he was also representing private respondent.

In March 1990, Atty. Fernandez confirmed to petitioner that all her co-owners were already amenable to sell their shares for P1,500,000.00.

On March 4, 1990, petitioner signed a Deed of Sale drafted by Atty. Fernandez. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the other co-owners did not agree to sell their shares over the subject property.

On November 4, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Calamba, Laguna, for annulment of the contract of sale and damages with a prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against private respondent. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint stated no cause of action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

On August 20, 1991, a motion to declare private respondent in default was filed by petitioner. This was granted by the trial court.

Private respondent appealed the said orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the complaint stated no cause of action. Hence this Petition

ISSUES:

Whether or not the contract is based upon fraud, mistake and undue influence which vitiated her consent.

RULING:

No. Undue influence, is any means employed upon a party which, under the circumstances, he could not well resist and which controlled his volition and induced him to give his consent to the contract, which otherwise he would not have entered into. It must in some measure destroy the free agency of a party and interfere with the exercise of that independent discretion which is necessary for determining the advantages or disadvantages of a proposed contract (Tolentino, supra at p. 501). If a competent person has once assented to a contract freely and fairly, he is bound thereby.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner executed the contract of her own free will and choice and not from duress is fully supported by the evidence. Such finding should not be disturbed (Martinez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 15 Phil. 252 [1910]).

Private respondent did not commit any wrongful act or omission which violated the primary right of petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not have a cause of action (State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 348 [1992]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED.

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CASE DIGEST : VICENTE PEREZ vs. EUGENIO POMAR, Agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos,

Civil Code:

Article 1305 Contracts is the meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or render something.

FACTS:

On December 8, 1901, Don Eugenio Pomar, general agent of the Compaia General de Tabacos, requested the plaintiff to act as interpreter between himself and the military authorities. The plaintiff continued to render services until May 31, 1902, and Pomar assured him that the Tabacalera Company always repaid services rendered. But that did not happen. The plaintiff's mediation resulted in large profits, as evidenced by the agency's accounts and letterpress books.The defendant denied the allegations in the complaint. The defendant also denied that through the mediation of the plaintiff the company and himself had obtained large profits. The defendant also stated that plaintiff accompanied him to Pagsanjan, Pilar, and other towns for business trips, and acted as an interpreter of his own free will.It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the parties for the employment of the plaintiff as interpreter.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the plaintiff was entitled for compensation in the absence of any written contract between parties for the employment of the plaintiff as an interpreter.

RULING:

Yes. whether the plaintiff's services were solicited or whether they were offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render services as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services rendered, is thereby incurred.

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CASE DIGEST: AURELIO G. BRIONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRIMITIVO P. CAMMAYO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-23559. October 4, 1971.

Civil Code:

Article 1273: The renunciation of the principal debt shall extinguish the accessory obligations; but the waiver of the latter shall leave the former in force.

FACTS:

Plaintiff filed an action against the defendants to recover from them the amount of P1, 500.00, plus damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. The defendants answered that a mortgage contract was executed for securing the payment of P1,500.00 for a period of one year, without interest, but the plaintiff delivered to the defendant Primitivo only the sum of P1,200.00 and withheld the sum of P300.00 which was intended as advance interest for one year; that on account of said loan of P1,200.00, defendant Primitivo paid to the plaintiff the total sum of P330.00 which plaintiff, illegally and unlawfully refuse to acknowledge as part payment of the account but as an interest of the said loan for an extension of another term of one year; and that said contract of loan entered into between plaintiff and defendant Primitivo is a usurious contract. Briones denied the allegations of the counterclaim. The Municipal Court rendered judgment sentencing the defendants to pay the plaintiff with interests thereon plus attorney's fees. The Court of First Instance of Manila also ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff. Defendants claim that the trial court erred in sentencing them to pay the principal of the loan notwithstanding its finding that the same was tainted with usury. It is not now disputed that the contract of loan in question was tainted with usury

ISSUES:

Whether the creditor is entitled to collect from the debtor the amount representing the principal obligation in a contract of loan tainted with usury.

