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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title XV - Civil Register

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186027               December 8, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent.

FACTS: On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth – from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).

The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained “because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048.”

Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court:

Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8,  1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn.

On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera.

In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera

Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also bears his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera. When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.

In its September 28, 2005 Decision, the RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108.

For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but “it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights.” What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, “may not substitute one for the other for purposes of expediency.” Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower court’s order in effect allowed the change of one’s name in the civil registry without basis.

The Court of Appeals (CA) was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 108 is proper?

RULING: In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from “MARILYN” to “MERLYN” is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.

The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes “changes of name,” the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

This rule in “names,” however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. “After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.”

A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSG’s assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of Mercadera’s petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance with the publication requirement.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from.” To change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.”36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court “to remove the faults or error” from her registered given name “MARILYN,” and “to make or set aright” the same to conform to the one she grew up to, “MERLYN.” It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief.

In this case, the use of the letter “a” for the letter “e,” and the deletion of the letter “i,” so that what appears as “Marilyn” would read as “Merlyn” is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between “Marilyn” and “Merlyn” may well be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercadera’s Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.

The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember. Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title XII - Final Provisions

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165803        September 1, 2010

SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners, vs. DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN, Respondents.

FACTS: In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.Atanacio offered 2 lots located in Parañaque to the petitioners. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and showed them the following documents:

(a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Elena to sell the property. The petitioners paid P200,000.00 as earnest money for which Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money which stipulated that the peitioners would pay an additional payment of P130, 000.00 on February 4, 1991; P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991 and P700, 000.00 on March 31, 1991 once Elena turned over the property.

On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied by the broker, went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify the TCTs shown by Elena. There they discovered that one of the lots had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed that the loan was effected through and SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baños Rural Bank, with the same SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the loan.

The petitioners and the broker next inquired about the mortgage and the court order at the Los Baños Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank had asked for the court order because the lot involved was conjugal property.

Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment on February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT to them.

On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.

On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded P800,000.00” in exchange for the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide. Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Elena.

Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case No. 91-1005 entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.

On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?

RULING: Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code

The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the CivilCode, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan’s counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.

To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.

Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.

Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.

Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property. Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified. On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title IX - Parental Authority

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996

NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ, respondents.

FACTS: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse working in the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.

Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.

Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore.

ISSUE: Whether or not custody of the child is to be given to the father.

RULING: No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation. The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the child’s age to 5 years.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title VIII - Support

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26231  August 7, 1926

LORENZO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. GORGONIA PARUNGAO, Honorable EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, GABRIEL BELMONTE, sheriff ex-officio of Nueva Ecija, and Honorable MANUEL V. MORAN, Vacation Judge of First Instance of the Court of Nueva Ecija, respondents.

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza filed a writ of certiorari against Gorgonia Paruñgao, Nueva Ecija ex-officio sheriff Gabriel Belmonte and Judges Eduardo David (Nueva Ecija CFI) and Manuel Moran (Vacation Judge of Nueva Ecija) to prohibit the carrying out of sale of property of petitioner and forward the case to the Supreme Court for revision.

On August 1925, the CFI declared Mendoza and Paruñgao’s marriage null and void upon the reappearance of the Paruñgao’s first husband Antonio Buenaventura, who was considered dead after an absence of more than 7 years. (Buenaventura died later on.) While the first judgment was on appeal, Paruñgao filed for alimony and settlement of her conjugal property with Mendoza on September 1925.

Subsequently, the court directed Mendoza to give Paruñgao monthly support. However, the writs of execution were not complied with.

On July 10, 1926, the CFI denied Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration regarding support. On July 23, the Supreme Court affirmed the nullity of Mendoza and Paruñgao’s marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paruñgao, when she filed for liquidation of conjugal property and alimony, is entitled to support during pendency of the action

RULING: No. While a wife is entitled to support during the pendency of an annulment suit, this right ceases along with other mutual obligations of marriage after the decree of nullity is issued. The marriage between Mendoza and Paruñgao was annulled on August 1925. She was, therefore, no longer entitled to support on September 1925 when she filed the complaint. However, Paruñgao is entitled to payment in advance of her share to the conjugal property, if such exists. CFI’s order of monthly payment is to be considered an advance of conjugal property share but no writ of execution can be issued thereon because of excess of jurisdiction and its interlocutory character.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title VII - Adoption

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22523  September 29, 1967

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA. LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

FACTS: Petitioner Luis and Edipola Santos filed the petition before the court praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, four (4) years old, be declared their son by adoption.

The petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Edwin Villa y Mendoza is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession.

The parents of the child testified that they entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up, resulting to a deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.

RULING: Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting.

Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in the opinion of this court is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title IV - Paternity And Filiation

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994

EUTIQUIO MARQUINO and MARIA TERENAL-MARQUINO Survived by: LUZ. T. MARQUINO, ANA T. MARQUINO and EVA T. MARQUINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION, BIBIANA ROMANO-PAGADORA, Survived By: PEDRO PAGADORA, EMY R. PAGADORA, JUNE R. PAGADORA, EDGAR R. PAGADORA, MAY R. PAGADORA, MAGO R. PAGADORA, ARDEN R. PAGADORA, and MARS R. PAGADORA, respondents.

FACTS: Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio.  Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single.  It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete.  She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family.  The Marquinos denied all these.  Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive.  Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. 

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

ISSUES: Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs and also Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

RULING: Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.  The right is purely a personal one to the natural child.  The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. 

Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father. IAC decision was reversed and set aside.  Complaint against Marquinos has been dismissed.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title VI - Paternity And Filiation

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988

VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA, MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA in her behalf and as Guardian ad litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.

FACTS: This is a contest over the estate of the late Dra Esperanza Cabatbat. The petitioner Violeta who claims to be her only child and respondents are the sisters of the doctor and the children of her deceased brothers. The IAC found Violeta not to be the offspring of Dra and hence, not a legal heir. Respondents allege that Violeta is merely a ward (ampon) of the Spouses Esperanza and Proceso, without benefit of the adoption proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not Violeta can inherit from the Dra Esperanza?

RULING: NO. She is not the decedent’s child. Being neither legally adopted, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased because there was no record that Esperanza was admitted to the hospital where Violeta was born on the day of her birth; no certificate of live birth in the hospital and in the civil registrar; certification from Violeta’s school that the spouses were listed as guardians and not as parents; and there was a testimony of a person who met a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to a baby girl who grew up to be Violeta. The following are proof of her non-filiation thus not entitled to inherit at all.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title IV - Property Relations Between Husband And Wife

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200274

MELECIO DOMINGO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by ESTER MOLINA, Respondents.

FACTS: Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land.

During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora's death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967... and transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.

Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have falsified the document transferring Anastacio and Flora's one-half undivided interest over the land. Finally, Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject property from the time of Anastacio's death up to the time he filed the Complaint. Melecio presented the testimonies of the Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, and of Melecio's nephew, George Domingo (George).

The Records Officer testified that he could not locate the instrument that documents the transfer of the subject property ownership from Anastacio to the spouses Molina. The Records Officer also testified that the alleged sale was annotated at the time when Genaro Molina's brother was the Register of Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac. George, on the other hand, testified that he has been living on the subject property owned by Anastacio since 1986. George testified, however, that aside from himself, there were also four other occupants on the subject property, namely Jaime Garlitos, Linda Sicangco, Serafio Sicangco and Manuel Ramos.

The spouses Molina presented Jaime Garlitos (Jaime) as their sole witness and who is one of the occupants of the subject lot. Jaime testified that Elena Molina permitted him to build a house on the subject property in 1993. Jaime, together with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing trees on the subject property and gave portions of their harvest to Elena Molina without any complaint from Melecio. Jaime further testified that Melecio never lived on the subject property and that only George Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses Molina, has a hut on the property.

Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio Molina.

ISSUE: Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora's consent is valid and legal

RULING: Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora's consent. We do not find Melecio's argument meritorious. Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora's death. There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code's effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership. The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968 Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation, Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title IV - Property Relations Between Husband And Wife

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27421 September 12, 1986

ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mang-oy; LEONORA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA TAYNAN, and JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married to Salming Pirazo, and ABITO TUMPAO, respondents.

FACTS: Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a second wife but without issues. However she had adopted 2 children according to the practice of Igorots. On September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he called “last will and testament which were read to and thumb mark affixed by all of the beneficiaries who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old Tumpao, the parties remained to be in possession of the lots assign to them which was in accordance of the wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed upon by the parties in a public document.

On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-judicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Tumpao among the three of them only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance , sustained by trial court but reversed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Will and testament” of Old Tumpao be duly allowed even without being proved in the court

RULING: In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.

