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A look at Jiang Wei parts 1 and 2

Jiang Wei is not an obscure figure. Everyone knows who he is. He’s certainly one of the most recognizable characters. However, if you ask others, they can’t really tell you a lot about Jiang Wei. I was in that camp too. I knew who he was and more or less what he did, but since he’s from the later parts of the Three Kingdoms period I never really dug deep into the man. This isn’t helped by the romance, that heavily simplifies events after the death of Zhuge Liang and becomes a lot duller as a result. So, today I’ll be talking about his honestly quite extensive career, his virtues and his flaws.

The early years

Jiang Wei, styled Boyue, was born around the year 201 in Ji county, Tianshui commandery. He was the son of Jiang Jiong, a minor official of Tianshui who held the rank of meritorious officer, a position subordinate to the commandery administrators. At some point during Jiang Wei’s youth, the Rong and Qiang tribes rose up and Jiang Jiong died fighting them [1]. There is no concrete date on Jiang Wei’s biography, and searching a bit some sites mention the year 214. That’s when Xiahou Yuan is noted to have pacified the Qiang west of mount Long, but I couldn’t find anything more concrete. Since then, Jiang Wei would live with his mother, holding the position of cadet and acting as a military adjutant to the administrator of Tianshui [2].

From an early age Jiang Wei displayed charisma and leadership, assembling a small retinue of men who were trained to die for him [3]. This dare to die corps was obviously not something he was allowed to have with such a low status, but it was his foray into training men and preparing them to fight. He also liked studying and was fond of confucian scholar Zheng Xuan’s texts [4].

With the death of Cao Pi in 226, Cao Rui succeeded him as sovereign of Wei. Since Cao Rui had only recently occupied the throne, Chancellor Zhuge Liang of the Han dynasty launched in 228 the first of his northern campaigns. With the newly ascended sovereign in the north occupied in state affairs, and after several years of relative quiet in the southwestern frontier, the invasion from the Han troops took Wei by surprise [5].

Zhuge Liang’s plan was to send a decoy army under general Zhao Yun to Mei while the main army marched to the Longyou area to take Yong and Liang, then from there take the ancient capital of Chang’an.

With the coming of the invading army, the administrator of Tianshui Ma Zun went on an inspection. As part of his staff, Jiang Wei accompanied him. It happened that the Han’s invading army caused several border commanderies to revolt, whcih included Jiang Wei’s native Tianshui. There seems to be different accounts of what happened. Jiang Wei’s own biography states that Ma Zun was suspicious of his staff officers and secretly left them, marching east to Shanggui. Jiang Wei, trying to reunite with the administrator, was not let inside Shanggui and he was rejected at Ji county as well. As a result, he defected to the Han.

An alternate account offered by Weilve is a bit more detailed. Jiang Wei did follow Ma Zun on his way to the east and urged him to go back to Tianshui. Ma Zun instead told him it’s better to scatter in face of the enemy, so Jiang Wei returned to his native Ji county. Once back home, the rebelling officers forced Jiang Wei to meet Zhuge Liang, and with him retreated after Ma Su’s defeat at Jieting, when the Chancellor led the people of those counties to Han. Since Jiang Wei had been forced to defect, his mother was not punished as a result.

There is no way to know which of these versions is correct, so I present both.

Regardless, Jiang Wei was a man of Han from then on, and it appears the Chancellor Zhuge Liang was quite impressed by him. On a letter to Jiang Wan and Zhang Yi, he wrote this about the new recruit [6]:

“姜伯约忠勤时事，思虑精密，考其所有，永南、季常诸人不如也。其人，凉州上士也。”又曰：“须先教中虎步兵五六千人。姜伯约甚敏于军事，旣有胆义，深解兵意。此人心存汉室，而才兼于人，毕教军事，当遣诣宫，觐见主上。”

Jiang Boyue is loyal and hard working on daily affairs, precise in though, meticulously examining his conduct. Yongnan (Li Shao) and Jichang (Ma Liang) can’t compare to him. He is an officer of superior qualities of Liang province.

He also added: He must first command the five or six thousand troops of the center tiger infantry. Jiang Boyue is adept in military matters, as well as possessing valor and righteousness. He deeply understands military principles. His heart is with the house of Han and his talent doubles that of ordinary men. I will give him authority on military affairs and have him go to palace to see His Majesty.

He also enfeoffed Jiang Wei as a village marquis and had him work as a staff officer under the General in chief. It appears that Jiang Wei did not disappoint the Chancellor, for he obtained sveral promotions during Zhuge Liang’s regency, reaching the rank of General who Campaigns West [7].

During the fifth northern campaign in 234, Zhuge Liang and Sima Yi faced each other at Wuzhang plains. Given the tactical prowess of the Chancellor, Sima Yi received an order from Cao Rui to stay in camp, for Sima Yi was frequently defeated whenever he went up against Zhuge Liang in open battle.

Despite his provocations, Zhuge Liang failed to make Sima Yi engage him in open battle and he died of illness. Before passing, however, he gave the order to retreat.

Rumors of the death of the Chancellor quickly spread, and Sima Yi was eager to advance in pursuit. The Han Jin chunqiu by Xi Zuochi mention that during this time Jiang Wei, then in Yang Yi’s camp, raised the flags and beat the drums as if he was going to attack. Sima Yi, thinking this was all a ruse by Zhuge Liang to lure him out, retreated [8]. When the army was on the way to Hanzhong, the Chancellor’s death was confirmed and made public.

Service under Jiang Wan

Back in Chengdu, Jiang Wei’s merits were recognized and he was given another promotion, this time as General of the Right and General who Upholds the Han. He was once again enfeoffed [9].

In the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Jiang Wei becomes Zhuge Liang’s successor, but in history nobody really was Zhuge Liang’s immediate successor to the position of Chancellor. The Emperor had left the position vacant after Zhuge Liang’s death, and nobody else in the remaining history of the Han held that position again. Jiang Wan however was considered to be Zhuge Liang’s successor, and as inspector of Yi province [10], he was in charge of supervising state affairs.

Jiang Wan’s plan was originally to advance East. https://i1.kknews.cc/SIG=362816l/ctp-vzntr/689os56o0o0o47239s75n9nqoo0r821o.jpg

Even though Han military activity slowed down during this era, the General in chief still had some plans to launch an expedition against Wei. His intention was to march East and invade Shangyong through the Han and Mian rivers, as Zhuge Liang’s northern campaigns didn’t find success. For this reason, Jiang Wan ordered a large number of ships to be built [11].

Unfortunately this plan was believed to be too risky. The difficult terrain makes the path to invade easy but retreat hard, so if the army failed to take the military objectives it could risk getting trapped and annihilated [12].

After some persuaion, Jiang Wan would modify this plan, intending to send Jiang Wei north to take the region West of the Yellow River, while he himself would station close to the Fu river. This location is important, as it was well connected by water and land, and would provide with Jiang Wei with support by reacting to military movements in the northeastern parts of the frontier [13], perhaps involving a surprise invasion to Shangyong.

This shows Jiang Wan had confidence in Jiang Wei, as he also suggested he be named inspector of Liang province. Moreover, Jiang Wan had used Jiang Wei on several incursions in the north and apparently performed well, given Jiang Wan’s eagerness to entrust more responsibility to him [14]. These invasions were probably just harassing campaigns to destabilize the west, as Guo Huai put Jiang Wei to flee without a battle [15], never meant to be a committed invasion of the north. These incursions, despite being small in scale, gave Jiang Wei insight into the Qiang and the northern frontier [16]. It makes sense Jiang Wan would choose him for a concentrated effort in the region.

This incursions likely ended in 242, when Jiang Wei camped by the Fu river, the same location that was central to Jiang Wan’s plan. In preparation for his invasion of the north, he had Jiang Wei formalized as Grand General who Subdues the West and inspector of Liang province in 243 [17].

This plan was not to be executed, however, as in 244 Jiang Wan would leave his post of General in Chief to Fei Yi, likely because of illness. Jiang Wan finally died at the beginning of the year 246.

Service under Fei Yi

Under new leadership, Jiang Wei’s campaigns didn’t really change in nature, getting involved in small campaigns and suppressing rebellions [18]. One such campaigns was the one of 247, when several Qiang tribes rose up in Nan’an and Jincheng, switching their allegiance to the Han [19]. Jiang Wei invaded from Longxi and defeated Guo Huai and Xiahou Ba [20]. He tried pressing the attack to Didao, but retreated back home, bringing with him many of the defecting tribes to Han.

In 248 Jiang Wei once more took advantage of the unrest of the Qiang and invaded to gather the defeated Qiang rebels and unite with the fleeing Zhiwudai. Marching west, he ordered Liao Hua to build a fortification at Chengzhong. In order to avoid Jiang Wei from uniting with Zhiwudai, Guo Huai attacked Liao Hua, forcing Jiang Wei to go back to rescue him [21]. Unable to rendezvous with Zhiwudai, Jiang Wei and Liao Hua retreated.

Later the following year, Jiang Wei once again was ordered to invade. Similarly to his previous campaigns, he cooperated with the Qiang to put pressure on the northern frontier and built fortifications in Chu. Since Chu was far from home, the supply lines were vulnerable. Wishing to isolate Jiang Wei and capture him, Guo Huai and Chen Tai surrounded the fortress at Chu and attempted to cut off Jiang Wei’s retreat at Mount Niutou. Jiang Wei outmaneuvered Guo Huai and retreated, but Gou An, the officer guarding Chu, surrendered [22].

With the Qiang suppressed, Deng Ai suggested leaving some military presence in the region in anticipation of Jiang Wei coming back and camped north of Bai river. Jiang Wei then decided to send Liao Hua with a decoy force to threaten Deng Ai while he himself would lead the men across the river to Taocheng, a position that, if occupied, would outflank Deng Ai’s position and would rout his men. Deng Ai, however, saw through this feint and garrisoned Taocheng. Jiang Wei retreated seeing the place had already been occupied [23].

Earlier Cao Shuang had been exterminated with his entire family by order of Sima Yi. Fearing for his life, Xiahou Ba defected to the Han and became acquainted with Jiang Wei. It is through Xiahou Ba that Jiang Wei allegedly first heard of Zhong Hui, as Xiahou Ba believed him to be a force to be reckoned with [24]. Given the prophetic nature of this passage and Jiang Wei’s later history with Zhong Hui, I suspect this is just a cliché.

During this period, on the domestic side, we start observing the first signs of decline. Dong Yun died in 246, and Fei Yi appointed Chen Zhi to succeed him as inside attendant. Dong Yun was quite strict and was cautious of the eunuch Huang Hao, warning the Emperor that such a man should not hold a high position. Chen Zhi, however, was very fond of Huang Hao and promoted him after Dong Yun’s death. Huang Hao’s influence at court would only grow as he was given free reign to manipulate the Emperor and staff the different positions with his yes men [25]. Considering the fate that Huang Hao suffered [26], I doubt those appointments were even coincidentally good. As a result, the domestic situation of Han would decline after Fei Yi died and Jiang Wei failed to leverage his influence against Huang Hao.

As for the military side of things, the campaigns under Fei Yi had a much more limited scope, focusing on exploiting tensions between Wei and the Qiang and capturing population to work the land rather than an effort to launch a grand campaign. Jiang Wei often had more ambitious plans that he brought to his superior, but Fei Yi rejected them and never had him lead more than 10.000 men at any given time [27]. As a result, Jiang Wei couldn’t afford to press the attack or contest well defended positions and successes were pretty minor. During his incursion to Xiping on 250, Jiang Wei captured Guo Xun, an officer of Wei. Guo Xun assassinated General in Chief Fei Yi in 253. It is ironic that the minor success of capturing an enemy officer in the smaller scope invasions that Fei Yi advocated for would lead directly to his death.

The death of Fei Yi meant that it was Jiang Wei’s turn to take the mantle as General in Chief and realize his northern campaigns. While he would be given the position a few years after the death of Fei Yi, he nonetheless received more military authority right after the previous General in Chief’s passing [28]. Jiang Wei’s role as General in Chief would be paralell to the further influence of Huang Hao, who would damage the administration and contribute to the fall of the State.

Interestingly enough, this decline ran paralell to that of each of the three kingdoms: Wei would suffer from armed rebellions of various generals as they cling to the withering house of Cao or rally behind the emerging Sima clan, and in Wu, Zhuge Ke would fall and Sun Jun would seize absolute power and tyrannize the people, leading to the rise and fall of emperors in the south.

The following years would be tumultuous, as Jiang Wei’s career intensifies.

(Part 2 begins here and the references start from number 1 again)

General in Chief of the Han: Taoxi and Shanggui

253 was an eventful year. Sima Yi had died a few years back and his son Sima Shi was in control of the army. Previously, Wei invaded Wu and the invading army was defeated at Dongxing by Zhuge Ke. Wishing to seize the momentum, Zhuge Ke launched a counter invasion and besieged the new city of Hefei on this year [1].

In coordination with Wu’s advances, Jiang Wei also led several tens of thousands of men to besiege Nan’an [2]. Since he thought Wei would be occupied dealing with Wu’s counterattack, Jiang Wei didn’t bring many provisions, hoping to quickly take Liang and take the supplies from there [3]. When Chen Tai and Guo Huai quickly advanced to relieve the siege, Jiang Wei retreated. Zhuge Ke was defeated as well, so in the end no gains were made by either ally.

Jiang Wei’s campaigns started to intensify to the point where he would lead a campaign pretty much every year for a while. While the ultimate goal of taken Liang province was never realized, Jiang Wei found some form of success in some of these invasions. Jiang Wei’s campaign of 254 is one of these.

That year he set forth and marched onto Didao. The reason for this is that the county chief of Didao, Li Jian, wrote a letter asking to defect and invited the army. Despite many people’s doubts about Li Jian’s honesty, Zhang Ni [4] and Jiang Wei believed it to be true. Zhang Ni was sent to welcome Li Jian’s surrender [5], but Wei’s general Xu Zhi engaged the troops in battle to stop them. Jiang Wei and Xu Zhi clashed at Xiangwu county, with Zhang Ni’s contingent led by him personally [6]. Despite the illness he was suffering at the time that prevented him from even getting up on his own, he still managed to kill many of the enemy’s troops [7].

Despite the loss of his general, Jiang Wei still greatly defeated Xu Zhi. The enemies killed were numerous [8], including Xu Zhi himself, who either died in battle or was beheaded after his capture.

Having overcome his foe, Jiang Wei followed up his victory by advancing towards Hejian (possibly actually named Heguan according to Hu Sanxing)[9], Didao and Lintao counties, taking the people with him and marching back home [10]. Despite Zhang Ni’s death, this incursion was pretty successful. While some may bring up Jiang Wei’s inability to take Liang, this campaign began because Li Jian of Didao county wanted to defect. Having escorted him and the local population safely to Han is already a benefit to the state and a positive thing. That Liang province couldn’t be taken was because Li Jian was just a county chief [11] and his defection couldn’t impact the balance of power in the province that heavily in Han’s favor. Jiang Wei probably realized this and limited his military goals. In the end he destroyed Xu Zhi and got more population to work the fields, certainly a success given the circumstances.

In 255, Sima Shi died during the suppression of Guanqiu Jian and Wen Qin’s rebellion. That same year, Jiang Wei with Xiahou Ba once again marched north to Didao, despite Zhang Yi firmly opposing this decision [12]. The inspector of Wei’s Yong province, Wang Jing, was put in charge of the defense at Didao. Chen Tai told him to wait for reinforcements and hold out Han’s invading army. However, Wang Jing engaged Jiang Wei directly. Chen Tai imagined something must have been amiss and the situation had changed for him to sally out [13].

Both armies clashed at Taoxi, or west of the Tao River. The details of this battle are scant, but the result is clear: it was a resounding victory for Han and one of Wei’s biggest losses in its history. Jiang Wei utterly crushed Wang Jing and inflicted casualties that are described in the tens of thousands of men [14]. This number is nothing to scoff at, and I can’t stress enough how big it is. For comparison, Cao Xiu’s troops at Shiting amounted to ten thousand [15], and a similar number is given in regards to Wei’s casualties at Dongxing [16].

After the battle, Zhang Yi suggested to retreat, be content with the achievement and retreat back to Han in order to preserve morale [17]. Jiang Wei, once again, disagreed with Zhang Yi and pressed the attack to Didao, where Wang Jing’s remaining army was holed up.

Chen Tai remarked the strategic situation at hand: Jiang Wei had overextended himself and pressing the attack on Didao means he won’t commit to taking a supply base on Lueyang or to rally the Qiang against Wei like in previous campaigns [18]. However, the reality on his side was that Wang Jing had suffered very heavy casualties and his morale was low, and Chen Tai’s own army wasn’t in the best fighting condition either [19]. He thus decided to use guile in order to make Jiang Wei retreat.

Taking the high ground, Chen Tai made a display of force, loudly proclaiming his coming and raising numerous flags to inspire the allies guarding Didao. Jiang Wei was surprised at the speed by which reinforcements had arrived, and after attacking Chen Tai unsuccessfully, he led his men in retreat. Wang Jing was grateful for the reinforcements, as he didn’t feel like he could have held out for much longer with the supplies he had [20].

Jiang Wei has attracted criticism in the three kingdoms community because of the way he had conducted this campaign, citing Zhang Yi’s remarks and Chen Tai’s evaluation of the situation. I have several arguments in favor of Jiang Wei’s siege of Didao.

Wang Jing’s defeat at Taoxi was devastating. Such a high number of casualties was pretty rare and only a handful of battles during this entire period had comparable numbers. It was an impressive feat that not even Zhuge Liang could pull off. This naturally weakened Wang Jing’s morale significantly.

Just because Jiang Wei retreated doesn’t mean Zhang Yi was right and his approach was perfect. Let’s not forget he was against the campaign from the very beginning, being unwilling to continue even after finding success. While it is true that if Jiang Wei had retreated the army could preserve its morale, this shows a lack of ambition that I personally find frustrating.

Following up on the previous point, one flaw of Zhuge Liang’s was that, despite his victories on the battlefield, he often did not capitalize on them. Jiang Wei had already been witness to that, as well as being constricted by Fei Yi’s more passive stance. Jiang Wei understood that to simply retreat after such a crushing defeat of the enemy would be to waste all the momentum gained with successful tactics, rendering the victory ultimately empty. Why would Jiang Wei retreat after humiliating Wei like this? Is that how Han was supposed to win the war? By retreating at the height of success? This was a war of unification, not a videogame. The objective is not to get a high score, it is to unify the land. Not capitalizing in victories is a defeatist attitude and would only lead to destruction. Imagine if Liu Bei and Zhou Yu decided to go home after Red Cliffs. Would we be talking about three different kingdoms here then?

Chen Tai naturally understood the risks of Jiang Wei taking Lueyang or riling up the Qiang. However, I don’t think this assessment discredits Jiang Wei. What Chen Tai was talking about was one way to approach the attack, and a perfectly valid one. However, Jiang Wei’s rationale is perfectly sound. Aiming straight for Didao was a somewhat risky move given the distance from Han and the lightly armored troops he was leading, but it still has its merits. Wang Jing himself had mentioned a lack of supplies, so it is quite likely that Jiang Wei saw the opportunity to take Didao quickly and use it as a base to press the attack on Wei. What I’m about to say is admittedly conjecture on my end, but Wang Jing perhaps saw his supplies were not enough to withstand a protracted siege and decided to sally out, defeat Jiang Wei and at least buy some time by forcing him on the degensive. Regardless of Wang Jing’s motives, the reality is that his supply situation was dire, and if Jiang Wei had committed more to the siege, taking Didao was absolutely not out of the question.

It is unlikely that Jiang Wei suffered heavy casualties to Chen Tai, as his adjutants noted his army was not in the best fighting condition [21]. More than likely, Jiang Wei saw he could not dislodge Chen Tai of advantageous terrain and chose to retreat lest he threatened his rear and disrupted his supply lines. He also was suspicious of a ruse by Wei, as the speed at which Chen Tai arrived had caught him off guard. Because of this, Jiang Wei didn’t commit his men to a full attack and retreated shortly after. The fact that Chen Tai had enough prestige to make Jiang Wei suspect a ruse, if anything, speaks more of Chen Tai’s talent than Jiang Wei’s incompetence.

While the campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, Taoxi stands as Jiang Wei’s greatest victory and one of Wei’s greatest defeats. For this achievement, Jiang Wei was named General in Chief, just as Jiang Wan and Fei Yi had held before him, and it was earned.

The events of 256 also prove that Jiang Wei’s retreat was not that damaging to the Han in terms of morale. While the costs are in lost opportunities, Deng Ai still thought Jiang Wei’s army was a worthy foe and had not yet exhausted his strength. In fact, Deng Ai remarked that the region was in dire straights after Jiang Wei’s last incursion, and that he would indeed follow up sooner or later [22].

Jiang Wei marched towards Mount Qi, but seen it tightly defended by Deng Ai, he changed his route to Nan’an. There, Deng Ai had occupied advantageous terrain and Jiang Wei was unable to contest it [23].

His next march was towards Shanggui, crossing the Wei river. He had arranged for General who subdues the west Hu Ji to rendezvous with his army there. For one reason or another, however, Hu Ji failed to show up. This left the Han troops without supplies [24].

This proved quite disastrous, in fact. Jiang Wei engaged Deng Ai at Duan Valley, where Deng Ai heavily defeated Jiang Wei’s invading army, putting an end to the campaign. A memorial congratulating and rewarding Deng Ai for his victory numbers Jiang Wei’s casualties in the thousands, and some minor officers were killed as well [25].

Despite Jiang Wei’s success that propelled him to General in Chief, his edge was blunted by Deng Ai at Duan valley, and while the number of casualties is not exact, they must have been considerable, for the people of Han complained about it and came to dislike Jiang Wei as a result. While Hu Ji is blamed in the sources for this defeat, it strikes me as odd that Jiang Wei would simply ignore that Hu Ji was not there. Jiang Wei clearly must have known his army was poorly supplied because of Hu Ji’s absence. Why then did he engage Deng Ai? This was too reckless.

Regardless, Jiang Wei agreed with my sentiment, as he blamed himself for this defeat and requested his own demotion, being named General of the Rear, but was still in charge of the army [26].

Next year, however, an opportunity presented itself. Wei’s Zhuge Dan had revolted in Huainan and requested help from Wu in order to oppose the Sima family. Jiang Wei decided to march north once again, knowing that the army would be occupied dealing with Zhuge Dan [27].

He marched towards Chancheng, an important supply depot in the area that was lightly defended. Knowing the importance of this location Sima Wang marched towards Chancheng and tightly defended it, with Deng Ai on his way. Despite Jiang Wei’s provocations, Deng Ai and Sima Wang refused to engage him in battle, learning the lessons of Taoxi [28].

The following year, Zhuge Dan was killed and Jiang Wei felt compelled to retreat. His status as General in Chief was restored [29].

Jiang Wei’s final northern campaign was carried out on the year 262. It was a rather unremarkable affair. Jiang Wei advance to Houhe and was defeated by Deng Ai, forcing him to retreat back to Tazhong. This campaign was met with opposition from the start [30], and the fruitless nature of it most certainly did not help his case.

In fact, such was the case that Huang Hao conspired to dismiss his from the post of General in Chief and place his close associate Yan Yu in power as Jiang Wei’s substitute. Jiang Wei was dissatisfied and urged the Emperor to execute him immediately. The Emperor however, refused, but nonetheless had Huang Hao apologize to him [31].