RULING:

Yes. Under the Usury Law a usurious contract is void and the creditor had no right of action to recover the interest in excess of the lawful rate but this did not mean that the debtor may keep the principal received by him as loan — thus unjustly enriching himself to the damage of the creditor. A contract of loan with usurious interest consists of principal and accessory stipulations; the principal one is to pay the debt; the accessory stipulation is to pay interest thereon. And said two stipulations are divisible in the sense that the former can still stand without the latter. Article 1273, Civil Code, attests to this: "The renunciation of the principal debt shall extinguish the accessory obligations; but the waiver of the latter shall leave the former in force. In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the debtor to pay the principal debt, which is the cause of the contract (Article 1350, Civil Code), is not illegal. The illegality lies only as to the prestation to pay the stipulated interest; hence, being separable, the latter only should be deemed void, since it is the only one that is illegal.

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CASE DIGEST : Salvador Panganiban vs Agustin Cuevas 7 Phil 477

Civil Code:

Article 1241. Payment to a person who is incapacitated to administer his property shall be valid if he has kept the thing delivered, or insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him. Payment made to a third person shall also be valid insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor. Such benefit to the creditor need not be proved in the following cases: (1) If after the payment, the third person acquires the creditor's rights; (2) If the creditor ratifies the payment to the third person; (3) If by the creditor's conduct, the debtor has been led to believe that the third person had authority to receive the payment.

FACTS :

December 10, 1897, Salvador Panganiban was the owner of a camarin and lot. Panganiban sold the property to one Francisco Gonzales for the sum of PhP1,300, with a stipulation among other thigs: "Seventh. The vendor reserves the right to repurchase the property within six months from date, after complying with the obligations mentioned in article 1518 of the Civil Code, and in case of his failure to do so within the tome stipulated, the vendee will pay to him the additional sum of 200 pesos and will become the absolute owner of the property and the vendee may dispose of the same, as long as the condition subsequent continues to exist with the limitations provided by the Mortgage Law, of the provisions of which he has been duly informed." it was recorded in the Register of Property on August 13, 1900

In August 1900, Gonzales sold the property to one Agustin Cuevas with the statement on the deed of sale : ""Second. That the vendor (Panganiban) reserves to himself the right to repurchase the property thus sold within the period of six months from the tenth of December, 1897, for the same price, thirteen hundred pesos, and in case he fails to do so, the said Gonzales will pay to the vendor, Salvador Panganiban, the additional sum of two hundred pesos . . . ."

That in the month of May, 1898, Panganiban attempted to effect the repurchase of the property, but the creditor, Gonzales, being absent from his place of residence on account of the war, he was unable to do so, nor was he able to deposit the purchase price with the clerk of the court for the same reason; and (2) that the revolution broke out that time and the land and improvements in question were seizes by the Filipino government from Francisco Gonzales, the property having been redeemed by Panganiban from the Filipino government on the 12th of November, 1898.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the repurchase made by plaintiff from the filipino government vested in him the title to the property.

RULING:

No. Paragraph 2 of article 1163 was not applicable to this case,which states that "That the creditor was benefited by the payment made to a third person by his debtor can not be presumed, and must, therefore, be satisfactorily established by the person interested in proving this fact."since their was nothing in the record to show that a payment made by Panganiban to the revolutionary government was for the benefit of Gonzales, thus, the repurchase was deemed to be invalid.

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CASE DIGEST: Salvador Panganiban vs. Agustin Cuevas, G.R. No. L-2001

Civil Code:

Artilcle 1241 :

Payment to a person who is incapacitated to administer his property shall be valid if he has kept the thing delivered, or insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him. Payment made to a third person shall also be valid insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor. Such benefit to the creditor need not be proved in the following cases:

(1) If after the payment, the third person acquires the creditor’s rights;

(2) If the creditor ratifies the payment to the third person;

(3) If by the creditor’s conduct, the debtor has been led to believe that the third person had authority to receive the payment.

