#2017 turkish constitutional referendum

[mariacallous]

Can elections remove an autocrat like Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from power? If you pose this question to Turkey watchers in Western capitals to get their take on the country’s upcoming election, you will get a resounding “no” from a significant number of them. Some will say Erdogan is still very popular—or at least adept at mobilizing his followers. Others will argue that elections do not matter in the entrenched autocracy he has built; one way or another, he will find a way to stay in power. Take the Western conventional wisdom about this Sunday’s election with a grain of salt, and here’s why.

Erdogan is indeed a popular leader. He commands somewhere between 40 percent and 45 percent support, no small feat after 20 years in power. But he is not nearly as popular as he once was. In the 2018 presidential election, Erdogan captured 52 percent of the vote, or some 26 million votes. Several factors worked in his favor then. The elections were held just two years after the failed 2016 coup and its “rally-around-the-leader” effect. Erdogan was riding high on a wave of nationalism after the Turkish military intervened in the Syrian civil war to fight the Syrian Kurds. The country was not suffering from a major economic crisis like today. The opposition was fractured: The popular Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) co-chair Selahattin Demirtas, Iyi Party leader Meral Aksener, Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate Muharrem Ince, and Felicity Party leader Temel Karamollaoglu were each on the ballot running separately against Erdogan. The nationalist base was more unified, with the majority still backing Erdogan; the nationalist breakaway Iyi Party had been established too recently to draw away much of the vote.

Fast-forward to 2023. To win the election, Erdogan has to capture more than the 26 million votes he secured in 2018 because Turkey’s voting population has grown. His problem is that he faces a dramatically different political context that makes that task very difficult. The failed coup’s rally-around-the-leader effect is long gone. The wave of nationalism that Erdogan once rode has come back to haunt him: There is now a growing nationalist opposition to Erdogan, with several nationalist parties peeling away votes from his far-right ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The Turkish economy has plunged into a major crisis, with runaway double-digit inflation and soaring food prices. Most importantly, the opposition is more united than it has ever been: Six parties have come together under the Nation Alliance banner and a single presidential candidate, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, with additional backing from the pro-Kurdish HDP. Altogether, Kilicdaroglu commands 50.9 percent of the vote, according to the latest poll.

Skeptics might say that these arguments and poll numbers would only be relevant if Turkey were a democracy and add that Erdogan has so much to lose that he would do anything to secure victory. They have a point. It is easy to be cynical about elections in a country run by an entrenched autocrat who has demonstrably manipulated previous votes and refused to accept the results when they haven’t gone his way. In the June 2015 parliamentary elections, Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its parliamentary majority. Erdogan stalled talks between the AKP and the CHP about forming a coalition government and forced new elections. He renewed the fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party to reverse his party’s defeat in new elections held that November. In 2017, Turkey held a controversial constitutional referendum to switch to an executive presidency that would grant Erdogan unprecedented powers. The referendum, which Erdogan won by a narrow margin, was marred by widespread allegations of fraud. In both the parliamentary elections and referendum, the opposition was not organized enough to protect the ballot or challenge Erdogan’s efforts to create a fait accompli.

In 2019, however, things changed. Erdogan’s party lost almost all of Turkey’s major cities in municipal elections. Particularly frustrating for Erdogan was the loss of Istanbul, the financial capital where he had launched his political career. Erdogan did not accept the opposition’s narrow win in Istanbul and called for a rerun. When the election was run again, the ruling party lost by a much bigger margin. Erdogan abusing his power to deny the election result had the effect of mobilizing the opposition.

What does this tell us about elections in Turkey? That they are popular and fraud is not, making heavy-handed election fraud risky for Erdogan. The 2019 elections made something else clear, too. When the opposition parties get their act together, they can beat Erdogan at the ballot box. Skeptics might point out that the stakes are much higher for Erdogan in the upcoming vote than they were in the 2019 municipal elections and that he will not accept defeat gracefully. They are not entirely wrong. In personalist autocracies like Turkey, rulers who lose power are likely to end up in jail or exile, so they risk everything to cling to power.

What are Erdogan’s options in a scenario where he loses the vote by a small margin? He might declare that the election was stolen and ask the Turkish bureaucracy to back him up. That Turkey’s top electoral body and security bureaucracy will heed his call is not a foregone conclusion, however. A recent decision by the electoral watchdog to turn down a request for voter data from the Erdogan government, part of an effort to create a new online election monitoring system, is a case in point. In March, the Constitutional Court ignored Erdogan’s objections when it reversed a previous decision to block the HDP from receiving allocated state funding to finance its electoral campaign over its alleged ties to militant groups. These and other decisions by key state institutions suggest that Turkish bureaucrats are hedging their bets. They are unlikely to back Erdogan after an election loss and risk legal repercussions under the new government.

Similarly, opposition supporters optimistic about finally beating Erdogan would be more likely to take to the streets if they think the election was rigged or its outcome denied.

A smarter option for Erdogan would be to accept the result and wait for the new government to fail. He still has a strong following he can mobilize for this purpose. Given the enormous economic problems an inexperienced new government would have to address, surging back through democratic means is not impossible—especially if the current opposition makes good on its pledge of switching to a reformed parliamentary system, which would open a path for Erdogan to return to power as prime minister.

Finally, one might expect Erdogan to fight tooth and nail to stay in power in order to avoid facing trial. But according to Turkish law, an indictment would have to be approved by two-thirds of parliament, a supermajority that would be very difficult to achieve—not least because the opposition includes former key Erdogan allies who might get sucked into any investigation, an outcome the opposition will likely want to avoid. The fact that a trial and potential jail time are unlikely makes it easier for Erdogan to accept defeat.

All of this is to say that not all autocracies are created equal; Turkey is neither Russia nor China. In some, elections matter more than in others, and strongmen are weaker than they seem.

[metafinancies1]

What Impact Has Erdogan Had On Turkey's Democratic Institutions?

The story of Turkey's democratic institutions is one marked by periods of progress and moments of tension.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has been a dominant figure in Turkish politics for over two decades, has played a pivotal role in shaping the country's democratic landscape.

In this blog, we will explore the multifaceted impact Erdogan has had on Turkey's democratic institutions, examining both the advancements and the challenges they have faced under his leadership.

Early Promise of Reform

When Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) first came to power in 2002, it brought with it a sense of optimism for democratic reforms.

The AKP positioned itself as a moderate Islamist party with a pro-European Union stance, promising greater civil liberties and political openness.

In the early years, Turkey made significant strides in democratization, including constitutional changes and a more open public discourse.

Constitutional Reforms

One of the most significant impacts of Erdogan's tenure has been the constitutional reforms that took place during his leadership.

In 2010, a referendum approved a series of changes aimed at democratizing the constitution.

However, as time went on, some critics argued that these changes actually concentrated more power in the executive branch, including the presidency, and weakened checks and balances.

