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#Philippine Case Digest
discipleofthemis · 10 months
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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 165545             March 24, 2006
Civil law; subsequent marriages before the effectivity of the Family Code.
ISSUE: May the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque be terminated by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon? (answers are rulings of the Supreme Court) after the facts
FACTS: Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz got married in 1955. Over 15 years later, Bailon filed a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead, and the court granted it in 1970.
In 1983, Bailon married Teresita Jarque. Bailon, a retiree pensioner, passed away in 1998. Teresita filed claims for funeral and death benefits, which were granted by the Social Security System (SSS).
However, Cecilia Bailon-Yap, claiming to be Bailon's daughter, contested the claims, stating that Alice was still alive and that Teresita's marriage to Bailon was void. The SSS recommended canceling Teresita's benefits and refunding the amount paid to her.
Various parties filed claims for Bailon's death benefits, and the SSS ordered Teresita to refund the benefits she received. Teresita protested and filed a petition with the SSS.
Later, Alicia P. Diaz, claiming to be Bailon's widow, submitted an affidavit contradicting Bailon's representation of Alice's disappearance. The SSC declared Teresita as a common-law wife, ordered her to refund the benefits, and directed the SSS to pay Alice her rightful death benefit.
Teresita appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the SSC's decision, stating that the SSS lacked the authority to nullify the court's findings and that Teresita was not given a fair opportunity to present evidence. The motions for reconsideration by the SSC and the SSS were denied.
ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): YES!
Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Social Security System (SSS). The SSS argued that the Court of Appeals (CA) failed to consider the findings of the Social Security Commission (SSC) regarding the prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice, disregarded the authority of the SSC to determine the beneficiaries of the death benefits, and claimed that the SSS did not provide the respondent with due process.
However, the Supreme Court held that the SSC exceeded its authority by reviewing and overturning the decisions of regular courts.
The court emphasized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the marriages involved is the Civil Code since they were solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the first spouse is considered illegal and void unless certain exceptional circumstances exist or it is declared null and void by a competent court.
The court further explained that the burden of proof lies with the party challenging the validity of the second marriage.
In this case, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which was not even required for purposes of remarriage at that time. Additionally, the court cited legal opinions stating that if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages arise.
Therefore, since no steps were taken to nullify Bailon's and respondent's marriage before Bailon's death, the court concluded that the respondent is the rightful dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. As a result, the Supreme Court denied the SSS' petition.
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wielsonf · 5 months
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why qualitative research matters to teaching (mathematics)
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the pioneer cohort of ed.d. and ph.d. educ at ateneo gbseald with dr. ma. assunta "achoot" cuyegkeng / screengrabs from markkie aribon and lavi subang of ed.d.
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i told the internet about why i am where i am now in a previous post. now, i am ready to share what invaluable knowledge i've got from one of my courses so far.
during my undergrad and graduate studies, just pen and paper is mostly sufficient to create new ideas, problems, and solutions, and do research in math, but that's not the only concern i have with life and work.
for the past half a decade or so, peers and i saw a decline in the perceived quality of students in calculus at the university of the philippines los banos. what was supposed to be tackled in senior high school, like algebra, trigonometry, and precalculus especially for those from stem track, wasn't adequately done so. when introduced to fundamental calculus concepts, they do understand the notion of limit, how lines and derivatives intertwine and entangle, and why area is an integral, but when it comes to crafting solutions and answering problems, this inadequacy becomes apparent.
in turn, it becomes necessary for us to ask why this is the case? how do teachers influence their students' calculus learning and what are they doing to adapt? has existing policies done us (dis)service in the philippine (math) education? and, why is everybody and nobody at fault here?
just thinking about possible solutions is not enough. we need to get our hands dirty, wreck some established norms, and possibly hurt some feelings in the process. qualitative research, i learned, has some of the answers.
as i mentioned in a previous post,
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for this course, i posed this question: how do teachers facilitate collegiate calculus learning through creative interventions?
in an attempt to answer this question, i had to look back at what is happening and what research tells us about calculus learning.
for one, most mathematics learning theories are based on existing ones from classical learning theories, like constructivism, positivism, and behaviorism. since the start of the 21st century, one of the main motivations of mathematics education research is rationalizing a theory for mathematics in consideration of its unique nature as a subject matter.
next comes becoming aware of challenges and factors in teaching and learning calculus, how do teachers intervene, and how important their role is.
