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Child Support Enforcement Actions in Texas

If you have need a best Law service, You can get better suggestions from Child Support Enforcement Actions in Texas with the great process!c

Divorce Attorneys Houston: It is the public policy of the State of Texas that both parents of a child should play an active and involved role in their upbringing. While parents may get divorced or separate permanently, a Court will ensure that the parent with whom the children do not live with on a day to day basis gets an opportunity to spend as much time as is possible with the children.

The other part of this arrangement is that this parent (known as a non-custodial parent) also is typically obligated to pay child support towards the upbringing of the child when he or she is not in their care.

This child support is calculated:

> as a percentage of a person’s take home pay > based on how many children he or she has

The more children a person must care for, the higher the percentage of their income that is taken for child support purposes.

What happens when a person, for lack of income or any other reason, fails to timely and fully pay their child support obligation and what can the other parent do to make sure that this is brought to a court’s attention?

Child Support Enforcement Lawsuit

If a parent who is owed child support begins to take note of the fact that the support payments are not coming regularly or contain only a fraction of the normal amounts of support that they ordinarily would there is a problem to be dealt with.

As the attorneys with the Law Office of Bryan Fagan, PLLC will tell clients and potential clients- it’s not as simple, however, as letting a police officer know that your former spouse has failed to pay his or her child support as ordered by a Court and to have that officer penalize the other parent in some way.

The parent to whom the money is owed must actively seek remedies from their Court in the form of an Enforcement suit.

What is a Motion for Enforcement?

A Motion for Enforcement of a prior order is a fairly straightforward document in terms of what it is asking for, but there are intricacies to consider in drafting the document.

Essentially this Petition:

> informs the court of any violations of its order > specifies the date(s) of said violations and > brings to the Court’s attention any other information that may be important for it to be aware of.

What goes into a Motion for Enforcement?

Houston Divorce Attorneys: Using our topic, missed child support payments, as an example, the requesting parent would need to draft a Petition that includes:

> the monthly amount of child support owed to them > the dates that the payments were missed and > a total amount that the other party is in arrearage to them

The enforcement petition must also:

> reference or quote (or preferably both) that section of the Court’s prior order that the other parent is in violation of. > Failure to do these things properly can be grounds to have the request denied by a Court so attention to detail is critical.

What Remedies are available through a Motion for Enforcement?

The remedy or relief that a person can request for failed child support payments varies. A Court can and should:

> order a party to pay any amounts owed in child support to the other parent. > The Court may take into consideration how much the owing spouse earns on a monthly basis and base a payment plan on the person’s monthly income.

It is important to keep in mind that the child support arrearage has an interest rate of six percent attached to it, so a Court must determine what monthly amount will allow the parent to pay the money back on top of what interest accumulates on top of that sum.

Other remedies that a Court has available to order are:

Liens - placing liens on the property and assets of the owing parent Licenses suspension - the loss of professional and recreational licenses until the child support is paid back. This ranges from a person’s Class C driver’s license to a license to operate a truck or other piece of machinery. Jail Time - in some instances, depending on the amount owed, the frequency of payments being received already and the reason(s) provided by the owing party for having failed to make payments in the past, jail-time is an allowable punishment from a court. If the party requesting the support be paid is requesting jail time, it must be limited to no more than 180 days of time (six months).

If you’re wondering how frequently a judge would order this kind of punishment, the author of this article can say that they’ve seen parents who have owed large amounts of child support ordered to go straight to jail or to register for deferred adjudication immediately after a hearing on the subject.

If the payment plan set forth by the Court is not followed by a person on probation, then jail time is sure to follow.

How Should You Proceed?

Divorce Attorneys in Houston: If you are owed back child support the best time to do something about it is early on after you are aware of the missed support payments.

Reason being that the longer you wait, the harder it can be track down the other parent and the harder it may be to have an income withholding order sent to any employer of the parent.