Erosion of Civil Liberties

Erdogan's presidency has been marked by increasing concerns about the erosion of civil liberties.

Critics point to a growing intolerance for dissent, restrictions on freedom of speech, and the suppression of independent media.

High-profile cases involving journalists and academics have drawn international attention and raised questions about the state of free expression in Turkey.

Crackdown on Opposition

Another contentious issue is the government's crackdown on political opposition.

Erdogan's administration has taken legal actions against various political opponents, including the detention and imprisonment of political figures, such as the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) members.

These actions have raised concerns about the fairness and impartiality of the justice system.

State of Emergency and Executive Powers

In the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in 2016, Turkey declared a state of emergency, which lasted for two years.

During this period, there were widespread arrests and dismissals of individuals accused of being linked to the coup.

While there was a need to address the coup attempt, critics argue that the state of emergency led to an overreach of executive powers and human rights abuses.

Shift Towards a Presidential System

Perhaps the most significant change to Turkey's democratic institutions during Erdogan's presidency has been the shift towards a presidential system.

In a 2017 referendum, voters narrowly approved constitutional changes that expanded the powers of the presidency.

This transformation has centralized authority and changed the balance of power within the government.

Challenges to the Independence of the Judiciary

Concerns have also been raised about the independence of the judiciary in Turkey.

Critics argue that the government has exerted influence over the judiciary through appointments and removals, potentially compromising its ability to serve as an impartial check on government actions.

Conclusion

The impact of Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Turkey's democratic institutions is complex and multifaceted.

While his early years in power were marked by promises of reform and democratization, his tenure has also seen a series of challenges to democratic norms and institutions.

The concentration of power in the executive branch, erosion of civil liberties, and a crackdown on political opposition have raised concerns both domestically and internationally.

Turkey's democratic journey continues to evolve under Erdogan's leadership, and the debate over the state of democracy in the country remains a topic of intense discussion.

As Turkey navigates its path forward, it faces the challenge of reconciling the principles of democracy with the realities of its political landscape, making it a critical issue to watch in the years to come.

#ErdoganEffect #TurkeyDemocracy #DemocraticInstitutions #PoliticalTransition #TurkishPolitics #DemocracyChallenges #ErdoganEra #RuleOfLaw #CivilRights #DemocraticValues

[nicapachi]

RIP democracy in Turkey

#turkish constitutional referendum #2017 #rip democracy #erdogan #recep tayyip erdoğan #apk

[uncensoredmagazine-blog]

Should There Be An Independent Kurdish State?

Who can blame the Iraqi Kurds for wishing to establish a separate and autonomous state for themselves? Definitely no Iraqi who still cares to remember the murderous history of Saddam Hussein's Anfal genocide and Halabja massacre of the Kurdish population, predicated on a long history of denying their identity.[1]    

The Kurdish People have their own culture, own freedoms and have all the elements of a nation, but the question is statehood, meaning operating with sovereignty. They have access to oil - which could improve poverty and bad infrastructure in Turkish and Iranian Kurdistan. They have already accomplished so much without their own government or country and their objective is to create a free nation where women and ethnic minorities would be treated with equality.

Yet, due to the current borders of the Middle East, which have been imposed by European colonial powers post-WWI to pursue their own interests, the Kurdish people have had little success toward independence, until recently. The cause of Kurdish separatism in any country where Kurds currently live is of course perfectly understandable, but it is alas no cause for celebration in a region already plagued with ethnic nationalism of multiple vintages. The partition and dismantling of four sovereign states: Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran, to carve an autonomous Kurdistan is as much disastrous for the entirety of the region as for the Kurds remaining within these states and is enormously consequential for the eventual resurrection of multiple other nations.[2]

 The borders drawn up in Middle East were a disastrous attempt to impose western colonialism and a western state model upon a vast heterogeneous population, where no single religion or ethnic group made up more than 50% of the population. It just so happens that the Kurdish people had been dragged into all this mess. The Kurdish people have faced discrimination, genocide and the denial of basic cultural and political rights at the hands of their occupiers, all accompanied by the Sykes-Picot agreement.[3]

So, how is it possible that one of the oldest civilizations in the world weren’t given their own autonomous state? Geographically, most Importantly is the country of Iraq, at first the French and the Americans post-WW1 denied British interests in the annexation of The Vilayet of Mosul (Modern Day Northern Iraq), both hoping for the creation of a Kurdish independent state. However, The Vilayet of Mosul was not only possessing an abundance of Kurds, but revealed to be rich in oil. American and French protests did not prevail once Great Britain offered the French 25% and the Americans 10% of the stocks of what would become the North Oil Company (NOC). The Kurds were basically sold out by the Sykes-Picot agreement (1923) between the UK and France, forcefully separating the Kurds between four countries. What could have been one of the most influential turning points in Kurdish history, instantly turned into a hellish nightmare, a nightmare where the Kurds became an instant target for the exploitation of their land for oil interests.[4]

After a few decades, the Iraqi regime controlled by Saddam, changed governorate boundaries in 1958, thus, pushing Kurdish people further north of Iraq, and in a way gradually separating them from their oil rich lands in the Vilayet of Mosul. After decades of violence conducted by the Iraqi regime through the genocide of approximately over 200,000 Kurdish people known as Saddam's Anfal/Arabization campaign and the retaliation of Kurdish "rebels", the Iraqi government granted the Kurdish people autonomy in 1992 by Saddam. However, they only received autonomy over the Kurdish speaking areas which didn't have any oil. In the last 10 years, the KRG government (the Kurdistan regional government) tried, unsuccessfully, to get what is rightfully theirs.

Today, In respect to regaining the Kurdish Homeland, ISIS has been a gift from heaven as the Kurds are now controlling huge swaths of territory of Northern Syria and Northern Iraq, gaining what is rightfully theirs and what the Arabs would have never given them. With territory in this region of the Middle East, comes oil, and with oil, fear has risen within the Iraqi government of a possible Kurdish independence. With oil profits to fuel a bid for independence, the Iraqi government has threatened to sue any country or company that buys Kurdish oil, and has cut off national funding for the Kurdish region.

Although Iraq has the right to impose Iraqi law, the Kurds have kept pumping oil anyway, betting that their American allies, who have pressured them to abide by the Iraqi oil law, will soften their stance, and that buyers will come forward. But as oil prices have plummeted within the last year due to less reliance on oil in western countries, and as Iraq and the United States have refused to budge, the odds are getting less in favor by the day.