However, the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the Old Civil Code which was the law in force at the time the document was made. The law says: “If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitimacy of the forced heirs.” Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter vivos, which is a consequence of its special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is sustained by the provision of Art 1056, Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when the beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and confirmed with the disposition made by Old Tumpao.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title IV - Property Relations Between Husband And Wife

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185063    July 23, 2009

SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, Petitioners, vs. ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE LEON, Respondents.

FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City.  On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.

Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC.  They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal property

HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970.  This full payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968.  In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title II - Legal Separation, Article 63

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169977 March 18, 2010

INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner, vs. MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON, Respondents.

FACTS: Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo Gozon. Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties, Alfredo and Mario entered into Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario pays the partial payment of the said price and he took the possession of the property.

When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their property was dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to Elvira.

On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18 million pesos in his favor by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in full payment.

Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for specific performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and void for their attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts, further alienating or disposing of the subject property. Also the agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of written consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property of this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell their conjugal partnership without the consent of the other spouse, and share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership.

RULING: No. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. And the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties. Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title I - Marriage

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971

BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed CONSUEGRA, 

petitioners-appellants, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and ROSARIO DIAZ, respondents-appellees.

FACTS: Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages in his lifetime, the first to respondent Rosario Diaz (with whom he had two children) in July 1937 and the second to Basilia Berdin (with whom he had seven children) in May 1957. The second marriage was said to have been contracted in good faith while the first was subsisting. As a shop foreman of the office of the District Engineer in the province of Surigao del Norte, Consuegra was a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Upon his death in September 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to petitioner Berdin and her children, who were the beneficiaries in the named policy. As Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement benefits due him, Diaz filed a claim for said retirement benefits, being the only legal heir of Consuegra. Berdin and children opposed, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits. GSIS ruled that both are legal heirs and awarded Diaz half and Berdin and children the remaining half. The Court of First Instance of Surigao upheld the GSIS decision.

ISSUE: Whether GSIS was correct in the allocation of the deceased's retirement insurance benefits.  RULING:Yes. The Supreme Court held that when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each family be entitled to one half of the estate. Although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title I - Marriage, Article 36

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 137590            March 26, 2001

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent

FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.  Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.  Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.  In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings.  While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein.  Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.

RULING: Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.  The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state.  No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition.  The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title I - Marriage, Article 26

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia's parents into their family affairs. Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her contract will expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow failed to contact her or get in touch with her. Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that Julia's failure to return home and communicating with him for more than 5 years constitute psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c) incurability. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage. Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Psychological Incapacity

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title I - Marriage, Article 26

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia's parents into their family affairs. Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her contract will expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow failed to contact her or get in touch with her. Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that Julia's failure to return home and communicating with him for more than 5 years constitute psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c) incurability. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage. Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Psychological Incapacity

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title I - Marriage, Article 45

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant. Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.

FACTS: Plaintiff J filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with C on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation. J alleged that the condition of C's genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.  C, however, failed to submit her answer within the required period. The Court ordered C to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. but C did not follow the order and did not appear during the scheduled hearings. The judge, thus, rendered judgment annulling the marriage of the parties. 

ISUUE: 

Whether or not the marriage in question be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband-plaintiff?

RULING: No. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.  Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

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The Family Code of the Philippines

Title I - Marriage, Article 40

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971

BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed CONSUEGRA, 

petitioners-appellants, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and ROSARIO DIAZ, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages in his lifetime, the first to respondent Rosario Diaz (with whom he had two children) in July 1937 and the second to Basilia Berdin (with whom he had seven children) in May 1957. The second marriage was said to have been contracted in good faith while the first was subsisting. As a shop foreman of the office of the District Engineer in the province of Surigao del Norte, Consuegra was a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Upon his death in September 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to petitioner Berdin and her children, who were the beneficiaries in the named policy. As Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement benefits due him, Diaz filed a claim for said retirement benefits, being the only legal heir of Consuegra. Berdin and children opposed, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits. GSIS ruled that both are legal heirs and awarded Diaz half and Berdin and children the remaining half. The Court of First Instance of Surigao upheld the GSIS decision.

ISSUE: Whether GSIS was correct in the allocation of the deceased's retirement insurance benefits.  RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each family be entitled to one half of the estate. Although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.