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probablyasocialecologist · 5 months

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The complex, planned control of a huge country required automation. After discussions that took place from 1956 to 1957 at the Institute of Economics in Moscow under the leadership of academician K. Ostrovityanov, a troubled mode of commodity production under socialism was officially adopted, contradicting Karl Marx’s writings on the practice of economic planning. State-owned enterprises worked according to the plan and, at the same time, for profit. This doctrine divided the country’s economists into Marxists (advocates of a non-commodity economy), who denied the commodity nature of production under socialism, and restorers of capitalism (promoters of a commodity economy). The ideological struggle between these economists received a new impetus with the awareness that cybernetics were needed to solve economic problems. Yet, while cyberneticists were busy solving the complex problem of automating economic management, the party nomenklatura, afraid of losing the privileges that came from planned, manual control, imposed economic “reforms” from the 1950s through the ’90s. At the same time, a shortage of goods in the consumer market was created in the short-term interests of the nomenklatura by fixing prices, which led to increased speculation and corruption. The system of equilibrium prices—a necessary feedback mechanism of the consumer market that plays an important role in optimizing the supply structure—was excluded from the economic planning process. This doomed the ruble to defeat by the dollar. The reforms aimed at giving more and more rights to enterprises, allowing them to focus on profit, intensified the chaos in public administration and ultimately led to the collapse of the country in 1991, with the restoration of capitalism and the transfer of management of the country’s development to global capitalist forces. How do we explain why the nomenklatura ended up choosing to dismantle socialism? It is necessary to note that Stalin eliminated the party maximum in 1932. According to the academic E. S. Varga, the abolition of the party maximum contributed to the disintegration of Soviet society into layers with huge differences in income and the personal enrichment of appointed party nomenklatura. Their example was followed by the bureaucracy and the lower strata, becoming expressed in careerism, intrigues against competitors, theft, and corruption. The contradiction between the officially proclaimed communist morality and the real ideology of the ruling circles led to a widening gap between the elites and the working people, and encouraged cynicism and careerism in society.

#soviet union #planning #planned economy #cybernetics

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infinitysisters · 9 months

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“Moral grandiosity seems to have infected the nomenklatura class of giant corporations. It is not enough for them to ensure that the corporations make a decent profit within the framework of the law; they must claim to also be morally improving, if not actually saving, the world.

So it was with Alison Rose, the first female chief executive of the National Westminster Bank, a large British bank 39 percent owned by the British government. When first appointed to the position, she said that she would put combatting climate change at the centre of the bank’s policies and activities. Whether shareholders were delighted to hear this is unknown.

But the bank, under her direction, went further. Its subsidiary, Coutts, founded in 1692 and long banker to the rich, compiled a Stasi-like dossier on one of its customers, Nigel Farage, before “exiting” him from the bank, to use the elegant term employed by Ms. Rose. (Defenestration will come later, perhaps.)

Farage is, of course, a prominent right-wing political figure in Britain, as much detested as he is admired. There was no allegation in the dossier that he had done anything illegal; indeed, in person, he had always acted correctly and courteously toward staff. What was alleged was that his “values” did not accord with those of the bank, which were self-proclaimed as “inclusive” (though not of people with less than $3.5 million to deposit or borrow). Farage was depicted as a xenophobe and racist, mainly because he was in favour of Brexit and against unlimited immigration. That anyone could support Brexit for any reason other than xenophobia, or oppose unlimited immigration other than because he was a racist, was inconceivable to the diverse, inclusive thinkers of Coutts Bank.

Ms. Rose saw fit to leak details to the BBC about Farage’s banking affairs, claiming to believe that they were public knowledge already. She did not mention the 40-page dossier that her staff had put together, about Farage’s publicly-stated views. The Stasi would have been proud of the bank’s work, which comprehensively proved him to have anti-woke views.

Whatever else might be said about Mr. Farage, no one would describe him as a pushover, the kind of person who would take mistreatment lying down. Even the Guardian newspaper, which cannot be suspected of partiality for him, suggested that the bank and its chief executive had questions to answer.

It was not long before Ms. Rose had to beat a retreat. She issued a statement in which she said:

I have apologised to Mr. Farage for the deeply inappropriate language contained in [the dossier].

The board of the bank said that “after careful reflection [it] has concluded that it retains full confidence in Ms. Rose as CEO of the bank.”

The following day, Rose resigned, admitting to “a serious error of judgment.”

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐛𝐚𝐧𝐤 𝐟𝐞𝐥𝐥 𝐛𝐲 𝐦𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐧 $𝟏 𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧.

The weasel words of Ms. Rose and the bank board are worth examination. They deflected, and I suspect were intended to deflect, the main criticism directed at Ms. Rose and the bank: namely, that the bank had been involved in a scandalous and sinister surveillance of Mr. Farage’s political views and attempted to use them as a reason to deny him banking services, all in the name of their own political views, which they assumed to be beyond criticism or even discussion. The humble role of keeping his money, lending him money, or perhaps giving him financial advice, was not enough for them: they saw themselves as the guardians of correct political policy.