as of yet, i think the question can't be answered by a simple survey, answered using a likert scale. we have to go on the ground and diligently ask calculus teachers and instructors in college the existing literature still resonate with the challenges they face and what they do about them in order to help their students. the quality of administration and prestige of the institutions they serve affect their students, but in reality, educators are at the frontline facing the students and implementing interventions as they go along day by day. their experience is a vital part of understanding the problem.
we should break down such a complex question into easily digestible and directly answerable ones that help us understand sac (structures-agency-culture): ask where the teachers come from, what kind of pool do they dive in to teach calculus, what restrictions they are put in, what the students are like, what they do to help the children [sic], and in what way do their interventions affect the students.
with the pisa results just released, now more than ever, we need to act as fast as we can to implement changes from the ground up.
why are we, everyone at school, so miserable in one way or another? this, i can definitely say, is my magnum opus.
i will die on this hill.
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anncata · 6 months
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Case Digest
Wolf Gang O. Roehr V. Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez, et al.
G.R. No: 142820 June 20, 2003
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr (A German Citizen) married Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez (A Filipina) on December 11, 1980, and their marriage was later ratified in the Philippines.
They had two children during their marriage.
In August 1996, Rodriguez filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On December 16, 1997, Roehr obtained a divorce decree from a German Court.
Based on the divorce decree, Roehr filed a motion to dismiss the case in the Philippine RTC.
The RTC initially granted the motion to dismiss but later partially set aside its order to resolve issues related to property settlement and child custody, despite the divorce decree.
Issues:
Whether the trial Judge gravely abused discretion by partially modifying the earlier order.
Whether the trial Judge has Jurisdiction to retain the case, considering the foreign divorce decree.
Held:
The trial Judge did not gravely abuse her discretion by partially modifying the earlier order. The rules of Civil Code procedure allow for partial reconsideration, especially when the original judgment has not yet attained finality.
The trial judge had jurisdiction to retain the case to determine issues regarding child custody, care, support and education. However, she lacked jurisdiction to resolved property relations since both parties admitted in their pleadings that there was no property to account for.
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marketdevelopment · 1 month
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paolawdiary · 2 months
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
TITLE IV
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Chapter 5. Separation of Property of the Spouses and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse During the Marriage
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. 
CASE DIGEST: Alfonso Lacson vs. Carmen San Juan-Lacson I G.R. No. L-23482  | August 30, 1968 | CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Carmen San Jose-Lacson and Alfonso Lacson married on February 14, 1953. Four live children were born to them. The respondent spouse moved to Manila on January 9, 1963, leaving the marital residence in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City. She filed a lawsuit for custody of all of their children as well as support for herself and them in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila on March 12, 1963, with the case docketed as civil case E-00030. Nonetheless, with the help of their own attorneys, the couple was able to come to a friendly agreement over child custody, child support, and property division. They filed a joint petition on April 27, 1963, with the date of April 21, 1963. It was docketed as special proceeding 6978 of the Negros Occidental Court of First Instance. The CFI issued an order on April 27, 1963, finding the aforementioned joint petition to be "conformable to law," giving judgment and approving and implementing in toto their compromise agreement. As stipulated in paragraph 4 of their mutual agreement (par. 3 of the compromise judgment), the petitioner spouse gave the respondent spouse full custody of all four children and sent financial support for their education. Respondent spouse claimed to have "entered into and signed the  Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of the… minor children who are all below the age of seven" in a move filed before the JDRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement and the judgement of the CFI grounded on said agreement conformable to law
RULING:
Yes, In accordance with article 191 of the Civil Code, as stated in the Article 136 of the Family code, as far as the separation of the property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership are concerned. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
Source:
Family Code of the Philippines (2022); Judge Ed Vincent S. Albano , Ed Vincent A. Albano, Jr.
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1987/07/06/executive-order-no-209-s-1987/
https://chanrobles.com/cralaw/1956julydecisions.php?id=269
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Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, [September 21, 2005], 507 PHIL 485-508
Doctrine
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. 
In relation to Art. 26(2) FCP Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Note: The concept of psychological incapacity was heavily discussed in the decision, however I do not think that it should be included in this digest. That’ll be quite advanced. Let’s cross the bridge when we get there.
SUPER SUMMARY
Crasus and Fely got married in Cebu City. What started with a blissful marriage blessed with 5 kids ended with Fely leaving the marital home and eventually left for the United States of America. 13 years thereafter, Crasus filed for annulment. Fely, on the other hand, contends that such proceedings are no longer necessary as she had filed a divorce against Crasus in 1984 and became an American citizen in 1988, therefore PH laws should not bind her anymore. Is the contention of Fely correct? 