This open move against Huang Hao put Jiang Wei on the corsshairs. Not daring to go back to Chengdu lest he came to harm, Jiang Wei stationed at Tazhong [32] and never again marched north against his long time rivals.

Jiang Wei had been unsuccessful in his northern campagins. Concerned with supplies and advancing deep into enemy territory, it was often that his supply lines were threatened and sometimes he suffered heavy losses like at Shanggui. Despite this, it’s quite remarkable how Jiang Wei’s new defense strategy revolved precisely around reverting these roles. That is to say, developing a new strategy that in theory would make the enemy overextend themselves with the purpose of launching a vigorous counterattack, completely crushing the enemy and replicating the great victory at Taoxi.

For this purpose, he abandoned the several passes into Hanzhong and wished to garrison Hancheng and Luocheng [33]. If you remember my article on Zhuge Liang’s campaigns, these are the fortresses he built to meet Cao Zhen’s invasion, carefully placed to meet the marching enemy and easily defeat them after an arduous march across the Qinling [34].

By inviting the enemy in, he could fight Wei on his own terms, harrassing the weak spots in the enemy’s formation and straining their supply situation. By stalling an invading army and forcing them to exhaust their provisions, he would cause them to retreat through treacherous roads, an opportunity he would use to pursue the enemy and obliterate their army in one stroke [35].

This defense plan has been heavily criticized, and not undeservedly so as it ultimately didn’t work. I personally think it was a plan with plenty of merit, even if its execution was flawed. I will go more in depth later about how viable this plan was, but for now I will simply say that this approach would potentially be a lot more effective than the previous defensive arrangements. While the passes that protected Hanzhong were a formidable defense, they were used to simply repel enemy invasions that retreated after encountering impassable fortifications. They were used quite effectively by Wang Ping, for example, but Cao Shuang didn’t lose a significant number of men [36].

Because of this, even though Han was safe, Wei could return relatively unscathed. Jiang Wei’s approach is a lot more daring and fresh, with the potential to deal a very heavy blow to his former state and severely weakening them.

Unfortunately he was up against formidable foes.

The fall of the Han

Sima Zhao made note of the change in development in the western frontier. He had previously been offered the Nine Bestowments and the title of Duke, having rejected every time [37]. Now obviously it was him appointing himself to those titles so that he can reject them and make a display of loyalty and humility [38], but he truly did covet those honors and much more.

Wishing to justify his accession with a military conquest, he thought the defeat of the Han would propel his prestige enough to make his final moves towards emperorship. Not only was this a political decision, it was also strategic. With Han annexed, his troops could sail down the Changjiang, strike at Wu from water and land and unify the empire once and for all, this time under a new regime [39].

In order to do so, he planned with Zhong Hui a three pronged invasion of the Han. The three main commanders would be Deng Ai, Zhuge Xu and Zhong Hui, numbering approximately 160.000 troops (100.000 under Zhong Hui, 30.000 under Deng Ai and Zhuge Xu each) [40].

At the time, Jiang Wei was stationed at Tazhong with 50.000 men, west of Hanzhong, and requested more men to face the incoming invasion. Huang Hao thought Wei wasn’t really going to invade, hence Jiang Wei’s reinforcements did not arrive [41].

Even though the map is rather featureless, it pinpoints the main locations in this invasion. From: John W. Killigrew (2001) A case study of Chinese civil warfare: The Cao‐Wei conquest of Shu‐Han in AD 263, Civil Wars, 4:4, 95-1

Sima Zhao’s plan was simple. Zhong Hui would advance from the northeast through Ye, Luo and Ziwu valleys into Hanzhong to take this strategic location, the gate to Shu. The main problem was the defensive stronghold of Jian’ge, the last line of defense before the Chengdu plain [42].

Since Jiang Wei was stationed in Tazhong, Zhong Hui’s army was to be assisted by Deng Ai and Zhuge Xu. Deng Ai would advance from Didao on the northwest to engage with Jiang Wei directly, and Zhuge Xu would advance from Mount Qi on the north towards the bridgehead of Yinping. This way, Deng Ai would hold down Jiang Wei and Zhuge Xu would cut off his escape route. With Jiang Wei pincered between two large forces, Zhong Hui could march through Jian’ge unopposed and strike Chengdu directly [43].

The invasion began in 263 and things had originally gone as planned. Zhong Hui entered Hanzhong, and as per Jiang Wei’s plans, the fortresses of Hancheng and Luocheng were tightly guarded. Only then did the Emperor authorize reinforcements, sending Liao Hua to aid Jiang Wei at Tazhong and Zhang Yi with Dong Jue to reinforce Yang’an pass [44].

On their front, Deng Ai and Zhuge Xu made their move. Jiang Wei was defeated in a minor engagement and decided to move to Hanzhong to reinforce those fighting Zhong Hui. It happened that Jiang Shu had defected and guided the invading army to attack Yang’an pass, taking it . With Hanzhong lost, Jiang Wei marched towards Yinping, but discovering Zhuge Xu was in the vicinity. With effective maneuvering, Jiang Wei feigned an attack north to outflank Zhuge Xu, and this, feeling threatened, chose to retreat [45].

In this moment, Jiang Wei turned and marched straight to Jian’ge, where he met up with Liao Hua and the others and was ready to defend the bastion with tooth and nail. With this maneuver, Jiang Wei had outmaneuvered Deng Ai and Zhuge Xu [46], and the speed in which he marched made Zhong Hui hit a roadblock at Jian’ge.

The original plan of Sima Zhao had failed, as Jiang Wei could not be restrained and marched onto Jian’ge, stopping the northern hordes in their tracks. However, the reality of the situation is that Hanzhong was taken, and given this success, Sima Zhao took the opportunity to finally accept the title of Duke of Jin [47].

The defense of Jian’ge was fierce. Jiang Wei’s impenetrable formation proved too much for Zhong Hui to overcome, and since the supply situation was dire, he seriously considered to retreat [48], just as Jiang Wei’ had envisioned in his defensive plan.

At this juncture, Deng Ai took an undefended Yinping and wanted to advance towards Jiangyou in a daring march to outflank Jian’ge and aim straight for Chengdu. Zhuge Xu thought this was not the original plan, and since he had failed to stop Jiang Wei, he joined up with Zhong Hui, who stripped him of his command [50].

Deng Ai decided to take matter into his own hands and adapt to the changing situation. The march into Jiangyou was incredibly arduous. The terrain was very hard to traverse through, and at some point Deng Ai had to roll himself in felt in order to advance [51]. Despite the difficulty that the terrain posed, Deng Ai still managed to reach Jiangyou, that surrendered immediately. The men of Han were caught completely off guard by Deng Ai’s daring march, as the route was considered so difficult that it was not thought the enemy would risk marching through it.

With this surprise attack, the court sent Zhuge Zhan, who marched to Fu. Undecided to take the defiles and defensive terrain [52], Zhuge Zhan was defeated and retreated to Mianzhu. Deng Ai engaged him in battle and was unsuccessful. Understanding that failure meant total annihilation [53], as there really was no viable way to escape, he pressed the attack and successfully defeated Zhuge Zhan, killing him in battle.

With Deng Ai in the proximity, the Emperor was offered an array of different advice, like fleeing to Wu or preparing a defense at Nanzhong. Qiao Zhou, one of the critics of Jiang Wei’s foreign policy, thought the best course of action was surrender [54]. The Emperor agreed and capitulated, ordering Jiang Wei to lay down his arms and yield. The Han dynasty had finally fallen.

The fall of the Han. Taken from: https://www.bilibili.com/read/cv1954392

Final attempt at restoration and death

Obeying the imperial command, Jiang Wei surrendered to Zhong Hui. Zhong Hui was deeply impressed with his rival, putting him above men like Zhuge Zhan, Zhuge Dan or Xiahou Xuan [55]. From then on, Jiang Wei and Zhong Hui became friends, though it wouldn’t be long before they died together.

However there was still work to be done. Deng Ai accepted the Emperor’s surrender and started giving out ranks and enfeoffments, some positions to serve under him directly [56]. Because Deng Ai had stepped out of his boundaries, Zhong Hui reported the matter to Sima Zhao. Zhong Hui himself had his own ambitions and rewrote the letters that Deng Ai sent to make his alleged words sound more arrogant than they actually were [57].

Since Zhuge Xu was stripped of his command, only Deng Ai remained to challenge his authority, so Zhong Hui was happy to send Wei Guan to arrest him. It so happened that Zhong Hui sent Wei Guan with only a handful of men so that Deng Ai felt confident enough to kill him, thus giving Zhong Hui a pretext to move against him and bringing him to justice [58].

Wei Guan sensed this and convinced Deng Ai’s officers that only he and his son Deng Zhong were to be punished, while his officers would still retain their rank and status [59].

With Deng Ai arrested, Zhong Hui stood as the de facto supreme commander of all Wei troops in Shu. In 264, Zhong Hui started plotting his rebellion to expel Sima Zhao and take the empire [60]. His plan was to send Jiang Wei with the vanguard to Chang’an through Ye valley. Once the west was taken, Zhong Hui would send the armies through river and land onto Luoyang and thus have free access into the Central Plains [61].

Sima Zhao was suspicious of Zhong Hui from the beginning though [62], and with the pretext that he feared Deng Ai would not accept his arrest, he sent Jia Chong through Ye valley into Luocheng, while he himself stationed at Chang’an with a large force. Zhong Hui was alarmed at this new development, but found some respite with the thought that even if he failed he could still survive in Shu, just like Emperor Zhaolie had done in days of old [63].

Zhong Hui summoned the different officials in mourning service of Lady Guo, and had a petition allegedly written by her compelling him to destroy Sima Zhao. Declaring himself inspector of Yi province, he forced the attending officers to comply and held them under house arrest in the government buildings used by Han [64].

Jiang Wei had his own designs and urged Zhong Hui to slaughter the Wei officers. His plan was to use the army given to him by his associate to kill him and restore the Emperor to his rightful throne. Zhong Hui hesitated [65].

During this time, the rumor spread that Zhong Hui indeed intended to slaughter the officials, and when the invading troops heard of this, they mutinied. Entering Chengdu, they liberated the prisoners and attacked Zhong Hui. Facing complete annihilation, Jiang Wei decided to face with death with bravery and charged at the enemy troops [66]. Despite his advanced age, Jiang Wei struck down several enemy soldiers [67]. His death by the side of the man he was planning to betray marked the end to Jiang Wei’s chaotic life.

Historical Appraisals

Appraisals on Jiang Wei are surprisingly varied with some relevant ones in his own wikipedia article with decent translations. Chen Shou himself considered him a man of both Wen and Wu, that is to say a cultured man yet skilled in warfare. Despite this, he was careless, anxious to achieve merit and wantonly mobilized the people and thus brought his own destruction [68].

Sun Sheng’s comment on Jiang Wei is a lot more negative, scathing. Seriously, read this:

Although scholar-officials may take different paths and have different goals, they should live by the four fundamental values of loyalty, filial piety, righteousness and integrity. Jiang Wei was originally from Wei yet he defected to Shu and betrayed his ruler for personal gain. Therefore, he was disloyal. He abandoned his family to lead a meaningless life. Therefore, he was unfilial. He also turned against his native state. Therefore, he was unrighteous. He lost battles but chose to live on. Therefore, he had no integrity. When he was in power, he failed to establish himself as a virtuous leader and instead brought untold suffering to the people by forcing them into a prolonged war to boost his personal glory. Although he was responsible for defending his state, he ended up provoking the enemy and lost his state. Therefore, he was neither wise nor courageous. Jiang Wei possessed not a single one of these six values. In reality, Jiang Wei was nothing more than a traitor to Wei and an incompetent head of government to Shu, yet Xi Zheng said he was worthy of serving as a role model. How absurd is that. Even though Jiang Wei may be studious, that is just a good habit rather than a praiseworthy virtue. That is no different from a robber taking his due share of the loot, and no different from Cheng Zheng pretending to be humble.

Translation from Jiang Wei’s wikipedia entry.

These words are absurd. It even feels like Jiang Wei stole Sun Sheng’s wife or something, because even the virtuous Jiang Wei had that couldn’t be spun around and interpreted as some heinous crime, he disregard as something that should be the bare minimum (sound familiar?).

Pei Songzhi has a much more positive view of Jiang Wei and counters Sun Sheng’s points one by one. I will summarize his points when I give my personal opinion later [69].

Several of Jiang Wei’s contemporaries also appear to have had a positive view of the man. Deng Ai considered him a hero of the times [70], Cao Huan thought that he was the only person the Han could rely on [71], Zhong Hui had a very high opinion of him, comparing him to people like Xiahou Xuan, another respected and popular figure of Wei [72] and naturally Zhuge Liang as well considered him a talented individual [73].

Liao Hua and Qiao Zhou were critical of his foreign policy [74], but otherwise were not as harsh on the man as a person.

Hu Sanxing thought Jiang Wei was dedicated fully to the cause of Han, that he must have been intelligent and able to manipulate Zhong Hui for his country, disagreeing with Chen Shou and Sun Sheng’s opinion [75].

Lastly, I want to cite Xi Zheng’s appraisal, found in Jiang Wei’s own bio:

Jiang Boyue held the responsibilities of a top general and occupied a high position in the government, yet he lived in a plain-looking residence, had no other income besides his salary, had only one wife and no concubines, and had no form of entertainment. His clothes and transport were just sufficient for use; he also imposed restrictions on his meals. He was neither extravagant nor shabby. He kept his spending within the limits of his state-issued allowance. His purpose in doing so was neither to prove that he was incorruptible nor to resist temptation. He did so ungrudgingly because he felt satisfied with what he already had. Mediocre people tend to praise those who achieve success and condemn those who fail; they praise those of higher status than them, and condemn those of lower status than them. Many people hold negative views of Jiang Wei because he died in a terrible way and his entire family was killed. These people do not look beyond the superficial. They fail to grasp the true meaning of appraisal as set out in the Spring and Autumn Annals. Jiang Wei’s studiousness, as well as his modesty and humility, make him a role model for his contemporaries.

Translated from Jiang Wei’s wikipedia page.

This appraisal is what triggered a response from Sun Sheng. This shows us a more personal side to Jiang Wei, a side that shows his humility, his frugality and his studious nature.

My personal opinion

I have quite a high opinion of Jiang Wei. I find his personality traits quite admirable. He was humble, he was loyal and he was incredibly dedicated, tenacious to the extreme. It kind of reminds me of Liu Bei in the way he refused to give up. Even in the face of absolute annihilation he decided to fight for what he truly believed in, never ceasing in his efforts, no matter the odds.

However, you didn’t read my lengthy writeup pretty much covering his entire military career for me to talk about Jiang Wei’s quality as a man. His military record was mixed, but his military talents still shine through his shortcomings. Not only was he praised by some very competent contemporaries like Deng Ai, Zhuge Liang or Zhong Hui, but he showed remarkable tactical prowess and ingenuity. He cleverly stopped Sima Yi’s pursuit at Wuzhang plains, was an integral part of Jiang Wan’s northern strategy, successfully agitated the Qiang and Hu barbarians, slaughtered Xu Zhi, crushed Wang Jing and shook the western border to the point where even Deng Ai considered him a considerable threat.

Despite my respect and admiration for Jiang Wei, I think it wouldn’t be fair to ignore his flaws. He sometimes displayed a significant degree of recklessness. He ended up campaigning every year late on his career, exhausting the resources of Han in campaigns that didn’t yield significant results that could swing the war in his favor. I think Shanggui was his biggest failure, as I can’t really think of a reason why he would engage Deng Ai with hungry troops once he realized Hu Ji didn’t arrive. It was a very dumb mistake.

According to the Han Jin chunqiu, Xue Xu, an envoy from Wu, remarked that Han was impoverished and the people had a hungry look on their face, with a foolish ruler at the helm. While I have been told Pei Songzhi interpreted this annecdote was an analogy to criticize Sun Xiu and the state of Wu at the time, I don’t think it negates the state of Han either. Jiang Wei, despite this pitiful state of civil affairs, constrained the people and the resources of the Shu region, making his fruitless campaigns all the more damaging. While many of them didn’t end in significant losses of life, maintaining and mobilizing those armies must not have been a cheap endeavor, and the end result was a weakening of his country despite his best intentions.

This, of course, wasn’t helped by the situation at home. The rise of Huang Hao meant that those who favored him would see appointments, while those whom he disliked would be his targets. I can’t however fault Jiang Wei for that. He was not in charge of the administration. He was not a politician and it was not his job to govern the state. It is unfortunate that later in his life he would always return to a state dominated by Huang Hao and his cronies, a court that was divided and tired of war, as the local gentry lacked the drive to move out of Shu and was involved in a tug of war with Jiang Wei and the more expansionist clique. It was a far cry from Zhuge Liang’s regency, and if the country were to be managed more competently, perhaps Jiang Wei would have found more success. Killigrew also emphasizes Han’s factionalism and mismanagement as opposed to the Sima’s increasing unity.

While Chen Shou criticized Jiang Wei’s warmongering because the Han was a small state, I heavily disagree with this conclusion and that of his detractors. Precisely because the Han was a small state, it couldn’t afford to wait it out. Wei would win the long game, it really is that simple. Zhuge Liang saw this, Jiang Wan saw this and Zhuge Ke explicitly remarked this. Invading north was the only way the Han could viably survive, not accumulating resources waiting for a state that will outresource you by a wider margin the longer you wait.

He truly was unfortunate, as his career started taking off after Zhuge Liang died. While Jiang Wan was open to the idea of giving him important roles in a grand campaign, Fei Yi was uneager to push and expel Wei, and when he finally came to dominate the army, the political situation was already devolving into bickering between the different factions. Campaigning north meant having less pressence to influence court politics at home, and this situation Jiang Wei couldn’t overcome. Alas, Heaven was not on his side.

Then there is his controversial plan to defend the Han. The plan ultimately failed, and he deserves criticism for that. The execution was not as good as it could have been, and people like Killigrew remark that Tazhong was too far from Hanzhong to speedily reinforce it. Despite this, Pei Songzhi praises the plan and thinks it was almost successful. The daring nature of Deng Ai’s march cannot be understated: it was borderline suicidal. If Zhong Hui had retreated, Jiang Wei could have had his desired great victory against Wei, mortally wound the reputation of Sima Zhao and send a detachment to destroy Deng Ai. His plan had flaws, flaws that were skillfully exploited by Zhong Hui, but nonetheless it was very close to success and perhaps it would have cemented Jiang Wei’s place in history as one of the greats. But because his plan failed while Deng Ai’s succeeded, it is the latter that gets his brilliant reputation (which is still deserved in my opinion, but not entirely because of his plans in the invasion of Han).

Despite his flaws, Jiang Wei was a man of exceptional ability, loyalty and determination. I can’t help but compare him with Wei Yan. Like him, Jiang Wei was brave and daring, a resourceful strategist and a capable commander of men. The key difference is that Jiang Wei was infinitely more humble and actually loyal. It truly is a pity the Chancellor couldn’t employ Jiang Wei earlier.

Jiang Wei is a tragic figure that had to play his role as the last hero of the Han dynasty, finally being swallowed by the necessities and circumstances of the time. May his sacrifice be forever remembered.

References

Part 1:

1: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

2: ibid

3: Fuzi, annotation on Jiang Wei’s SGZ biography.

4: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

5: Weilve has it: Now, after the Emperor Liu Bei had died, complete quiet had reigned in Han for some years, so Wei had not made any preparations at all. Hearing of suddenly

Zhuge Liang’s exodus, both the court and the country at large were frightened and awed.

Translation from Achilles Fang.

6: The letter can be found in Jiang Wei’s biography on the SGZ.

7: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

8: Obviously, Han Jin chunqiu. Found in Achilles Fang’s Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

9: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

10: ibid.

11: ibid.

12: ibid.

13: ibid.

14: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

15: SGZ, Guo Huai’s biography.

16: As he would lately remark in his exhortations to Fei Yi.

17: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

18: He suppressed the barbrians at Wenshan and Pingkang in 247, as his own SGZ biography states.

19: These uprisings were not the ones he had suppressed earlier that year, as this was Wei territory.

20: Huayang guozhi has it: Wei came to Longxi, with Wei generals Guo Huai and Xiahou Ba battled, defeating them. 维出陇西，与魏将郭淮、夏侯霸战，克之。 My translation.

21: SGZ, Guo Huai’s biography.

22: This description of events was summaized from Achilles Fang’s Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms. The different sources include the biographies of Chen Tai and Liu Shan.

23: SGZ, Deng Ai’s biography.

24: Han Jin chunqiu.

25: Biographies of Dong Yun and Chen Zhi on the SGZ.

26: Dong Yun and Chen Zhi’s SGZ tell use that Huang Hao bribed Deng Ai’s men to be let go when he was arrested after the surrender of Chengdu. Having accumulated great wealth, it’s clear Huang Hao was not in the least interested in running a state properly.

27: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

28: ibid

Part 2:

1: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang.

2: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography. ZZTJ mentions he was besieging Didao, but his owne biography mentions Nan’an, so that’s the one I decided to write in.

3: Yu Song explained to Sima Shi that Jiang Wei seeked to take the wealth from the Wei border and thus didn’t bring many provisions. His full evaluation of the situation can be found in Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

4: SGZ, Zhang Ni’s biography.

5: ibid.

6: ibid. I am assuming the battle described in Zhang Ni’s biography against Xu Zhi is the same and the one Jiang Wei lead against Xu Zhi, Zhang Ni being a subordinate officer and performing well.

7: ibid. It’s not entirely clear if it was Zhang Ni who personally killed many or if it was his regiment because of Zhang Ni’s tactics. Regardless, Zhang Ni performed exceptionally and was put to great use.

8: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography. The original line is 进围襄武，与魏将徐质交锋，斩首破敌，魏军败退。, “Besieging Xiangwu county, (Jiang Wei) with Wei general Xu Zhi engaged, cutting heads and breaking the enemy, Wei’s troops withdrew in defeat”. My translation.

9: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms

10: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

11: ibid.

12: SGZ, Zhang Yi’s biography.

13: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

14: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

15: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. He is noted to have advanced with Ten thousand men. Since Cao Xiu successfully escaped, he didn’t lose all ten thousand, but still was a significant defeat.

16: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. It cites “tens of thousands”.

17: SGZ, Zhang Yi’s biography.

18: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

19: ibid. The various generals all said, “Wang Jing

was recently defeated and the Shu hordes are too strong. You, General, with your motley

troops have succeeded to a defeated army and will confront the keen edge of the victorious

enemy; this will not do at all".

20: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. Wang Jing sighed and said, “We have been cut

off from provisions for the past ten days. Had reinforcements not come speedily, the entire

city would have been butchered and rent asunder, and the whole province overthrown.”

Being cut off from supplies, his own reserves couldn’t hold the fight for long.

21: See 19.

22: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. Deng Ai, said, “At the defeat on the west of the Tao, our loss was not small; our officers and men are worn out and depleted, our granaries are

empty, and the population is wandering homeless. We are almost reduced to ruin.”

23: ibid.

24: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. The source in question is the Zhanlve of Sima Biao, that states: “Jiang Wei penetrated into our territory without waiting for the baggage to arrive. His men suffered from hunger and his army was thus overthrown at Shanggui.”

25: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. Deng Ai planned out appropriate measures; loyally and bravely he exerted himself, killing tens of their

generals and decapitating thousands of their men.

26: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

27: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

28: ibid.

29: SGZ, Jiang Wei’s biography.