For now, Kurdish officials are determined, from a long-term perspective, on the confrontation; despite its high cost at a time when the government is all but broke. They believe that, eventually, the oil glut will end and that international buyers will need Kurdish crude and support their nationalist aspirations. Also, Kurdish credibility over the years has risen in Syria. The Kurds created their own constitution in 2014 and the YPG Kurdish fighting force has become a major ally of the United States in its campaign against the Islamic State in Syria. I believe there will be a silver lining out of the many deaths and sacrifices during the ISIS occupation of Iraq and Syria, at least for the Kurdish people.[5]

On another note, Israel has been the only nation to support the Kurdish secession from Iraq, even celebrating the outcome of the September 25th, 2017, referendum, in which an overwhelming majority of Iraqi Kurds voted for breaking away from Baghdad. Israeli enthusiasm for Kurdish independence has little to do with compassion for the Kurds, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, and more to do with geopolitical interests.[6] In fact, it is beyond ironic for Israel, a nation founded and sustained on brutal military occupation and apartheid, to champion freedom for the Kurds or any group of people in the world. Israel has never supported any other national liberation movement in its history. Israel's support for an independent Kurdish state is solely motivated by geopolitical reasons. Israel wants to secure the flow of oil supplies from the Kurdish Autonomous Region, but more importantly, it wants to build a pro-Israeli entity that cuts through the Arab World. So in contrast to the rejected referendum vote, Israeli influence in the region might be the answer for these stateless people. A bittersweet victory for the kurds having to side with the Israeli government.[7]  

  Israel already imports 77 percent of its oil supplies from Iraq's Kurdish region. These imports are extremely vital for the Israeli territory, as it does not have access to the natural resources of oil-rich Gulf states. Also, Israel believes that an independent Kurdish state can serve as a potential foothold for the Israeli military and intelligence, giving the country leverage against Iran, Syria and Iraq. The creation of an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East fits perfectly into Oded’s 1982 plan for the Middle East, which advocated the split up of the Arab World along ethnic and sectarian lines to strengthen Israel and expand its hegemony.[8]

The Israeli backing of the Kurdish secession from Iraq is further igniting Arabs' suspicions that such a move would be a concrete step towards the disintegration of the Arab World, something that could trigger clashes and even wars.  

Israel perceives a future Kurdish state as a potential non-Arab ally in the region an ally that is not directly affected by the Palestinian cause. Since its inception, Israel has followed the "alliance of the peripheries"[9] strategy, conceived by its first Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, to strengthen Israel's ties with non-Arab Muslim states or groups in the region, in order to break the isolation of the Israeli territory.

As part of this doctrine, Israel reached out to Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, the father of current Kurdish President Masoud Barzani, several times throughout his time in office. As a result of these efforts, Mustafa Barzani visited Israel twice, once in 1968 and once in 1973. Yet, these efforts did not amount to much. Kurds did not show any strong support for Israel or animosity towards the Palestinians.

Since then Israel has succeeded, with the help of Kurdish leaders like President Masoud Barzani, to infiltrate Kurdish society and end a once strong Kurdish association with the Palestinian cause.[10]

There is no doubt that the tyranny of the Arab states and their failure to adequately deal with Kurdish rights pushed new generations of Kurds away from the Arab World and into the lap of Israel.  As Iraq plummeted into sectarian violence and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant group started its campaign of terror, rape and grisly atrocities, a new fault line between the Kurds and the rest of the Arab world has emerged.

But the two main turning points in Kurdish-Arab relations were the 1991 Western-imposed no-fly zone that went beyond protecting the Kurdish population into tearing the Kurdish region from Iraq and the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. The catastrophic invasion triggered internal strife that further alienated the Kurds from the rest of the country and allowed for increased Israeli presence in the area.[11]

[1] Who are the Kurds? (2017, October 31). Retrieved December 06, 2017

[2] Who are the Kurds? (2017, October 31). Retrieved December 06, 2017

[3] Gelvin, J. L. (2016). The modern Middle East: a history. New York: Oxford University Press

 [4] Gelvin, J. L. (2016). The modern Middle East: a history. New York: Oxford University Press

 [5] Gelvin, J. L. (2016). The modern Middle East: a history. New York: Oxford University Press

 [6] Lee, Ian. “Why Israel Supports an Independent Iraqi Kurdistan.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Oct. 2017

 [7] Lee, Ian. “Why Israel Supports an Independent Iraqi Kurdistan.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Oct. 2017

 [8] Lee, Ian. “Why Israel Supports an Independent Iraqi Kurdistan.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Oct. 2017

 [9] Lee, Ian. “Why Israel Supports an Independent Iraqi Kurdistan.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Oct. 2017

 [10] Lee, Ian. “Why Israel Supports an Independent Iraqi Kurdistan.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 Oct. 2017

 [11] Gelvin, J. L. (2016). The modern Middle East: a history. New York: Oxford University Press

[antoine-roquentin]

The world’s biggest financial crash in the 21st century turned into then Eurozone crisis by 2010. In these years, the policy response by the Central Banks of the core capitalist countries helped periphery achieve high rates of growth. The capital inflows initiated a short-lived economic boom in Turkey and the country was the second fastest growing one in the world, following China during 2010-11. The AKP governments benefited from cheap credit period until 2013 and strived to spread further the financial modes of calculation among its electorate.[1]

A low interest rate policy was key to the neoliberal populist model of Erdoğan. Its limits were first tested with the end of Fed’s quantitative easing that marked the end of the capital bonanza. As economic growth slowed after 2013, throwing into question the model of neoliberal populism, the agenda of AKP shifted towards a new model with developmentalist elements.[2] The idea of transition to a presidential regime was put on hold, as economic policy makers started putting more effort in devising alternative mechanisms for finance and hybrid development strategies. Policy makers underlined the need to deepen Islamic bond markets and draw in the savings of households to the financial sector, by enabling the creation of new investment instruments. Islamic think tanks questioned central bank independence and targeted central bank’s sole objective of providing price stability. Accordingly, consultants of then Prime Minister (and President from 2014 onwards) Erdogan and policy makers wanted to create deepened financial markets to help corporations with financing problems on the one hand and devised strategic incentives to key sectors producing intermediary goods in order to minimize current account deficit, on the other hand. This brand of import substitution lacked a detailed plan, but the idea behind the industrial policy by the AKP governments was related to enabling high value added production and minimizing import dependency in key sector. These attempts however, did not structurally transform the economy in a few years.

Thus, the recovery of advanced capitalist countries pushed Turkish authorities to pursue new bottles for putting their old wine. The tightening of financial conditions for periphery would make it harder for the Turkish firms to find cheap sources of finance. We see that the similar concerns are now voiced over the emerging market contagion, though the exposure to dollar drain by many peripheral countries are more manageable than Turkey.

One narrative of the Turkish crisis attributes the chaos in the currency markets to the “one man rule” consolidated last year. Accordingly, Erdoğan’s grasp of absolute power, symbolized by the 2017 constitutional referendum and his electoral success in 2018 elections, made Turkey rely on one man’s decisions and skirmishes. New presidential powers of the President inevitably made things worse, suffering from democratic retrenchment during the state of emergency. The spat with Trump is well located in this narrative, as a final episode.