HELD: Negative. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. 
FACTS
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. 
At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. 
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Fely is still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties despite acquiring American citizenship.
RULING
The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines - Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law - is not applicable to the case at bar. 
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse.  By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.  Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.  In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988.  At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.  Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.  Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
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juztize · 4 months
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Case Digest (NewCivilCode)
G. R. No. L-7817 October 31, 1956
ALFREDO M. VELAYO, in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIR LINES INC. (CALI),
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND, LTD.,
Defendant-Appellee
FELIX, J.:
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. In this case, the defendant clearly acted in bad faith when it schemed and effected the attachment of the C-54 plane of its debtor CALI by assigning its credit to its sister company in the US. Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay damages.
FACTS:
In 1948, the Commercial Air Lines, Inc., (CALI), is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws, with offices in the City of Manila and previously engaged in air transportation business. The Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., defendant-appellee, a corporation organized under the laws of England and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, with principal offices at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank building in the City of Manila.
The defendant was a supplier of fuel since the start of CALI’s operations, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, its Credit Manager who extended credit to CALI, was in charge of the collection thereof. As of August, 1948, the books of the Defendant showed that CALI had a balance of P170,162.58, and as partial settlement of their accounts, Mr. Alfonso Sycip, CALI’s President of the Board of Directors offered to Mr. Fitzgerald, the CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane, located in California. However, defendant declined as it thought that CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt.
CALI called upon informal meeting to its creditors and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.
Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 planewas not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at the State of California, U. S. A. and their financial situation.
Whether or not Defendant may be made under the law to answer for the damages and if so, what should be the amount of such damages.
RULING:
YES. The Defendant took advantage of its knowledge of the existence of Airplane C-54 at the California and financial situation of the CALI.
Because of its action assigning the credit in favor of a sister Shell Company in the USA, and the court action involving the plane has cause delay on the sale of the plane, thus the other creditors have suffered because they could not be paid. The defendant did not show good faith, and honesty. Art 19. of the Civil Code said, “Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith".
It may be said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct, yet we find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: "Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".
Now, Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: "Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited." It supports the argument that even assuming Shell is not liable for taking advantage of situation of the airlines, it was nevertheless benefitted when its assigned credit to its sister company in the U. S. The Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. Shell was ordered to pay damages at double the value of the airplane.
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ronaldbustillo · 6 months
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Case Digest:
ALFREDO M. VELAYO, in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIR LINES, INC. (CALI), Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD., Defendant-Appellee, YEK HUA TRADING CORPORATION, PAUL SYCIP and MABASA & CO., intervenors.
G.R. No. L-7817, EN BANC, October 31, 1956, FELIX, J.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. In this case, the defendant clearly acted in bad faith when it schemed and effected the attachment of the C-54 plane of its debtor CALI by assigning its credit to its sister company in the US. Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay damages.
FACTS:
Shell supplies fuel needs of CALI. However, due to financial crisis CALI failed to pay Shell and its other creditors. Thus, they entered into an agreement that they would present suits against the corporation but to strive for a pro-rata division of the assets, and only in the case of non-agreement would the creditors file insolvency proceedings. However, when Shell PH assigned the credit to Shell Oil, its American Sister Corporation, the latter filed a case against CALI for the collection of assigned Credit attaching the C-54 plane of CALI which the creditors opposed and filed damages against Shell for breach of their agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages. (YES)
RULING:
Article 21 of the Civil Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. This is the legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
Another rule is expressed in Article 23 which compels the return of a thing acquired ‘without just or legal grounds’. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: “Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Shell, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited” with mere much more reason the Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. Shell taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case — schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent’s property depriving the latter, of the opportunity to recover said plane –to the detriment of the other creditors.
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chrislspulaw · 6 months
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Case Digest for
Alfredo Velayo for  vs Shell Company of the Philippine Islands
Facts:
CALI operation's fuel needs were all supplied by the defendant.
The books, of Defendant showed a balance in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI.
The defendant had reasons to believe that the financial condition of the CALI was far from being satisfactory.
The management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors
Mr. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of Directors of the CALI, informed the creditors present that this corporation was insolvent and had to stop operations. He explained the memorandum agreement executed by... the CALI with the Philippine Air Lines), Inc.
