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greatworldwar2 · 4 years

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• Hugo Sperrle

Hugo Sperrle was a German military aviator in World War I and a Generalfeldmarschall in the Luftwaffe during World War II.

Sperrle was born in the town of Ludwigsburg, in the Kingdom of Württemberg, German Empire on February 7th, 1885 the son of a brewery proprietor, Johannes Sperrle and his wife Luise Karoline, née Nägele. He joined the Imperial German Army on July 5th, 1903 as a Fahnenjunker (officer cadet). Sperrle was assigned to the 8th Württemberg Infantry Regiment, a regiment in the Army of Württemberg, and after a year received his commission and promotion to Leutnant on October 28th, 1912. At the outbreak of World War I, Sperrle was training as an artillery spotter in the Luftstreitkräfte (German Army Air Service). On November 28th, 1914 Sperrle was promoted to Hauptmann. Sperrle did not distinguish himself in battle as his fellow staff officers in World War II had done, but he forged a solid record in the aerial reconnaissance field. Sperrle served first as an observer, then trained as a pilot with the 4th Field Flying Detachment (Feldfliegerabteilung) at the Kriegsakademie (War Academy). Sperrle went on to command the 42nd and 60th Field Flying Detachments, then led the 13th Field Flying Group. After suffering severe injuries in a crash, Sperrle moved to the air observer school at Cologne thereafter and when the war ended he was in command of flying units attached to the 7th Army.

After the war Sperrle joined the Freikorps and commanded an aviation detachment. He then joined the Reichswehr. Sperrle commanded units in Silesia including the Freiwilligen Fliegerabteilungen 412 under the leadership of Erhard Milch. Sperrle fought on the East Prussia border during the 1919 conflict with Poland. On December 1st, 1919, commander-in-chief of the German army, Hans von Seeckt issued a directive for the creation of 57 committees, encompassing all the military branches, to compile detailed studies of German war experiences. Helmuth Wilberg led the air service sector and Sperrle was one of 83 commanders ordered to assist. The air staff studies were conducted through 1920. Sperrle served on the air staff for Wehrkreis V in Stuttgart from 1919 to 1923, then the Defence Ministry until 1924. Sperrle then served on the staff of the 4th Infantry Division near Dresden. Sperrle travelled to Lipetsk in the Soviet Union at this time, where the Germans maintained a secret air base and founded the Lipetsk fighter-pilot school. Sperrle purportedly visited the United Kingdom to observe Royal Air Force exercises. In 1927 Sperrle, at the rank of Major, replaced Wilberg as head of the air staff at the Waffenamt an Truppenamt (Weapons and Troop Office). Sperrle was selected for his expertise in technical matters; he was seen as highly qualified staff officer with combat experience in commanding the flying units of the 7th army during the war. Sperrle was promoted to Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) in 1931 while commanding the 3rd battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment from 1929 to 1933. Sperrle ended his army career in command of the 8th Infantry Regiment, from October 1st, 1933 to April 1st, 1934. At the rank of Oberst (colonel), Sperrle was given command of the headquarters of the First Air Division (Fliegerdivision 1). Sperrle was given responsibility for coordinating army support aviation.

After Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party seized power, Hermann Göring created and Reich Air Ministry. Göring handed most of the squadrons in existence to Sperrle because of his command experiences. Sperrle was involved in the difficulties in German aircraft procurement. Four months after assuming command, Sperrle was rigorously critical of the Dornier Do 11 and Dornier Do 13 in a conference on July 18th, 1934. Five months later, with development failing, Sperrle met with Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, head of aircraft development and Luftkreis IV commander Alfred Keller, a wartime bomber pilot. It was decided Junkers Ju 52 production would be a stopgap, while the Dornier Do 23 reached units in the late summer, 1935. The awaited Junkers Ju 86 was scheduled for testing in November 1934 and the promising Heinkel He 111 in February 1935. On March 1st, 1935, Hermann Göring announced the existence of the Luftwaffe. Sperrle was transferred to the Reich Air Ministry. Sperrle was initially given command of Luftkreis II (Air District II), and then Luftkreis V in Münich upon his promotion to Generalmajor (Brigadier General) in October 1935. Sperrle remained in Germany until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. He commanded all German forces in Spain from November 1936 to November 1937. Sperrle was the first commander of the Condor Legion during the Spanish Civil War. Sperrle left Germany by air on October 31st, 1936 and arrived in Seville, via Rome on November 5th. Sperrle was sent a Kampfgruppe (bomber group—K/88), Jagdgruppe 88 (fighter group 88—J/88) and Aufklärungsstaffel (reconnaissance squadron—AS/88). They were supported by a Flak Abteilung (F/88) with three heavy and two light batteries with communications, transport and maintenance units. The Germans could not afford to fully equip the Legion, and so the air group made use of Spanish equipment. Of the 1,500 vehicles used, there were 100 types creating a maintenance nightmare.

After his experience leading the Condor Legion Sperrle was given command of Luftwaffe Group 3 on the February 1st, 1938 which eventually became Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) in February 1939. Sperrle commanded the air fleet for the remainder of his military career. Sperrle was used by Hitler in his foreign policy to intimidate small neighbours with the Luftwaffe, which had earned a reputation in Spain. On February 12th, 1938, Hitler invited Sperrle to a meeting at Berchtesgaden with Kurt Schuschnigg, chancellor of the Federal State of Austria. The meetings eventually helped pave the way for Anschluss, the Nazi seizure of Austria. In March 1939 Hitler decided to annex Czechoslovakia completely and risk war. He turned once again to the Luftwaffe to assist him achieving diplomatic results. The threat of aerial bombardment proved a crucial in forcing smaller nations to submit to German occupation. The successes confirmed Hitler's view that air power could be used politically, as a "terror weapon". Sperrle was asked by Hitler to talk about the Luftwaffe, to intimidate the Czech president. Hácha purportedly fainted, and when he regained consciousness, Göring screamed at him, "think of Prague!" The elderly President reluctantly ordered the Czechoslovakian Army not to resist. The aerial part of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia was carried out by 500–650 aircraft belonging to Sperrle's newly renamed air fleet, Luftflotte 3.

On September 1st, 1939, the Wehrmacht invaded Poland prompting the British Empire and France to declare war in her defence. Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 remained guarding German air space in western Germany and did not contribute to the German invasion, made possible by the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The air fleet's Order of battle had been stripped of almost all of the combat units it held in March 1939. Only two reconnaissance staffel (squadrons) and a single bomber unit attached to Wekusta 51 remained. Sperrle received the competent Major General Maximilian Ritter von Pohl as his chief of staff. The two men made for a "good partnership". Sperrle was also assigned Major General Walter Surén, appointed as the air fleet's chief signals officer. Surén planned and organised the German field communications for the offensive in 1940. While guarding the Western Front during the Phoney War, Sperrle's small fleet of 306 aircraft which included 33 obsolete Arado Ar 68s fought off probing attacks of French and British aircraft. Sperrle developed a reputation as gourmet, whose private transport aircraft featured a refrigerator to keep his wines cool, and although as corpulent as Göring, he was reliable and as ruthless as his superior. Sperrle wanted his air fleet to take a more aggressive stance and won over Göring. On September 13th, 1939 he was authorised to undertake long-range high altitude reconnaissance missions at extreme altitudes. Photographic operations over France authorised by the OKL began on September 21st, which the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht did not sanction until four days later.