The mirror image of the dissident argument is voiced by the Islamo-fascist cadres. Using the escalation of tensions with the U.S. as an alibi, these policymakers portray the recent crisis as an extension of the “economic war” launched by the West. Otherwise, it is suggested Turkey is on its glorious path to become a leading economy in not only her region but also on the global stage.

Neither perspective underlines the impact of recent economic measures upon the Turkish turbulence. Since 2013, the Turkish economy has faced a bottleneck, which paralysed the top level AKP cadres. As we mentioned above, current account deficit continued to grow and the level of financial deepening was not enough to overcome the dependency of the economy to capital inflows for new investment as well as rolling over debt. The 2016 coup attempt and the contraction of the economy in the third quarter of the year added insult to the injury.

This bottleneck can be resumed as follows: attracting capital inflows requires increasing interest rates. This however would stifle domestic demand in medium term as well as result in economic activities further losing pace. One, albeit limited response, was the state-sponsored credit expansion of 2016-17. In turn, falling interest rates would provide an incentive for domestic consumption, but it will result in further depreciation of Lira. Depreciation of TL would also mean increased burden for corporations heavily indebted in foreign exchange. Thus, this bottleneck has also been a manifestation of a deep-rooted crisis of capital accumulation regime of Turkey.

The cost of postponing interest rate adjustment and renewing state sponsored credit expansion became much more notable in 2018, when TL continued to depreciate despite a 5 per cent interest rate hike (see Figure). The FX liabilities of the real sector reached 339 billion USD by May 2018. Before the elections in June 2018, current account deficit to the GDP ratio exceeded 6 per cent and the money needed to rollover private and public sector debt for the coming 12 months surpassed 180 billion USD. The desperate search for new funds did not yield any result and the portfolio flows financing the deficit economy of Turkey lost pace by 2018.

Turkish Lira gained some ground in the third week of August but the level of depreciation against USD from the 6th of August to the 14th was above 25 per cent. Stagflation is ahead and thousands of firm will go bankrupt as the FX liabilities cannot be managed against the backdrop of this depreciation.

We believe that the capital accumulation regime in Turkey, which benefited from capital inflows in 2002-07 and 2010-13 came to a definite end in 2018. AKP was successful in managing the ensuing social tensions by resorting to increasingly authoritarian techniques. By suppressing labour organizations, deferring strikes, assuming partial costs of the newly employed staff in particular and intervening into the economy via bypassing the parliament in general, policy makers served the major business groups as well as the SMEs under the state of emergency (July 2016 to July 2018). It seems that they can no longer go on as they used to.

Entertaining new-developmentalist ideas in the post-2013 era, such as selective incentives to the sectors producing intermediary goods did not result in a detailed road map for overcoming the crisis, which was then at the doorsteps. Since rapid growth continued thanks to capital inflows and the construction sector did not lose its steam, the policy makers relied on doing more of the same. It is partly because of the fact that the collapse of the economy in late 2008 was managed easily; the top level economic managers do not have a model or economic package for the coming months. They seem to rely on the regime’s tools to suppress mass discontent, praying that foreign capital will flow into wage-suppressed sectors and Turkish corporations will take huge steps in due course to produce technology intensive products. Keeping fingers crossed, however, will not be sufficient to have an easy access to a new path of prosperity and high economic growth.

In a nut shell, the recent currency crisis of Turkey clearly shows that Erdoğan government is at a crossroads now. Erdogan may choose the ‘more of the same’ option and implement a standard IMF type stabilization programme that has been demanded by the dominant capital fraction in the ruling block. This option requires elimination of the most ‘zombie firms’ that were bailed out by the government after 2016 contraction. Of course, it will come with a huge political cost in the wake of the local election that will be held in March 2019.

Alternatively, Erdoğan may follow a new-developmentalist framework and initiate a kind of import substitution industrialization strategy. We should underline that there is no clear blueprint or a concise plan for a new-developmentalist project, although there are some initial attempts and ad hoc initiatives of various ministries. A full-fledged transition to a new developmentalist path would require a more substantial change in the ruling block against the interest of currently dominant fraction of capital, and a change in the mode of integration of the Turkish economy in financialised globalisation which may necessitate to impose capital controls.

Thus, Turkey’s current problems are far more complicated than the increasing interest rates or Erdoğan’s ideological approach as suggested by the international media outlets. The currency crisis now set the country as a stage for further socioeconomic turbulences. The opposition in Turkey has to struggle not only against Erdogan’s authoritarian populist rule, but also technocratic neoliberal authoritarianism, creeping in IMF’s structural reform suggestions.

[brookstonalmanac]