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Agustin Cuevas was ordered to return the property to Panganiban and to pay the proceedings

Dec. 10, 1897. Panganiban was an owner of a Camarin (Nipa and bamboo construction) and lot. He sold it to one Francisco Gonazales in the sum of P1,300. It had a stipulation that the vendor has the right to repurchase within six months from the time of purchase, in compliance with the art 1518 of the civil code, if the vendor fails to do so the vendee will pay P200 and he will be the absolute owner.

August 1, 1900. Gonzales sold the property to Agustin Cuevas with the same price. It was also stated that the vendor (panganiban) has the right to repurchase and if in six months he failed to do so the vendee (Cuevas) has to pay P200 and will be the owner.

Cuevas asked and granted judicial possession of the property, notice was given to the occupants of the property, among them was the wife of Panganiban. Cuevas paid in court the sum of P200 and declared that he is now owner of the property. The payment was refused by Panganiban and an action of ejectment was filed against Panganiban

Panganiban said that In the month of May 1898, He sought to repurchase the property, but he could not locate Gonzales due to the revolutionary war. The revolutionary government then seized the land and camarin from Gonzales. Panganiban redeemed  the property to th erevolutionary government on November 12, 1898  by paying the repurchase price. On the other hand, on August 1, 1900, Gonzales sold the property to Cuevas.

Issue/s:

 W/ON the Purchase made by Panganiban from the revolutionary army vested him the right to the property.

Ruling:

No. The property was seized by the army not confiscated, a seizure just prohibits the owner from enjoying his/her property. Panganiban repurchased the property from the army but the army was not the owner. the Supreme Court said that payment made to a third person, even through error and in good faith, shall not release the debtor of the obligation to pay and will not deprive the creditor of his right to demand payment. If it becomes impossible to recover what was unduly paid, any loss resulting therefrom shall be borne by the deceived debtor, who is the only one responsible for his own acts unless there is a stipulation for the wrongful payment.

Ramos|Case Digest

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CASE DIGEST : Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, et.al

Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, et.al

G.R. No. 97906 | May 21, 1992

Justice Regalado

Family Code:

ARTICLE 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court in Special Case No. 5934 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community.

The matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr, was granted. However the Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

Ruling:

Yes. A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion.

It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

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CASE DIGEST : Christina Marie Dempsey, et.al vs RTC, Branch LXXV et.al

Christina Marie Dempsey, et.al vs RTC, Branch LXXV et.al

G.R. No.L-77737-38| August 15, 1988

Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Family Code:

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children’s homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel Dempsey before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II, Olongapo City charging him with violation of Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D. 603 and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603.

The facts of the case are summarized by the Trial Court as follows:

The testimony of complainant Janalita Rapada purports to show that in her cohabitation with the accused, without the benefit of marriage, Christina Marie was born on October 01, 1984, at the St. Jude’s Family Clinic, Olongapo City where she delivered the child. Her birth certificate, bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father and the Affidavit of the Acknowledgment duly signed by him.

“At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused in the sum of $150.00 thru the child’s mother, Janalita Rapada. Aside from this monthly support, Janalita Rapada obtained a promise from the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This will entitle the child for all the benefits and privileges extended to dependents of American US Navy servicemen like free medical check-up. Efforts were made with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval Facilities, Subic Bay, Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill these commitments but to no avail. To seek redress thru the Court, she engaged the services of Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr., offering P5,000.00 as Attorney’s fee payable after the cases are decided.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Christina Marie Dempsey is an abandoned child.

Ruling:

No . The respondent court would shift jurisdiction over the case from the municipal trial court to the Department of Social Services and Development. It is readily apparent that the DSSD cannot take cognizance of and enforce the criminal sanctions of P.D. 603. Besides, Christina Marie Dempsey is not an abandoned child in the strict sense of the word as she is still in the custody and care of her mother. Art. 141 of P.D. 603 defines an abandoned child as follows: “x x x An abandoned child is one who has no parental care or guardianship or whose parents or guardians have deserted him for a period of at least six continuous months x x x.” Article 161 cannot, therefore, be applied to the case at bar. Thus, it is not the Department of Social Services and Development which has jurisdiction but the Municipal Trial Court.