Regarding the proposed sale to the latter of the aviation equipment of the former
Mr. Alexander Sycip was assisted in the explanation by CPA Alfredo Velayo of Washington, Sycip & Company, Auditors of the CALI, who discussed the balance sheets and distributed copies thereof to the creditors present
The said balance sheet made mention of a C-54 plane in the United States, the property now involved in this suit.
After the creditors present knew the balance sheet and heard the explanations of the officers of the CALI, it was their unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets although the management of the CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file insolvency proceedings... the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., filed a complaint against -the CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. in and for the County of San- Bernardino for the collection of an assigned credit... and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued on the same date against a C-54 plane.
Unaware of Defendant assignments of credit and attachment suit, the stockholders of CALI resolved in a special meeting to approve the memorandum agreement of sale to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
The National Airports Corporation learned of the Defendant's action in the United States and hastened to file its own complaint with an attachment against the CALI
The CALI, also prompted by the Defendant's action in getting the alleged undue preference over the other creditors by attaching the C-54 plane in the United States, beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippines, filed a petition for voluntary insolvency.
An order of insolvency was issued by the court which necessarily stayed the National Airports Corporation's action against the CALI and dissolved its attachment thus compelling the National Airports Corporation to file its claims with the insolvency court
After properly qualifying as Assignee, Alfredo M. Velayo instituted this case... against the Shell Company of P. I., Ltd., for the purpose of securing from the Court a writ of injunction... restraining Defendant, its agents, servants, attorneys, and solicitors from prosecuting in and for the County of San Bernardino in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. the aforementioned Civil Case No. 62576 against the in solvent Commercial Air Lines, Inc.
and as an alternative remedy, that judgment for damages of double the value of the airplane be awarded in favor of the plaintiff against the Defendant, with costs.
The Court rendered a decision... dismissing the complaint
Issues:
Whether the respondent acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of CALI by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc.?
Ruling:
Defendant, upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that with all probability, it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of certain other creditors, forgot that "Man does not live by bread alone" and entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.
The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of the other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and... surprise move that enabled Defendant to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of Justice cannot countenance such attitude at all, and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of our Government and local business.
ART 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith".
It may be said that this article only contains a mere declaration of principles and while such a statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such a declaration is implemented by Article 21... which prescribes the following: 
"ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".
It may be argued that the afore quoted provisions of the Civil Code only came into effect on August 80, 1950, and that they cannot be applicable to acts that took place in 1948, prior to its effectivity. But Article 2252 of the Civil Code, though providing... that: 
''Changes made and new provisions and rules land down by this Code which may be prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive effect.
Implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation and it cannot be alleged that in the case at bar Defendant had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence of the... insolvent CALI or of its creditors said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can be given retroactive effect.
Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from which it could derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in the United States where CALI's plane C-54 was then situated, succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of said insolvent's property by removing it from the possession and ownership of the insolvent.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is reversed and Defendant-Appellee, Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd., is hereby sentenced to pay to Plaintiff-Appellant, as Assignee of the insolvent CALI, damages.
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discipleofthemis · 10 months
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Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
Civil law; Family Code; Applicability of Article 40
NOTE: A mere signing of the marriage contract by the parties, without the presence of the solemnizing officer, there in no marriage to speak of because there is no actual marriage ceremony that was performed by the duly authorized solemnizing officer. There is no need for Judicial Declaration of Nullity. No crime of bigamy is committed.
ISSUE: Did Morigo need to file a declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to avoid the bigamy case? answers are rulings of the Supreme Court, after the facts.
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were former boardmates in Bohol and lost contact when their school year ended. However, they reconnected through a card from Lucia while she was in Singapore, leading to constant communication and the development of a romantic relationship.
Lucia eventually returned to the Philippines in 1986 but left again for Canada to work. Despite the distance, they maintained regular communication. In 1990, Lucia returned to the Philippines and proposed to petition for Lucio to join her in Canada. They agreed to get married and had their wedding on August 30, 1990, in Bohol. Lucia went back to Canada for work, leaving Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed for divorce against Lucio in the Ontario Court, which was granted on January 17, 1992, with an effective date of February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint to declare the nullity of his first marriage, claiming that no actual marriage ceremony took place.
ANSWER (SUPREME COURT RULING): NO!