This order can ensure that payments are taken out of a person’s check automatically without any future action from either parent. An experienced family law attorney, such as those with the Law Office of Bryan Fagan, PLLC, are well equipped and experienced in handling child support enforcement actions as well as defending clients against them.

The best way to learn more about this subject, and to be able to ask questions about your particular situation and how a court may rule on it, is to contact the Law Office of Bryan Fagan, PLLC today in order to set up a time to consult with one of our attorneys.

Consultations are always free of charge and can go a long way towards determining what your rights are and what you can do to ensure that they are protected … Continue Reading

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The common law doctrine of Privity of Contract: Is the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 an adequate response to the problem of Contracts with third party effects?

The 1999 Act provides not only an adequate response to the problems Contracts with Third Party effects pose, but an excellent one.[1] In assessing the Act’s commendable response to the problems of Contracts with third party effects, this essay purports that the Act’s success is largely owed to three features of the statute: the Act’s succinct yet flexible nature, its recognition and enforcement of the intentions of the contracting parties, and the superior protection statute provides for third parties over alternative exceptions.

Background

The Doctrine of Privity rules that contracts and their terms apply strictly to contracting parties only.[2] However, a number of exceptions to this rule allow for third parties to obtain benefits under contracts which they are not strictly party to. For instance, contracting parties may establish collateral contracts.[3] Agency is another exception by which agents act on behalf of a principal, therefore technically making the principal a third party to the contract.[4] The establishing of trusts similarly allows for parties to the contract to sue on behalf of a third party, as do restrictive covenants.[5] Assignment allows for a contracting party to assign their rights to the third party, but has limited application, confirmed by Wilson.[6] A number of statutes also provide exceptions to the doctrine.[7] This essay henceforth explains why the 1999 Act responds effectively to the problems of contracts with third party effects and the “lacunas” that alternative exceptions leave.[8]

The Act is concise, comprehensive, clear and flexible

The common law exceptions which existed before the 1999 Act caused profound tension and uncertainty in English Law.[9] With exceptions evolving on an ad hoc basis, it was exceptionally difficult for the judiciary to reach consistent conclusions in the region. The 1999 Act delivered a “legal somersault”[10] in the domain by providing a succinct yet comprehensive single statute, which “the tools of the common law could not match.”[11] The “short but intricate”[12] Act provides coherent information in areas where the common law was silent, such as variation and rescission; thereby providing contracting parties with superior awareness of their legal position under the contract.[13] The Act eradicates the need for tedious artificial devices such as collateral contracts, particularly crucial in Private Finance Initiatives; thereby generating a more commercially convenient option for contracting parties.[14] In Morris, for instance, as an intended beneficiary under the Act, there would be no need for reliance on the uncertainty of bailment.[15] Although Stevens argues the Act was unnecessary in consideration of the common law remedies available, reform was desperately required, considering the complexity of pre-existing exceptions and the injustice they whittled into litigation[16]. The straightforward “default setting” the Act provides through its palpably comprehensible nature allows for the statute to give rise to the intentions of the contracting parties and afford greater protection to third parties, the two predominant aims of the Law Commission in forming the Act. The Act, therefore, provides an excellent response to the problems of Contracts with Third party effects.

The Act acknowledges and enforces the intentions of the contracting parties

The Act is wholeheartedly devoted to enforcing the intentions of the contracting parties, which earlier exceptions frequently ignored. Acknowledgement and enforcement of the contracting parties’ intentions is largely owed to the Act’s clarity, which stipulates when a third party may enforce a term of the contract and how parties may legally confer a benefit on a third party through specific means of identification.[17] This thereby decreases the possibility for incidental beneficiaries to claim under the contract, thus innately giving rise to the intentions of the parties. Themis[18] confirms that under s.1 1.3 of the Act, the contract must be specific as to who it intends to benefit. Conversely, if the contract is neutral on the matter, as was the case in Nisshin, the Judiciary find that the contracting parties did not intend to confer positive benefits on the third party.[19] Thus, the Act does not artificially generate intentions of the party where they did not exist. Although its strictness may potentially resolve in injustice for third parties who were not specified clearly enough in the contract, the benefits of the intentions of most parties being exactly recognised owing to the precise nature of the Act outweighs the negatives less diligent parties may face.