30: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. “One will burn himself with military weapons if he does not lay

them aside. I am referring to Jiang Boyue (i.e. Jiang Wei). His sagacity does not surpass

that of the enemy, and his strength is less than the enemy’s. Still he would use them (the

weapons) immoderately. How is he going to preserve himself?“

31: ibid.

32: ibid.

33: ibid.

34: ibid.

35: ibid.

36: ibid. However, the original text of the ZZTJ mentions Cao Shuang lost a significant degree of men. As Achilles Fang points out, this was rewritten by Sima Guang and the original reference cites a loss of cattle for transporting supplies.

37: ibid.

38: ibid. The various officials held the appearance of the dragons in the wells to be an auspicious

sign. The Emperor said, “Dragons symbolize the virtue of a sovereign. But they are not in

heaven above, nor in the fields below; in their frequent appearances they are being

constricted in wells. This is not an auspicious omen.” He composed a poem on a dragon lying

hid in allusion to himself. Sima Zhao saw it and was displeased.

Cao Mao was clearly unsatisfied with Sima Zhao’s blatant political moves. It’s not likely he would voluntarily insist in Sima Zhao receiving a dukedom and the Nine Bestowments.

39: Killigrew, 2001.

40: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. It mentions Zhong Hui having some ten odd myriads of men. In Chinese, 十万 can also be the number 100.000.

41: Jiang Wei’s number of men was taken from Killigrew, 2001. The story about Huang Hao was taken from Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

42: Killigrew, 2001.

43: ibid.

44: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

45: ibid.

46: Killigrew, 2001.

47: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms.

48: ibid.

49: ibid.

50: ibid.

51: ibid.

52: ibid. The Shangshu lang Huang Chong was a son of Huan Quan. He repeatedly advised Zhuge Zhan to hasten forward and occupy the defiles, to

keep the enemy from entering level terrain. Zhuge Zhan continued to hesitate without

accepting his advice.

53: ibid.

54: ibid. Deng Ai said, “To be or not to be depends on this one stroke. How dare you say they cannot be beaten?”

55: ibid. Zhuge Zhan was mediocre, but Zhong Hui thought highly of him. Jiang Wei being compared to him is not meant as criticism.

56: Ibid. Following the precedent of Deng Yu, he presumed Imperial authority and appointed Liu Shan, the Sovereign of Han, to be acting piaoji jiangjun, the Crown Prince to be fengche (duyu) and the various officials princes of the blood to be fuma duyu. As for the various officials of Han, he appointed them, in accordance with their different ranks, as subordinate officials either of the Prince Liu Shan or of Deng Ai himself.

57: ibid.

58: ibid.

59: ibid.

60: ibid.

61: ibid.

62: Killigrew, 2001. Sima Zhao was warned of Zhong Hui’s disloyalty, but decided to use him anyway as only he was in favor of campaigning west, using Zhong Hui’s ambition to ensure victory.

63: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms (although Zhong Hui used the Emperor’s personal name).

64: ibid.

65: ibid.

66: ibid.

67: ibid.

68: Jiang Wei was proficient in civil and military affairs, and he desired to attain personal glory and leave his name in history. However, he lacked foresight and good judgment when he chose a path of warmongering, and that resulted in his downfall. As Laozi once said, ‘governing a state is like cooking a small dish.’ Shu was a small state, so all the more he should not have continuously disturbed it.

Found on wikipedia’s article on Jiang Wei.

69: Pei Songzhi’s comment:

When Zhong Hui and his massive army attacked Jiange, Jiang Wei and his officers led their troops to put up a solid defence. When Zhong Hui wanted to retreat after failing to breach Jiange, Jiang Wei nearly gained the glory of successfully defending Shu from an invasion. However, Deng Ai took a shortcut, bypassed Jiang Wei, defeated Zhuge Zhan and conquered Chengdu. If Jiang Wei turned back to save Chengdu, Zhong Hui would attack him from the rear. Under such circumstances, how could he possibly achieve both goals? People who criticise Jiang Wei for not turning back to retake Mianzhu and save the emperor are being unreasonable. Zhong Hui later planned to execute all the Wei officers who opposed his rebellion and put Jiang Wei in command of a 50,000-strong vanguard force. If everything went according to plan, all the Wei officers would have been executed and Jiang Wei could have seized military power and killed Zhong Hui, and thus it would not have been too difficult for him to restore Shu. When great people made remarkable achievements while others least expected it, they receive praise for creating miracles. When unforeseen circumstances ruin a plan, it does not mean that the plan was a bad one to begin with. If an unforeseeable condition caused Tian Dan’s "fire cattle columns” tactic to fail, would people say that he was foolish?“

70: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms. Jiang Wei is indeed a hero of the time; it is because he had to deal with me that he is reduced to this extremity.

71: 蜀所恃赖，唯维而已。

72: See 55.

73: See part 1 of this article.

74: Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms records Liao Hua’s comment and Qiao Zhou’s memorial.

75: 姜维之心，始终为汉，千载之下，炳炳如丹，陈寿、孙盛之贬，非也。

#Jiang Wei #Three Kingdoms

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zhaolie-the-benevolent · 1 year

Text

Evaluating Wu: Zhuge Liang's campaigns parts 1 and 2

I’m not going to tell you who Zhuge Liang is because everyone knows who he is. I would say he’s the most famous character in this story, or at least on par with Cao Cao. A brilliant man, Zhuge Liang was enfeoffed as the Loyal and Martial Marquis (Zhongwuhou, 忠武侯). This is exactly what we’re going to talk about, the wu in Zhuge Liang’s title, the military career of the Marquis. I have decided to split the piece in 2 parts so as to not make it too long. In this first one I will describe Zhuge Liang’s career until the end of the Third Northern Campaign, and part 2 will talk about Wei’s invasion and Zhuge Liang’s final 2 campaigns, as well as my appraisal once the context of each and every campaign has been explained. Let us go.

The Northern Campaigns is definetely my favorite part of this time period, and I will talk about them properly. However, let’s briefly introduce Zhuge Liang’s first campaign.

Zhuge Liang’s military career starts at around the year 215, when Liu Bei was besieging Chengdu. The Marquis led the multiple armies from Jingzhou upstream from the Changjiang, sending the two generals Zhang Fei and Zhao Yun to take Jiangzhou and Jiangyang, respectively. They then moved on to Chengdu, whereby they united with Liu Bei’s troops (SGZ 35). That’s it.

The Southern Campaign of 225

A more significant campaign was his Southern Campaign. Previously, at the death of Zhaolie, Yong Kai used the tensions between the tribes and the Han government to rebel in the south. He joined up with king Gao Dingyuan of the Sou tribes and Zhu Bao in Zangke commandery. As a result, the commanderies of Zangke, Yizhou and Yuexi were in rebellion. The ZZTJ also mentions that there were 4 commanderies in rebellion, so perhaps Yongchang in the far south was one of them as well.

The rebellion wasn’t put out immediately, and the Marquis decided the better strategy was to rest the people, gather supplies and train the soldiers.

Zhu Bao, the Grand Administrator (taishou) of Cangke, and Gao Ding, the King of the barbarians at Yuehui, both revolted and responded to Yong Kai. Because of the recent death of the Emperor of Han, Liu Bei, Zhuge Liang temporized with them all and did not dispatch a punitive expedition against them. He paid attention to agriculture in order to increase production; he closed the passes in order to give rest to the people. Only when the people were put as ease and provisions became abundant did he employ them.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang (ZZTJ)

In 225, Zhuge Liang’s preparations were complete and he launched his southern campaign. Zhuge Liang’s strategy was to invade the rebels from three separate directions: He himself would go west to Yuexi, Li Hui south to Yizhou and Ma Zhong east to Zangke.

Zhuge Liang marched on river, and upon his arrival at Yuexi, he camped at Beishui. His strategy was simple: he had hoped to wait the enemy to gather their forces in one place so that he could defeat them in a decisive engagement and crush the rebellion in one blow. Gao Dingyuan prepared his defense at Maoniu and Yong Kai also wished to engage the Chancellor.

The plan went better than expected when Gao Dingyuan had Yong Kai assassinated and Meng Huo, a man that held considerable influence over the southern peoples, was named leader of the rebellion.

With a new leader taking over, Zhuge Liang made use of this new development to strike at Gao Dingyuan’s forces, greatly defeating him. He was then captured and executed.

I have seen other people narrate this particular incident as follows: Gao Dingyuan and Yong Kai join up at Yuexi, Gao Dingyuan kills Yong Kai and then Gao Dingyuan surrenders to Zhuge Liang, after which is executed. This is false, as the sources only claim the following:

The troops of Gao Ding-Yuan killed Yong Kai and others, including gentry and common people. Meng Huo succeeded Yong Kai as ruler. Zhuge Liang put Gao Ding-Yuan to death.

Huayang Guozhi as written in the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang.

At no point it is mentioned that Gao Dingyuan surrendered to Zhuge Liang. The following passage goes into more detail:

后主建兴元年(223)，杀郡将军焦璜，举郡称王，与益州郡雍闿相呼应。三年三月，当诸葛亮帅兵南征时，率属下自旄牛(今四川汉源县)、定筰县(今四川盐源县)至卑水(今四川美姑县至宁南县中间地区)置垒抗拒，并获雍闿军援。后彼此矛盾，使部曲杀闿。七月，被蜀军击败，为诸葛亮所杀。

On the inaugural year of Jianxing (223) during the reign of the Later Sovereign, he killed the garrison commander Jiao Huang, named himself king and worked with Yong Kai of Yizhou. On the third month on the third year, when Zhuge Liang was leading men on an expedition south, he led his men from Maoniu (today’s Hanyuan county in Sichuan), Dingzuo county (today’s Yanyuan county in Sichuan) to Beishui (today’s area between Meigu and Ningnan counties) and established defenses to repel the enemy, also receiving reinforcements from Yong Kai. Later they had a disagreement and with his troops killed Yong Kai. On the Seventh Month, he was attacked and defeated by the troops of Shu, killed by Zhuge Liang.

Historical Dictionary of China’s Minority Peoples, page 1915, Gao Wende. My translation.

Meanwhile, Ma Zhong successfully defeated the rebels of Zhu Bao at Zangke and quickly pacified the commandery, while Li Hui was surrounded and outnumbered at Yizhou. Li Hui managed to break free using a clever ruse by which he pretended to surrender. The rebels believed him, for he was isolated from the rest of the army, so they relaxed the encirclement. Li Hui violently charged and marched to Zangke, joining with Ma Zhong.

The southerners believed this, so the besiegers became neglectful. Therefore Huī went out and attacked, and greatly defeated them, and immediately pursued the defeated men south to the river Pán, to the east joining the forces at Zānggē and restoring communication with Liàng.

Biography of Li Hui, translated by Yang Zhengyuan

Zhuge Liang marched to Dianchi and defeated Meng Huo. The Annals of Han and Jin describe how Meng Huo was captured 7 times, but it’s unlikely his men would have let him lead after being captured 7 times.

Regardless of the details, the south was pacified and Zhuge Liang treated the southerners with leniency, appointing the locals to fill administrative posts.

Some one advised Zhuge Liang against this measure. Zhuge Liang said, “If we leave behind outsiders, we must also leave soldiers with them, and the soldiers back there will not have any provisions. This is the first difficulty. Then, the barbarians have lately suffered injury and destruction, their fathers and elder brothers being killed. Leaving behind outsiders and no soldiers would be certain to bring calamity. This is the second difficulty. Lastly, the barbarians have frequently committed the crime of deposing and killing governors and they are aware how serious their misdeeds are. If we leave behind outsiders, they will never be at ease. This is the third difficulty. Now I intend to leave no soldiers behind nor transport provisions, and yet to bring about the same government and to make both the barbarians and the Chinese live more or less peacefully with each other. Hence my measure.”

Annals of Han and Jin

This is just as Ma Su had adviced prior to Zhuge Liang’s depart:

Xiāngyángjì states: Jiànxīng third year [225], [Zhūgě] Liàng campaigned against Nánzhōng. Sù escorted him for several tens of lǐ. Liàng said: “Though we have made plans together for many years, now I can again ask you a favor for a good plan.” Sù answered: “Nánzhōng relies on its rugged terrain and distance, and has been disobedient for a long time. Even if today they are defeated, tomorrow they will again rebel and that is all. Now you lord are about to gather the whole state for a Northern Expedition to deal with powerful rebels [Wèi], so they [the Nánzhōng rebels] will learn the government’s authority is weak inside [while Zhūgě Liàng is away in the north], and their rebellions will also accelerate. If all their tribes and kinds are exterminated to remove future worry, that is not the way of the benevolent, and moreover could not be done quickly. In the way of using troops: attacking the heart is best, attacking cities is worst; hearts battling is best, soldiers battling is worst. I hope you lord will focus on subduing their hearts and that is all.” Liàng accepted this plan, and pardoned Mèng Huò to comfort the south. Therefore to the end of Liàng’s life, the south did not dare again rebel.

Biography of Ma Liang, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

It’s important to note that the last sentence is not correct. Trouble in the region did not stop in its entirety.

Through the use of good tactics, Zhuge Liang quickly broke the rebel forces. I would also like to bring attention to Zhuge Liang’s choice of personnel. Li Hui proved to be a resourceful and courageous warrior, and shortly after the troops left, he successfully quelled further unrest in the region.

Ma Zhong, more importantly, was also an excellent choice, because not only was he capable, he was also politically conscious:

Third year [225] Liàng entered the south and appointed Zhōng as Administrator of Zāngkē. The prefecture Deputy Zhū Bāo rebelled. After the rebellion, Zhōng brought relief and reasonable government, and deeply had authority and kindness.

Biography of Ma Zhong, translated by Yang Zhengyuan

Ma Zhong was well aware of the strategy to be followed and continued the policy of leniency as laid out by Ma Su before the campaign.

The First Northern Campaign, 228

In the year 226, the usurper Cao Pi succumbed to illness, leaving Cao Rui on the throne. With troubles with the Qiang tribes brewing in the western frontier of Wei, Zhuge Liang decided it was the appropriate time to launch his campaign and march from Hanzhong on 228. He previously contacted Meng Da so that he may join him in coordination with his campaign, but he was attacked and killed by Sima Yi.

Let us look at a map of the Han-Wei border to discuss maneuvers:

Ignore Zhuge Liang’s arrow moving to Chencang for now. Zhuge Liang’s strategy was to march from Mount Qi into the west of Liang and the Wei River valley. This area is known as Longyou (west of Long Mountain). In order to accomplish this, he wanted to have General Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi march towards Mei as a decoy force, while the main army under the Chancellor moved towards Longyou.

The arrow on the east, as it is stated there, is indeed Wei Yan’s rejected proposal. I have already talked about this plan here. I criticized his plan as not being viable due to the difficulty of retreat caused by harsh terrain, as well as the defensive nature of Chang’an. Wei Yan requested 10 thousand veteran troops to march them through the valley and attack Chang’an with this surprise maneuver, hoping the presumably cowardly Cao Mao would flee in terror upon seeing him.

I have somewhat warmed up to this proposal. I still think it is not viable: 10 thousand men is too few a number for taking Chang’an, and if it fails it would mean the end of both Wei Yan and his army. However there is some merit to the attitude displayed here. I will elaborate on this later.

The Weilve states:

Now, after the Emperor Liu Bei had died, complete quiet had reigned in Han [i.e., in Shu] for some years, so Wei had not made any preparations at all. Hearing of suddenly Zhuge Liang’s exodus, both the court and the country at large were frightened and awed.

Weilve, Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms by Achilles Fang as seen in passage 6 of year 228 (ZZTJ)

Zhuge Liang’s invasion shook the west and as a result, the commanderies of Anding, Tianshui and Nan’an revolted in favor of the Han.

It is in this moment when Zhuge Liang made the biggest mistake of his entire military career. Advancing to the Longyou area, he had Ma Su act as the vanguard. Ma Su camped at Jieting, and faced off against Zhang He’s troops.

Ma Su had camped on a hill, cutting off his own water supply. Zhang He easily encircled the enemy and dealt a devastating defeat to Ma Su. It was the actions of Wang Ping that earned the most merit, as Wang Ping was the only general to orderly retreat and rally the scattered troops back home.

The army was completely scattered, and only Píng’s command of a thousand men, shouted and drummed to maintain themselves, and Wèi General Zhāng Hé suspected there were hidden troops, and did not pursue. Therefore Píng slowly gathered the scattered camps to escape, leading the officers and soldiers back.

Biography of Wang Ping, translated by Yang Zhengyuan

With the defeat at Jieting, the campaign was called off. General Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi were both defeated. This is no surprise, as they were to be used as decoy forces and thus their objective was to pin down Cao Zhen at Mei while the main army took Longyou. Thanks to the command of General Zhao Yun, the decoy force safely withdrew without suffering significant losses, for which he was commended (SGZ 36, biography of Zhao Yun). The population of the rebelling counties followed the Marquis back home as well.

Killigrew brings attention to Zhuge Liang’s inability to reinforce Ma Su despite not being too far away from Jieting, and the ZZTJ describes Zhuge Liang arriving but being unable to take any positions, meaning that he had arrived too late.

After the failed incursion into enemy land, Zhuge Liang then memorialized the throne and requested his demotion:

“The fault is mine in that I erred in the use of officers. In my anxiety I was too secretive. The ‘Spring and Autumn’ philosophy has pronounced the commander such as I am is blameworthy, and whither may I flee from my fault? I pray that I may be degraded three degrees as punishment. I cannot express my mortification. I humbly await your command” So the emperor demoted Liang to General of the Right but acts as the Prime Minister and commands the army as before.

Biography of Zhuge Liang, translated by Lucy Zhang and stephen So.

In contrast to his southern campaign, Zhuge Liang’s first expedition against the northern rebels did not show a particularly good choice of personnel. General Zhao Yun was used effectively, as by his command the decoy force was secured and suffered no major setbacks, essentially fulfilling his role properly.

However, in hindsight, the choice of Ma Su was a really bad one. He disobeyed Zhuge Liang’s orders (ZZTJ, year 228 passage 11 of Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms) and did not listen to Wang Ping’s admonitions, making his already difficult situation even more precarious.

Using Zhuge Liang’s perspective the choice of Ma Su was not entirely unwarrented. He trusted the man and he had proven to be a pretty intelligent fellow if his southern strategy is anything to go by.

I am not going to be dishonest, though. Even if we take Zhuge Liang’s perspective into account, the choice of Ma Su simply does not work. Regardless of his talents, Ma Su was not experienced in warfare and he had to go up against Zhang He, one of the most veteran rebel officers in the land.

Ma Su’s tactical mistakes and conceit are his own, but he should not have been put in such a position to begin with. It is no surprise that Ma Su was defeated. This is a rare case of Zhuge Liang engaging in nepotism. It is clear to me that the fondness he had for Ma Su played an important part in this choice. And yes, Ma Su was an intelligent man. But being intelligent is honestly not the most important thing. Yuan Shao could have been a king among hegemons if he just had some more humility and acted more quickly. Ma Su certainly had the necessary gifts, but he did not cultivate them before he was thrown in a position of certain defeat.

Ironically, Ma Su’s closeness to Zhuge Liang spelled his doom, as Zhuge Liang clearly saw the error of his ways and had Ma Su executed. This is in line with Zhuge Liang’s legalist inclinations: the law had to be upheld, and he had to be particularly harsh with Ma Su precisely because he was his close friend. If those close to the Chancellor could get away with disasters of that nature, martial discipline would not be upheld and the troops will be loose and insubordinate.

There is a famous anecdote about Sunzi, author of the Art of War, that I think is quite fitting in this context. The story goes, roughly like this: the king summons Sunzi and asks him about his lessons and whether or not they could be applied to women. When Sunzi said that his teachings could indeed be applied to women, the king then gave him “command” over his concubines.

Sunzi divided the concubines into two groups and assigned one of the king’s favorites to command each group.

When Sunzi began the drill and his orders were not obeyed even after being repeated several times, he arrived to the conclusion that his orders were indeed quite clear, and the subordinate “officers”, in this case the leading concubines, were being too lax on discipline.

Sunzi had these “officers” executed immediately and appointed new ones. Both groups performed the drill with perfect precision.

Ma Su could be compared to the king’s favorite concubines. If he were allowed to live, the army would not take the consequences of negligence seriously and matters would be confused. The army would be lax and ineffective and his authority as commander diminished. He was very well aware of this fact.

The Second Northern Campaign, 228

The second campaign began shortly after the first one, but it’s much less grand and eventful.

This campaign started how all good things should start: by Emperor Da of Wu achieving merit. A clever ruse by Lu Xun led to the disastrous defeat of Cao Xiu’s troops.

With a hit taking place in the east, an opportunity arose later in 228 and the Marquis marched once again from Hanzhong. The map above describes this fruitless campaign. Zhuge Liang besieged Chencang, with the rebel Hao Zhao in charge of the defense.

Despite Hao Zhao’s inferior numbers, he managed to counter every one of Zhuge Liang’s tactics. Zhang He was sent to reinforce Chencang and he made note of Zhuge Liang’s lack of supplies:

(Cao Rui) He asked Zhang He, “Is it not possible that Zhuge Liang will have captured Chen Cang when you, General, arrive?”

Zhang He was aware that Zhuge Liang had penetrated deeply but lacked provisions; counting with his fingers, he said, “When I get there Zhuge Liang will already be gone.”

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang.

Zhang He was indeed correct, as after his attempts at taking Chencang proved to be inadequate, the Marquis retreated.

Zhuge Liang’s tactical acumen was once again in display when the rebel general Wang Shuang pursued him. Falling into an ambush, Wang Shuang was killed and the Han troops retreated.

Chencang was an important hub of the Silk Road as well as controlling communications with the Wei River (Killigrew, Zhuge Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228 - 234).

Given the Marquis’ cautious nature, it is likely he saw the attack not worth pursuing anymore when reinforcements for Hao Zhao arrived . We are told how Zhuge Liang appealed to Hao Zhao and compelled him to surrender, as well as provoking him into battle:

Zhuge Liang had had Jin Xiang (靳詳), a man from the same county as Hao Zhao, exhort Hao Zhao from outside the wall of Chen Cang. From a turret of the wall Hao Zhao answered him, “You are well aquainted with the laws of the House of Wei, and you know very well what kind of man I am. I have received much grace from the state and my house is important. There is nothing you can say; I have only to die. Return and thank Zhuge Liang for me; he may launch his attack.”

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang

My conclusion is that Zhuge Liang had hoped to earn a quick victory owing to Wu’s success at Shiting, taking the strategic point of Chencang and thus securing Tianshui in the process, but Hao Zhao’s defense proved to be formidable and, as a result, he was compelled to abandon the campaign so as to not face a strong enemy and to not put further strain on his already scarce supplies. The fact that Zhuge Liang didn’t bring a lot of provisions proves he was not very committed to this campaign to begin with and was simply using an opportunity to get some gains.

Zhuge Liang’s retreat is revealing in that, despite his losses in the first campaign, he did not relax the discipline and training of his men, for he orderly withdrew his forces and managed to kill Wang Shuang in the process. While Wang Shuang is not a very notable person, the fact still remains that Zhuge Liang made preparations in retreat and was adept in the use of ambush tactics.

The Third Northern Campaign, 229

The third of Zhuge Liang’s campaigns was somewhat successful, but to a pretty limited extent. Zhuge Liang sent Chen Shi to take the commanderies of Wudu and Yinping as a first step towards the conquest of Longyou.

Guo Huai was sent by Zhang He to meet Chen Shi in battle, but Zhuge Liang encountered Guo Huai in Jianwei, Wudu commandery, and defeated him.