Events 12.11

220 – Emperor Xian of Han is forced to abdicate the throne by Cao Cao 's son Cao Pi, ending the Han dynasty. 361 – Julian enters Constantinople as sole Emperor of the Roman Empire. 861 – Assassination of the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil by the Turkish guard, who raise al-Muntasir to the throne. Start of the "Anarchy at Samarra". 969 – Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas is assassinated by his wife Theophano and her lover, the later Emperor John I Tzimiskes. 1282 – Battle of Orewin Bridge: Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the last native Prince of Wales, is killed at Cilmeri, near Builth Wells, in mid-Wales. 1602 – A surprise attack by forces under the command of Charles Emmanuel I, Duke of Savoy, and his brother-in-law, Philip III of Spain, is repelled by the citizens of Geneva. (Commemorated annually by the Fête de l'Escalade.) 1675 – Antonio de Vea expedition enters San Rafael Lake in western Patagonia. 1688 – Glorious Revolution: James II of England, while trying to flee to France, throws the Great Seal of the Realm into the River Thames. 1792 – French Revolution: King Louis XVI of France is put on trial for treason by the National Convention. 1815 – The U.S. Senate creates a select committee on finance and a uniform national currency, predecessor of the United States Senate Committee on Finance. 1816 – Indiana becomes the 19th U.S. state. 1868 – Paraguayan War: Brazilian troops defeat Paraguayan at the Battle of Avay. 1899 – Second Boer War: In the Battle of Magersfontein the Boers commanded by general Piet Cronjé inflict a defeat on the forces of the British Empire commanded by Lord Methuen trying to relieve the Siege of Kimberley. 1905 – A workers' uprising occurs in Kyiv, Ukraine (then part of the Russian Empire), and establishes the Shuliavka Republic. 1907 – The New Zealand Parliament Buildings are almost completely destroyed by fire. 1917 – World War I: British General Edmund Allenby enters Jerusalem on foot and declares martial law. 1920 – Irish War of Independence: In retaliation for a recent IRA ambush, British forces burn and loot numerous buildings in Cork city. Many civilians report being beaten, shot at, robbed and verbally abused by British forces. 1925 – Roman Catholic papal encyclical Quas primas introduces the Feast of Christ the King. 1927 – Guangzhou Uprising: Communist Red Guards launch an uprising in Guangzhou, China, taking over most of the city and announcing the formation of a Guangzhou Soviet. 1931 – Statute of Westminster 1931: The British Parliament establishes legislative equality between the UK and the Dominions of the Commonwealth—Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland. 1934 – Bill Wilson, co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous, takes his last drink and enters treatment for the final time. 1936 – Abdication Crisis: Edward VIII's abdication as King of the United Kingdom and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, and Emperor of India, becomes effective. 1937 – Second Italo-Ethiopian War: Italy leaves the League of Nations. 1941 – World War II: Germany and Italy declare war on the United States, following the Americans' declaration of war on the Empire of Japan in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States, in turn, declares war on them. 1941 – World War II: Poland declares war on the Empire of Japan. 1941 – World War II: The Imperial Japanese Navy suffers its first loss of surface vessels during the Battle of Wake Island. 1946 – The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) is established. 1948 – Arab–Israeli War: The United Nations passes General Assembly Resolution 194, creating a Conciliation Commission to mediate the conflict. 1958 – French Upper Volta and French Dahomey gain self-government from France, becoming the Republic of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and the Republic of Dahomey (now Benin), respectively, and joining the French Community. 1960 – French forces crack down in a violent clash with protesters in French Algeria during a visit by French President Charles de Gaulle. 1962 – Arthur Lucas, convicted of murder, is the last person to be executed in Canada. 1964 – Che Guevara speaks at the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. 1972 – Apollo 17 becomes the sixth and final Apollo mission to land on the Moon. 1978 – The Lufthansa heist is committed by a group led by Lucchese family associate Jimmy Burke. It was the largest cash robbery ever committed on American soil, at that time. 1980 – The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund) is enacted by the U.S. Congress. 1981 – El Mozote massacre: Armed forces in El Salvador kill an estimated 900 civilians in an anti-guerrilla campaign during the Salvadoran Civil War. 1990 – Demonstrations by students and workers across Albania begin, which eventually trigger the fall of communism in Albania. 1994 – First Chechen War: Russian President Boris Yeltsin orders Russian troops into Chechnya. 1994 – A bomb explodes on Philippine Airlines Flight 434, en route from Manila, Philippines, to Tokyo, Japan, killing one. The captain is able to land the plane safely. 1997 – The Kyoto Protocol opens for signature. 1998 – Thai Airways Flight 261 crashes near Surat Thani Airport, killing 101. The pilot flying the Airbus A310-200 is thought to have suffered spatial disorientation. 1999 – SATA Air A��ores Flight 530M crashes into Pico da Esperança on São Jorge Island in the Azores, killing 35. 2001 – China joins the World Trade Organization (WTO). 2005 – The Buncefield Oil Depot catches fire in Hemel Hempstead, England. 2005 – Cronulla riots: Thousands of White Australians demonstrate against ethnic violence resulting in a riot against anyone thought to be Lebanese in Cronulla, New South Wales; these are followed up by retaliatory ethnic attacks on Cronulla. 2006 – The International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust is opened in Tehran, Iran, by then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; nations such as Israel and the United States express concern. 2006 – Felipe Calderón, the President of Mexico, launches a military-led offensive to put down the drug cartel violence in the state of Michoacán. This effort is often regarded as the first event in the Mexican Drug War. 2007 – Insurgency in the Maghreb: Two car bombs explode in Algiers, Algeria, one near the Supreme Constitutional Court and the other near the offices of the United Nations. 2008 – Bernard Madoff is arrested and charged with securities fraud in a $50 billion Ponzi scheme. 2012 – At least 125 people are killed and up to 200 injured in bombings in the Alawite village of Aqrab, Syria. 2017 – New York City attempted bombing: A pipe bomb partially detonates in the New York City Subway, in the Times Square–42nd Street/Port Authority Bus Terminal. Four people are injured, including the perpetrator. 2019 – The results of the 2019 Bougainvillean independence referendum are announced. The results are overwhelmingly one-sided. Over 98% of voters vote for Bougainville's independence.

#Events

[tumbirus]

Hagia Sophia and Mr:Erdogans political drama in Turkish? A part of Mr:Erdogan's conservative Islamist base had been agitating for converting Hagia Sophia into a mosque ever since his party come to power in2002 .But Mr:Erdogan had ignored the demand as long as the Turkish economy was booming under his leadership and he was receiving credit for dismantling the miltry dominated authoritarian power structure the justice and Development party (AKP) had inherited from its secular Kemalist predecessors. All this changed after his re_election for second time in 2011 and especially from 2013 when the Gezipark protest against the governments decision to change the character of iconic Taksim Square in Istanbul building a mosque and installing ottoman _style buildings brought large numbers of protesters onto the streets. Mr:Erdogan's decision to change the established parliamentary system to a presidential one passed by thin majority of 51% to 49% in referendum in 2017.This was an indication of how the wind was blowing.Mr:Erdogan did win the presidential election held under the new system in2018,gaining over52%of the votes.However, in the simultaneously, the ruling AKP received only 42% of the votes,down from 49% in the previous elections. The figures do not bode well for Mr:Erdogan for next round of presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled in 2023.Mr:Erdogan's authoritarian trails and his disregard for constitutional norms if not the letter of the law(which he constantly rewrites l have been clearly on display since the fails coup of july2016.Thousands of civil servants and academics have been removed from their jobs and many of them imprisoned for their alleged links to the Gulenist movement. In recent years the economy has also taken a nosedive growth dipped to less than 1%in2019.The Turkish lira has fallen to approximately 7to one U.S dollar from a a high of about1.5to one 2011. These figures express the increasing unemployment and economic distress .Much of this the result of economic mismanagement with massive wasteful projects.........continue.. (at मुंबई Mumbai) https://www.instagram.com/p/CC1FcBGFzo_/?igshid=l3wnzt3vsrgq

[newstfionline]

Headlines

Erdogan Says Turkish Operation in Syria’s Afrin to Be Supported by Rebels (Reuters) President Tayyip Erdogan said on Tuesday that Turkey’s planned military operation against Kurdish militia forces in Syria’s Afrin region will be supported by Syrian rebel fighters.

EU ‘Still Open’ to Britain Changing Mind on Brexit (Reuters) Donald Tusk, the European Council president, weighed in to new British debate on whether to hold a second referendum on Brexit by saying on Tuesday that Britons would be welcome to stay in the European Union.

Philippine Lawmakers Start Talks for Switch to Federal System of Government (Reuters) Philippine lower house lawmakers on Tuesday kicked off discussions on possible changes to the 30-year-old constitution, with the aim of shifting to a system of federal government and allowing the president up to two terms in office.

Iran Says Planned U.S.-Backed Force Inside Syria Would Fan War (Reuters) Iran said on Tuesday a new U.S.-backed, 30,000-strong force inside Syria would “fan the flames of war”, echoing the vehement response of Syria, Turkey and Russia to the plan.