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CASE DIGEST : Republic vs Hon. Vergara, et.al

Republic vs Hon. Vergara, et.al

G.R. No. 95551| March 20, 1997

Justice Romero

Family Code:

Art. 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a, E. O. and PD 603).

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City1 to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr., a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption.2 Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child.3 The court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.

Ruling:

No. Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife’s legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.

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CASE DIGEST : Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote vs Republic, et.al

Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote vs Republic, et.al

G.R. No. 222095| August 07, 2017

Justice Carpio

Family Code:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

On 24 June 2008, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan (Tinitigan) in her relative’s residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital. To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.

When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates) with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.

The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state the names “Avee Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and “Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan”. Ricky Tinitigan was the listed Informant in both birth certificates.

Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing erroneous entries.

RTC granted the cancellation of birth certificates. CA, however, reversed and set aside the same.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered by their father Tinitigan, which were not duly signed by their mother Barcelote, were void.

Ruling:

Yes. The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the word “shall” underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR. Since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”

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CASE DIGEST: Liyao Vs Tanhoti-Liyao, et.al

Liyao Vs Tanhoti-Liyao, et.al

G.R. No. 138961| March 07, 2002

Justice De Leon Jr.

Family Code:

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be roved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize andacknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successionalrights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceasedhaving been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There weretwo sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but livingseparately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. Onthe other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legallymarried and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.

Issue/s:

Whether or not may the petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

Ruling:

No. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none—even his heirs—can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

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CASE DIGEST: Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III, et.al

Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III, et.al

G.R. No. 29168| December 29, 1928

Justice Ynares-Santiago

Family Code:

Art. 153 : Ang isang bahay at lupa ay maituturing lamang na tahanan kapag ito ay inokupahan ng isang pamilya at itinuring na kanilang tahanan. Mula sa panahon na naituring itong tahanan ng isang pamilya at hangga’t ang sino mang tagapagmana ay aktwal na nakatira rito, ito ay mananatiling tahanan ng pamilya at hindi maaring maisama sa pagpapatupad, sapilitang pag bebenta at pag sasama, maliban kung pinapayagan at sa lawak lamang ng halagang naaayon sa batas.

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City.

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

Issue/s:

Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

Ruling:

No. The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

[juliusceazarramos]

CASE DIGEST : Antonio A.S. Valdes vs RTC, Br.102,Quezon City, et.al

Antonio A.S. Valdes vs RTC, Br.102,Quezon City, et.al

G.R. No. 122749| July 31, 1996

Justice Vitug

Family Code:

Art. 147 : Kapag ang isang lalaki at isang babae na may kapasidad na magpakasal sa isa't isa, ay namuhay nang eksklusibo sa isa't isa bilang mag-asawa nang walang benepisyo ng kasal o sa ilalim ng walang bisang kasal, ang kanilang mga sahod at suweldo ay pantay nilang pag-aari at ang ari-arian na kanilang naipundar sa pamamagitan ng kanilang trabaho o industriya ay pinamamahalaan ng mga patakaran sa kapwa pagmamay-ari.

Sa kawalan naman ng katibayan, ang mga ari-arian na naipundar sa kanilang pagsasama ay maituturing na naipundar sa pamamagitan ng kanilang magkasanib na pagsisikap, trabaho o industriya, at pagmamay-ari nila ang nasabing ari-arian sa pantay na bahagi. Para sa mga layunin ng Artikulo na ito, kahit ang isang partido ay walang partisipasyon sa pagpundar ng anumang ari-arian na naipundar ng kabilang partido ay maituturing pa din na kanilang dalawa kung ang una ay ang syang nangangalaga at nagpapanatili ng pamilya at ng sambahayan.

Walang sinumang partido ang maaaring magsangla o mag bahagi sa iba ng kanyang parte sa ari-arian na naipundar sa panahon ng kanilang pagsasama at pag mamay-ari nilang pareho, ng walang pahintulot ng isa, hanggang magwakas ang kanilang pagsasama.

Kapag isa lamang sa mga partido sa isang walang bisang kasal ang may mabuting loob, ang bahagi ng nang linlang na partido sa kanilang ari-arian ay mapapawalang bisa at maililipat ito sa kanilang mga anak.