Killigrew’s paper explains that, after his defeat at Jianwei, Guo Huai took a defensive position at Mount Qi, in close proximity to Jianwei. Because Mount Qi was a defensive screen that protects Tianshui and the Longyou area, Zhuge Liang decided the campaign would be too resource intensive and, once again, withdrew back to Hanzhong. Emperor Xiaohuai rewarded him, restoring him to the office of Chancellor.

This third campaign saw some minor success in the conquests of Wudu and Yinping, but these locations aren’t particularly valuable on their own due to the lack of population in the area.

(Part 2 begins below)

So last time we took a look at the first few of Zhuge Liang’s campaigns. This time we will be looking at the end of his career. Once you have read everything you will have the context for my final evaluation. If by any chance you don’t, I condensed everything into a short chronology immediately before the conclusions. Let’s go.

The rebel invasion of 230

The third campaign left our Chancellor with a tactical victory that didn’t yield impressive strategic results, to say the least. In 230, Cao Zhen proposed to invade the Han, a proposal that was accepted by Wei’s sovereign.

The plan was to launch a three pronged invasion of Hanzhong from land and river. The original arrangement was modified due to Chen Qun’s admonition, but the campaign was still started.

The Emperor accepted his proposal. When Cao Zhen was on the point of starting for the western expedition, the Emperor in person bade him god-speed. He left Chang'an in the eight month (August 27-September 24) and entered southward by the Ziwu[-gu] route. Sima Xuanwang sailed up the Han river and was to meet him at Nancheng; the various other generals were to enter either by way of the Yegu route or Wu-wei.” (This Wuwei, according to Hu Sanxing, is an error; the correct name would be either Wudu or Jianwei.)

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, notes on passage 8, year 230

Emperor Xiaohuai’s biography describes the invasion in a slightly different way:

八年秋，魏使司马懿由西城，张郃由子午，曹真由斜谷，欲攻汉中。丞相亮待之于城固、赤坂，大雨道绝，真等皆还。是岁，魏延破魏雍州剌史郭淮于阳溪。

Autumn of the eighth year (230), Wei used Sima Yi from Xicheng, Zhang He from Ziwu, Cao Zhen from Xie Valley, wishing to attack Hanzhong. The Chancellor Liang waited for them at Chenggu and Chiban, great rains cutting off the roads and Zhen and the rest all returned. This year, Wei Yan defeated the inspector of Yong Province Guo Huai at Yangxi.

Biography of the Later Sovereign (Liu Shan), my translation.

A memorial by a Wang Su states that Cao Zhen, after a month of marching, was still in Ziwu valley. It’s obvious, then, that the arrangement described in Xiaohuai’s biography is outdated. The first passage quoted here also mentions that there were groups invading from Wudu and Jianwei. Since Wang Su’s memorial talks about Cao Zhen’s difficulties across Ziwu, then it is likely that Zhang He was supposed to invade from Jianwei and Wudu in the west. Xiaohuai’s biography may be describing the invasion plans that were modified after consideration with Chen Qun.

Let’s look at a couple of maps for clarification’s sake:

Basically, Cao Zhen’s plan was to have Sima Yi sail upstream from the Han river into Hanzhong, joining up with Cao Zhen who would be coming from the Ziwu valley, and together striking at the east of Nanzheng. Zhang He would be marching from Jianwei and Wudu and strike the west of Nanzheng. Once Hanzhong is taken, Shu would be exposed.

In the end, the invasion was stopped because of continuous rain, as Xiaohuai’s biography states. Cao Zhen and Sima Yi were thus prevented from moving.

Despite this development, Zhuge Liang was more than prepared to met them:

Zhuge Liang, the (Chancellor) of Han, moved his headquarters to Xiayuan in Nanshan. He built Hancheng at Mianyang and Luocheng at Chenggu.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang, year 229. I changed cheng-hsiang for Chancellor just for consistency.

Killigrew’s paper on the Northern Campaign states that Zhuge Liang prepared defenses along 200 kilometers in Hanzhong, from the bank of the Mian river to a fortress on the side of a mountain, 7 kilometers in diameter (Killigrew, 1999:68).

So, as the above map’s location indicates, the east of Nanzheng was guarded by Luocheng, which was built at Chenggu and where Zhuge Liang was awaiting the invasion. After the arduous march through the valley, Zhuge Liang’s rested men would be eager and ready to meet their exhausted enemy. This didn’t matter, for the awaited enemy did not arrive.

What about the western front? Zhuge Liang had also taken care of that:

Eighth Year [230], he sent Yán west to enter among the Qiāng. Wèi General Fèi Yáo and Yōng Province Inspector Guō Huái with Yán battled at Yángxī, Yán greatly defeated [Guō] Huái and the rest.

Biography of Wei Yan, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Wei Yan was sent to the Qiang tribes in order to trade with them, thus bypassing Zhang He’s positions and disrupting his rear. Because Wei Yan was also rallying the Qiang against the Wei regime, Zhang He was at risk of being outflanked and thus unable to move from his position without addressing the threat posed by Wei Yan.

In other words, Zhang He was pinned down. He then decided to send Guo Huai to defeat Wei Yan and eliminate the threat to his rear. As the above passage indicates, however, Guo Huai was greatly defeated, and Zhang He’s predicament was thus accentuated. (Killigrew, 1999:69).

With Hanzhong secured, Zhuge Liang marched west and defeated Guo Huai, joining up with Wei Yan. He did not press the attack on Zhang He’s positions, for he considered they were too well defended. (Killigrew, 1999:70)

The Fourth Northern Campaign, 231

Zhuge Liang’s fourth campaign began in 231, the year following Wei’s failed invasion. Marching north, he left Li Yan in charge of supplies and attacked Mount Qi, once again hoping to gain access to the Longyou area. According to Killigrew’s paper, Mount Qi and Shanggui were very defensive and more than ready to meet Zhuge Liang’s incursion. Wei had made defensive preparations.

The arrow going through Baoxie valley refers to the fifth campaign. We’re not talking about that just yet.

This year, Cao Zhen became ill and Sima Yi took over the defense of the west. We all know of Sima Yi and Zhuge Liang’s legendary encounters. Unlike the romance, however, it’s only in Zhuge Liang’s last two campaigns that both men clashed.

Zhuge Liang’s opening move was to besiege Mount Qi and leave the rest of his army in reserve. Sima Yi likewise marched and garrisoned Shanggui, near Tianshui. He left some 4,000 crack troops to defend Shanggui while he sent the rest of the army to Mount Qi (ZZTJ, 231, passage 8).

Zhuge Liang then decided to take the garrisons around Tianshui. Leaving part of his army besieging Mount Qi, the Marquis marched towards Shanggui. Guo Huai, who was located in the northwest of Tianshui coordinated with Fei Yao in Shanggui itself to attack Zhuge Liang from both front and rear while he was on the march. With this pincer attack, they hoped to catch Zhuge Liang in a difficult situation and greatly defeat him. (Killigrew, 1999:71).

Well, the opposite happened. Guo Huai and Fei Yao were defeated and Tianshui was left defenseless. Zhuge Liang, however, decided to stop the march and claim the harvest to feed his army. Sima Yi, hearing of the defeat of Guo Huai and Fei Yao, went back to Shanggui with Zhang He:

Zhuge Liang sent a detachment to attack Qi-shan; he himself encountered Sima Yi at Shanggui, Guo Huai, Fei Yao, and others joined battle with Zhuge Liang. Zhuge Liang defeated them, and he took the opportunity to mow their wheat extensively. He encountered Sima Yi east of Shanggui, but Sima Yi drew back his troops and found protection in defiles, so that no battle could be joined.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang, year 231, passage 8

As this passage indicates, Sima Yi chose a pretty defensive position and Zhuge Liang considered those positions to be too hard to attack, as he had done several times in previous campaigns. With that, Zhuge Liang retreated back to Mount Qi.

Sima Yi wished to pursue the retreating army of the Han, but Zhang He advised caution while keeping some form of pressure on the enemy. Because Zhuge Liang hadn’t lifted the siege of Mount Qi since the beginning of the campaign, Zhang He’s advice makes sense. They would keep the enemy on their toes and the men of Mount Qi would see that the Wei armies still have the initiative.

Zhang He’s proposal was ignored and Sima Yi followed Zhuge Liang’s men. Both armies clashed at Lucheng, where Zhuge Liang enticed Sima Yi to battle. Sima Yi, however, was cautious and took the high ground, while sending Zhang He to relieve Mount Qi (Killigrew, 1999:72). His men ridiculed him for this:

Sima Yi did not follow his advice, but pursued Zhuge Liang as before. But when he came near to Zhuge Liang, he went up a mountain and dug out camps, being unwilling to fight. Jia Xu (Not that one) (賈栩) and Wei Ping (魏平) repeatedly requested him to fight; they said, “Your Excellency fears the Shu as if they were tigers, and the whole world laughs at you.” Sima Yi was vexed at this. The various generals all asked to fight.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang, year 231 passage 8.

Sima Yi, so as to appease his critics, decided to abandon his defensive positions and attacked Zhuge Liang. This proved to be a mistake. Sima Yi was greatly defeated by Zhuge Liang at the battle of Lucheng. Making use of Wei Yan and Wu Ban, the troops of the Han broke Wei’s army and forced it to retreat in disarray:

Han Jin chunqiu mentions that “They [the Shu troops] killed three thousand armored men, taking five thousand pieces of black armor and thirty-one hundred cross-bows made of horn.”

Han Jin Chunqiu, as is translated by Achilles Fang in the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms

Zhang He was unable to fulfill his role and was repelled at Mount Qi.

Things were looking up to Zhuge Liang. However, a single incident put an end to his campaign. Remember that I said Li Yan was put in charge of supply transport? He failed in this task. Supplies did not reach the frontlines and Liang’s troops had to deal with diminishing supplies. This is not entirely Li Yan’s fault, for the rains made it difficult to transport supplies from Hanzhong.

What is his fault, however, is the way Li Yan handled the situation. He sent a letter to Zhuge Liang ordering him to go back to Chengdu as the emperor dictated. This proved to be false, and when Liang indeed made it back home, Li Yan recriminated him for retreating and slandered him, unwilling to accept responsibility. Li Yan was therefore removed from office and reduced to commoner status:

Ninth Year Spring, Liàng’s army was at Qíshān, Píng supervised transport matters. During autumn and summer, it happened to continuously rain, transports and grain was not connected, Píng sent Advisor to the Army Hú Zhōng and Commander of the Army Chéng Fān to inform and call Liàng to come return. Liàng thus withdrew the army. Píng heard the army withdrew, and then acted alarmed, saying “The military provisions are ample, why then return?” wishing to relieve himself of the blame of not managing, and make prominent Liàng’s fault of not advancing.

Li Yan’s biography, translated by Yang Zhengyuan. Li Yan had changed his name to Li Ping, therefore Ping in the text refers to Li Yan.

Before Zhuge Liang had retreated back to Hanzhong, Sima Yi, once more against Zhang He’s better judgement, pursued him on his way home. Despite his unwillingness to pursue, Zhang He had no choice but to obey Sima Yi’s command:

Wèilüè states: [Zhūgě] Liàng’s army retreated, Sīmǎ [Yì] Xuān-wáng sent Hé to pursue them, Hé said: “In army methods, in besieging cities one must open an exit road, a returning army is not pursued.” [Sīmǎ Yì] Xuān-wáng did not listen. Hé had no choice, and therefore advanced.

Biography of Zhang He, Yang Zhengyuan.

Zhang He’s worries were proven to be true when he encountered Zhuge Liang at Mumen. Taking the high ground, Liang’s men surprised the pursuing Zhang He and completed decimated his force (Killigrew, 1999:73). Zhang He was struck in the leg by an arrow and shortly after died of this wound.

And this was the unceremonious end to the fourth of Zhuge Liang’s campaigns: forced to retreat, victim of Li Yan’s tricks. At least he had eliminated Zhang He.

The book of Jin, however, tells a different story, stating that Sima Yi managed to inflict casualties of 10,000 men while Zhuge Liang was retreating.

帝攻拔其围，亮宵遁，追击破之，俘斩万计。天子使使者劳军，增封邑。

The emperor attacked to relieve his encirclement. Liang by night escaped, he was pursued and greatly defeated. Those captured and killed numbered ten thousand. The Son of Heaven sent an envoy congratulating the army and increased the size of his (Sima Yi’s) fiefdom.

Book of Jin, volume 1. My translation.

I do not believe this account in the slightest. Killigrew states that Zhuge Liang’s force Mount Qi was about 30,000 (Killigrew, 1999:71). Considering that a portion of that army was left behind to maintain the siege, and that Zhang He was unable to break through it when he was sent by Sima Yi to relieve the garrison stationed there, Zhuge Liang must have left a significant enough amount of men so as to keep the pressure.

The ZZTJ mentions that Sima Yi had earlier left Shanggui with 4,000 veteran troops as a garrison while the rest of the army was to relieve Mount Qi. Let’s assume that Mount Qi’s garrison was of a similar size. Chapter 3 of the Art of War says:

Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy’s one, surround him. When five times his strength, attack him. If double his strength, divide him. If equally matched, you may engage him with some good plan. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing. And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful if it figths back recklessly.

Taking this into account, Zhuge Liang’s force had to be larger than the besieged garrison at Mount Qi. Let’s assume that Zhuge Liang divided his forces equally and marched with 15,000 men, leaving the remaining 15,000 besieging Mount Qi. That means that after fighting Guo Huai, Fei Yao and Sima Yi, the latter was still able to pursue him in the end and crushing his army so heavily that he lost two thirds of it, implying no casualties were taken when fighting the battles at Shanggui and Lucheng.

I don’t know the exact numbers, but let’s assume that Ma Su had suffered casualties of 10,000. Ma Su was executed and Zhuge Liang himself was demoted by three ranks for making a poor choice. After his return, however, Zhuge Liang did not face any political repercursions. Had he suffered such a tremendous loss, not even Li Yan’s debacle would be enough of a distraction to drive attention away from such a military disaster. This account is nonesense and should not be taken seriously.

Zhuge Liang’s Fifth Northern Campaign, 234

Let’s use the same map as before:

With Sima Yi now in charge of the west, he decided to prepare his defenses against Zhuge Liang, improving the local agriculture and employing the tuntian system in the area for better access to supplies. This system had been used in the past, most notably by Cao Cao, and consisted in soldiers tilling and farming the land, allowing them to supply themselves as well as defending the crops.

Zhuge Liang used a similar system for Hanzhong. Not only that, but Zhuge Liang also invented some sort of boat, the “flowing horse”, that was going to be used for supply transports on water. This would allow him to supply his armies across the Wei river as well as facilitating the supply lines across the plank roads of Hanzhong. Previously, continuous rains had impeded supply transports, so these flowing horses would also be useful in case the ways out of Hanzhong flooded.

After years of preparation and in coordination with Wu, Zhuge Liang launched his final campaign in 234 through Ye valley, accross the Qinling Mountains. Sima Yi, in order to meet the invading army, crossed the Wei and camped, setting up his defenses. Zhuge Liang then arrived at Mei and prepared to establish communications on the river so as to bypass Chencang by water (Killigrew, 1999:76). Guo Huai feared that if Zhuge Liang moved west and crossed the river, the Longyou area would be cut off:

If Zhuge Liang straddles the Wei and climbs Bei-yuan, connecting his forces with Bo-shan, the route in the region of Long will be cut off, the aborigines and Chinese people will be shaken. This would not be to the advantage of our state.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang, year 234, passage 8.

Guo Huai was therefore stationed at Beiyuan, a strategic location that controlled communications with the Longyou area (Killigrew, 1999:76). Zhuge Liang was unable to take it and was forced to retreat, camping at Wuzhang plains.

Sima Yi and Zhuge Liang had a final showdown at Wuzhang plains, but no significant fighting took place. Zhuge Liang had repeatedly provoked Sima Yi to come out of his encampment and fight, but Sima Yi refused.

So as to maintain the stalemate, Zhuge Liang carried out the tuntian system to supply his army and avoid supply constraints.

Although Zhuge Liang had indeed issued forth many times before, his aims had not materialized due to lack of steady transport of provisions. So he divided his troops and settled them in military agricultural colonies as a foundation for permanent encampment. The troops who tilled land were mixed among the inhabitants on the bank of the Wei; the people lived in peace, the troops showing themselves no partiality.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang, year 234 passage 9

With his health worsening, however, Zhuge Liang ordered a retreat. On the eighth lunar month, Zhuge Liang departed to the Nine Golden Springs.

Sima Yi, hearing news of Zhuge Liang’s death, decided to pursue the army. Jiang Wei, however, turned the flags and beat the drums so as to meet Sima Yi in battle and he retreated, giving enough time for the Han troops to successfully withdraw.

Shortly after, when Sima Yi could confirm that Zhuge Liang had indeed died, he inspected Zhuge Liang’s camps and exclaimed: “What a genius he was!” (ZZTJ, 234 passage 28).

Chronology

225: Zhuge Liang marches south. Through water he arrives and camps at Beishui. He sends Li Hui to Yizhou and Ma Zhong to Zangke. Gao Dingyuan and Meng Huo are defeated, pacifying the south.

228: Zhuge Liang launches his first Northern Campaign. He sends Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi through the Qinling mountains into Mei. Ma Su marches to Jieting but is defeated by Zhang He. Ma Su is executed and the campaign ends in failure. Later that year, Zhuge Liang tries and fails to take Chencang. He retreats and ambushes Wang Shuang, killing him.

229: Zhuge Liang sends Chen Shi to Wudu and Yinping. Guo Huai attacks Chen Shi, but Zhuge Liang’s reinforcements arrive and defeat Guo Huai at Jianwei. Guo Huai takes defensive positions and Zhuge Liang retreats.

230: Wei invades. Cao Zhen and Sima Yi are unable to get through Ziwu and the Han river, respectively, due to the copious rains. Zhuge Liang guards his fortress at Chenggu, then sends Wei Yan to bypass Tianshui and trade with the Qiang, as well as disrupting Zhang He’s rear. Guo Huai attacks Wei Yan but is defeated at Yangxi, and later joins up with Zhuge Liang. Both return to Hanzhong.

231: Zhuge Liang besieges Mount Qi. Sima Yi garrisons Shanggui and Zhuge Liang leaves part of his force besieging Shanggui, he himself leading men to Shanggui. Guo Huai and Fei Yao pincer Zhuge Liang, but they are defeated. Sima Yi takes defensive positions east of Shanggui and Zhuge Liang goes back to Mount Qi. Sima Yi sends Zhang He to lift the siege at Mount Qi, while he himself pursues Zhuge Liang and is greatly defeated at Lucheng. Li Yan is unable to deliver supplies and recalls Zhuge Liang. Sima Yi sends Zhang He against his will to pursue Zhuge Liang, but is ambushed at Mumen and dies.

234: Zhuge Liang marches to Mei through the Qinling Mountains. Sima Yi crosses the Wei river and takes a defensive position. Zhuge Liang tries to take Beiyuan and cut off Wei’s communications with Longyou, but is defeated by Guo Huai. Zhuge Liang and Sim Yi face each other at Wuzhang plains. Zhuge Liang starts using the tuntian system, but falls sick and orders a retreat. Zhuge Liang dies and Sima Yi pursues, but retreats after thinking Zhuge Liang is alive. Wei Yan’s mutiny is put down and the army returns to Hanzhong.

Conclusions

And that’s the Martial Marquis’ career. Hopefully I have been thorough and clear enough so as to give you a good understanding of the type of commander he was. What’s my final evaluation?

I think Zhuge Liang is an underrated commander in historical circles. His campaigns were not very successful, the northern one, at least, but he still showed several traits that are incredibly useful for a commander. As I explained in part 1, he didn’t let anyone get away from punishment if their mistake was serious enough. Discipline is an incredibly important part of any army, and Zhuge Liang excelled at keeping his men in line. Not only can that be seen in his orderly retreats, but in his final campaign as well. The army blended with the local populace seamlessly and their presence did not affect the people’s livelihood.

Zhong Hui and Yu Jin too had this traits. Yu Jin, after the incident that brought the death of Cao Ang, executed troublesome Qingzhou troop commanders so as to maintain discipline and Zhong Hui executed Xu Chu’s son because he had failed to fulfill his task and the commander could have died. They were both accomplished, and Zhong Hui was the only general in that invasion that actually completed his task successfully. Coincidentally, he too was an admirer of Zhuge Liang.

Perhaps Zhuge Liang’s biggest flaw was his high degree of caution. Across all of these campaigns you have seen how Zhuge Liang’s tactical victories were not taken advantage of. Guo Huai was defeated on the third expedition, yet the momentum wasn’t taken advantage of. Fei Yao and Guo Huai likewise were defeated, yet Tianshui was not seriously attacked. The western commanderies had risen up in his favor during the first campaign, yet he did not make use of this opportunity.

His careful approach is why I think Wei Yan’s more daring strategy has some merit. I repeat, I do not think the details of his plan were correct, but to violently strike Wei and shake the Nine Provinces while Wei does not expect an attack from the west could have turned the tide. The political implications of a great defeat to Wei at the beginning of Wei and the loss of the western territories could have severely weakened Wei’s internal legitimacy, an opportunity that could have been used by the southern states to topple the rebel regime and restore the house of Han.

However, Zhuge Liang did not exploit his advantage. He did not follow up his numerous tactical victories to obtain significant strategic advantages, and that’s what doomed him in the end. In the end, Wei was ready to met him in battle and his lack of flexibility meant he would not seize opportunities after a great victory, and it’s a shame.

This is not to say he was a poor strategist, however. He had moments of sheer brilliance like the way he completely checkmated both Cao Zhen’s and Zhang He’s plans to invade the Han. By predicting where the enemy would invade, he prepared fortifications and then pinned down Zhang He until he could go to the relief of Wei Yan.

And not only that, but Zhuge Liang was also a good tactician. He crushed the forces of Gao Dingyuan and Meng Huo, defeated Guo Huai multiple times, dealt important losses to Sima Yi, decimated Zhang He and ultimately killed him. Zhuge Liang definetely had the tactical prowess to put up a good fight against Wei, but ultimately his strategic approach doomed him and he was unable to achieve his goals.

For a moment it seemed that Zhuge Liang could have made progress in the Fourth Northern Campaign, but alas, Heaven was not on his side.

This concludes my write up on Zhuge Liang’s military career. It is my wish that those skeptical can now see him in a more positive light, but even if I failed to convert you, I still thank you for your time and hope that, even if you disagree with my conclusions, you still learnt something and can look at the man from a slightly different perspective.

#Three Kingdoms #Zhuge Liang #Northern Campaigns

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zhaolie-the-benevolent · 1 year

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The treachery of Cao Aman

The man himself needs no introduction. Cao Cao is probably the most notable and famous man of te later Han period and is always a central figure in the story adaptations of the Three Kingdoms as a rival to his majesty Zhaolie.

Let me preface by saying that Cao Cao was indeed a great man, the greatest of his time. He led a successful government and led mostly successful campaigns, defeating important odds. My favorite stories regarding the man are those shows of enlightened and kingly governance he occasionally displayed, for he was capable of mercy and kindness.

However, as the title may suggest, this is not a post to talk about his virtue, and in fact I will be using quite harsh words. I think it’s important to add this disclaimer, because it’s not that I think Cao Cao has no qualities worthy of praise, but rather that I will not be singing any more praises other than the ones found on this preface. I am here to harshly criticize him. I want to note that despite my inflammatory remarks towards his person I will be fair in my judgement. Let us begin.