Two Killed After Explosion Destroys Buildings in Belgium (Reuters) Two people were killed and 14 injured when an explosion in the Belgian city of Antwerp destroyed three buildings.

Czech PM Babis to Ask Lawmakers to Lift His Parliamentary Immunity (Reuters) Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis said on Tuesday he would ask lawmakers lift his parliamentary immunity to face allegations of EU subsidy fraud.

Bangladesh Agrees With Myanmar to Complete Rohingya Return in Two Years (Reuters) Bangladesh said on Tuesday it would complete the process of returning within two years many of the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims who had fled a conflict in Myanmar, following a meeting of the neighbors.

China’s Xi Tells Trump Hard-Earned Easing of Tensions on Korean Peninsula Must Continue (Reuters) China’s President Xi Jinping told U.S. President Donald Trump in a phone call on Tuesday that the hard-earned easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula must continue, Chinese state media reported.

Prodded by China, Qantas Amends Website References to Taiwan, Other Regions (Reuters) Australia’s Qantas Airways said on Tuesday it had amended its website to no longer refer to Taiwan and Hong Kong as countries, rather than Chinese territories, after China issued a warning to foreign airlines last week.

Glowing Red Lava Causes More to Flee From Philippine Volcano (AP) Glowing-red lava spurted in a fountain and flowed down the Philippines’ most active volcano on Tuesday in a stunning display of its fury that has sent more than 21,000 villagers fleeing to safety and prompted police to set up checkpoints to stop tourists from getting too close.

Sweden to Reissue Cold War Era Booklet on War Threat (AP) Sweden says it will issue an updated version of a Cold War-era civil emergency advice booklet, reflecting Stockholm’s concerns of a worsened security situation in the Baltic Sea region.

Germany: New Asylum Seekers Drop to 186,000 in 2017 (AP) The number of new asylum-seekers registered in Germany dropped significantly last year to some 186,000, according to new government figures released Tuesday.

48 Injured, Mostly Children, in German School Bus Accident (AP) A bus carrying children to school in southern Germany hit multiple cars and then slammed into the side of a building without braking, injuring 48 people early Tuesday, including 10 seriously, police said.

#headlines

[mariacallous]

The joint Turkish opposition, “The table for 6”, on Monday announced a constitutional package for restoring democracy, the rule of law and a parliamentary system in case of an election victory in 2023 against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“We are committed to implementing our ‘Strengthened Parliamentary System Constitutional Amendment Proposal’ with the hope that it will bring peace and tranquillity to all our nation and future generations,” the joint declaration wrote.

The constitutional package comprises 167 articles in nine main topics, primarily aiming to return the country to a parliamentary system of democracy from the current executive presidential system, which Erdogan created in 2017 with a controversial referendum.

“The most problematic part of the current constitution, which infects the entire system, is … the ‘one-man regime,’” Serhan Yucel, secretary general of the DEVA Party, said at the official ceremony.

The package would return the presidency to its previously symbolic role and restore parliament’s powers with strong checks and balances on the government. The current election threshold of 7 per cent would also drop to 3 per cent.

Representatives of the six opposition parties, the main opposition Republican People’s Party, CHP, the İYİ (Good) Party, Felicity Party, Democratic Party, Future Party and DEVA Party, have been working on the constitutional amendment proposal for months.

The so-called Table for 6 was initiated by Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the social democratic CHP, in February. The six parties pledged to work together to end the rule of President Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, AKP, by fielding a joint presidential candidate and proposing a new political system. The move was seen as a major step by political observers.

Amid a high degree of political polarisation and a grim economic crisis, strongman Erdogan faces his greatest challenge in 20 years of rule, lagging behind the opposition in elections polls.

While the exact date of the election is yet not set, polls are expected to take place by the end of June.

[bigyack-com]

Turkey’s Ban on Wikipedia Is Unconstitutional, Court Says

A high court in Turkey ruled on Thursday that the country’s ban on Wikipedia was unconstitutional, dealing a victory to free speech advocates more than two and a half years after the ban was imposed amid a crackdown on access to information.The Turkish Constitutional Court — the highest court that could consider the issue — ruled in favor of Wikipedia after the online encyclopedia’s lawyers argued that the ban violated the right to freedom of expression, which is protected by the Turkish Constitution, according to Stephen LaPorte, the legal director for the Wikimedia Foundation, which runs Wikipedia. The foundation said in a statement Thursday that it hoped “access will be restored in Turkey soon.” A summary of the case was posted on the court’s website. But before the ban is lifted, a full opinion will most likely need to be published, said Yaman Akdeniz, a law professor at Istanbul Bilgi University who had also challenged the ban on Wikipedia.He said he expected the court’s decision on Thursday to be enforced.“We join the people of Turkey, and the millions of readers and volunteers who rely on Wikipedia around the world, to welcome this important recognition for universal access to knowledge,” the foundation said in its statement.The Turkish Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Thursday.The ban was seen as yet another attempt by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to clamp down on freedom of expression. Mr. Erdogan was emboldened after a failed coup attempt in July 2016, embarking on a sweeping purge of Turkish institutions and suspending or firing thousands suspected of being dissidents, including judges and police officers.Turkish voters approved a referendum in April 2017 that gave broad executive powers to Mr. Erdogan, whose government has sentenced dozens of journalists to prison.The same month, Turkey blocked access to Wikipedia after the site refused to remove content that the government found offensive, including references to its relationship with terrorists and Syrian militants. The country said it was banning the site for the protection of public order or national security. Days after the ban was imposed, Wikimedia asked a court to overturn it, Mr. LaPorte said. A court in Ankara ruled against the foundation, so it filed a series of appeals shortly afterward.The foundation also announced in May that it had filed a case challenging the ban with the European Court of Human Rights. A response from Turkey in that case is due in January, the foundation said.Many saw Thursday’s ruling as an attempt from Turkey to pre-empt or blunt a ruling from the European court.“This is to avoid the European court issuing a judgment prior to the Constitutional Court issuing its judgment,” Mr. Akdeniz said. “That would have been detrimental to Turkey.”The ruling on Thursday was not the first time that Turkey’s Constitutional Court had weighed in on bans on popular websites. In 2014, the court determined that bans on both YouTube and Twitter violated freedom of expression.Mr. Akdeniz said Thursday’s ruling was “welcome.” But he said “it’s two and a half years late.”“The Constitutional Court should have given priority to this case,” he said. Read the full article

#1augustnews #247news #5g570newspaper #660closings #702news #8paradesouth #911fox #abc90seconds #adamuzialkodaily #atoactivitystatement #atobenchmarks #atocodes #atocontact #atoportal #atoportaltaxreturn #attnews #bbnews #ban #bbcnews #bbcpresenters #bigcrossword #bigmoney #bigwxiaomi #bloomberg8001zürich #bmbargainsnews #business #business0balancetransfer #business0062 #business0062conestoga #business02

[mideastsoccer]

Turkey and the Kurds: What goes around comes around

By James M. Dorsey

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean and Castbox.