Kung hindi kinuha o ayaw tanggapin ng isa o lahat ng mga anak ang ari-arian o mga inapo, ang kanilang bahagi sa ari-arian ay mapupunta sa mga nabubuhay na inapo. Kung wala ang mga ito, mapupunta ang bahagi ng ari-arian sa inosenteng partido. Sa lahat ng nabanggit, ang pagtanggi ay magaganap lamang sa pagtatapos ng kanilang pagsasama.

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition.

The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.” Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the trial court correctly applied Article 147 of the Family Code to the present case and Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code to govern their common property.

Ruling:

Yes. The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.

[juliusceazarramos]

CASE DIGEST : Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Josefa Aguirre De Garcia, et.al

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Josefa Aguirre De Garcia, et.al

G.R. No. L-25659 | October 31, 1969

Justice Fernando

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

There is no question as to one Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc., executing a surety bond in favor of the Philippine National Bank, Victorias Branch, to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000.00. On or' about the same date, Vicente Garcia, together with the said Ladislao Chavez and one Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify now petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the petitioner may at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond.

It was likewise stipulated that on or about April 27, 1956, the Philippine National Bank filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, docketed as its Civil Case No. 3893. against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co.. Inc.. In turn, a third-party complaint against Ladislao Chavez. Ramon 8. Lacson and Vicente Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement, was instituted by Luzon Surety Co., Inc.

Issue/s:

Whether or not a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company.

Ruling:

No. In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the new Civil Code is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership/' There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal parthership.

Doctrine:

Javier vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 336

[juliusceazarramos]

CASE DIGEST : Adolfo Aenlle vs. Clementina Maria Bertrand Rheims, et.al

Adolfo Aenlle vs. Clementina Maria Bertrand Rheims, et.al

G.R. No. 29168| December 29, 1928

Justice Street

Family Code:

Art. 99 : Kung kailan magwawakas ang absolute community:

Sa pagkamatay ng alinmang asawa

Kapag may hatol ang korte ng legal na paghihiwalay

Kapag ang kasal ay napawalang bisa o idineklara na walang bisa

Sa kaso ng judicial separation ng ari-arian sa panahon ng kasal sa ilalim ng Artikulo 134 hanggang 138. (175a)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

The principal litigants in the case, Adolfo Aenlle and Clementina Maria Bertrand, were married on November 22, 1886, in London, England. After living together for many years the pair separated; and on July 7, 1917, the wife procured a decree in the District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, U. S. A., purporting to divorce her (f rom her husband. Returning to the Orient she contracted marriage, on February 10, 1919, with one George Rheims, at Victoria, Hongkong, China. Among the properties which had been acquired by Aenlle and his wife during the time of their common marital life, were, according to the appealed decision, the two lots Nos. 16 and 17, which are the subject matter of the present appeal. In his brief as appellant Aenlle here assigns error to the finding of the trial court declaring said lots to pertain to the conjugal estate between himself and Clementina, but the proof so clearly predominates to this effect that there can, we think, be no question as to the correctness of the decision on this point.

The additional facts pertinent to the appeal of the Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc., are that, on March 15, 1922, Aenlle executed a mortgage in favor of said company for the purpose of securing a loan of P2,000, which Aenlle undertook to repay in ten years at the rate of P28.70, per month. This mortgage purports to cover the entire property in the lots in controversy; and Clementina maintained successfully before the trial judge that, inasmuch as this mortgage was created subsequently to the date of the decree of divorce in the Nevada court, it could not have the effect of encumbering her undivided share in the lots.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the divorce decree procurred by the wife in the State of Nevada affects the mortgage executed by Aenlle in favor of the Philippine Guarranty Co.,Inc.

Ruling:

No. A decree of divorce purporting to dissolve the bonds of matrimony does not, as against a third person, have the effect of abrogating ipso facto the authority of the husband to alienate or encumber the property acquired by the spouses during their common marital life; and a third person who, prior to the inscription of the decree of divorce in the property registry, lends money to the husband upon the execution by the latter of a mortgage upon the entire property, acquires a valid lien upon the whole, and not merely upon the undivided interest of the husband.