The Act also enforces the intentions of the contracting parties by providing a quasi-exception to the rule that a promisee must provide consideration for a promise to be enforceable. The Act places unswerving emphasis on the intentions of the parties, who are frequently apathetic to consideration; thus ensuring that a lack of unnecessary impositions do not invalidate contractual relations. Thus, the precedent established in Tweddle that “no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit,” no longer applies under the Act.[20] Furthermore, the Act does not require for there to be “some close nexus” between the contracting parties and the third party.[21] The Act thoroughly disregards the imposition of immaterial obligations and respects human autonomy, providing parties with the remarkable sovereignty to ‘determine their own justice.’

The Act provides extensive protection to Third Parties

The Act finally provides third parties with a “ticket to ride” to obtain benefits under contracts which they are not strictly party to.[22] The requirements stipulated under s.1.1a and b of the Act are expansive yet clear, intentionally evading defining “benefit” in order to respect the independence of parties in their varying interpretations of the word. Prudential Assurance[23] and Dolphin Maritime confirm that there is no requirement for the term to purport a benefit solely or even predominantly on the third party under the Act, thus protecting a vast number of third parties’ expectations under the contract.[24]

The Act also provides superior protection to third parties by preventing contracting parties from varying or rescinding the contract and subsequently removing the rights of the third party along with it. Under Section 2 of the Act 1 a, b and c, the Act confirms that even mere foresight of reliance on the terms of the contract allow for the third party to enforce terms which explicitly provide a benefit on the third parties, a clear example of The Act prioritising protecting third parties, as opposed to treating third parties as mere strangers to the contract.

Concluding statements

The 1999 Act has unequivocally reformed exceptions to Privity of Contract for the better. The Act’s transparency constructs the conduits on which the Law Commission’s aims flow: acknowledgement and enforcement of the contracting parties’ intentions alongside protecting third parties. The Act which passed through Parliament unopposed cultivates “a sound piece of legislation which will solve many problems in contract law,”

[25] absolving the previous “embarrassment of privity doctrine.”

[26] For these reasons, the Act provides not only an adequate response to the problem of contracts with third party effects, but an excellent one.

References

[1] The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999

[2]Treitel, G. (1987). The Law of Contract. 7th ed. London: Stevens. P. 449

[3] Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854

[4] New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A. M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. [1974] UKPC 1

[5] Les Affreteurs Reunis SA v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd: HL 1919

[6] Farrow v Wilson (1869) LR 4 CP 744

[7] Road Traffic Act 1988, Section 148(7); Married Women’s Property Act 1882, Section 11; Bills of Exchange Act 1882, Section 29; Law of Property Act 1925, Section 136, Section 56(1); Competition Act 1998.

[8] Swain v. The Law Society[1983] 1 HL. 598 , 611D, Lord Diplock, pp 611, p 4

[9] Andrews, N. (2001). Strangers to justice no longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rule under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. The Cambridge Law Journal, 60(02), pp.353-381.

[10] Lilienthal, J. (1887). Privity of Contract. Harvard Law Review, 1(5), p.226.

[11] Ibid (n9)

[12] Ibid.

[13] The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, Section 2: Variation and Rescission of Contract

[14] Ibid (n2), p. 458

[15] Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716

[16] Stevens, RH; (2004) The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Law Quarterly Review , 120 pp. 292-323

[17] The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties Act) 1999, Section 1

[18] Themis Avraamides & Anor v Colwill & Anor [2006] EWCA Civ 1533

[19] Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves & Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2602

[20] Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57

[21] Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] UKHL 1

[22] Ibid (n9).