Morigo's marriage with Barrete is considered void ab initio because no formal marriage ceremony was conducted by a solemnizing officer; instead, they merely signed a marriage contract. Therefore, the petitioner is not required to file a declaration of nullity for his first marriage when he entered into his second marriage with Lumbago. Consequently, he did not commit bigamy and has been acquitted in the filed case.
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marisatuito · 6 months
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Case Digest: Garcia v Recio G.R No. 138322
Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. In 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, in Cabanatuan City.
In 1998, Grace Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Rederick on the ground of bigamy. She alleged that Rederick had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her which she learned in 1997 only. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.
Issues:
1. Was the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson proven?2. Was respondent proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?
Held:
The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following reasons. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino spouse can be allowed to remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce would be capacitated to remarry because of the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws must be alleged and proved.
There are two basic types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The Court could not determine which type of divorce Rederick had acquired in Australia because of insufficient evidence.
The Australian law provision stated in the facts led the Court to believe that Rederick’s divorce might have been restricted. Hence, his capacity to remarry has not been proven. Thus, the Court had to remand the case to find conclusive evidence. However, the Court also ordered that if there is no proof shown that Rederick had the capacity to remarry, then the court a quo may declare the nullity of the marriage on the ground of bigamy since there are already two marriages contracted.
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anncata · 6 months
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Case Digest
Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
Facts:
Restituto Tobias was employed by the petitioner as a Purchasing Agent and an Administrative Assistant in an Engineering Operations Manager.
Fictitious purchases were discovered and the petitioner confronted Tobias stating that he is the number one suspect.
He was then ordered to take 1 week's leave, not to communicate with the office, and leave the tables and drawers open and leave the office keys.
When he returned to work, Hendry called him a "Crook" and a "Swindler".
He was ordered to submit a specimen of his signatures and to take a lie detector test, but all examinations were proven negative.
Then a private investigator hired by the petitioner reported that Tobias was found guilty.
He was subsequently suspended and was sued for estafa, thru falsification of documents.
All 6 criminal cases against respondent Tobias were dismissed.
When he was terminated, he applied for a job for Retelco, but Hendry wrote a letter to Retelco stating that Tobias was dismissed by the Globe Mackay due to dishonesty.
Tobias filed a case of damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of the petitioners. The lower court rendered in favor of him.
Petitioners contended that they cannot be liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss the respondent.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether or not the petitioners are liable for the damages to private respondent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld that Article 19 of the New Civil Code must be observe.
The right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not confuse with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
Calling Tobias a "Crook" and a Swindler" as well as saying "You Filipinos cannot be trusted", and then sending of letter to Retelco were tortious acts committed by Hendry and Globe Mackay, they are therefore liable under Article 2176 of New Civil Code.
Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/aug1989/gr_81262_1989.html Family Code of the Philippines, by Judge Ed Vincent S. Albano (+), Atty. Ed Vincent A. Albano III, et al. ,2022 Edition
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paolawdiary · 3 months
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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
TITLE IV
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 3: SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
ARTICLE 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (160)
EXPLANATION:
This Article emphasized the rule on the Absolute Community of Property that properties acquired during the marriage form part of the absolute community of property. But, even if they were acquired during the marriage, if the other spouse or heirs of the other spouse can prove that it was acquired by gratuitous title, where no provisions exist that it shall form part of the Absolute Community, the same is exclusive, or if it ca be proven that the property is for the personal and exclusive use of either the spouse. The presumption applies regardless of the source of the fund used to acquire the property. What gives rise to the presumption is the fact that it is acquired by onerous title through labor, industry, or other valuable considerations, such as payment or money.
CASE DIGEST: Villanueva vs. International Appellate Court et. al. I G.R. No. 74577 |  December 4, 1990 | NARVASA, J.
FACTS:
Lot 13 was inherited by Modesto and Frederico Aranas from their parents, Nicolasa Bunsa and Graciano Aranas. Said lot was split up into two parts, one for the north and the other for the south (Lot 13-C), and given to Modesto and Frederico, respectively. The names of Modesto's two illegitimate children are Teodoro C. Aranas and Dorothea Aranas Ado. These two obtained a P18,000.00 loan from Jeusu Bernas, which was backed by Lot 13-C. The siblings and Bernas signed a Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage in which they declared themselves to be the only owners of Lot 13. As witnesses, Raymundo Aranas and Consolacion Villanueva signed the paperwork. In their complaint against Bernas, Villanueva and Aranas claimed that they should be recognized as co-owners of the land because Victoria Comorro's will left all of her "interests, rights and properties, real and personal, x x as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas x x." In contrast, Modesto Aranas' will left Dorothea and Teodoro all of his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria, "as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage with his said wife.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Victoria Camorro's last will and testament grants Consolacion Villanueva any ownership or rights to Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon.