Cao Cao was born into the family of a eunuch and died as king of Wei. Histories often refer to him as Wei Taizu, the temple name bestowed upon him after the ascension of the usurper Cao Pi. Taizu means “Supreme Ancestor”, but I will hereby referm to him as Taizei, “Supreme Rebel”, for that is the most fitting adjective for the man. I will not be talking about his wanton massacres here, but I obviously criticize them as well.

For indeed, Cao Aman was the foremost rebel in the land. In the year 196, Cao Cao loyally and dutifully received his imperial majesty emperor Xiaomin of Han. Upon receiving the Son of Heaven’s entourage, it appears that his arrogance did indeed know no bounds:

Xiàn-dì Chūnqiū states: Shào was ashamed to be ranked below Tàizǔ, and angrily said: “Cáo Cāo was about to die several times, I at once saved him, now he turns back on kindness, seizing Heaven’s Son to command me!” Tàizǔ heard this, and yielded the General-in-Chief position to Shào.

SGZ6, biography of Yuan Shao, translated by Yang Zhengyuan. The writing of Taizu is not mine, nor do I condone it.

As soon as the emperor came into his hands at Xu city in 196, Cao Cao arranged the resignation of the Grand Commandant Yang Biao and the Excellency of Works Zhang Xi. He took Zhang Xi’s title for himself and offered the honour of Grand Commandant to Yuan Shao: the Excellency over the Masses Zhao Wen was allowed to keep his position. All three Excellencies had been appointed by the junta of Li Jue and Guo Si, but none had held any real authority and they had been pawns in the conflict between the quarrelling generals. Their position was now little better; the critical office was the Imperial Secre-tariat, which controlled official correspondence and the proclamation of edicts, and Cao Cao immediately appointed his trusted counsellor Xun Yu to be its Director.

Imperial Warlord by Rafe de Crespigny, page 111

As we see in these passages, Cao Cao’s attitude towards the emperor was complicated, to say the least. He took in the emperor and appointed his cronies to key positions so as to tighten his control over the court. Originally he even gave himself a greater position, but decided to relinquish it in favor of Yuan Shao so as to placate him.

The attitude of His Majesty towards his new protector was not very warm either. Not long after Cao Cao’s taking over the court, the Son of Heaven himself issued a secret decree by which the rebel ought to be punished. Dong Cheng, His Majesty’s relative and close friend, was the main support he had during this plot, but people like Zhaolie also took part in it.

The plot was discovered in the year 200 and the conspirators save for Zhaolie were executed along with their families. One person was the daughter of Dong Cheng, who was an Honored Lady of His Majesty. Despite his pleas, Cao Aman had her executed.

I don’t want my argument to be misunderstood. Clan extermination is harsh, however it was the law of the land and Cao Cao is not particularly heinous for following the customs of his time. It is important to note that clan extermination is reserved for serious crime, like treason. The problem is that Dong Cheng’s noble goal was to rid the dynasty of its primary enemy. It was the emperor’s desire to extirpate sedition and restore the authority that Heaven had bestowed upon him.

Dong Cheng’s actions are only judged as treacherous because he did not succeed. It is unthinkable to call a traitor the one who was executing the emperor’s will while the one abusing his authority gets to judge the emperor’s actions against him as treacherous. Dong Cheng did nothing wrong, and is indeed a tragic hero who did not deserve his fate. He was innocent of every single charge put against him.

In the year 207, Cao Aman subdued the lands north of the Yellow River. It was around this time that Cao Cao resurrected the title of Chengxiang (丞相), Imperial Chancellor or Prime Minister.

This position held remarkable influence and power, so much that it was abolished and was not used during the Later Han period until he revived it. The position of Chancellor was the most important of the Three Excellencies, the highest posts in the imperial bureaucracy, and the reason is that the Chancellor could select the reports that reach the emperor. By selecting proposals to forward to the Son of Heaven, the Chancellor could dictate policy. (The Cambridge History of China, volume 1, 468).

Parallel to this, Cao Cao had set up the city of Ye as his main residence:

Soon after Cao Cao had captured Ye from the Yuan in 204, he adopted the city as his chief residence. The emperor and his puppet court remained at Xu, which continued to be recognised as the formal imperial capital, and Cao Cao was frequently on campaign to the north, south and west, but Ye city and the surrounding territory of Wei commandery became the heart of his power.

Imperial Warlord, page 333

At an early stage of occupation Cao Cao brought numbers of new settlers to develop the region, in the same fashion as the agricultural colonies which he had established at Xu city.

Imperial Warlord, page 334

Even as he thus embellished his capital, Cao Cao established a court to match the emperor’s at Xu city. Under the guidance of Du Kui, who had formerly served Emperor Ling and later took refuge with Liu Biao, he recovered much of the imperial music and enhanced his own ceremonial with suitable compositions and players.

Imperial Warlord, page 339

Ye as capital of Wei commandery would go on to serve as Cao Cao’s de facto capital and center of power. He developed it and constructed palaces so as to awe the land and make his authority known.

As if that were not enough, Cao Cao took further steps towards solidifying his position.The first one was his proclamation as Duke of Wei on the year 213.

Under LaterHan, the title of king (王wang) was reserved for members of the imperial Liu clan,while the notional descendants of the ancient Shang/Yin and Zhou dynasties were granted title as dukes (公gong) and held small fiefs (公國gongguo): Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 105-109 at 108. Thehighest noble rank available to others was marquis (侯hou), with a fief of varying size and value

To Establish Peace, a translation of the ZZTJ by de Crespigny, year 212, passage K, note 17.

As can be seen in here. Cao Cao’s highest possible title was that of marquis. He could not become a duke as he did not have ancestry related to the dukes of old. Not only that, but Cao Aman also took the Nine Bestowments in 213 upon the formalization of his title as duke of Wei.

The reason this is significant is because the Nine Bestowments were created by the infamous Wang Mang who usurped the Han dynasty 200 years prior. This was an attempt by the foremost rebel of the land to legitimize himself, accumulating honors.

Note that the above passage is a note in the year 212, while his enfeoffment was on the year 213. This means that the decision to name Cao Cao duke was already made beforehand by Cao Cao’s supporters and the emperor’s role was to simply formalize it. It was not something the emperor did willingly and eagerly.

It is precisely his ascension to dukedom that caused a rift between him and his close advisor Xun Yu. As head of the Secretariat, Xun Yu refused to let the appointment as duke go through.

Daolun has argued in the past that this was just a show to garner clout and that Xun Yu was not genuinely loyal to the Han. This may very well be the case, but regardless of his intentions, the truth of the matter is that letting the appointment go through would be seen as an act that goes against the interests of the ruling dynasty.

Cao Cao as a result removed him from his position and granted him a more prestigious one but from which he would not beable to contest Cao Cao’s ascension. There is some debate on whether Xun Yu was ordered to commit suicide or he died of illness. I am inclined to think it is the latter, for Cao Cao had already removed the only obstacle standing on his way to the appointment and kept Xun Yu close to him. However, I do not put it past Cao Aman to betray a close friend. I’ll give him the benefit of the doubt here.

Perhaps more blatant was Cao Cao’s reorganization of the different provinces. He redrew the borders of the provinces to fit the neat number of Nine provinces, like they were in times of the Zhou dynasty. These are the old borders:

These are the new borders that Cao Cao proposed:

This was made effective in territories he controlled, of course. The most significant change here is the merge of You, Ji and Bing provinces. Cao Cao’s fief of Wei commandery, were Ye was, is located in Ji province and he held governance over the region. He used the previous prestige of the Zhou dynasty to justify his merging of provinces, but this clearly benefitted him, as he had access to an even larger pool of population and land by conveniently making his province absorb the other two.

This is a map of the population of the Han empire on the year 140 AD. While bing province was sparsely populated, and maybe even more so at this time, You still had an important concentration of population. This new merged also allowed Cao Cao to control the lands north of the Yellow River, which perhaps can be used as a natural barrier, though not to the extent the Yangzi was.

Regardless, he still had a larger base of power and he would eventually relocate the population of Hanzhong to Ye.

Taizei’s treachery does not end here. On 217 he claimed the title of king. This title, much like the title of Duke, was not one that Cao Cao could claim. Members of the imperial family were sometimes given a fief that worked as a commandery, but was called a kingdom instead.

He kept defying imperial authority by performing ceremonies reserved for independent rulers.

SGZ1:42 records that in the first month of this year Cao Cao undertook for the first time the ceremony of ploughing the sacred field (耕籍田geng jitian), privilege of an independent ruler.

To Establish Peace.

Taking imperial privileges, Cao Cao died (thank God) as king of Wei.

Appraisal

Cao Aman was a traitor. I’d dare to say he was the biggest traitor in the land. Following the example of Wang Mang, he gradually accumulated political power, restricted the actions of his sovereign and acted as the Son of Heaven in all but name. He continually usurped imperial functions, tried to put his lineage in the imperial line, abused his authority constantly and built structures in his own parallel capital so that his authority could rise above that of the same man he vowed to protect.

A man so devoted to the destruction of the Han dynasty cannot be called loyal to the Han dynasty. A man who would exterminate the clan of those trying to remove him from power because they were following the desires of the emperor on charges of treason cannot be called loyal to the Han dynasty. A man who continued to erase every trace of independence the emperor had in the name of his own personal ambition cannot be called loyal to the Han dynasty.

It would be unfair of me to say the destruction of the Han was all his fault. Taizei was merely another player in the time period he got to live in. It was a time where heroes would rise above the level they would expect to rise were they living in times of peace, and the decay of the dynasty was perceived long before he was even born. He was a product of his time.

What makes people like The Marquis so remarkable is that in the face of absolute power they remained incorruptible. Zhuge Liang truly is the epitome of what a minister should be, the perfect example of a man devoted to his sovereign and unwaveringly loyal until the very end. I cannot recriminate this to Cao Cao. His treachery is reprehensible, but not everyone can be a paragon of statesmanship and loyal service. Zhuge Liang is an extremely rare case, how can I realistically blame Cao Cao for not being on his level when the vast majority of men in human history would not behave like Zhuge Liang did were they in Zhuge Liang’s position?

But the truth of the matter still remains. Cao Cao was offered the whether or not to betray the world, and betray the world he did.

#three kingdoms #cao cao

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zhaolie-the-benevolent · 1 year

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The Generalissimo, Yuan Shao

The leader of the coalition needs no introduction. Any person who has delved into the Romance of the Three Kingdoms or Dynasty Warriors knows who Yuan Shao is. He always stood out to me, because he showed a great authoritative character in the coalition stages and he appeared to be a great ruler, only to become a clown by the time Guandu rolls in. So, I decided to write a bit about this man, Yuan Shao of Runan, styled Benchu.

Early life

Yuan Shao was a grandson of Yuan An, one of the Three Excellencies during the reign of emperor Zhang of the Eastern Han dynasty, who ruled from the years 75 to 88 AD. For several generations, the Yuan family would occupy important positions of government, and the Yuan clan’s influence would extend throughout the entirety of the empire. His date of birth is not entirely clear, but since he was friends with Cao Cao from a young age, their ages might not have been that far apart (155 AD in the case of Cao Cao).

Shao was the son of Yuan Feng by a concubine, but he was later adopted into the family of his uncle Cheng to continue his lineage. The sources are a bit unclear about this, however, as the Records of Heroes by Wang Can states that, while he was mourning the death of his father, the Excellencies Yuan Wei and Yuan Feng favored him, meaning that Yuan Shao was Yuan Cheng’s own flesh and blood:

Yīngxióngjì states: Shào was born and his father died, and the two Excellencies [Yuán Féng and Yuán Wěi] favored him. When young he was employed as a Cadet, when capped sent out as Púyáng Chief, and had pure reputation. He encountered his mother’s funeral, his mourning was completed, and also in recollection of his father had mourning, altogether at the mound hut for six years. The ritual was completed, and he lived in seclusion in Luòyáng, did not rashly communicate with guest retainers, and if it was not someone well known within the Seas, he did not meet him. […]

Your Servant Sōngzhī comments: Wèishū says: “Shào was [Yuán] Féng’s [concubine-born] lesser son, sent out as descendant to his father’s elder brother [Yuán] Chéng.” If it is like this record [Yīngxióngjì] says, then it seems he truly was by [Yuán] Chéng begat. Recollection and mourning for parents still alive, the Lǐ has no such writing, so all the more how could one be a descendant and yet act like this! The two books are unclear in which is correct.

Yuan Shao’s biography in the SGZ6, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

As a young man, Yuan Shao would earn the admiration of many as he was a charismatic and handsome man. However, Yuan Shu, son of Yuan Feng by his wife, was not fond of his half-brother/cousin, and often referred to him as the family slave. The conflict between these two members of the Yuan clan was very important, for it shaped the initial struggles in the fight for the Central Plains when the warlords rose up.

For now however, the two half-brothers/cousins would remain united with the purpose of committing vile deeds like the extermination of the palace eunuchs. In a power struggle between He Jin and the eunuchs, He Jin was assassinated and the carnage that followed took many lives. The records even state that those beardless men that could be mistaken for eunuchs were killed in the ensuing struggle as well, so the two Yuan were not very fond of the eunuchs to say the least. This isn’t surprising, for Shao urged He Jin to take action against them in the past.

The coalition against Dong Zhuo

Becaue He Jin had invited Dong Zhuo to the capital, it was him who put the capital in order and took control of state affairs. Dong Zhuo, however, was incredibly bold and lacked political subtlety, so one of his first acts in his newly found position of power was to depose emperor Ling’s heir Liu Bian and put the younger Liu Xie on the throne (future emperor Xiaomin of Han). The Xiandi Chunqiu records the following exchange between Dong Zhuo and Yuan Shao on the question of Liu Xie’s enthronement:

“Brat! How can the realm Under Heaven’s affairs not be decided by me? I now will do it, who dares not follow? Do you say that I Dǒng Zhuó’s saber is not sharp?” Shào said: “The realm Under Heaven’s powerful, is there only your Excellency Dǒng?” He drew his belt’s saber to salute and went out.

Yuan Shao’s biography in the SGZ, translated by Yang Zhengyuan

Pei Songzhi, however, says this incident is fake. Even though it makes Yuan Shao look like a really strong and authoritative individual, I am inclined to agree, since Yuan Shao drew his sword against Dong Zhuo and nothing happened to him on the spot. We all know how Dong Zhuo liked to operate, so it seems strange he wouldn’t call the guards on him.

Regardless of how the exchange took place, Yuan Shao clearly opposed the decision and promptly fled the capital to Bohai to raise troops against the tyrannical rule of the evil usurper Dong Zhuo. This rhetoric was quite effective, and even though it wasn’t Yuan Shao who first sent a proclamation against Dong Zhuo, many regional lords joined the call to arms and Yuan Shao was elected leader, which speaks of his charisma and the influence of the powerful Yuan clan.

One has to question the rhetoric of the righteous troops rising to punish a tyrannical ruler, however. It is true that Dong Zhuo was a pretty ruthless man who was looking to monopolize imperial authority, but Yuan Shao tried to et up a parallel court under Liu Yu (that Liu Yu himself rejected). Perhaps setting up a new ruler would give Yuan Shao the opportunity to earn merits and influence under him. If an emperor rises to power, it’s easy to see why the man that put him in that position of power would want to receive some favor and recognition. This is my guess however, and it is also possible that he wanted to simply set up another court simply to legitimize what is essentially his rebellion. This possibility is likely considering that Liu Yu enjoyed a great deal of prestige.

Regardless, on the year 190 the lords gathered up at Suanzao in current Henan and not too far from the capital at the time, Luoyang. However, the forces of the coalition were too busy claiming grand titles and feasting rather than actually fighting. Yuan Shao claimed the title of General of the Chariots for himself, but despite being the leader, he didn’t show any initiative. That initiative came from Yuan Shu’s general Sun Jian, who found success. Cao Cao also brought the fight to Dong Zhuo with poor results.

Despite his conniving nature and the accumulation of enough treacherous deeds to overflow Heaven itself, Cao Cao was undeniably a clever man, and seeing the failure of his battle against Dong Zhuo, he thought of a different approach. Let us look at the following map, taken from de Crespigny’s Imperial Warlord:

Cao Cao’s plan was for the army to advance and take positions in Rongyang and the passes. With an advance from the south by Yuan Shu’s forces, there would be no need to fight Dong Zhuo in order to exhert pressure on him. If the other lords saw that progress was being made, it would be enough to make them all join the fight against Dong Zhuo and finally reclaim the capital by just appearing to be threatening but without engaging in combat.

This proposal was not accepted. Any attempts to make peace were rejected as well, for Yuan Shao executed the envoy of Dong Zhuo, causing part of the Yuan clan to be exterminated in the capital. The coalition would fail, but the opportunity for Yuan Shao’s rise had presented itself.

Yuan Shao’s rise to power and his clash with Gongsun Zan

The righteous rebels that Yuan Shao raised were in the end scattered without putting much of a fight. Luoyang was sacked and burnt and the court fled west to Chang’an. Yuan Shao returned to Ji province and began his own designs to take the land.

Being a subordinate officer of Ji province’s governorn Han Fu, one of Yuan Shao’s subordinates, Pang Ji, thought of a brilliant plan to seize Ji province without bloodshed. The plan was to call in Gongsun Zan of You province and plot with him to split Ji province between the two. Meanwhile, a persuader would only need to convince Han Fu to surrender Ji province to Yuan Shao as the only man who can face Gongsun Zan and then the deal will be settled. The plan worked wonders, but obviously Gongsun Zan was not exactly thrilled by this development of events. Gongsun Zan also had a grudge against Yuan Shao because previously, Shao sent some Zhou Ang to seize Sun Jian’s headquarters during the fight against Dong Zhuo. During the ensuing fight, Gongsun Yue, a cousin to Gongsun Zan, was killed, and therefore blamed his death on Yuan Shao. The war between Gongsun Zan and Yuan Shao finally started, and the conflict between these two would last for a few years.

The advice given to Yuan Shao by Ju Shou is telling of the strategic situation he found himself in. It reads as follows:

You General when capped ascended to Court,then you spread your name Within the Seas; right at the time of the deposing and enthroning, then your loyalty and righteousness was roused; alone you rode out in exile, then Dǒng Zhuó harbored fear; crossing the Hé and going north, then Bóhǎi bowed head. You shook the whole prefecture’s soldiers, gathered Jì Province’s army, your authority shakes the Hé’s north, your name heavy Under Heaven. Though the Yellow Headscarves are crafty and chaotic, the Black Mountains domineering, if you raise the army and eastward go, then Qīng Province can be settled; return to suppress the Black Mountains, then Zhāng Yān can be exterminated; return the army to north head, then Gōngsūn [Zàn] will certainly be a corpse; shake and coerce the Róng and Dí, then the Xiōngnú will certainly obey. Stretch across the Great Hé’s north, unite Four Province’s lands, collect heroes’ talents, embrace a million army, welcome the Imperial Chariot from the western capital, restore the Ancestral Temples at Luò city, announce order Under Heaven, to suppress the not yet submitted, and by this contend and strive, who is able to oppose you? Within a few years, this achievement will not be difficult.

Biography of Yuan Shao on the SGZ, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Yuan Shao agreed with the assessment. As we can see, the situation in the land was complicated. The remnants of the Yellow turbans rose in Qing province and were dealt with by Gongsun Zan, while in Bing provinces the Black Mountain bandits came and went as they pleased.

The more pressing menace however, was Gongsun Zan, who was encroaching on Ji province and enjoyed some initial support from the local rulers. Yuan Shao set out to march and in the year 191 both forces clashed at Jie bridge, in Julu commandery at the north of Ji province. Gongsun Zan’s troops numbered 30.000 troops of infantry and 10.000 cavalry divided into two wings. Yuan Shao’s numbers aren’t clearly stated, using vague terms like “tens of thousands”, but he sent Qu Yi to the front with roughly 2000 men to the front. Gongsun Zan then sent the cavalry forward to meet Qu Yi, but their men greatly defeated Gongsun Zan’s cavalry and, taking advantage of the momentum, Qu Yi bravely pushed forward and took Gongsun Zan’s main camp, causing the army to scatter and winning a great victory.

Qu Yi was an experienced fighting man from the frontier that had experienced troops with him and proved their worth on the battlefield and were a good asset for Yuan Shao’s forces. He also found further success in 195 against Gongsun Zan. However, Qu Yi grew arrogant and insubordinate, so Yuan Shao had him executed. While it’s easy to criticize Yuan Shao’s decision here, it’s important to note that an arrogant and capable general was a threat to the ruler. It is likely that Yuan Shao felt his position threatened by him and decided to take care of him before he became a bigger nuisance. Talent is of no use if it works against you. Qu Yi also rebelled against Han Fu when Yuan Shao came into Ji, so who says Qu Yi wouldn’t be willing to defect once more once he sees the opportunity? I don’t think the decision to get rid of Qu Yi was a bad one. Nobody wants to have a Wei Yan situation. But Qu Yi was certainly capable and a great asset, so getting rid of him before he could realize his full potential was a bad choice. It was a matter of timing, not whether the execution itself was a bad decision or not.

Gongsun Zan, on his end, still had a personal vendetta because of the death of his cousin in a fight against one of Yuan Shao’s appointed officials. This was a symptom of the land splitting into two factions according to which one of the two half- brothers of the Yuan clan they supported, Yuan Shu (Gongsun Zan, Tao Qian) or Yuan Shao (Liu Biao, Cao Cao).

After the great victory at Jie bridge, however, there was not a lot of time for celebration, for the Black Mountain bandits were threatening Ye, Wei commandery’s capital and Yuan Shao’s base of power. Swiftly returning, Yuan Shao marched and campaigned in the mountains, defeating many bandit chiefs and taking a lot of their positions. In his fight against the Black Mountains, Yuan Shao also employed Lü Bu to great effect, breaking Zhang Yan’s formations in Zhongshan and adhieving some merits. Yuan Shao, once again, wanted to dispose of his successful general and sent assassins against Lü Bu, but he had already fled. Ironically, his intention to kill Lü Bu was beneficial in hindsight. Because Lü Bu was threatened, he escaped and took the opportunity presented by Zhang Miao to rise up against Cao Cao in Yan province, so he kept his future rival busy dealing with other affairs.

When Gongsun Zan murdered Liu Yu, several of his officers wanted to avenge him, and Yuan Shao participated in these campaigns, sending the valorous Qu Yi against him. After successive defeats, Gongsun Zan stationed himself at Yi and erected a great fortress. As Gongsun Zan was losing support, Yuan Shao was acquiring more and more land. He sent Yuan Tan to Qing province, Gao Gan to Bing province and had planned for his other sons to be in charge of the different provinces as well in order to gauge which of them was worthiest of succession. This earned him heavy criticism from Ju Shou, who thought this would bring ruin to the Yuan clan:

Shortly afterward, he struck and defeated [Gōngsūn] Zàn at Yìjīng, absorbing his armies. (3) He sent out his eldest son [Yuán] Tán to Qīng Province. Jǔ Shòu remonstrated Shào: “This will certainly be disaster’s beginning.” Shào did not listen, and said: “I wish to order my various sons to each occupy a province.”