[23] Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v Ayres & Ors [2007] EWHC 775

[24] Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening [2009] EWHC 716 (Comm)

[25] MacMillan, C. (2000). A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Modern Law Review, 63(5), pp.721-738.

[26] Ibid (n9).

Bibliography

Statutes

The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999

Road Traffic Act 1988, Section 148(7)

Married Women’s Property Act 1882, Section 11

Bills of Exchange Act 1882, Section 29

Law of Property Act 1925, Section 136, Section 56(1)

Competition Act 1998

Cases

Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854

New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A. M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. [1974] UKPC 1

Les Affreteurs Reunis SA v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd: HL 1919

Farrow v Wilson (1869) LR 4 CP 744

Swain v. The Law Society[1983] 1 HL. 598 , 611D, Lord Diplock, pp 611, p 4

Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716

Themis Avraamides & Anor v Colwill & Anor [2006] EWCA Civ 1533

Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves & Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2602

Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57

Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] UKHL 1

Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v Ayres & Ors [2007] EWHC 775

[1] Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening [2009] EWHC 716 (Comm)

Beswick v Beswick [1967] UKHL 2

Books

Burrows, A. (2011). A casebook on contract. 4th ed. Oxford: Hart.

O'Sullivan, J. and Hilliard, J. (2014). Law of Contract. 1st ed. London: Oxford University Press.

Articles

Stevens, RH. (2004). The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Law Quarterly Review 120 pp. 292-323.

Winter, J. (2007). Briefing: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Management, Procurement and Law. Vol 160, Issue 3. pp. 95-96.

Lilienthal, J. (1887). Privity of Contract. Harvard Law Review, 1(5), p.226.

Kincaid, P. (2000). Legislative Comment: Privity reform in England. Law Quarterly Review 116 pp. 43 – 47.

MacMillan, C. (2000). A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Modern Law Review, 63(5), pp.721-738.

Andrews, N. (2001). Strangers to justice no longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rule under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. The Cambridge Law Journal, 60(02), pp.353-381.

Geoffrey, W. (1995). “Whither Privity of contract?” Property Management Vol 13 No. 2 pp. 36-39.

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Explain whether and why it is fair to argue that, following the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, English law has moved from providing a paternalistic, ‘doctor knows best’ model of medical practice, and now provides a right to informedconsent.

Montgomery: Medical Law’s greatest modern triumph, represents a pronounced pivot in British law away from paternalism to a meaningful right to informed consent. This essay purports that the welcomed judgment catalysed the shift for two overarching reasons. Firstly, the multitude of cases which have followed Montgomery confirm that a meaningful right to informed consent remains ingrained in our jurisdiction. Secondly, the judiciary are no longer willing to accept that the medical profession sits on a throne exempt from subjection to the law, facilitating the movement from paternalism to informed consent. A meaningful right to informed consent is based here on Faden and Beauchamp’s theory of “effective consent,” and interpreted as a right to understand potential medical treatments, consequences, risks and alternatives comprehensively.[1] Paternalism in this essay is grounded on Dworkin’s theory, interpreted as a doctor’s interference with a patient’s liberty of action, which innately undermines the ability to obtain informed consent.[2] To reach the conclusion that Montgomery ignited the movement from paternalism to informed consent, this essay will assess the law before Montgomery, Montgomery’s significance and the law which has followed since.