Luftflotte 3 was heavily reinforced in the spring, 1940. Sperrle's headquarters was based at Bad Orb. The air fleet was assigned I. Flakkorps under Generaloberst Hubert Weise, I. Fliegerkorps under Generaloberst Ulrich Grauert at Cologne, the II. Fliegerkorps under Generaloberst Bruno Loerzer at Frankfurt, and V. Fliegerkorps under command of General Robert Ritter von Greim at Gersthofen. For the coming battle, Sperrle had 1,788 aircraft (1,272 operational) at his disposal. Opposing Sperrle, was the Armée de l'Air (French Air Force) eastern (ZOAE) and southern (ZOAS) zones under Général de Corps d'armée Aérien René Bouscat and Robert Odic. Bouscat had 509 aircraft (363 operational) and Odic 165 (109 combat ready). Fall Gelb began on May 10th,1940. Sperrle's air fleet engaged in operations supporting Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt and Army Group A in the Battle of Belgium and Battle of France, as well as Army Group C. Sperrle's counter-air campaign started badly, reflecting poor photographic interpretation of targets, though he later claimed Luftflotte 3's operations were decisive in achieving air superiority. Sperrle's men claimed 240 to 490 aircraft destroyed, mostly "in hangars"—Allied losses were actually 40 first-line aircraft. Failing to neutralise Allied fighter units cost Sperrle 39 aircraft. Sperrle's air corps commanders targeted air interdiction operations and ordered, attacks on rail communications to prevent the westward deployment of the French Army from the Maginot Line and to pin down Allied reserves by disrupting communications across the Meuse. 26 French rail stations were bombed as were 86 localities from May 10th to 12th. During the breakthrough to the English Channel, rail networks were attacked to prevent Allied forces rallying. Sperrle and Kesselring objected to the halt order during the Battle of Dunkirk. Neither man believed the pocket could be reduced by air power alone. Gelb was complete, and the OKL prepared for Case Red. The Luftflotten were reorganised; Sperrle retained II. and V. Fliegerkorps along with I. Flakkorps. The flak corps was reorganised into two brigades, with four regiments each with the firepower of 72 batteries. Sperrle was required to strike far deeper into France, and was given the majority of Zerstörer (destroyer aircraft) equipped with Messerschmitt Bf 110.

In a prelude to the offensive, Sperrle planned to carry out strategic bombing operations against Paris. Sperrle had long-planned for air attacks on Paris using II., V. and VIII. Fliegerkorps in May. He was forced to abandon the plan on May 22nd because of weather, but the following day, the OKL prepared a plan for Operation Paula. The plan was to attack the estimated 1,000 French aircraft detected on Parisian airfields, but also to attack factories and destroy the morale of the French people. The operation was undone by poor staff work and excessive confidence in the Enigma machine. On June 5th Sperrle's forces flew eight bombing operations against railways and localities, 21 to 31 against road targets, 12 against troop columns and 34 to 42 against French Army defences or strongpoints. Sperrle was ordered to support Rundstedt advancing southward, with orders to encircle the Maginot Line, from the west. The campaign played out for a further five days, which came as Luftwaffe logistics were breaking down, fuel and ammunition shortages were acute and relied on air transportation. Sperrle attempted to prevent the British Operation Ariel a second evacuation but the only success was the sinking of Lancastria, with 5,800 lives lost. On June 20th arrangements were made for the Armistice of June 22nd, 1940. Upon learning of it, Sperrle ordered the abandonment of a planned bombing operation against Bordeaux. In July 1940 Winston Churchill's government rejected peace overtures from Hitler. Hitler resolved to knock Britain out of the war. The OKL began tentative planning for Operation Eagle Attack to destroy RAF Fighter Command to gain air superiority, before supporting an amphibious landing in Britain, codenamed, Operation Sea Lion.