Biography of Yuan Shao, SGZ 6, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

The whole “Shao did not listen” part will be prevalent in Yuan Shao’s career, or better said, Shao did not listen to good advice when it was offered to him. These events I have described took place at the end of the 190s, but in the middle of it, on the year 196, the conflict at the capital between the different forces at Chang’an caused the young emperor to flee. Yuan Shao was approached to meet him and give him some refuge, but fearing that the emperor would be controlling him instead of the other way around, Yuan Shao declined. Here is the passage from his own biography:

Previously, Heaven’s Son’s enthronement was not Shào’s intention, and when at Hédōng, Shào sent Yǐngchuān’s Guō Tú as envoy. [Guō] Tú returned and advised Shào to welcome Heaven’s Son to set capital at Yè, but Shào did not listen. (1) It happened that Tàizǔ [Cáo Cāo] welcomed Heaven’s Son to set capital at Xǔ, collected the Hé’s south’s lands, and Guānzhōng all attached to him. Shào was regretful, and wished to order Tàizǔ to move Heaven’s Son’s capital to Juànchéng to be closer to him, but Tàizǔ resisted this.

Other sources claim it was Ju Shou who argued in favor of the emperor and Guo Tu was the one that gave advice against it:

Guō Tú and Chūnyú Qióng said: “The Hàn House has declined, and has for a long time. Now wishing to raise it, is it not also difficult! Moreover now heroes occupy and hold provinces and prefectures, armies move in the tens of thousands, this is what is called Qín losing its deer, the first to obtain it is King. If you invite Heaven’s Son to be near you, every move must be memorialized and reported, if following him then your power is little, if disobeying him then you oppose command, this is not the best plan.”

Both this and the previous passage were translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

There is a clear contradiction here and no sure way to know which one is correct, but regardless of who advised against it, the fact of the matter remains: Yuan Shao did not welcome the imperial court and deeply regretted it. Upon the Son of Heaven’s arrival in Xudu, Cao Cao was quick to grab titles for himself. Yuan Shao was named Grand Commandant and marquis of Ye, but he was vexed and refused the appointment for he was lower in rank than Cao Cao, so Cao Cao instead chose the Excellency of Works, lowest of the Three Excellencies, and ceded the position of General in Chief to Yuan Shao. With this move, Yuan Shao was trying to exhert his authority and remind Cao Cao who was the dominant power of the land. However, this is all an empty fit of indignation, because had he listened to the advice of Ju Shou/Guo Tu, he would be the one giving orders and choosing what ranks to get for himself. He has nobody else to blame but himself for that lack of foresight.

Regardless of any maneuvers to appease Yuan Shao, conflict between Cao Cao and him was inevitable. Yuan Shao defeated Gongsun Zan and the Black Mountains, and he also sent his eldest son Yuan Tan to battle Tian Kai. Yuan Tan also managed to defeat and completely destroy Kong Rong’s forces, making him one of the greatest military geniuses in Chinese history.

With this, Yuan Shao effectively had control over the lands north of the Yellow River (with some caveats that I will explain later), and if he wished to expand somewhere it would have to be through his dangerous rival’s lands south of his own. With a grand proclamation, the Generalissimo unleashed the dogs of war and prepared to fight Cao Cao.

However, there are a few problems that we will explain here. The battle of Guandu and the whole campaign surrounding it took place on the year 200. However in 199, Liu Bei liberated Xu Province as per the Son of Heaven’s wishes and enjoyed widespread support, with tens of thousands joining him.

This was perhaps a good opportunity to strike. Let’s look at the map:

This map that I used on my write-up on Emperor Zhaolie of Han is perfect to describe this situation. Liu Biao in Jing had already fought Cao Cao in the past, Liu Bei was certain to fight him and Yuan Shao was breathing down his neck, Cao Cao’s situation could have been quite dire if all of his borders were attacked in a semi-coordinated manner. Liu Bei, however, was defeated in a lightning campaign that struck him before he could completely consolidate his position. Liu Biao was probably preoccupied with Sun Ce’s expansion, considering the personal vendetta Ce had against Huang Zu for the death of his father Jian. And what was our unlikely hero doing on the meantime? He was too busy taking care of his kid:

Tián Fēng advised Shào to attack Tàizǔ‘s rear, but Shào declined as his son was ill, and would not agree. [Tián] Fēng raised his cane and struck the ground saying: “This is encountering a difficult to obtain opoortunity, but due to an infant’s illness to lose this chance, a pity!” Tàizǔ arrived, struck and defeated [Liú] Bèi, and [Liú] Bèi fled to Shào.

Biography of Yuan Shao, SGZ6, Yang Zhengyuan.

I however object to this account. While it’s certainly possible that Yuan Shao was indeed taking care of his sick child (it’s not clear who it is, as it could be Yuan Shang or Yuan Mai), this account makes Shao look like a complete moron for missing the opportunity to strike, taking care of minute things and thereby losing the empire. However, I believe the situation was more complicated than that. Yuan Shao’s biography goes on to state:

Before this, Tàizǔ sent Liú Bèi to visit Xú Province to resist Yuán Shù. [Yuán] Shù died, and [Liú] Bèi therefore killed the Inspector Chē Zhòu, leading the army to garrison Pèi. Shào sent cavalry to assist him. Tàizǔ sent Liú Dài and Wáng Zhōng to strike him, but was unsuccessful.

Biography of Yuan Shao, SGZ6, Yang Zhengyuan.

As it can be seen here, Yuan Shao was not blind to opportunity, he was not so tunnel-visioned by his own son’s sickness that he forgot everything else. He did indeed send a cavalry detachment in assistance. If he did not commit more heavily to the attack is because he likely could not send more men. Let’s use another map.

Yuan Shao was in control of You, Ji, Qing and Bing provinces, while Cao Cao owned Xu, Yu, Yan and Sili provinces. While 4 provinces is an impressive number, this is deceptive. Yuan Shao’s positions were not secure in all four of these provinces. He still had to deal with the threat of the Black Mountain Bandits of Zhang Yan and You province was recently conquered. The local families were still enjoying autonomy and influence, and some of them even threw their lot with Cao Cao.

Though he had eliminated his enemy, Yuan Shao did not gain a great deal more from the victory. He established a loose hegemony over the north, granting seals and insignia to various Wuhuan chieftains, but several local Chinese leaders maintained their independence, and Xianyu Fu in Yuyang, a former officer of Liu Yu, sent envoys to Cao Cao and was named Area Commander over six commanderies of You province; the appointment was meaningless, but indicates that Yuan Shao had limited authority in the region.

de Crespigny, Imperial Warlord, page 123

What about Qing province? As I have said, Yuan Tan had previously conquered it, but his management of the province was absolutely abysmal:

The poor and weak were many, so that they fled and hid in the hills and wilderness, and troops were sent to capture and search, as if hunting for birds and beasts. Cities with ten thousand households, the registers did not pass several hundred, and collecting taxes, out of three not even one entered. He sought worthy scholars, but did not obtain them; he did not deploy armies by season, and the resident clan factions, he also could not punish.

SGZ 6, Yang Zhengyuan

He scared off the people, who took refuge in the mountains, leaving them outside of the government’s control as well as letting the local gentry take over affairs. He was incapable of being of much use in this state and Qing might as well have been Kong Rong’s for all that it was worth, though obviously Kong Rong would have been able to defeat both Shao and Cao and we wouldn’t be talking about these two right now.

This is why Tian Feng and Ju Shou time and time again remonstrated with Yuan Shao and tried to have him adopt a more protracted strategy that consisted of resting the people, filling the granaries and raid Cao Cao’s position so as to somewhat weakening him without committing to a full assault.

Meanwhile, Cao Cao’s positions were more solid. He had defeated Zhaolie and secured the loyalty of Zhang Xiu, as well as preparing defenses at Guandu, a naturally defensive position in the first place.

Regardless, despite Yuan Shao’s initial reluctance to attack when Zhaolie was gathering troops, he shortly after changed his mind and in the year 200 launched his campaign south. Yuan Shao’s army of 100.000 men was impressive, and it was in his hope to win with force of numbers as Shen Pei and Guo Tu suggested:

Shěn Pèi and Guō Tú said: “By the principles of military books, ten besiege five attack, the enemy then can be battled. Now with your enlightened excellency’s divine martial ability, spanning the Hé’s north’s strong armies, to campaign against Cáo, it is like turning a hand; if now you do not use this time to take him, later it will be difficult to plan.”

SGZ 6, Yang Zhengyuan

The initial assault was against Cao Cao’s positions at Baima. General Yan Liang laid siege to Baima, but Cao Cao outflanked him, threatening Yuan Shao’s positions across the river. Cao Cao sent a detachment to relieve Baima, where the mighty Guan Yu slayed Yan Liang. Yuan Shao then sent Zhaolie and Wen Chou to Yanyin, where they fell into an ambush and Wen Chou was killed.

Yan Liang and Wen Chou were Yuan Shao’s most fearsome generals, so their loss was a blow to the morale of the army. Despite these setbacks, Yuan Shao managed to push Cao Cao back to Guandu, where Cao Cao put up a formidable defense. Guandu was besieged for months with back and forth between the different parties, but Yuan Shao’s officer Xu You defected as he felt mistreated, revealed to Cao Cao the location of his provisions at Wuchao and essentially led to Yuan Shao’s defeat. The supplies at Wuchao burnt while Yuan Shao was unable to break the defenses at Guandu. With the army scattered, Yuan Shao fled north. Several cities in Ji province rebelled but were quickly suppressed and Yuan Shao managed to regroup. On the year 202, he finally went to the Nine Golden Springs.

Yuan Shao is mostly remembered by his loss at Guandu, a tale of a man who wasted his resources through poor decisions and got destroyed by an inferior force. There has been some debate on this, however, with Pei Songzhi questioning whether Yuan Shao’s numbers were truly that much greater than Cao Cao’s. Sun Sheng, on the other hand, argues that Ji province was certainly densely populated enough to field that many men. Professor de Crespigny states that Yuan Shao simply did not have as much resources as Cao Cao in history becaue he did not stop and develop his land. If we take his opinion, then it makes sense why Yuan Shao was fixated on a decisive strike and end the war early: if he had waited and consolidated, Cao Cao would grow even stronger, and he couldn’t allow this to happen. It’s an interesting angle and it gives some insight into his decision, even if it was flawed.

Conclusions

So, how was Yuan Shao at the end of the day? He was certainly a charismatic leader and had a huge advantage as a member of the Yuan family. He had many connections and prestige, and he gathered a group of followers that were incredibly competent in their own right: Pang Ji, Tian Feng, Zhang He, Qu Yi, Ju Shou…

What went wrong, then? Nothing. Nothing really went wrong. Yuan Shao was never exceptionally talented to begin with. In war he found success against the bandits and Gongsun Zan, but it took him a very long time to defeat the latter.

In governance he was weak, with ravaged lands that could not be used very effectively. While Cao Cao was using the military colonies system, Yuan Shao had to feed his men with mulberries:

Yuan Shao was north of the Yellow River, and the men of his army ate mulberries, Yuan Shu was by the Yangzi and the Huai, and his soldiers took clams and mussels. Many turned to cannibalism, and all the country was abandoned and desolate.

To Establish Peace, de Crespigny

So, while he certainly had to have some qualities and didn’t completely stumble into a position of power, he could not make use of his provinces because they were either ravaged or not under his complete control.

Finally, Yuan Shao completely botched his succession. The eldest son was Yuan Tan, but he favored the young Yuan Shang, barely of age at the time of Yuan Shao’s death. He never formally declared an heir, though he definetely showed deference to Shang over Tan. The conflict between the two brothers allowed Cao Cao to take the north, slowly but surely.

Yuan Shao decided to give a province to each of his sons and see how they did as governors. Yuan Tan proved to be an absolutely disastrous ruler, so it’s no wonder he’d be disinheritted. However, Yuan Shao did not do anything to relieve him of his command or curb his military power, so as soon as he was dead, Tan had free reign to lead his men against his own brother.

However, Yuan Shao’s biggest failure was definetely what ended up crippling his family beyond repair. Let us see this passage:

Shào’s favored his young son Shàng, who had beautiful looks, and wished to have him be successor but did not yet reveal it. (1) Shěn Pèi and Páng Jì with Xīn Píng and Guō Tú fought for power. [Shěn] Pèi and [Páng] Jì with Shàng joined, [Xīn] Píng and [Guō] Tú with Tán joined. Everyone because Tán was the eldest, wished to establish him. [Shěn] Pèi and the rest feared that if Tán was established [Xīn] Píng and the rest would harm them, and went along with Shào’s original intentions, and so had Shàng succeed Shào’s position. Tán arrived, could not be established, and declared himself Chariots and Cavalry General. Because of this Tán and Shàng had discord.

SGZ 6, Yang Zhengyuan

This right here was Yuan Shao’s greatest failure: he had failed as a ruler. He showed favoritism to certain subjects, listened to their slander and alienated otherwise competent people. He executed Tian Feng because of slander, he allowed infighting within his own court and when he died, it’s not a surprise that advisors and officers started scheming against each other to try and settle grudges and achieve more recognition. This is the kind of environment he allowed.

As if that were not enough, because of his lacking government and his lack of energy to react to changing events, Yuan Shao did not make full use of the land he had, and by the time he wanted to act against an upstart like Cao Cao, it was already too late. He didn’t stand a chance.

I think he is treated unfairly in fiction, as a complete and utter moronic and indecisive ruler, a fatuous lord who didn’t know what he was doing. In reality, Yuan Shao was not erratic and had a strategy in place, it just so happens he didn’t have the right strategy and had many flaws as a ruler. It’s not that he was stupid and indecisive, it’s that he was incompetent and slow to react. Had he been more humble, he would certainly be remembered as one of the great leaders of the age. He certainly had the manpower to achieve great things, but alas, he lacked the discernment of a man born to rule.

#three kingdoms #yuan shao

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zhaolie-the-benevolent · 1 year

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A response to Cui Hao's appraisal of Zhuge Liang

Cui Hao was a minister of emperor Taiwu of Northern Wei (386 - 535) who helped his ruler unify the north of China. Cui Hao’s appraisal of Zhuge Liang can be found in Mao Xiuzhi’s biography in the Book of Northern Wei. I am using Taishi Ci’s translation for this.

Anyway, this is what he had to say about Zhuge Liang:

Cui Hao appointed Mao Xiuzhi as a scholar on subjects of the Middle Kingdom. Although Mao Xiuzhi was no erudite, he was still conversant in the old texts and histories, so Cui Hao was always respecting him and engaging in conversations with him.

On one occasion, they began discussing Chen Shou’s Records of the Three Kingdoms. They felt that it was a worthy successor to the glorious histories of old, having followed in their footsteps; its prose was sublime, its composition proper, all in imitation of the words of Wang Ting. It had been a slight project, yet produced a glorious work, one concise and yet complete. They felt that no other history since the Book of Han by the Ban clan compared to Chen Shou’s work.

During this discussion, Mao Xiuzhi said, “When I was in the Shu region many years ago, I used to hear the elders say that Chen Shou had received a hundred floggings while serving as a clerk under the Zhuge family, and that was why he had ended his biography of Marquis Wu (Zhuge Liang) with the comment that ‘flexibility of strategy was never his forte’.”

Cui Hao replied, “If anything, Chengzuo (Chen Shou) was far too effusive in his appraisal of Zhuge Liang and bolstered his reputation. If we examine what he wrote, there is no sign of blame against Zhuge Liang; there could not have been any underlying animosity against him. Why do I think so? You may note that the age in which Zhuge Liang became Liu Bei’s chancellor was one in which the cauldrons of the Nine Provinces were roiling over, a time when heroes and stalwarts rose and burst forth, and when this master and his servant found one another, it was like when a fish had found water. Yet they could not contend for the realm with the Cao clan. Rather, they abandoned Jingzhou, fled into the regions of Ba and Shu, deceived and wrested power away from Liu Zhang, pretended to form common cause with the Sun clan, held out in some cramped and distant region, and declared themselves sovereign amidst the border tribes. This was an inferior sort of strategy. One might, perhaps, put Zhuge Liang on the same level as the regional warlord Zhao Tuo. Yet Chen Shou would have him as second only to Guan Zhong and Xiao He? Isn’t that being too generous? I say that his censure of Zhuge Liang was inadequate to his real failings.

“Besides, once Zhuge Liang had occupied the Shu region, feeling reliant upon the firm defenses of the mountainous terrain, he did not act according to the proper timing or appreciate the real measure of his strength. He enforced the laws through severity and power, wielding his control over the people of Shu, and proud of his talents and boastful of his achievements, he was most inclined to give himself false credit. He even sought to pit an army of border barbarians against a superior state. At first he sent his troops out to Longyou, twice against Qishan and once against Chencang. But his efforts in this regard were always too little too late, and he was obliged to admit defeat and turn back. Thus the next time he entered Qinchuan, he no longer attacked cities, but sought to fight the enemy in open battle. But the people of Wei knew his intention, and they kept shut their ramparts and fortified their defenses, until Zhuge Liang was compelled to give in without fighting. In the end, when he recognized that all his efforts had been exhausted, the indignation of it all was like a blow to his body, and that led to the illness that killed him. Knowing all that, how could one ever rank him among the great generals of old, who could both recognize opportunity and advance and realize dangers and retreat?”

Mao Xiuzhi said that Cui Hao had the right of it.

Let’s go by parts.

Yet they could not contend for the realm with the Cao clan. Rather, they abandoned Jingzhou, fled into the regions of Ba and Shu, deceived and wrested power away from Liu Zhang, pretended to form common cause with the Sun clan, held out in some cramped and distant region, and declared themselves sovereign amidst the border tribes. This was an inferior sort of strategy.

I frankly don’t know what other strategy could have been taken when it came to bringing the fight to Cao Cao. Liu Bei’s forces only numbered a couple tens of thousands of men and had recently been defeated by Cao Cao. At this point, trying to bring the fight to Sun Quan would have been disastrous because Sun Quan spent several years consolidating his position as opposed to Liu Bei, who had recently lost it. Therefore moving to Wu was not feasible. Then we have the alternative of resisting Cao Cao in Jing province, but Liu Bei was literally unable to do that. Let’s not forget that Liu Biao limited his command and never considered him for succession. It was not his decision to surrender, it was Liu Cong’s, and his decision took him completely off guard. Cao Cao’s men were quickly approaching, and getting bogged down in Jing province would have again been a bad idea. He already suffered losses at Changban, and even then it seems kind of irrelevant in the grand scheme of things because Liu Bei did take Jing province later on anyway.

If we look at Zhuge Liang’s analysis of the situation, he predicted Cao Cao’s defeat at Red Cliffs due to the exhaustion of Cao Cao’s men, their inexperience in naval warfare and the situation of Sun Quan’s own realm. Seizing the armory and fleeing south to get into a better strategic positioning proved to be effective. For being unable to “contend for the realm with the Cao clan”, the Cao clan sure was unable to unify the realm. Cao Cao’s loss at Red Cliffs and once more at Han river meant he would be unable to unify All Under Heaven. The use of geographical features for defense was key, and Cao Cao was unable to break those barriers. If the alliance didn’t have secure positions for an attack north, then as easy as land was taken it could be lost. Cao Cao’s domains were vast and densely populated, so relying on the advantages of the land is one way to defeat a superior foe and progress was being made in 219.

Besides, once Zhuge Liang had occupied the Shu region, feeling reliant upon the firm defenses of the mountainous terrain, he did not act according to the proper timing or appreciate the real measure of his strength.

This I can’t really disagree with, Zhuge Liang’s chance was during the first Northern Campaign, which failed, and subsequent attempts couldn’t really make as much of an impact.

He enforced the laws through severity and power, wielding his control over the people of Shu, and proud of his talents and boastful of his achievements, he was most inclined to give himself false credit. He even sought to pit an army of border barbarians against a superior state.

It is no secret that Zhuge Liang was a follower of legalist principles. He severely applied the law, which is apparently the opposite of what Cui Hao did while he was alive. However, Zhuge Liang’s handling of internal affairs was stellar. He punished those who broke the law regardless of how friendly they were with him, he promoted talent no matter how unlikable he may be. Zhang Yi has this to say about the way he conducted government:

His Excellency does not leave out those afar when he deals out rewards, nor does he show partiality to the near when he metes out punishments. Rank cannot be obtained when one does not deserve it, nor can one escape punishment by dint of powerful influence. This is why all, regardless of wise or foolish, forget their own selves in serving him.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang.

Chen Shou’s appraisal from Zhuge Liang’s own biography:

His punishments were indeed harsh and strict, yet there were none who complained; this was because he was equitable and fair in mind and clear in his exhortations.

Even then, Zhuge Liang was willing to show leniency to those who regretted their faults and would be merciful to the biggest of offences. Li Yan was not executed even though his crimes warranted it. By ruling with “severity and power”, the names could be corrected and all in the realm knew exactly what their jobs were and how to act. What actions deserved punishment and which actions deserved promotion. Despire his severity and power, the people of the region of Shu deeply respected him. Zhuge Liang was so beloved that the people started worshipping him and even falsely attributed good deeds to Zhuge Zhan just because his father was so well liked. This cannot be put against him.

Regarding the comment of being proud and boastful, it is indeed rich coming from a man who considered himself superior to the famous Zhang Liang of the Han dynasty. There are some grounds in which one can accuse Zhuge Liang of arrogance. He compared himself to people like Guan Zhong (warranted) and Yue Yi (debatable). However, this was during his youth. When Zhuge Liang had to take matters into his own hands as Prime Minister of the Han, Zhuge Liang showed great frugality.

Now Zhuge Liang had memorialized the Sovereign of Han saying: “In Cheng-du I have eight hundred mulberry trees and fifteen qing of poor land; my sons and younger brothers have thus clothes and food in abundance. While serving outside, I have not drawn any emolument. As for the clothes and food I need for my person, I have depended entirely on the state. I have accumulated no other property. On the day I die, there will be no superfluous silk inside my house nor any extra wealth outside, for such would make me ashamed toward Your Majesty.”

When he died, it was just as he had said.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Achilles Fang, from Zhuge Liang’s biography.

Let’s not forget the failure of the First Northern Campaign. After Ma Su’s failure in Jieting, the campaign was terminated and the Han forces had to retreat back to Hanzhong. Zhuge Liang then sent a memorial requesting demotion as punishment. Ma Su’s failure was also Zhuge Liang’s, for he was appointed by Zhuge Liang himself based on the confidence he had on his protégée. When that proved to be a bad decision, Zhuge Liang took the blame. It was all a matter of accountability, and Zhuge Liang was perfectly willing to admit his own faults. The execution of Ma Su was part of it as well. Because Ma Su was a friend of Zhuge Liang’s, he had to be executed so as to uphold the law and send the message that nobody was above it, no matter their proximity to the Prime Minister. He was clearly upset about his execution, but still went ahead with it anyway. The man was clearly aware of his position and what it entailed, taking the blame for the good of the state and toiling for his sovereign and country. While there are grounds to accuse him of arrogance in his youth, when he actually was in a position of power he never let it get to his head and was impartial and fair in his governance, and he had the humility to just take what is necessary to feed himself and his family. The accusation of him being boastful and taking other people’s credit is preposterous.

Finally his comment about pitting an army of barbarians against a superior state. While I am not entirely sure what Cui Hao meant by this, Zhuge Liang’s army was far from barbaric.

Liang has always worried about the lack of supplies would stop his ambition, thus he send some troops to farm, preparing to stay for an extensive period of time. The farmers live among the peasants on the bank of Wei River, but the peasants lived peacefully with the army as the troops do not abuse their powers.

SGZ, biography of Zhuge Liang, Translated by Lucy Zhang and Stephen So

His men were trained to such degree that the locals were not disturbed.