The Context of Montgomery: The extent to which the Law pre-Montgomery entrenched paternalistic values and Montgomery’s imperative significance

The cases of Bolam[3] and Sidaway[4] firmly establish an undercurrent of medical paternalism in British law and embody “a long tradition of highly paternalistic medicine.”[5] The Bolam test rules the duty of care owed by a doctor to a patient is decided on medical judgment, and that a practice causing injury, if supported by a responsible body of professionals, does not constitute a breach of duty. The very ethos of this judgment, as Manusson contends,[6] defers power to the medical profession, representing a doctor-patient relationship where medics retain the upper hand, correlating closely to Friedson’s professional dominance thesis.[7] Sidaway, a case in which a patient had not been warned of the intrinsic risk of her operation, applied the Bolam test to acquit the surgeon of negligence. In doing so, the courts fundamentally validated the hegemony of the medical profession. Too timid to knock the profession from its “pedestal”,[8] the courts denied patients the rights already engrained in the GMC, including the requirement of the doctor to explain the “potential benefits, risks, burdens, and side effects of each option.”[9] It would be inherently unsubstantiated and nonsensical to argue that there did not exist an air of paternalism in the model of medical practice prior to Montgomery.

However, support for cases cementing paternalism gradually dissipated in the years prior to Montgomery. In the judiciary, tentative tiptoes cautiously advanced towards placing respect for patients and their right to understanding their treatment at the forefront of medical practice. This is evidenced by the case of Bolitho in response to Bolam, exemplifying the “first signs of judicial shift” by ruling that a judge need not support a body of medical practice if it cannot withstand logical reasoning.[10] Lord Scarman’s powerful dissenting judgment in Sidaway (on which the Montgomery test was predominantly based) reinforced the insecure foundations of the ruling, routinely criticised for its “notoriously unclear ratio.”[11] Movements in the cases of Pearce,[12] Wyatt[13] and Chester[14] supported the notion that the medical profession was no longer viewed as “somehow sacred or fragile asset of society,” as criticism of British healthcare gained rising momentum.[15] Furthermore, as increasing numbers of scandals in the medical sphere were publicised, confidence in British health services continued to plunge. The ignoring of rules outlined in the GMC and NHS guidelines which “supported a doctor’s duty to disclose relevant information and risks,”[16] along with EU cases including Glass prioritising the right to informed consent, provoked a mounting whisper of frustration amongst the general public towards the medical profession.[17] From our analysis we can confirm that there were hesitant movements towards a model of practice which prioritises informed consent before Montgomery, with patients increasingly eager to witness the “erosion of professional autonomy in the medical profession.”[18]

The case of Montgomery, however, in contrast to somewhat timid preceding cases, represents a “significant step forward in the law,”[19] as “the most important UK judgment on informed consent for 30 years.”[20] The Montgomery test is outlined clearly and comprehensibly in the judgment, which focuses on the reasonable person in the patient’s position or the particular patient when considering materiality, restoring power to patients through the “reasonable person test,” as opposed to the “reasonable doctor” test. Therefore, regardless of the fact that Montgomery does not represent a “new direction” for the model of medical practice,[21] it categorically signifies the “final nail in Sidaway's coffin.”[22] Foster unconvincingly purports Montgomery represents merely a “symbolically significant, declaratory judgment.”[23] This can be immediately dismissed by analysis of the fragmented pre-existing case law before Montgomery. To suggest that a principle as important as the right to informed consent could be ingrained in English Law on the foundations of disjointed litigation is unsubstantiated and impracticable. Montgomery remains a deeply imperative decision introducing a “patient focused test to UK law” and bringing the common law up to speed with GMC guidance.[24] We can therefore conclude that Montgomery epitomises the “belated obituary, not the death knell, of medical paternalism,” providing the necessary precision and cogency to facilitate the movement to recast medical consent.[25]

Cases following Montgomery confirm a patient’s right to informed consent is firmly ingrained in British Law.

The cases which have followed since the pivotal ruling confirm that the right to informed consent is fully imbedded in English Law as a result of Montgomery. Crossman[26] principally reasserts the importance of interaction in a doctor-patient relationship, representing a profound victory for more reserved patients, where in this instance the claimant, “not someone who finds it easy to express himself,”[27] was entitled to the same duty of care as anyone else, reaffirming that the law no longer provides an unfair advantage to patients “arrogant enough” to question a doctor.[28] Related cases following on from Montgomery applying its precedent, such as Inglis,[29] Spencer,[30] Shaw,[31] Thefaut[32]and Webster[33] embody the law which encourages shared decision making as outset by Montgomery and reflect the court’s steadfast respect for the judgment.