[juliusceazarramos]

CASE DIGEST : Rosa Gustilo vs. Augusto Gustilo, et.al

Rosa Gustilo vs. Augusto Gustilo, et.al

G.R. No. L-18038 | May 31, 1965

Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon

Family Code:

Art. 72 : Kapag ang isa sa mga mag-asawa ay nagpabaya sa kanyang mga tungkulin sa conjugal union o gumawa ng mga kilos na may posibilidad na magdulot ng panganib, kahihiyan o pinsala sa isa o sa pamilya, ang naagrabyado ay maaaring magsampa ng kaso sa korte.

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

When Calixto Gustilo died in May 1952, he was survived by his wife Martina Poblador and their four legitimate children Augusto, Josefa, Carlos and Fe.

It appears that in August 1945, the spouses executed a deed of sale (Exh. “H”) to their said children, of almost all of their real properties; and so, in November 1952, Rosa Gustilo, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Calixto Gustilo, filed this action to annul the sale, and to get the part allegedly corresponding to her, as acknowledged natural daughter, in the estate of Calixto Gustilo. Defendants are his widow and four legitimate children plus two banks, who had become mortgagees of some realties conveyed under Exhibit H.

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment declaring that Rosa had been acknowledged as natural daughter by Calixto, and that Exhibit H was fictitious and void. Gustilo vs. Gustilo, 14 SCRA 149, No. L-18038 May 31, 1965.

Refusing to admit Rosa’s claim, the widow and the legitimate children brought the matter to the Court of Appeals; and that court, after due deliberation, reversed the judgment, expressing the opinion that Rosa Gustilo had no interest to protect, nor right to sue, because she was not a duly acknowledged natural child.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Rosa was duly acknowledged as a natural child.

Ruling:

No. To be effective recognition, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing must be made by the alleged parent himself and the writing must be the writing of said parent.

A deed of donation made by an alleged parent in favor of an alleged natural child wherein the donee renounced her rights to inheritance, does not amount to the unequivocal avowal of relationship of parent and natural child required by law. Gustilo vs. Gustilo, 14 SCRA 149, No. L-18038 May 31, 1965

Doctrine:

Malonda v. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149; Cf. Dayrit v. Piccio, 49 Off. Gaz. 949; Adriano v. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350.

Pareja v. Pareja, L-6823, May 31, 1954; Montilla v. Mantilla, L-14462, June 30, 1961.

[juliusceazarramos]

CASE DIGEST : Aquino vs. Delizo

Aquino vs. Delizo

G.R. No. L-15853 | July 27, 1960

Justice Gutierrez David

Family Code:

Art. 46 : Ang alinman sa mga sumusunod na pangyayari ay maituturing na panloloko na tinutukoy sa Numero 3 ng naunang Artikulo:

Ang hindi pagsisiwalat ng dati ng kinasangkutang krimen na may kaugnayan sa moral turpitude at ang nasabing kaso ay nahusgahan na ng husgado.

Ang pagtatago ng asawang babae sa katotohanan na sa oras ng kanilang kasal, siya ay nabuntis na ng isang lalaki maliban sa kanyang asawa

Pagtatago ng sakit na nakahahawa sa pamamagitan ng pakikipagtalik, anuman ang uri nito, na umiiral sa panahon ng kasal.

Pagtatago ng pagkalulong sa droga, nakagawiang alkoholismo o homosexuality o lesbianism na umiiral sa panahon ng kasal

Walang ibang maling representasyon o panlilinlang tungkol sa pagkatao, kalusugan, ranggo, kayamanan o kalinisang-puri ang dapat bubuo ng gayong pandaraya na magbibigay ng mga batayan para sa aksyon para sa pagpapawalang-bisa ng kasal.

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter the fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

At the trial, the attorneys for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. 

On June 16, 1956, the trial court—noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage—dismissed the complaint.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the concealment of pregnancy as alleged by plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.

Ruling:

Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3), New Civil Code).

Doctrine:

Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19)