Sperrle thought the RAF could be defeated en passant. His personal strategy to attack ports and merchant shipping was overruled by Göring, ostensibly because the ports would be required for the invasion. Kesselring's contemporary notes indicate he thought air superiority could only be attained for a short time, since most airfields and factories in Britain were out of range. Sperrle and Kesselring miscalculated, or were misled by intelligence, into underestimating the number of fighter aircraft available to Fighter Command. They put the RAF total at 450 aircraft when the real figure was 750. Chronic intelligence failures on British production, defence systems and aircraft performance inhibited the German air operation throughout the battle. The Luftwaffe regrouped after the Battle of France into three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) . Sperrle's first task against the British Isles was during the Kanalkampf (Channel Battle) phase of what became known as the Battle of Britain. The aim was to draw out Fighter Command into dogfights by attacking Channel Shipping. Targeting British convoy systems, in July 1940 Sperrle's air fleet claimed 90 vessels sunk for approximately 300,000 tons, a third of this was claimed over August and September. Two days before Operation Eagle scheduled for August 13th he had lost two Gruppenkommandeur and a Staffelkapitän. Sperrle knew he could not afford to lose experienced officers at such a rate. The emphasis of German air attacks switched to bombing Fighter Command bases and its infrastructure. On August 13th, 1940, Sperrle's air fleet played a role in the failed Unternehmen Adlerangriff ("Operation Eagle Attack"). On the August 14th, Sperrle began a smaller, prolonged, but widely scattered series of attacks on aerodromes and other targets in the western half of England. The attacks were not very effective and earned the Luftflotte a rebuke from Göring. At the beginning of September 1940, Sperrle could muster 350 serviceable bombers and dive-bombers and about 100 fighters, either for his own purposes or to support the 9th Army and, if necessary, the 6th Army in a landing. Sperrle lost Richthofen to Kesselring who took possession of some units in Normandy, and concentrated the available dive-bomber force near the Straits of Dover.

The bombing operations continued against Fighter Command into October 1940, but with gradually more emphasis placed on attacking industrial cities, primarily because it offered the only way to continue hostilities against Britain directly in the absence of invasion. The preference for night over day operations was evident in the number of bombing operations flown by the German air fleets. Sperrle had spent the last week of August and first week of September gearing up for large–scale night operations. Sperrle's air fleet assisted in the beginning of The Blitz which began in earnest on September 7th, 1940. This night approximately 250 aircraft dropped 300 tons of high explosive and 13,000 incendiaries on the centre of London. Sperrle's airmen flew 4,525 bombing operations in November 1940. In December 1940 Sperrle's air groups flew 2,750 bombing operations against British cities. In February 1941 bad weather limited Sperrle to 975 bombing operations. During the month of May Sperrle's men carried out the burden of night operations, flying 2,500 sorties. Approximately 40,000 British civilians had been killed, another 46,000 injured, and more than a million houses damaged during the Blitz. The German air fleets lost 600 German aircraft on night operations. In five months of bombing docks and ports in 1941, only some 70,000 tons of food stocks were destroyed, and only one half a percent of oil stocks. Damage to communications was quickly repaired. Everywhere except in the aircraft industry the loss was too small a fraction of total output to matter seriously. In early June 1941, the majority of German bomber units moved eastward to the soon-to-be Eastern Front, in preparation for Operation Barbarossa.

Sperrle had been involved in the war at sea since the first phase of the Battle of Britain. He received an OKL directive on October 20th, 1940 ordering him to attack shipping once again in the Thames Estuary. He ordered his dive-bombers into this service, but they were rapidly neutralised in November by a "dynamic defence". The most effective support for the U-boat campaign came from attacking ports in 1941. Direct support to the Kriegsmarine in the Battle of the Atlantic was haphazard; successes were won by accident rather than by design. The Atlantic command came under Sperrle's control upon formation but was subordinated to Sperrle officially on April 7th, 1942. The name of the command was misleading, for it was tasked with maritime interdiction operations all around the British coast besides operating deep into the Atlantic. In the 46 months following July 1940, German aircraft sank 1,228, 104 tons of merchant shipping and damaged 1,953, 862 tons. Another 60, 866 tons were sunk or damaged by mines in 1942 and 1943. The failure to properly cooperate with the navy against shipping was a grave strategic error which prevented the achievement of greater results. For a brief period in March 1943 before the German defeat in Black May Sperrle intended to increase his command to 22 groups for Atlantic operations. From the Allied perspective, the Atlantic campaign became nothing more than a "skirmish" by the autumn, 1943.