A “no-one size fits all approach”[34] was a central consideration of the judges in Montgomery in their “radical move away” from paternalism, and the cases which have advanced since continue to demonstrate that there is no magic rule, formula or percentage which significance can be reduced to.[35] The case of Spencer applies and follows Montgomery very closely, with Collender accepting that the risk of deep vein thombrosis or pulmonary embolism pre-operation did not constitute a material risk, however, “there was a duty to inform about symptoms (following the operation) indicative of it,” conscientious reasoning which decidedly reinforces the significance of Montgomery in our jurisdiction.[36] Similar conclusions are made in Thefaut[37] and Webster,[38] reinforcing Laing’s contention that Montgomery has “set the bar high in terms of the legal standard required to advise patients.”[39] The judgment, on the basis of its renewed application and precise following, unmistakably remains an integral part of British medical law.

Furthermore, the cases since Montgomery which have defined the ruling’s parameters and confirmed which specific circumstances the judgment applies in, intrinsically protects the sanctity of the judgment. Judges have been rational in interpreting Montgomery and diligent in their application of the ratio, closing the floodgates to claimants attempting to exploit compensation culture, a concern raised in Darnley by Jackson.[40] In A v East Kent Hospitals, Dingemans confirmed that Montgomery does not represent “authority for the proposition that medical practitioners need warn about risks which are theoretical and not material,” following the judgment’s criteria and ensuring the ruling cannot apply universally to any hopeful sycophant.[41] Connolly[42] additionally reinforces the submission (similarly advanced by Whitaker) that different relationships within the medical sphere are fundamentally distinct from one another and require different levels of dialogue and forms of interaction in order to satisfy the criteria of Montgomery,,[43] further explaining why the courts in Montgomery found that risk could not be reduced to a percentage. In Connolly, the courts held that being provided with leaflets and one consultation in this instance provided the claimant with enough information to come to an informed decision, reinforcing the fact that each case is highly dependent on its facts and a magic universal equation to be under Montgomery would be unserviceable. Such cases are indispensable in order to cultivate an unswervingly stable and precise doctrine which patients can rely on. Montgomery was never intended to be and can never be authority to provide a free ticket to compensation city for every aspiring victim.

All of these cases and the principles which they embody unequivocally support the conclusion that the right to informed consent remains wholeheartedly entrenched in English Law. Hobson’s ill-founded suggestion that Bolam would “likely remain relevant”[44] has been entirely disproved by the Court’s repeated dismissal of the test, particularly in O’Hare and Webster.[45] Montgomery remains unconditionally the bedrock of the right to informed consent in Britain.

Cases following Montgomery confirm that the medical profession no longer resides on a throne exempt from subjection to the law

Montgomery finally acknowledges the medical profession no longer “merits special protection,” and cannot be exempted from the law.[46] Bolam and Sidaway confirm the courts formerly regularly acceded to the expertise of the “elevated and privileged association” of the medical profession, leaving medics as the ultimate arbiters.[47] Montgomery finally redresses the once inordinate imbalance of power, as has been confirmed by this essay’s assessment of the numerous aforementioned cases.