Therefore soldiers must be taught with out fail. First train them in conduct and duty, teach them to be loyal and trustworthy, instruct them in rules and penalties, awe them with rewards and punishments. When people know enough to follow along, then train them in maneuvers.

Zhuge Liang’s way of the general, translated by Thomas Cleary.

He clearly emphasized the important of training, the rules of the army and the fair dlivery of rewards and punishments. This isn’t anything new, it’s pretty much in line with the way Zhuge Liang ruled as a whole. His army, thus, was also very well disciplined, trained and organized, hardly a mob or a band of barbarians. This is an underrated aspect of his generalship in my opinion. Flexible military planning was not his forte, but administration and leadership of the army is also very important. The Art of War states:

Generally, management of a large force is the same as management of a few men. It is a matter of organization. And to direct a large force is the same as to direct a few men. […]

In the tumult and uproar, the battle seems chaotic, but there must be no disorder in one’s own troops. The battlefield may seem in confusion and chaos, but one’s array must be in good order. […] Order or disorder depends on organisation and direction; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on tactical dispositions. Thus, one who is skilled at making the enemy move does so by creating a situation, according to which the enemy will act.

Organization is key in order to create the right situations to bait the enemy into fighting. Zhuge Liang accomplished this a few times, like when he defeated Sima Yi at Lucheng or when Zhang He was killed at Mumen. He lured the enemy and struck. On the battlefield he was pretty competent and even if he was unsuccessful, retreat was orderly. This is Zhuge Liang’s forte. I will not claim he was one of the great generals of old, but I think Zhuge Liang was certainly a man of military talent, and part of that was due to his skills as an administrator.

Regardless, while Cui Hao’s criticism of his lack of flexibility in warfare is warranted and I don’t have much to disagree with him on, I think it’s also missing the point. Zhuge Liang is revered as an ideal minister, and while his military skills are celebrated, it is his role as a loyal and devoted minister that gets more attention. While Zhuge Liang does not qualify as one of the great generals of old, he certainly qualifies as one of the great ministers of old, a man who took the entire burden of the state on his shoulders, rested the people and strengthened the nation for the sake of its survival. The people were greatly satisfied with his rule, he had the favor of the Son of Heaven and all respected and admired him, both within and without. His name became a legend shortly after his death and earned him comparisons to the great people of old, even comparisons to Confucius himself. While I won’t judge how accurate this comparisons are, it’s certainly telling of the impact that Zhuge Liang left despite being ultimately unsuccessful. He became the inspiration of many after his death and he enjoys a very well respected reputation even to this day, earning praise all across China and in other foreign countries as an example of loyalty and good rulership. Cui Hao, while certainly a capable man, boasted of his abilities but was ultimately outmaneuvered politically and brought the ruin of his clan.

#three kingdoms #zhuge liang #cui hao

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zhaolie-the-benevolent · 1 year

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Wei Yan did NOTHING wrong

Just kidding, he brought it on himself. However that doesn’t tell us a lot, right? So, let us take a look at good old Wei Yan, styled Wenchang, and examine his case.

Wei Yan was born in Yiyang, Nanyang commandery in Jing province. Originally he was a mere bodyguard, but during Zhaolie’s campaign in Shu he earned great merit and was promoted to general. It is undeniable that Wei Yan was a talented military man and was known to be very brave. Almost too brave, but I will get to that in a minute.

In 219 Zhaolie liberated Hanzhong from the northern bandit’s influence and he bestowed upon Wei Yan the task to defend it. He eagerly accepted this responsibility:

“If Cáo Cāo raised the realm Under Heaven and came, I would ask to on the Great King’s behalf resist him; if a subordinate officer with a hundred thousand army arrived, I would ask to on the Great King’s behalf destroy them.”

Biography of Wei Yan in the Records of the Three Kingdoms, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Wei Yan’s defenses of Hanzhong were pretty successful since the Third Han managed to repel invasions from the northern bandits for decades. Jiang Boyue would later change the defenses and leave some passes unmanned, and even though his idea wasn’t bad, it turned out to bring about the destruction of the state, but that is something I want to cover at a later date.

It is also said in his biography that Wei Yan’s appointment as the man in charge of the defense of Hanzhong shcoked everyone, since it was expected that Zhang Fei would take care of that responsibility. This shows that Wei Yan was indeed trusted and the Son of Heaven recognized his talents. This is further explained by his promotion to General who Defends the North upon His Majesty’s ascension to the throne.

In 228 the Loyal and Martial Marquis Zhuge Kongming launched the first of his Northern Campaigns to punish the northern rebels.

This map covers the first and second of the Marquis’ Northern Campaigns. For the first one, you need only ignore the red line that goes to Chencang, which happened in the second of the campaigns.

The Marquis’ plan had Zhao Yun sent as a decoy while the main force marched west, seized the Wei River valley and threatened Chang’an and the Land Within the Passes. There was an ongoing rebellion of the Qiang and Hu nomads in the region, the northern bandits had recently lost their chieftain and the reserves of the Han were ready to strike. (Killigrew, Zhuge Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228 - 234).

While a sound plan, Wei Yan had a different suggestion which is the one you see on the map: to march to Chang’an through the treacherous Ziwu Valley:

Yán in every time he accompanied [Zhūgě] Liàng in setting out, at once wished to request troops of ten thousand men, to go on different road from [Zhūgě] Liàng and rejoin at Tóngguān, like Hán Xìn’s [traveling separately from Liú Bāng] former example, but [Zhūgě] Liàng always stopped him and would not agree. Yán always said [Zhūgě] Liàng was timid, and sighed in regret that his own [Wèi Yán’s] talent was not thoroughly employed [by Zhūgě Liàng].

Biography of Wei Yan, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Wèilüè states: Xiàhóu Mào was General Securing West, defending Cháng’ān, [Zhūgě] Liàng at Nánzhèng with his various subordinates discussed plans, and Yán said: “One hears Xiàhóu Mào is young, the ruler’s son-in-law, and timid and without planning. Now if I Yán lead elite troops of five thousand, carrying provisions of five thousand, directly from Bāozhōng setting out, following the Qínlǐng [mountain range] eastward, at Zǐwǔ turning north, without exceeding ten days we can arrive at Cháng’ān. [Xiàhóu] Mào will hear that I Yán suddenly arrived, and certainly ride ship and flee away. Cháng’ān’s inside will only have the Censorate and Jīngzhào administrator and that is all, and Héngmén Dǐgé [supply depot]’s and the scattered people’s grain are sufficient for thorough supply. For the east to gather together, it will take about twenty days, but if your Excellency from Xiégǔ comes, it will certainly be enough to arrive. In this way, then in one move everything from Xiányáng on west can be settled.”

Translation by Yang Zhengyuan.

The plan was pretty simple: lead a small force of crack troops through difficult terrain to surprise the capital, take it and hold out with Chang’an’s supplies awaiting for the Marquis’ troops.

I will say that I applaud Wei Yan’s more decisive and bold approach. While the Marquis was a man of sagely virtue and brilliant governance, his strategic approach in this campaign was too careful. With the unrest in the zone, a decisive strike to shake all under Heaven could have made the nomad people turn to the Han dynasty, Liang province could have been reclaimed after decades of rebel rule and then plans for the seizure of the Central Plains could be arranged. The Marquis’ plan failed to do that and a slip in his judgement cost the Han many lives and the campaign.

However let’s not go to the other extreme simply because one plan failed. While Wei Yan’s attitude and eagerness is commendable, the plan is downright suicidal and the Marquis was right to disregard it. Let’s examine it:

Han Xin did in the past: That is correct. This deserves some further analysis, however. Han Xin’s Ziwu Valley strategy is known in Chinese as 明修栈道, 暗度陈仓, roughly translated to “To openly fix the plank roads, secretly passing Chencang”. By making a show of fixing the roads, Han Xin surprised Chencang while the enemy had his attention somewhere else, defeating Zhang Han.

Thee green territory in the west from where the red arrow apears is the territory of Gaozu, founder of the Han dynasty. He attacked north against the king of Yong Zhang Han and the king Sai Sima Xin. Han Xin’s ploy was successful in bringing the northern territories an the heartleand of Qin under his control. However, Han Xin was also the greatest general in Chinese history.

Now Wei Yan was clearly talented, but he was no Han Xin. Besides, the circumstances that both generals faced are not similar. In the case of Han Xin, the land was split in many kingdoms that were in the confederacy of Xiang Yu. Not to mention, Gaozu enjoyed popularity in the Land Between the Passes. The northern rebels that Wei Yan had to face were not very divided internally.

Xiahou Mao is a moron and a spineless coward: I will make no comments regarding Xiahou Mao’s abilities, but let’s not forget that Chang’an was a capital city of Han for two centuries previous to the restoration of Guangwu. Dong Zhuo also moved the capital to Chang’an and was a more defensible city. Surely the city was strong enough to hold on its own against a paltry force. Wei Yan’s plan relies too heavily in Xiahou Mao being such a coward that he would just abandon the city completely and letting Wei Yan take a very important city in the region. Now, what if it turns out Xiahou Mao doesn’t retreat? Are 5.000 men enough to capture such a city? If Xiahou Mao resists, then it is possible that Wei Yan’s retreat is made much more difficult as a result, costing the state the lives of veteran soldiers and the life of a general too.

I can hold out in the capital: Ok, but for how long would Wei Yan be able to hold out even if he captures the old capital? The campaign was launched on spring and it would be a while until Wei Yan can take the yield of the harvest. What happens if the reserves are insufficient? What if the enemy counter attacks? 5.000 men is not a lot, but Chencang was defended with less. However, retreat is difficult and it could have again led to casualties of veteran soldiers and an admittedly talented general.

The Marquis was right to disapprove of Wei Yan’s plan.

In the year 230, the northern bandits invaded the Han. The invasion was to be done from 3 directions. Sima Yi would attack from the east into Hanzhong, using the Han river as his attack route. Cao Zhen would attack from the north and Zhang He would attack from the area of Tianshui. The Marquis sent Wei Yan to bypass Zhang He’s position into non-Han territory, trade with the local tribes and sow dissent amongst them. This was a brilliant move for it disrupted Zhang He’s rear and prevented him from moving, and Wei Yan executed his part of the plan well. In the end, the invasion didn’t amount to anything and the enemy forces retreated. Zhang He moved to Shanggui near Tianshui to block off Wei Yan and sent Guo Huai to Shouyang, where Wei Yan, together with the Marquis’ reinforcements defeated Guo Huai. Wei Yan wanted to use the momentum to attack Zhang He’s position, but the Marquis declined. (Killigrew, Zhuge Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228 - 234) I am of the opinion that an attack was worth the attempt and Wei Yan was right to push the initiative.

During the Marquis’ fourth Northern Campaign, the Wei rebels’ positions were attack at Mount Qi. Guo Huai and Fei Yao went in to reinforce, but were defeated by the Marquis and Sima Yi decided to garrison Shanggui. The Marquis took the harvest in the area and marched south to Mount Qi. Sima Yi pursued and engaged the Marquis at Lucheng. Sima Yi was heavily defeated. (Killigrew, Zhuge Liang and the Northern Campaign of 228 - 234). Even though it was the maneuvering of the Marquis that enticed Sima Yi into battle, the tactical victory was not entirely on his shoulders. The ZZTJ, referencing the Annals of Han and Jin by Xi Zuochi has this to say:

Summer, fifth month. On the day June 27, Sima Yi let Zhang He attack Heping captain of the Wudang brigade of the Shu at Nan-wei. He himself took a middle route toward Zhuge Liang. Zhuge Liang let Wei Yan, Gao Xiang, Wu Ban meet and engage him. The Wei troops were heavily defeated; the Han troops killed three thousand men in armor. Sima Yi retreated and guarded his camps.

Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, Chapter 12, passage 8 (a translation of the Zizhitongjian de Sima Qian, done by Achilles Fang).

Finally in the year 234 the fifth and final of the Northern Campaigns were launched. The Marquis fell ill and perished that same year at Wuzhang plains. Before dying, he gave the order to retreat and had Jiang Wei and Wei Yan cut the rear. If Wei Yan would not retreat, then the army is to withdraw without him. This was Wei Yan’s response:

[Yáng] Yí ordered [Fèi] Yī to go judge Yán’s intentions. Yán said: “Although the Chancellor is gone, I myself am still here. His office’s close officials and subordinates can lead the coffin back for burial, I myself can lead the various armies to strike the bandits. How can because of one man’s death we abandon the realm Under Heaven’s affairs? Moreover who am I, Wèi Yán, to be Yáng Yì’s subordinate, and be their officer cutting the rear?”

Biography of Wei Yan, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

He wished to remain and battle the northern rebels with Fei Yi, but Fei Yi instead went and informed Yang Yi. When Wei Yan learnt of it, he led the men in advance to go ahead and burn the plank roads that led back home. Wei Yan and Yang Yi each sent memorials against each other, but the court sided with Yang Yi.

Yán and [Yáng] Yí each memorialized the other was rebelling, and within one day, the feather dispatches arrived. Hòuzhǔ [Liú Shàn] asked about this to Attendant Internal Dǒng Yǔn and Remaining Office Chief Clerk Jiǎng Wǎn, and [Jiǎng] Wǎn and [Dǒng] Yǔn both believed [Yáng] Yí and suspected Yán.

Biography of Wei Yan, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Wei Yan camped at Gukou and faced off against his political rival Yang Yi. However, his men quickly deserted him and found himself alone:

“His Excellency [Zhūgě Liàng] is dead, his body not yet cold, but you sort dare act like this!” Yán’s soldiers and army knew the wrong was on Yán, and none would follow his orders, and the army all scattered.

Biography of Wei Yan, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Yang Yi sent Ma Dai in pursuit and executed Wei Yan with his entire family. He was no Han Xin, but he sure ended like one.

While a competent general, Wei Yan was a really unlikable man who nobody really liked. He was arrogant and the actions of his colleagues speak for themselves. Let’s look at this description of him in his own biography:

Yán both was good at caring for soldiers, and had valor surpassing others, and also by nature was boastful, and at the time all avoided and deferred to him. Only Yáng Yí did not accommodate Yán, and Yán because of this was of utmost indignation, and they were like water and fire.

Biography of Wei Yan, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Even though Wei Yan took good care of his soldiers, not even they were willing to throw their lot with him in the end. His actions were inexcusable. It was his right to remain and battle north. I can’t fault him for wanting more of the northern bandits dead. However, his preventing of the rest of the army from retreating and following the Marquis’ orders was nothing short of mutiny and his death was more than warranted. Ma Su got executed for way less.

I’ll end this post with Chen Shou’s appraisal of Wei Yan:

Considering Yán’s intentions were not to go north to surrender to Wèi but to return south, he only wished to remove and kill [Yáng] Yí and the rest. Ordinarily various officers are by nature not the same, and he hoped the time’s discussions would be that he certainly should succeed [Zhūgě] Liàng. His original intentions were like this. He did not rebel.

Biography of Wei Yan, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Wei Yan did not rebel, he only mutinied against his own state, gravely endangering them by cutting off their way back home, was disliked by everyone and could have started a full fledged civil war just because he didn’t like Yang Yi (which I don’t blame him for) and felt entitled to everyone’s obedience. Let’s set the record straight. Wei Yan did not rebel, he only led a coup against his own state for his own political gain and to satisfy his ego :). Wei Yan wasn’t wronged, he wasn’t treated unfairly by the Romance, he was portrayed as the rebel he was and clan extermination was a fate he completely deserved.

Good riddance.

#three kingdoms #wei yan

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zhaolie-the-benevolent · 1 year

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Liu Bei, Emperor Zhaolie of Han

Introduction

Today I will be talking about Liu Bei, the charismatic leader of the Third Han and warlord during the Jian’an period. His portrayal as a man of virtue in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms has already been contested by many, but I aim to write about the historical figure who not only is a fascinating man with an intense life, but also a man worthy of admiration because of his tenacity and his loyalty to men loyal to him, even if externally he had a history of duplicity as it was common in the chaotic fall of the Eastern Han.

Liu Bei’s early years

Born in 161 AD in Zhuo commandery, Liu Bei had the courtesy name Xuande, and grew up in an impoverished household. Even though his father Hong held office, he was dismissed and had to make a living making sandals and mats. His sgz biography indicates he was a descendand of prince Jing of Zhongshan, but Pei Songzhi indicates the ancestry is unclear.

Your servant Songzhi believes that although Liu Bei said he was descended from Emperor Jing, the generations are distant, and proper precedence (zhao-mu昭穆) in the ancestral temple, difficult to clarify.

Biography of Liu Bei, translated by William Crowell.

Even though he was sent to study under Lu Zhi, Liu Bei would be more interested in music, nice clothes and horse riding. During this time he would befriend Gongsun Zan, which would be relevant later on as central authority collapses. His uncle would pay for his whims and was quite fond of him.

Liu Bei’s biography specifies that as a young man he associated with rogues and fought alongside them, already assembling a small gang, but it was with the funding of Zhang Shiping and Su Shuang that he managed to gather an armed militia. In other words, Liu Bei managed to convince two wealthy merchants to give him money to rise an army, even though Liu Bei wasn’t anyone important at all. The merchants clearly saw he was a man that could achieve great merit and thus repay them when that time came around. It is not known what happened with those merchants since they don’t get mentioned again.

He would start his military career fighting the Yellow Turbans when they rose in 184, where he earned numerous official posts and ranks through merit. It is not exactly clear when he met Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, but it would be at around this time.

Xiān-zhǔ [Liú Bèi] in his hometown gathered followers into an army, and Yǔ with Zhāng Fēi became his bodyguards.

Biography of Guan Yu, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

He would also later join his old friend Gongusn Zan and would be sent under the service of Tian Kai, a general under Gongsun Zan. He once again earned military merits. During this time we also get some more insight into Liu Bei’s character:

History of the Wei says: “Liu Ping engaged a retainer to assassinate Liu Bei. Liu Bei did not realize the retainer’s purpose and received him lavishly. The retainer told Liu Bei the situation and left.“At the time, people were starving and they banded together to commit robbery. Liu Bei externally guarded against bandits and internally he generously carried out economic measures. He would make persons who ranked beneath the elite sit on the same mat and eat from the same pot. He felt no cause to be picky, so people attached themselves to him in droves.”

Biography of Liu Bei, translated by William Crowell

From the early days, Liu Bei would earn some fame as a likable and beloved ruler that the common people could trust. Liu Bei was so charming that not even assassins dared to kill him, and this would not be the only account of the people warming up to him, but that will come later when his career really starts taking off.

Anyway, Liu Bei would continue fighting, even joining the coalition against Dong Zhuo, but his role in it must have been minimal considering his biography doesn’t mention anything about it. The account comes from the Chronicle of Heroes (yingxiongji):

The Chronicle of Heroes says: “In the later years of Emperor Ling, Liu Bei was in the capital. Later, he and Duke Cao together returned to the State of Pei and assembled a large body of people. It happened that Emperor Ling died, and the empire fell into chaos. Liu Bei also raised troops and joined in the attack against Dong Zhuo.”

Biography of Liu Bei, translated by William Crowell.

Rise of warlords: The struggle for the central plains

With the death of Dong Zhuo and the fragmentation of authority, the different rulers would start to ally with one of the two Yuan: Yuan Shu or Yuan Shao, from the prestigious Yuan family of several generations of Excellencies. Cao Cao came to cross swords with Tao Qian and Tian Kai would send him to aid Tao Qian. Upon receiving more men, Liu Bei joined the ranks of Tao Qian and fought against the invading Cao Cao.

Liu Bei’s reputation and his charm once again won the hearts of many in Xu province and when Tao Qian died in 194, he was persuaded to take over Xu, which he eventually did despite originally refusing with the help of Mi Zhu and the influential families of the region. That same year, Lü Bu had seized Yan province from Cao Cao, but in 195 he was defeated and fled to Liu Bei.

While Liu Bei was busy fighting Yuan Shu, Lü Bu used the opportunity to seize Xu province after Cao Bao had rebelled, leaving Liu Bei homeless. Lü Bu’s biography notes that the reason was Cao Bao had quarreled with Zhang Fei, trusted officer of Liu Bei’s. The quote is as follows:

Yīngxióngjì states: Bù on water and land went down[stream] eastward, and the army arrived forty lǐ west of Xiàpī. [Liú] Bèi’s Internal Cadet-General Xǔ Dān of Dānyáng in the night sent Major Zhāng Kuáng to welcome Bù, saying: “Zhāng [Fēi] Yìdé and the Chancellor of Xiàpī Cáo Bào fought. [Zhāng] Yìdé killed Bào, and inside the city is utter chaos and no faith. (…)”

Biography of Lü Bu, Translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Nonetheless, Lü Bu had him occupy Xiaopei. He soon went to war against Yuan Shu once again, who asked for cooperation with Lü Bu to attack Liu Bei, but Lü Bu decided to mediate between the two. However, Lü Bu struck at Liu Bei once more in the year 198. The Chronicle of Heroes (yingxiongji) gives us details about the incident:

The Chronicle of Heroes says: “In the spring of Jian’an 3 (198), Lü Bu sent someone with money to visit Henei to buy horses, but he was robbed by Liu Bei’s soldiers. Lü Bu therefore sent General of the Gentlemen of the Household Gao Shun and Grand Administrator of Beidi commandery Zhang Liao 張遼43 to attack Liu Bei.

Biography of Liu Bei, translated by William Crowell.

His biography also notes that Liu Bei was gathering soldiers at the city, which greatly alarmed Lü Bu and prompted him to attack.

He was rescued by Xiahou Dun, but this one was defeated by Gao Shun and Liu Bei took refuge under Cao Cao. In 199, Lü Bu was defeated and, at Liu Bei’s suggestion, Cao Cao had him executed. Liu Bei was then promoted to the rank of General of the Left. In the annotations of Liu Bei’s biography, William Crowell has this to clarify:

(…) Miao Yue notes that it was reestablished by the Wei and was ranked just below the none ministers; the Sanguo huiyao says it was revived by Cao Pi. But Cao Cao submitted his memorial at the end of the Han, before the Wei was established. Thus, he was probably bestowing on Liu a singular honor by reviving the position specifically for him.

It was truly an honor, but note that Lü Bu was appointed General of the Left the year prior. The rank was then given to Liu Bei after the execution of Lü Bu so Liu Bei must have contributed enough to the victory for Cao Cao to appease him like this. Regardless, it seems Cao Cao held him in high regard and they’d become close during Liu Bei’s stay in Xudu, where the new imperial court was held.

However, Liu Bei’s coming under Cao Cao’s service was met with some scepticism and some men urged him to execute him, but Guo Jia had to say this about the matter.

(…) Now [Liú] Bèi has a hero’s reputation, and in destitution he joined you, and if you harm him, it will give you reputation for harming worthies, and then wise scholars will doubt themselves, and withdraw their hearts to choose other masters, and who will your Excellency work with to settle the realm Under Heaven? To remove a danger of one man, is to destroy the hopes of the Four Seas.

Biography of Guo Jia, translated by Yang Zhengyuan

While Guo Jia agrees that Liu Bei was an ambitious man, he also notes that he has a great reputation as a fighting man, and disposing of him would make other talented people think twice about joining Cao Cao’s ranks. This early, Liu Bei had already earned a reputation as an able fighting man.