RULING:
No, Consolacion Villanueva has no rights relating to Lot 13-C and its improvements. Comorro and Aranas' conjugal partnership property did not include Lot 13-C. It was the latter's personal, private property, registered only in his name and inherited from his parents. Whether he acquired the property after he married Comorroo is irrelevant because Article 148 of the Civil Code states that among other things, "that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own" and "that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title" are considered to be among the spouses' exclusive property. This is the situation with Modesto's purchase of Lot 13-C. Comorro never acquired anything from her husband, as evidenced by the fact that she passed just two years before Aranas. In order to establish whether an improvement is the property of the married couple as a whole or of each spouse individually, documentation regarding the date of construction and the source of funding is required in order to make a claim for the improvements made thereon. Villanueva did not provide any such evidence.
Source:
Family Code of the Philippines (2022); Judge Ed Vincent S. Albano , Ed Vincent A. Albano, Jr.
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1987/07/06/executive-order-no-209-s-1987/
https://chanrobles.com/cralaw/1990decemberdecisions.php?id=2834
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princessjoyvibora · 1 year
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CASE DIGEST: CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC v. CAPOTE
As cited in Chapter 3, Article 176 of Title I of Family Code of the Philippines
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC v. CAPOTE (G.R. No. 157043) February 2, 2007 FACTS Trinidad Capote is the legal guardian of Giovanni N. Gallamaso. In 1998, she filed a petition for the change of name under Rule 103 of her then 16-year-old ward to Giovanni Nadores. Note that Giovanni is an illegitimate child born in 1982 to his mother Corazon Nadores, and father Diosdado Gallamaso, who never recognized nor supported him. The petition to change Giovanni's name to adopt the surname of his mother is to facilitate the processing of his visa to US where his mother was residing. RTC granted the petition. OSG appealed the case to CA, arguing that the proceedings at the RTC were never adversarial as they should have been, considering the non-joinder of indispensable parties. CA affirmed the ruling of RTC.  RULING The Supreme Court affirmed the CA ruling. Even prior to the enactment of the Family Code in 1988, the Civil Code in effect at the time of Giovanni's birth in 1982 provides that "a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent." Because there was no indication that Giovanni was even acknowledged by his father, the SC noted that he should have had the surname of his mother as his own surname. The SC held that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. On OSG's contention that the proceedings at the RTC were not adversarial as prescribed by Rule 103, the SC held the contrary. In fact, the SC said that the proceedings at the RTC were adversarial because Capote complied with the requirement to publish the petition in a newspaper of general circulation, sufficiently informing the public about her petition. Most importantly, OSG was given the opportunity to object to the ex parte presentation of evidence by Capote, but OSG chose not to. The SC underscored that a proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
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juztize · 4 months
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Case Digest - Article 15 (NCC)
G. R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, Petitioner vs. HON. MANUEL V. RAMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CXV, Regional Trial Court National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON, Respondents
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seek to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
Petitioner Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that thy were married in Hongkong in 1972; that after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada with Theodore Van Dorn.
That on June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against her before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, Pasay City, asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business known as Galleon Shop, Ermita, Manila, which Upton alleged to be a conjugal property.
That petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from claiming the alleged conjugal property because their marriage has already been divorced. Upton, for his part asserts that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared national policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Divorce issued by Nevada Court is recognized by the Philippine laws and is thus valid.
HELD:
YES. The divorce is recognized by the Philippine Laws and it is valid.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizen of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Only Filipino citizens are covered by the policy against absolute divorce, as it is considered contrary to the concept of public policy and morality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided that they are valid according to their National Law.
In this sense, the Philippine laws recognize the validity of the Nevada divorce since the respondent is an American citizen, private respondent bound by the decision of his own country’s Court which validly exercised jurisdiction over him.
Therefore, private respondent cannot sue petitioner and claim on the alleged conjugal property, as the former is no longer the husband of the latter.
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juliusceazarramos · 1 year
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CASE DIGEST : Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, et.al
Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, et.al
G.R. No. 97906 | May 21, 1992
Justice Regalado
Family Code:
ARTICLE 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court in Special Case No. 5934 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community.
The matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr, was granted. However the Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.
Ruling:
Yes. A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion.
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
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