Laing proposes a striking logistical standpoint: the NHS, “almost at breaking point” owing to lack of resources and staff, means that in practice, the additional time required by doctors to fulfil their obligations under Montgomery to allow patients to reach decisions of informed consent is in essence, impossible to find.[48] While her assessment is convincing, her contention does not alter the fact that a model of medical practice with a meaningful right to informed consent still exists in English law under Montgomery. This essay is concerned with the law which judges apply in cases and what the law offers patients, not whether medics who appear to have an embarrassing tendency to ignore rules incumbent upon them, as reinforced by Sokol, adhere to what they are supposed to in practice.[49] The outcomes of cases following Montgomery and their continued respect for the judgment affirms that the right to informed consent remains indisputably entrenched in British Law. Implementation of the principle is undoubtedly difficult against the backdrop of a failing NHS, but “ethics and the law will no longer have it any other way.”[50]

Conclusion

Montgomery has unequivocally reformed British medical law by placing the right to informed consent at the very core of medical practice. This essay has confirmed this by firstly assessing the law and general consensus before Montgomery, concluding that although an undercurrent developed against paternalism prior to the case, the pioneering judgment represents a turning point in the law, providing an unambiguous, coherent test which patients can reasonably rely on. This essay has assessed the cases since Montgomery, noting that such cases have steadfastly engaged closely with and applied the principles at the heart of the judgment which reinforce the principle that the medical profession no longer resides on a throne beyond law’s control. Above all, this essay has confirmed that Montgomery indisputably represents medical law’s greatest modern triumph: the restoration of power to patients at last.

[1] Beauchamp, T. Faden, R. A History and Theory of Informed Consent (1986) Oxford University Press

[2] Dworkin, R. Law’s Empire (1986) Harvard University Press

[3] Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582

[4] Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] A.C. 871

[5] Laing, J. Delivering informed consent post-Montgomery: implications for medical practice and professionalism (2017) Journal of Professional Negligence

[6]Manusson, R. Case studies in nanny state name-calling: what can we learn? (2015) 129 Public Health

[7]

Friedson, E. Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge (1970) University of Chicago Press

[8] Buchan, A. Lewis, C.J. Lewis and Buchan: Clinic Negligence: A Practical Guide (2012) Bloomsbury Professional

[9] GMC Guidance (2013)

[10] Ibid (n5)

[11] Lamb, M. Montgomery: A symbolic or substantive change to the law? (2017) North East Law Review

[12] Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR P53

[13] Wyatt v Curtis [2003] EWCA Civ 1779

[14] Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41

[15] Hobson, C. No (,) More Bolam Please: Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2016) M.L.R.

[16] Ibid (n9)

[17]

Glass v The United Kingdom (2004) ECHR 9

[18] Ibid (n5)

[19] Mogan, A, Medical paternalism: still alive in English law? (2017) S.S.L.R.

[20] Dyer, C. Doctors should not cherry pick what information to give patients, court rules. (2015) British Medical Journal

[21] Ibid (n9)

[22] Ibid (n9)

[23] Ibid (n15)

[24] Chan, S. Montgomery and informed consent: Where are we now? (2017) BMJ

[25] Foster, C. The last word on consent? (2015) New Law Journal

[26] Crossman v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust (2017) 154 B.M.L.R. 204

[27] Ibid

[28] Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11

[29] Inglis v Brand [2016] ScotSC 63

[30] Spencer v Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1058 (QB)

[31] Shaw v Kovac [2017] EWCA Civ 1028

[32] Thefaut v Johnston [2017] EWHC 497 (QB)

[33] Webster v Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 62

[34] Locke, D. NHS trust: a risky business? Legal Update. (2017) New Law Journal

[35] Ibid (n24)

[36] Ibid (n30)

[37] Ibid (n32)

[38] Ibid (n33)

[39] Ibid (n5)

[40] Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 151

[41] A v East Kent Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] Med LR 262

[42] Connolly v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1339 (QB)

[43] Ibid (n5)

[44] Ibid (n15)

[45] O'Hare v Coutts & Co [2016] EWHC 2224 (QB)

[46] Ibid (n15)

[47] Ibid (n5)

[48] Ibid (n5)

[49] Sokol, D.K. The ethical gift box: suggestions for improving the ethical conduct of doctors (2013) BMJ; 346

[50] Ibid (n34)

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