In 1942 another threat emerged when the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) began bombing raids against targets in Belgium and France. Sperrle's fighter pilots carried the burden of the defence in 1942. Later that year, JG 1 was assigned to Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte, later known as Luftflotte Reich (Air Fleet Reich) but saw little action since USAAF rarely crossed into the Netherlands. Thereafter, the air war only escalated. Sperrle resisted attempts by Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte to gain control of anti-aircraft forces or to allow the physical degradation of his air fleet, and the offensive mindedness of the OKL favoured front-line units. In March 1943, an immediate rise in losses had already been noted. A report from Luftflotte 3 recognised the size and defensive power of American bombers required a timely interception by massed formations for any chance of success. In July alone, western fighter forces lost 335 single-engine aircraft to all causes. On the German side, there was a call to unify German fighter forces and hold them back from coastal and keep them out of Allied fighter escort range. Regardless of the logic, Sperrle opposed the idea to preserve his command. Sperrle was sensitive to a centralise command for fighter forces and resisted. On September 15th, 1943 an effort to improve Sperrle's organisation was made by creating II. Jagdkorps with the 5th and 4. Jagd Division. The improvement in command and control made little difference in the battle with the USAAF for neither division received the reinforcements it needed. At the end of 1943, the German air defences won temporary successes against the USAAF Eighth Air Force. In February 1944, Big Week targeted German and French–based targets. The German fighter force was bled white over the following two months. In the lead up to June 1944, Luftflotte 3 remained weak, and contained few ground-attack aircraft; nearly all were based on the Eastern Front. Sperrle's fighter pilots were required to attack the landing forces.

A major effect of the combined offensive on Sperrle's air fleet was the diversion and reinforcement of Luftflotte Reich at the expense of Luftflotte 3. By June 1944, the number of fighter aircraft available in the west numbered just 170. Sperrle's air fleet had, at most, 300 fighter aircraft on June 6th, 1944 to contest the D-day landings. The Western Allies amassed 12,837, including 5,400 fighters. Sperrle's air fleet was particularly weak in night fighter units. Given the low priority for their production, Sperrle went for periods with no night–fighting capabilities despite the crucial geographical position of his air fleet and the exposure of important French industries to night attack. Sperrle's air fleet was reinforced on Göring's orders for the purpose of bombing London. The offensive was named Operation Steinbock and began in January 1944. British defences had improved dramatically since 1941 and were fully prepared to repel the attacks. The offensive wasted the last German bomber reserves. The losses were a blow to Sperrle. Sperrle's air fleet Enigma signals had been cracked and ULTRA codebreakers from Bletchley Park deciphered signals sent by Luftflotte 3 headquarters to the OKW. Reading the reports, Allied intelligence deduced that the bombing operations against bridges, west of the Seine, and fighter activity between Mantes and Le Mans, had convinced the air fleet staff the invasion would take place in the Pas de Calais. Allied attacks in May 1944 against bases had a devastating impact on Luftflotte 3 capabilities. ULTRA gave the Allies intelligence on the location and strength of German fighter units as well as the effectiveness of attacks. Further damage was done to Sperrle's air defence network. Some 300,000 personnel worked in Luftflotte 3, 56,000 in signals. The fortification of radar sites after Dieppe had only highlighted them, and 76 of the 92 were knocked out by D-Day. The Allies enjoyed complete air superiority on June 6th, 1944 and flew 14,000 missions in support of the invasion. On the first day, the British and Commonwealth landed 75,215 men and the Americans 57,500. A large force of 23,000 paratroops parachuted in during the night. Luftflotte 3 barely reacted.