The battle of Guandu

During this time, the imperial court was in the hands of Cao Cao, who used emperor Xiaomin (Liu Xie) for his own political gain. It was him that wrote a secret edict ordering the execution of Cao Cao. In the capital, Liu Bei joined the plot with others. However, at this time, Yuan Shu was intending to cross Xu province to rejoin with Yuan Shao, and Cao Cao decided to send none other than General of the Left Liu Bei to stop him.

This proved to be a mistake. Liu Bei was obviously not loyal to Cao Cao, as demonstrated by his participation in the emperor’s plot, and Xu province was Liu Bei’s former base of power. In fact, Cao Cao was advised not to send Liu Bei to stop Yuan Shu, but by then was already too late.

Liu Bei executed inspector of Xu province Che Zhou and rose up against the authority of Cao Cao. Many soon followed and joined Liu Bei’s cause. His biography states that his army had tens of thousands of men, so the initial efforts to suppress the rebellion were unsuccessful. Liu Bei decided to send Sun Qian as an envoy to Yuan Shao in order to coordinate the war effort against Cao Cao

While a poorly edited map of Romance of the Three Kingdoms 11 is not a very orthodox of conveying the political situation of 2nd century China, it gives us an approximate idea of the borders at the time. In pink, Yuan Shu held Shouchun, but was defeated and try to cross Xu province to join up with Yuan Shao (yellow). This particular map shows Liu Bei (green) holding the province, so Yuan Shu was already dead at the time.

Here we can see that Yuan Shao had vast territories, and very populated as well, so he was quite a threat to Cao Cao (blue) and opening several fronts was definetely problematic, specially since Liu Biao (light blue) could also use the opportunity to attack on yet another front if Cao Cao’s situation was truly dire.

However, Yuan Shao didn’t act so Cao Cao could concentrate his forces against Liu Bei and was completely defeated, losing all of his men. Zhang Fei got split from his forces and so did Guan Yu. who entered the service of Cao Cao. Liu Biao was also passive and didn’t react to this new development.

Liu Bei then went under the service of Yuan Shao and was sent to Runan with the yellow turban leader Liu Pi and disrupt Cao Cao realm’s rear. Runan was an important city because the Yuan clan originates from there, so it would be easier to make them rise up. Cao Ren defeated them, however, and Yuan Shao sent him back to Runan to link up with Liu Biao of Jing. At this time, Guan Yu and Zhang Fei had already reunited with Liu Bei and were received by Liu Biao of Jing province. Yuan Shao was then defeated at Guandu.

Even though Liu Biao was suspicious, he still gave him the city of Xinye to govern, and thus Liu Bei left Yuan Shao. Shortly after Cao Cao’s victory at Guandu, Liu Bei crushed Xiahou Dun by feigning retreat and ambushing his troops. Despite being warned of a potential ambush, Xiahou Dun pressed on and was defeated at Bowang slope. Liu Bei retreated afterwards so this attack didn’t amount to much.

Liu Bei in Jing province

Liu Bei’s years under Liu Biao were rather quiet other than the attack of Xiahou Dun, and in fact, because of his lack of riding and exercise, he lamented that he had accomplished nothing at that point. This is the anecdote in question if you wish to read it in detail.

The Spring and Autumn of the Nine Provinces says: “Liu Bei stayed in Jing province for several years. Once when he was sitting with Liu Biao, he rose to go to the toilet. Noticing that the flesh in his thighs had increased, he sighed heavily and wept. When he returned to his seat, Liu Biao was puzzled and asked Liu Bei about it. Liu Bei replied, ‘I normally did not leave the saddle, and the flesh on the inside of my thighs melted away. Now I’ve not been riding anymore, and the flesh on the inside of my thighs has grown. The days and months seem to gallop by and old age has come! Yet, I have not made any achievements. It is this that I lament.’

Biography of Liu Bei, translated by William Crowell

However, an important meeting took place during this time. It would be during his service under Liu Biao that Liu Bei would hear of the Sleeping Dragon Zhuge Liang, who would later become one of the most celebrated ministers in Chinese history and would play an extremely vital role in keeping the state together. While Liu Bei was alive, Zhuge Liang would be in charge of administrative duties and army training. More importantly, Zhuge Liang proposed a plan to Liu Bei by which the land could be unified and the northern bandits expelled.

(The borders may be somewhat inaccurate, but it gives a general idea of what every warlord controlled at the time of 207).

The plan would consist in allying with Sun Quan in the east, take Jing province (Liu Biao’s territory) and then move to the bountiful Yi province in the west (Liu Zhang and Zhang Lu’s territory). With the land divided into three, The Liu-Sun alliance would coordinate their efforts and launch a Northern Campaign across the border, overwhelming Cao Cao and restoring the Han dynasty. The division of the land in three states would later become a reality, but things would not turn out as expected for our subject matter.

The battle of Red Cliffs

On the year 207, Cao Cao would defeat the remnants of the Yuan family and bring the north under his banner. With the north mostly settled, he set his eyes upon the south, more specifically, Jing province. Coincidentally, Liu Biao died and his young heir Cong inherited the province, only to give it up to Cao Cao.

This greatly alarmed Liu Bei, and while urging Cong to reconsider, many of his followers defected and joined the ranks of Liu Bei. Cao Cao’s armies were coming and the battle was inevitable.

Liu Qi, Liu Biao’s eldest son, was supported by Liu Bei and had been in Jiangxia for a while. Jiangxia was an important position because it had many weapons and a navy. Guan Yu was sent ahead while Liu Bei and the rest fled south, with the people following him. However, Cao Cao’s troops moved fast, and a light division dealt a great defeat to the fleeing army. However, Liu Bei and some of his followers managed to escape.

The stage was set for a great battle in the Changjiang river. In 208, Liu Bei joined up with Sun Quan, and their combined forces destroyed Cao Cao’s advance at Red Cliffs and followed up the naval battle with a land assault. The struggle that followed this battle was also vital to the survival of our hero and his ally. Zhou Yu, general under Sun Quan, went to Nan commandery and besieged Jiangling, then under the command of Cao Ren.

While Cao Ren was putting up a staunch resistence against Zhou Yu’s attack, Liu Bei took southern Jing province without a fight. There were a bunch of officials sent there by Cao Cao to administer the province when Liu Cong surrendered, but they quickly surrender before Liu Bei’s armies.

Finally, in 210, Cao Ren was defeated and Nan commandery was finally under Sun Quan’s control. That same year, Zhou Yu died and Lu Su suggested to Sun Quan that he should give Nan commandery to Liu Bei, as he considered that with Zhou Yu gone, those positions couldn’t be held. Professor de Crespigny has this to say in To Establish Peace:

After the death of Zhou Yu, therefore, the position of Sun Quan’s forces at Jiangling was all but untenable against Liu Bei, and Lu Su’s advice was no more than a recognition of the new reality. Later there was propaganda in Wu that the territory of Jing province had only been lent (借jie) to Liu Bei, and that Sun Quan was entitled to get it back in due course: for example, passage Dof Jian'an 20at 490. More probably, this was a face-saving formula, and Liu Bei never recognised the debt.

To Establish Peace, year 210, note 25.

The map above shows Liu Bei in control of southern Jing and Sun Quan in charge of Nan commandery, that was later ceded to Liu Bei in 210.

With their positions more secured, the three hegemon warlords looked west in 211. Cao Cao would march to Liang province to deal with Ma Chao and his confederation, while Sun Quan had designs to take Yi province for himself. This came into conflict with Liu Bei’s own design, that required him to also take Yi province in order to carry out the plan proposed by Zhuge Liang. Sun Quan offered a joint attack to Liu Bei, in which he’d serve as the vanguard into Yi province and they’d attack the region. Liu Bei refused following this piece of advice by Yin Guan:

“If you act as the vanguard for Wu and you advance and are unable to conquer Shu, as you withdraw Wu will be able to take advantage of you and the affair will be lost! Now, you only can endorse his attack on Shu, but explain that you have newly occupied several commanderies and are not yet in a position to act. Wu would not dare to reach over us to take Shu on its own. With such a strategy of advance and withdrawal you can reap the benefits of Wu and Shu.”

Biography of Liu Bei, translated by William Crowell

As time would have it, the fear of a rear attack by Sun Quan was warranted. However, the line about Wu not being able to attack the Yi province (Ba-Shu) on their own has some merit. Nan was vital to the attack of Yi province, but Sun Quan had already ceded the commandery to Liu Bei the previous year. It’s an odd decision to decide to attack Yi yet still give away your way of attacking to an ally you don’t trust.

Nan commandery, however, was a vital link in the communications between Jing province and Yi province through the Yangzi Gorges, and Jiangling, capital of the commandery, was the headquarters of Guan Yu.

De Crespigny, Generals of the South, 315.

Liu Bei enters Shu

Moving further west, in Chengdu, the governor of Yi province has been in war with Zhang Lu, a warlord that ruled Hanzhong like a king. Hanzhong’s position was very strategic and crucial to the survival of Shu. The mountainous terrain of Hanzhong was an excellent barrier against attacks from Liang province, but since the region was under the hostile Zhang Lu, Liu Zhang was naturally concerned, for Zhang Lu could descend upon the Chengdu plain.

Liu Zhang, however, was an extremely weak ruler who faced several rebellions during his time as governor and had angered an important part of his court. Amongst these people we can see Zhang Song and Fa Zheng, who turned to Liu Bei in their discontent with Liu Zhang. Zhang Song tried to contact Cao Cao at an earlier date, but was turned down.

These men came into contact with Liu Bei and proposed Liu Zhang to invite him into Shu in order to serve as reinforcements to attack Zhang Lu, conquer Hanzhong and secure his position. Their intentions, however, were to cooperate with Liu Bei from the inside and launch a coup to overthrow the ineffective Liu Zhang.

Liu Bei, seeing this as a golden opportunity, naturally accepted and marched west with his strategist Pang Tong to meet Liu Zhang, who offered him men and supplies. He then traveled north and in 212 established himself at Jiameng pass, near the border with Zhang Lu, where he would instead garner popular support and rally the local populace. Pang Tong had suggested these plans to Liu Bei:

“Secretly select elite troops, travel day and night, and directly attack Chéngdū. [Liú] Zhāng is both unskilled in military affairs, and also never prepared. When the main army arrives, with one move things will be settled. This is the best plan.

“Yáng Huái and Gāo Pèi are [Liú] Zhāng’s famous Generals, each lead strong troops, defending and occupying Guāntóu, and one hears that they have several times sent letters remonstrating [Liú] Zhāng, urging him to send you General back to Jīngzhōu. Now General before you arrive, send someone to them to report, saying Jīngzhōu has an emergency, and that you wish to rescue it, while simultaneously preparing attire to outwardly look like you will return. These two both respect your great reputation General, and also will be happy that you will leave, and certainly plan to ride with light cavalry to come meet. You General can then seize them, advance and take over their troops, and then head toward Chéngdū. This is the middle plan.

“Retreating back to Báidì, joining up with Jīngzhōu, and slowly return to make plans. This is the worst plan.

“If you delay and do not go, then you will be in great trouble, and cannot last.”

Biography of Pang Tong, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Out of these, Liu Bei followed the second plan. Using a letter from Sun Quan as an excuse to pack things up and leave, Liu Bei requested men and provisions on his way to aid his ally, but Liu Zhang only delivered half the requested amount. Also, at around this time, Zhang Song’s collusion with Liu Bei was discovered and he was executed.

Now, Liu Bei intended to attack Liu Zhang from the beginning, but this offered him the perfect casus belli to finally turn against him. He murdered Yang Huai and Gao Pei, took over their armies and begun his conquest of Shu.

Liu Bei would be largely successful in the Shu region. Despite his isolation, he earned several early victories, marching to Fu and defeating several generals, like Wu Yi and Zhang Ren. Zheng Du had proposed to Liu Zhang to reap all the grain and leave Liu Bei to starve, which he rejected as Fa Zheng, now under Liu Bei, had predicted.

In 213 Liu Zhang then sent general Li Yan to stop Liu Bei, but he defected to him istead and Liu Bei would lay siege to Luo city, where Pang Tong would lose his life.

Meanwhile, Zhuge Liang sent men from Nan in Jing province through the Changjiang. Zhang Fei and Zhao Yun would conquer several positions, Luo would fall and Liu Bei marched to Chengdu, capital of Yi province. Zhao Yun and Zhang Fei would join from their respective directions.

In 214, Liu Bei invited Ma Chao to join his ranks. Previously, Cao Cao betrayed Ma Chao by entering his territory and defeated him, so he had taken refuge under Zhang Lu. He was, however, not very well liked.

With Ma Chao’s arrival, men from Chengdu would defect en masse and Liu Zhang finally surrendered. Liu Bei sacked the treasury and delivered rewards to his own men, as well as restored the land to their previous owners to gain favor with the gentry.

He took the gold and silver from the city of Shu and distributed it to his commanders and soldiers and repaid [the people] with grain and silk. The Former Lord further assumed the position of concurrent shepherd of Yi province.

Biography of Liu Bei, William Crowell

The economy would suffer, but it would be quickly fixed by Liu Ba with strict price controls among other measures.

Thus, in 215, Liu Bei had finally conquered Shu, the heartland of the Third Han that he’d found a few years later.

The red arrows represent Liu Bei’s movement while the blue arrows are the movements of Zhao Yun and Zhang Fei under Zhuge Liang. Zhang Fei took Jiangzhou and Deyang, while Zhao Yun would sail further downstream and take Jialing and Jianwei. The different forces finally converged onto Chengdu and Ma Chao’s reinforcements finally ended the campaign.

Once settled in Shu, Sun Quan would be quick to betray their alliance and ask for the return of Jing province. Naturally, Liu Bei refused, for Jing province was conquered by him and only the territory of Nan was ceded to him, not lent.

However, Liu Bei conceded and the commanderies of Changsha, Jiangxia and Guiyang were given to Sun Quan. The reason was pretty straightforward. Cao Cao was preparing to enter Hanzhong, which was under Zhang Lu. Just as Liu Zhang feared the northern threat, Liu Bei was sure to be worried that his biggest rival was going to soon be at his doorstep. Hanzhong was a necessary holding for the survival of the rest of the region, and Liu Bei could not afford to get into a war with Sun Quan just yet. If Cao Cao conquered Hanzhong and Liu Bei was away, he could easily take Shu and leave Liu Bei homeless once more.

Liu Bei, King of Hanzhong

Just as Liu Zhang feared the threat from the north by the hand of Zhang Lu, Liu Bei was worried his position was threatened by Cao Cao, a far more competent man than Zhang Lu. By the end of 215, Cao Cao had already subdued the region. Although he personally encountered setbacks, a lucky strike by Xiahou Dun had brought him victory sooner than he had anticipated.

This map is a bit hard to read, but what matters is that the north is surrounded by hills and mountainous terrain. That is the territory of Hanzhong and to its south lies Shu. Chengdu, the capital, sits on a plain with several rivers running through it. Attacking from the mountains into the plains was easier for the attackers, and Zhang He threatened Baxi commandery, south of Hanzhong in 216, but Liu Bei’s mighty general Zhang Fei stopped him with a clever maneuver.

[Zhāng] Hé separately commanded various armies down to Bāxī, wishing to relocate its people to Hànzhōng, advancing army to Dàngqú, Méngtóu, and Dāngshí, and with Fēi resisted each other for over fifty days. Fēi led elite soldiers of over ten thousand men, along another road intercepted [Zhāng] Hé’s army and met in battle, the mountain roads were pressed and narrow, front and rear could not rescue each other, and Fēi therefore defeated [Zhāng] Hé. [Zhāng] Hé abandoned horse and climbed mountain, alone with bannermen of over ten people along lesser roads withdrew, leading the army back to Nánzhèng, and Bā’s territory obtained security.

Biography of Zhang Fei, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Even though Liu Bei was in a vulnerable position and Cao Cao was advised to attack him, Cao Cao was reluctant to commit to a campaign in which retreat would be difficult and defeat could be disastrous as a result. Instead, in 217, Cao Cao moved west and went to war with Sun Quan.

This was evidently not lost on Liu Bei, and Fa Zheng suggested to attack, to which Liu Bei agreed.

The day we overcome them, we can expand agriculture and accumulate grain, look for gaps and openings, at best we can overthrow our enemy and restore the Ruling Household, at middling we can nibble away at Yōng and Liáng to expand our border territory, and at worst we can firmly defend strategic points, to plan for enduring long. This is what Heaven has given us, and the opportunity cannot be lost.

Biography of Fa Zheng, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

Fa Zheng was aware of the benefits of owning Hanzhong, since the narrow roads crossing the Qinling range were easy to defend and would provide a wall to keep Shu safe and gather resources in that position.

The first attack in which generals Wu Lan and Lei Tong marched was unsuccessful and they lost their lives. Zhang Fei and Ma Chao were also pushed back, so in 218 Liu Bei took personal command of the troops. Leading his men to Yangping pass, he was met with staunch resistence by Zhang He.

The attempts at crackng Zhang He’s defenses were unsuccessful, so Liu Bei instead marched through hilly terrain, bypassed Yangping and camped on Mount Dingjun, just 40 kilometers away from Nanzheng, the capital of Hanzhong, where Xiahou Yuan was located. Liu Bei then attacked Zhang He, and Xiahou Yuan, wanting to aid his colleague, sent a detachment as reinforcements. This proved to be fatal, as Fa Zheng saw that Xiahou Yuan was weaker and sent Huang Zhong to strike at his camp.

This map shows us how the battle went down. First, Liu Bei’s forces (Red) moved to Yangping pass, where he was held, so he took an alternate route through the hills and camped at Mount Dingjun, where he attacked Zhang He and Xiahou Yuan (Blue). When there was am opening, Huang Zhong attacked and defeated Xiahou Yuan.

The enemy was utterly defeated, Xiahou Yuan lay dead and his forces were in disorder, but Zhang He rallied them and managed to safely retreat. Cao Cao arrived at Hanzhong, but by then Liu Bei had taken positions. He remarked that Cao Cao had nothing to do, and as he had anticipated, Cao Cao was defeated shortly after, when he couldn’t find a weakness and breach Liu Bei’s defenses.

With this, Liu Bei had secured his position and declared himself King of Hanzhong in 219, an allusion to emperor Gao, founder of the Han. This maneuver was made as a challenge to Cao Cao’s title of King of Wei, which he took in 217. He then sent Meng Da to take Yong’an.

The victory at Hanzhong was decisive. Not only did he secure the heartland at the Sichuan plains, but checkmated Cao Cao’s ambitions. If Liu Bei had not conquered Hanzhong, Cao Cao would have a base to seize Shu, and once Liu Bei was destroyed, he could attack SunQuan from multiple directions in a similar fashion as Jin would do 60 years later.

The loss of Jing province

However, having solidified his position in Yi province, Jing province would soon be lost. The success at Hanzhong was followed by a campaign against Fan by Guan Yu. He defeated Yu Jin and besieged Cao Ren, and greatly threatened Cao Cao’s position in Xudu, for local leaders rebelled in the vicinity.

Excellency Cáo discussed moving the capital from Xǔ to avoid this threat, but Sīmǎ [Yì] Xuān-wáng and Jiǎng Jì believed: “Guān Yǔ achieving his ambition is something Sūn Quán certainly will not accept. We can send someone to urge Quán to attack from the rear, dividing the south of the Jiāng to reward Quán, and in this way the siege of Fán will be resolved.” Excellency Cáo followed this.

Biography of Guan Yu, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

And indeed, Sun Quan sent Lü Meng to Jing province, isolating Guan Yu and executing him. With Sun Quan’s betrayal, any hopes of defeating the northern rebels were lost. Earlier in 217, Sun Quan had nominally submitted to Cao Cao, so this turn of events is not entirely unexpected.

Guān Yǔ raised troops about the Miǎn and Hàn, intending to ascend up the state, and though in rectifying the ruler to establish hegemony the achievement could not be certain, it needed to use a great sound to shake the distant, and had its reasoning. Sūn Quán secretly had disastrous heart and assisted Wèi in removing a danger, and so the example of Jiǎn Zōngzǐ rescuing his King, the cause for Excellency Cáo to plan to move the capital, the scheme to restore Hàn, came close to success only to be thwarted.

Biography of Zhuge Jin, translated by Yang Zhengyuan.

This is Pei Songzhi’s commentary, and I agree with his assessment that Guan Yu’s victory would cause a great disturbance in the heart of Wei, and the consequences could have been crucial to defeat Cao Cao. Although Guan Yu was defeated by Cao Ren, the fact of the matter is that Sun Quan turned against his ally and what could have been a setback in a campaign against the rebels turned into a great betrayal. It was the nature of those times. Both Liu Bei and Cao Cao had found success with treacherous means, it’s only normal Sun Quan would do the same. Despite the loan of Jing never existing, Sun Quan saw an opportunity and took it as the warlord he was, but this changed the landscape significantly and Wei would only be defeated by internal strife rather than external invasion in later decades..The entirety of Jing province was lost, the alliance between Sun Quan and Liu Bei was shattered and the stage for the three way civil war was set.

Emperor Zhaolie of Han

Cao Cao met his end the following year, in 220, and his son Cao Pi usurped the empire from Liu Xie later that year, proclaiming the beginning of his Wei dynasty.

In 221, Liu Bei, in order to challenge his claim, declared himself emperor of the Han dynasty arguing that Liu Xie had been assassinated in Chengdu and named Zhuge Liang his Prime Minister. In order to punish Sun Quan’s treachery, Liu Bei marched west and found initial success, however a brilliant move by Wu’s general Lu Xun caused his army to be destroyed and retreated to Baidicheng.

The emperor passed away in 222 and was named emperor Zhaolie of Han posthumously. He left Liu Shan to the care of Zhuge Liang and, despite his setbacks, he had no regrets. He left this world with the following words to his son and heir:

(…) If a man dies at fifty, it is not considered an early death. I am already past sixty. What is there further to regret? (…) Exert yourself! Exert yourself! Do not commit an evil because you think it minor; do not neglect to do a good because you think it small. Only the worthy, only the virtuous are submitted to by others. Your father’s virtue was meager; you should not emulate him.

Biography of Liu Bei, translated by William Crowell.

Conclusion: An appraisal of Liu Bei

Contrary to popular belief (in western internet communities, admittedly), Liu Bei was a man of exceptional talents. In his youth he earned merit bravely fighting rebels and bandits, he gathered many loyal and brave followers and he ruled his people well, and as a result he was beloved by them.

In war he was courageous, daring and unyielding. No matter how many setbacks he suffered, he never surrendered and spent most of his adult life on the battlefield, were he braved countless dangers in a chaotic time when defeat could mean the destruction of your clan.

In governance he was kind and close, earning the admiration of many people, whether big or small, notably Cao Cao himself who was said to be very close to him after the defeat of Lü Bu.

In leadership he was brilliant, gathering brave fellows to fight for him, and since he was oftentimes willing to not only fight alongside them, but to put his own life at risk to protect them, many were willing to follow him even in his darkest hour.

Zhaolie was also a cunning politician, who despite his weak claim to the ruling dynasty he still manage to succeed it. Born like a peasant, he fought his way to the highest position of power.

While his achievements were not that of Cao Cao, he is stil reminiscent of emperor Gao and was a more than worthy opponent. Is it really surprising that he’s considered a heroic figure by many?

If we’re willing to cast aside his portrayal in Romance of the Three Kingdoms and its subsequent adaptations, we will find that the historical Zhaolie was fascinating and a man worthy of admiration who, sadly, has been victim to a reaction from several readers. The aim of this post was to clear out the misconceptions about his character and hopefully help lessen the slander done against him. Thank you for your patience reading all the way here.

#three kingdoms #liu bei

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