 Turkey, like much of the Middle East, is discovering that what goes around comes around.

Not only because President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to have miscalculated the fallout of what may prove to be a foolhardy intervention in Syria and neglected alternative options that could have strengthened Turkey’s position without sparking the ire of much of the international community.

But also because what could prove to be a strategic error is rooted in a policy of decades of denial of Kurdish identity and suppression of Kurdish cultural and political rights that was more likely than not to fuel conflict rather than encourage societal cohesion.

The policy midwifed the birth in the 1970s to militant groups like the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which only dropped its demand for Kurdish independence in recent years.

The group that has waged a low intensity insurgency that has cost tens of thousands of lives has been declared a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

Turkish refusal to acknowledge the rights of the Kurds, who are believed to account for up to 20 percent of the country’s population traces its roots to the carving of modern Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire by its visionary founder, Mustafa Kemal, widely known as Ataturk, Father of the Turks.

It is entrenched in Mr. Kemal’s declaration in a speech in 1923 to celebrate Turkish independence of “how happy is the one who calls himself a Turk,” an effort to forge a national identity for country that was an ethnic mosaic.

The phrase was incorporated half a century later in Turkey’s student oath and ultimately removed from it in 2013 at a time of peace talks between Turkey and the PKK by then prime minister, now president Erdogan.

It took the influx of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980s and early 1990s as well as the 1991 declaration by the United States, Britain and France of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq that enabled the emergence of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region to spark debate in Turkey about the Kurdish question and prompt the government to refer to Kurds as Kurds rather than mountain Turks.

Ironically, Turkey’s enduring refusal to acknowledge Kurdish rights and its long neglect of development of the pre-dominantly Kurdish southeast of the country fuelled demands for greater rights rather than majority support for Kurdish secession largely despite the emergence of the PKK

Most Turkish Kurds, who could rise to the highest offices in the land s long as they identified as Turks rather than Kurds, resembled Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, whose options were more limited even if they endorsed the notion of a Jewish state.

Nonetheless, both minorities favoured an independent state for their brethren on the other side of the border but did not want to surrender the opportunities that either Turkey or Israel offered them.

The existence for close to three decades of a Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq and a 2017 referendum in which an overwhelming majority voted for Iraqi Kurdish independence, bitterly rejected and ultimately nullified by Iraqi, Turkish and Iranian opposition, did little to fundamentally change Turkish Kurdish attitudes.

If the referendum briefly soured Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish relations, it failed to undermine the basic understanding underlying a relationship that could have guided Turkey’s approach towards the Kurds in Syria even if dealing with Iraqi Kurds may have been easier because, unlike Turkish Kurds, they had not engaged in political violence against Turkey.

The notion that there was no alternative to the Turkish intervention in Syria is further countered by the fact that Turkish PKK negotiations that started in 2012 led a year later to a ceasefire and a boosting of efforts to secure a peaceful resolution.

The talks prompted imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to publish a letter endorsing the ceasefire, the disarmament and withdrawal from Turkey of PKK fighters, and a call for an end to the insurgency. Mr. Ocalan predicted that 2013 would be the year in which the Turkish Kurdish issues would be resolved peacefully.

The PKK's military leader, Cemil Bayik, told the BBC three years later that "we don't want to separate from Turkey and set up a state. We want to live within the borders of Turkey on our own land freely.”

The talks broke down in 2015 against the backdrop of the Syrian war and the rise as a US ally of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State of the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, the People's Protection Units (YPG).

Bitterly opposed to the US-YPG alliance, Turkey demanded that the PKK halt its resumption of attacks on Turkish targets and disarm prior to further negotiations.

Turkey responded to the breakdown and resumption of violence with a brutal crackdown in the southeast of the country and on the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP).

Nonetheless, in a statement issued from prison earlier this year that envisioned an understanding between Turkey and Syrian Kurdish forces believed to be aligned with the PKK, Mr. Ocalan declared that “we believe, with regard to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the problems in Syria should be resolved within the framework of the unity of Syria, based on constitutional guarantees and local democratic perspectives. In this regard, it should be sensitive to Turkey’s concerns.”

Turkey’s emergence as one of Iraqi Kurdistan’s foremost investors and trading partners in exchange for Iraqi Kurdish acquiescence in Turkish countering the PKK’s presence in the region could have provided inspiration for a US-sponsored safe zone in northern Syria that Washington and Ankara had contemplated.

The Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish understanding enabled Turkey  to allow an armed Iraqi Kurdish force to transit Turkish territory in 2014 to help prevent the Islamic State from conquering the Syrian city of Kobani.

A safe zone would have helped “realign the relationship between Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian offshoot… The safe-zone arrangements… envision(ed) drawing down the YPG presence along the border—a good starting point for reining in the PKK, improving U.S. ties with Ankara, and avoiding a potentially destructive Turkish intervention in Syria,” Turkey scholar Sonar Cagaptay suggested in August.

The opportunity that could have created the beginnings of a sustainable solution that would have benefitted Turkey as well as the Kurds fell by the wayside with Mr. Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from northern Syria.

In many ways, Mr. Erdogan’s decision to opt for a military solution fits the mould of a critical mass of world leaders who look at the world through a civilizational prism and often view national borders in relative terms.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin pointed the way with his 2008 intervention in Georgia and the annexation in 2014 of Crimea as well as Russia’s stirring of pro-Russian insurgencies in two regions of Ukraine.

Mr. Erdogan appears to believe that if Mr. Putin can pull it off, so can he.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture

#turkey #erdogan #syria #kurds #Russia #Vladimir Putin #putin

[armenianassembly]

California Representatives Send Letter to State Senate Urging Passage of Bill Divesting Public Pensions from Turkish Government

Spearheaded by Rep. Adam Schiff (D-28), ten Members of Congress from California sent a letter this week to California State Senate President Pro Tempore Kevin De León in support of California Assembly Bill 1597, which would divest California’s public pension funds from investment vehicles that are owned, controlled, or managed by the Turkish government.

“California has acted in the past to prohibit new investments by its pension funds in sectors that are inimical to our state’s values, such as the 2015 state law mandating divestment from coal companies,” the Members wrote in the letter. “The narrowly drafted AB 1597 proposal is an appropriate use of that authority, blocking future investments directly owned by the Turkish Government, such as government bonds.”

Rep. Schiff sent the letter along with Jackie Speier (CA-14), Anna G. Eshoo (CA-18), Zoe Lofgren (CA-19), Grace Napolitano (CA-32), Tony Cárdenas (CA-29), Brad Sherman (CA-30), Ro Khanna (CA-17), Salud Carbajal (CA-24) and Jim Costa (CA-16).