Sperrle was dismissed from his post on August 23rd, 1944, hours before American and French forces liberated Paris and overran his headquarters. As the German front collapsed in the aftermath of the Falaise pocket, the air fleet ground organisation uprooted and fled east across the Seine. Hitler charged the personnel of the 3rd air fleet with desertion and held Sperrle responsible. On September 22nd,1944 his former command was downgraded from air fleet to air command status. By the time of his dismissal, Sperrle had purportedly long since lost faith in the German war effort and in Hitler and Göring's military leadership. He had become lazy and had a tendency to indulge in the trappings and luxury lifestyle occupied France offered. During the war Hitler had occasionally gifted Sperrle artwork that may have been looted from occupied territories. Analysts of Sperrle's performance have been critical of his perceived inaction in Normandy and point to critical contemporary army reports on the failures of his command. Others have questioned Sperrle's influence on the conduct of operations and suggested he was a convenient scapegoat for Göring. Sperrle remained embittered after the defeat in France. He was deemed unfit for a senior command and spent the rest of the war in the Führerreserve. On May 1st, 1945, Sperrle was arrested by the British Army and became a prisoner of war. Sperrle was captured by the Allies and charged with war crimes in the High Command Trial at the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials but was acquitted. The court concluded that Sperrle had never been a member of the Nazi Party nor one of its affiliate organizations. After the war, he lived quietly and died in Munich on April 2nd, 1953 at the age of 68.

#second world war #world war ii #world war 2 #military history #wwii #history #german history #luftwaffe #long post #biography #aviation #battle of normandy #battle of britain

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fallschirmjager · 12 years

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German Order of Battle for Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein (part 1)

OKW RESERVE

Nine units appear in the Order of Battle of Heeresgruppe B as being in OKW reserve, of which five were being commited to 'Wacht am Rhein' by Heeresgruppe B and the other four by Heeresgruppe G, mainly for Operation "Nordwind". By comparison Heeresgruppe B reserve consisted of one division-an indication of the degree of initiative left to von Rundstedt and his senior commanders. The five were:

Führer-Begleit-Brigade

As the Führer-Begleit-Battalion, the brigade originated in 1939 as a motorized escort unit for for the Führer and from 1941 was stationed near the Führerhauptquartier at Rastenburg. Elements were sent to the Eastern Front to gain battle experience but Russian pressure soon cause the bulk of the battalion to be sent into action, leaving only a small detachment on guard duties at the Wolfsschanze. In May 1944 it was expanded into a regiment and in November into the Führer-Begleit-Battalion. It soon moved west under the command of Oberst Otto Remer and detrained in the Daun area of the Eifel between December 10 and 13. Now organized as a fighting unit it contained: a panzer regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment, and two motorized battalions of grenadiers plus a bicycle battalion, Gren.Btl.z.b.V. 928. Its panzer regiment was still embrionic: II. Abteilung of Panzer Regiment of 'Gross Deutschland' having been transferred to the brigade as its 1st Battalion, whilst Sturmgeschütz Brigade 200 acted as a substitute for its 2nd. According to the situation maps, on December 17 Panzer-Regiment 'Führer-Begleit-Battalion' then comprised: 1. Abteilung with twenty-three Panzer IVs and twenty sturmgeschütz: and (in place of II. Abteilung) 1. Abteilung with twenty-eight Sturmgeschütz.

Führer-Grenadier-Brigade

This unit originated in April 1943 as Führer-Grenadier-Battalion and fought as such on the Eastern Front. Raised to brigade strength in April 1944 it was reorganized as as Fallingbostel in September as by mid-October was committed to 4.Armee against a Soviet breakthrough near Gumbinnen in East Prussia. At the end of November it withdrew to Cottbus for rest and refit. When the brigade moved moved west between December 11 and 17 its composition was: a panzer regiment, an anti-aircraft battalion, an artillery battalion, a panzergrenadier regiment of two motorized battalions and one bicycle battalion, Gren.Btl.z.b.V. 929. The brigade commander was Oberst Hans-Jochim Kahler. On December 17, according to the situation maps, Panzer-Regiment "Füh.Grenadier-Brig." comprised: 1. Abteilung with eleven Panzer IVs and thirty-seven Panthers (a handful of them Jagdpanthers); standing in for II. Abteilung was Stu.Art.Brig.911 with thirty-four Sturmgeschütz. 9. Volks-Grenadier-Division

The Original 9. Infanterie-Division had been formed in 1935 as one of the early Wehrmacht divisions and had fought in the West in 1940 and on the Eastern Front from 1941. Destroyed in Romania in August 1944, it had been written off on October 9. he 9.Volks-Grenadier-Division which came into being on the west coast of Denmark on October 13 thus bore no resemblance to the former experienced infantry division of old but resulted merely from from a change of number, having been formed as 584. Volks-Grenadier-Division at Esbjerg, where it had been assembling since September; its Stu.Gesch.Kp.1009 equipped with the Jadgpanzer 38(t) at Milowitz in Czechoslovakia. The division moved out on December 14 and scheduled to detrain at Gerolstein, to be in readiness west of the town on December 19.

167. Volks-Grenadier-Division

The 167. Volks-Grenadier-Division was another of those veteran divisions which disintegrated itself on the Eastern Front and which disappeared in August of 1944 with 8. Armee in Romania. What remained of it, Divisiongruppe 197, was refitted Dollersheim with the remnants of 17. Luftwaffe-Feld-Division, shattered in France, to become the 167. Volks-Grenadier-Division on September 2, its Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1167 issued with the Jagdpanzer 38(t)at Milowitz. The division was due to arrive in the Gerolstein area December 24. 3. Panzergrenadier Division

As 3. Infanterie-Division it fought in Poland and the West, becoming a motorized infantry division in October 1940. From the summer of 1941 it fought in the East until it was destroyed at Stalingrad. Reformed in south-west France 386. Infanterie-Division (mot.), it became 3. Panzergrenadier-Division in June 1943. It fought in Italy until late August 1944 when ordered to France to counter tyhe Allied threat in Lorraine and then moved up to the Aachen sector, being pulled out at the beginning of December. On December 10 the division's Panzer Abteilung 103 could field forty-one StuGs and its Panzerjäger-Abteilung 3 twenty-five Jagdpanzer IV/70s, although operational on the charts for the offensive the number of StuGs was put at twenty.

The other formations in the OKW reserve were 257. Volks-Grenadier-Division, 6. SS Gebirgs-Division, 11. Panzer-Division and 110. SS-Panzer-Division, none of which was commited as such, although elements(for instance part of SS-Panzer-Regiment 10) saw action with other units. The introduction of 11. Panzer-Division into the battle delayed by problems over its transfer to Heeresgruppe G in the south; a disagreement between von Rundstedt and the Heeresgruppe G commander, General Hermann Balck, about moving an entire Panzer division across a disjointed railway system, and such by December 18 the disruption was such that the move had to be called off. All von Rundstadt's repeated requests for the deployment of these reserves were fruitless, except for both 9.VGD and 167. VGD which were ordered forward on December 23 albeit not released from OKW control. Three days later, when Model made another of his persistent demands to be allowed to make use of the OKW reserve-the armor specifically-he was given control of these two divisions. By this date the three divisions remaining in reserve were already earmarked for Operation 'Nordwind'.

#German Order of Battle for Wacht am Rhein #Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Reserve #Heeresgruppe B #Führer-Begleit-Brigade #Führer-Grenadier-Brigade #9. Volks-Grenadier-Division #167. Volks-Grenadier-Division #3. Panzergrenadier Division #Gren.Btl.z.b.V. 928.#Gren.Btl.z.b.V. 929 #Stu.Art.Brig.911 #1. Abteilung #Stu.Gesch.Kp.1009 #its Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1167 #Abteilung 103 #Panzerjäger-Abteilung 3 #WWII ETO #Hitler's Last Gamble in the West

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