“Given the recent assault on peaceful protestors in Washington, D.C. by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s personal security forces, as well as Turkey’s continued denial of the Armenian Genocide, divestment by California is an appropriate response,” the Members wrote.

AB 1597 passed the California State Assembly on June 1st by a vote of 67-0.

Full text of the letter is below:

 June 19, 2017

 The Honorable Kevin de León

California State Senate President Pro Tempore

State Capitol, Room 205

Sacramento, CA 94249

 Dear Mr. President:

 We write to voice our strong support for AB 1597, which would divest California’s public pension funds from investment vehicles that are owned, controlled, or managed by the Turkish government. This legislation passed the Assembly on June 1st by a vote of 67-0. Given the recent assault on peaceful protestors in Washington, D.C. by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s personal security forces, as well as Turkey’s continued denial of the Armenian Genocide, divestment by California is an appropriate response. We hope that the State Senate takes up and passes this legislation as soon as possible.

 As you are aware, the once dynamic and relatively open Turkish democracy has slid towards authoritarian rule by President Erdogan. With the recent passage, beset by voting irregularities, of a constitutional referendum, Erdogan has amassed dictatorial powers. Turkey has become the world’s leading imprisoner of journalists, suppressed free speech, and has engaged in a brutal campaign to stamp out political dissent.

 They have recently brought that campaign to the United States. On May 16th, members of Erdogan’s security detail brutally attacked a peaceful protest outside of the Turkish Embassy, causing serious injuries. Videos show Erdogan speaking to his security forces immediately prior to the attack, and observing from a distance as his armed security beat peaceful protestors. The House of Representatives recently passed H. Res. 354 unanimously, condemning this assault and calling on the Administration to hold Turkey responsible and take appropriate actions against those who carried out the attack.

 Finally, Turkey has engaged in a decades long campaign to deny the Armenian Genocide, expending millions of dollars to lobby against recognition of the historic fact of the extermination of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915-1923. California has been a leader in the United States in speaking frankly about the genocide, serving as a home for tens of thousands of Armenian-Americans whose families survived the genocide to build new lives in the United States.

 California has acted in the past to prohibit new investments by its pension funds in sectors that are inimical to our state’s values, such as the 2015 state law mandating divestment from coal companies. The narrowly drafted AB 1597 proposal is an appropriate use of that authority, blocking future investments directly owned by the Turkish Government, such as government bonds. The investments make up a small portion of the pension funds’ holdings, and reallocating these resources in an orderly fashion will have no measurable impact on their fiduciary duties.

 We hope that the Senate acts quickly on AB 1597, and that it can be signed into law as soon as possible.

 Sincerely,

  Adam B. Schiff                      Jackie Speier                           Anna G. Eshoo

Member of Congress               Member of Congress               Member of Congress

  Zoe Lofgren                            Grace Napolitano                    Tony Cárdenas

Member of Congress               Member of Congress               Member of Congress

  Brad Sherman                         Ro Khanna                              Salud Carbajal

Member of Congress               Member of Congress               Member of Congress

                                     Jim Costa                               

Member of Congress              

#Turkey #Adam Schiff

[spicynbachili1]

European court urges Turkey to free Kurdish politician Demirtas | News

A lawyer of Selahattin Demirtas, a pro-Kurdish opposition politician in  Turkey, has utilized for his launch, shortly after the European Courtroom of Human Rights (ECHR) dominated that his pre-trial imprisonment was “unjustified” and urged his launch.

In Tuesday’s judgment, the highest human rights court docket accepted that Demirtas, who has been in jail since November 2016, had been arrested on “affordable suspicion” of getting dedicated a felony offence.

However the ECHR mentioned judicial authorities had prolonged the politician’s imprisonment on grounds that might not be thought to be “ample” to justify its length.

It added that his pre-trial imprisonment interfered together with his freedom of expression as he couldn’t participate in parliament actions as an elected MP.

In a while Tuesday, Benan Molu, one of many the politician’s attorneys, advised Al Jazeera that an application for Demirtas’s launch had been filed to the Ankara court docket chargeable for the case.

We count on the court docket to make the choice to launch Demirtas as quickly as attainable as instructed by the ECHR judgment, she added.

Demirtas, 45, was a co-leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Get together (HDP). 

He, together with a number of different former HDP members of parliament, has been in jail for 2 years on the cost of getting hyperlinks to the outlawed Kurdistan Staff’ Get together ( PKK ), which has been combating the Turkish military for extra autonomy because the 1980s. Demirtas was arrested after his immunity as MP was lifted earlier in 2016.

Demirtas denies the fees. His trial started in December final 12 months and he faces as much as 142 years in jail. He acquired his first sentencing final September for finishing up “terrorist propaganda” for a speech he made in 2013.

‘Ulterior function’

The ECHR mentioned in its judgment the extensions of his detention have been “past affordable doubt”, particularly throughout his campaigns for April 2017 constitutional referendum and June 2018 presidential election.

“[The extensions of detention] had pursued the predominant ulterior function of stifling pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate, which was on the very core of the idea of a democratic society,” the court docket’s assertion mentioned.

“The Courtroom subsequently held, unanimously, that the respondent state was to take all obligatory measures to place an finish to the applicant’s pre-trial detention,” it added.

The previous HDP co-leader was his celebration’s presidential candidate within the final elections and campaigned towards the constitutional adjustments in 2017. He tried to marketing campaign from the jail by way of social media in each instances. 

Amnesty Worldwide’s senior Turkey researcher Andrew Gardner mentioned the ECHR’s judgment on the Demirtas case has an immense significance, not just for the politician however for the judicial system in Turkey.

“It’s the first time the court docket discovered a violation in keeping with the Article 18 of the conference. Consistent with that, the judgment says Demirtas’s detention will not be solely unjustified, but additionally politically motivated. For the court docket to declare that is big,” he advised Al Jazeera.

“That is significant not just for this specific case, however for all of the instances of journalists, activists and human rights defenders, who’re in jail on unjustified costs in Turkey. This choice might be made equally of their instances,” he added.

Gardner additionally mentioned Demirtas must be launched straight away because the court docket made it clear that the one solution to implement its judgment is to finish his pre-trial custody.

In his first feedback after the ECHR judgment, Turkish Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul was quoted by the state media that the court docket chargeable for the case will make the choice on the difficulty, however added that the ECHR judgments are a part of “home legislation”. 

Turkey is without doubt one of the 47 signatories of the European Conference on Human Rights that established the supranational human rights court docket, which makes legally binding verdicts on the instances associated to the signatories in query.

Comply with Umut Uras on Twitter: @Um_Uras

!function(f,b,e,v,n,t,s)(window, document,'script','//connect.facebook.net/en_US/fbevents.js');

fbq('init', '968100353246427'); fbq('track', 'PageView');

from SpicyNBAChili.com http://spicymoviechili.spicynbachili.com/european-court-urges-turkey-to-free-kurdish-politician-demirtas-news/