It was not that the words used to describe Mr. Farage were “inappropriate,” or even that they were libelous. It is that the bank saw fit to investigate and describe him at all, at least in the absence of any suspicion of fraud, money laundering, and so forth. “The error of judgment” to which Ms. Rose referred was not that she spoke to the BBC about his banking affairs (it is not easy to believe that she did so without malice, incidentally), but that she compiled a dossier on Farage in the first place—and then “error of judgment” is hardly a sufficient term on what was a blatant and even wicked attempt at instituting a form of totalitarianism.

This raises the question of whether one can be wicked without intending to be so, for it is quite clear that Ms. Rose had no real understanding, even after her resignation, of the sheer dangerousness and depravity of what the bank, under her direction, had done.

As for the board’s somewhat convoluted declaration that “after careful consideration, it concluded that it retains full confidence,” etc., it suggests that it was involved in an exercise of psychoanalytical self-examination rather than of an objective state of affairs: absurd, in the light of Ms. Rose’s resignation within twenty-four hours. The board, no more than Ms. Rose herself, understood what the essence of the problem was. For them, if there had been no publicity, there would have been no problem: so when Mr. Farage called for the dismissal of the board en masse, I sympathised with his view.

There is, of course, the question of the competence of the bank’s management. Last year, the bank’s profits rose by 50 percent (I wish my income had risen by as much). I am not competent to comment on the solidity of this achievement: excellent profits one year followed by complete collapse the next seem not to be unknown in the banking world. But the rising profits under Ms. Rose for the four years of her direction seem to point to, at least on some level, of competence. How many equally competent persons there are who could replace her, I do not know.

Still, 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐦𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐛𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐚 𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤 𝐨𝐟 𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐬𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐥𝐞𝐬, as illustrated in this episode, is worrying. Would one trust such people if the political wind changed direction? Their views would change, but the iron moral certainty and self-belief would remain the same, like the grin of the Cheshire Cat. How many meetings have I sat through in which some apparatchik has claimed to be passionately committed to a policy, only to be just as passionately committed to the precise opposite when his own masters demand a change of direction?! The Coutts story is one of how totalitarianism can flourish.”

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Theodore Dalrymple

#the new totalitarianism #political righteousness #totalitarianism #secular religion #moral exhibitionism #apparatchiks #professional managerial class mind virus #ideological fundamentalists #insane in the membrane #Theodore Dalrymple #western decline #Neil Farage #persona non grata #the new inquisitions #barbaric #national Westminster bank #the self anointed

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chicago-geniza · 2 months

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The Dispossessed is...so far a coming-of-age story about the Space Intelligentsia-Nomenklatura

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hyperions-fate · 2 years

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It's moronic to reduce every state action and conflict to Western influence. But it's equally moronic to ignore that the ruling classes of the Western powers have, particularly over the course of the past thirty years, created a world system where unending wars, occupations, drone assassinations, kidnappings and renditions, black site torture camps, strategies of ethno-sectarian tension, and all kinds of criminality have become acceptable methods of foreign policy. Russia's elite of industrial profiteers and washed-up nomenklatura are simply the latest actors to embrace these new and innovative techniques.

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oscarjcarlisle · 9 months

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In the 1920’s Isaac had distinguished himself in the Red Army during the Russian Revolution, and had some small influence on the Party. He was among the nomenklatura and used his connections in the Red Army to found a secret Paranormal Affairs division of the OGPU, later folded into the NKVD. Isaac met Stalin several times in person, and after Stalin’s accent to power Isaac demonstrated his immortality, convincing Stalin (though he needed little convincing) that magic was real and a possible threat to the Union. Thereafter Stalin committed essentially any resources Isaac requested to the Paranormal Affairs division. In actuality, magic users posed very little threat to the Soviet Union and all Isaac did was help them hide themselves from the persecution that Stalin would have levied against them.

Isaac despised Stalin, and tried several times to have him assassinated while also maintaining his good standing, but failed. Instead he did his best to mitigate the damage the rest of the NKVD was doing to the ethnic and religious minorities in Siberia.

Beryozka, the large tiger pictured here, was one of Isaac’s lieutenants and a personal friend. He was abducted from his village of reindeer Samoyedic reindeer herders in the Far North as a boy during the revolution, and fought in the Red Army, where he met Isaac. He speaks a Samoyedic dialect and is very familiar with the folklore and cryptids of Siberia, making him one of the division’s top field agents.

Beryozka is also gay and mostly closeted, Isaac was one of the first people he came out to, and while neither of them consider themselves to be in a relationship, they are very affectionate to each other. Only the other officers of the Paranormal Affairs division really know, and Isaac hand picked all of them to be fairly open-minded, anti-statist individuals, the type who’d rather let the two of them be gay together than report it to anyone because they hate the oppressive state more than they’re icked out by two guys cuddling.

#furry #anthro #anthro tiger #anthro red panda #furry worldbuiding #worldbuilding #alt history #alternate history

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russia-libertaire · 5 months

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Stalin and the Nomenklatura

'Stalin... concentrated on building up the party apparatus, which he controlled as general secretary. Most Communists had not spotted that this was where real power lay, once other political parties, institutions, and social classes had been destroyed. They were content to let Stalin assemble and classify his personnel files, not fathoming their potential. He used the information in them to appoint and advance the career of those who supported him, usually those who had joined the party during or since the civil war, and to block those who opposed him, who were not infrequently the party's old intellectuals from the days of underground struggle and early revolutionary elan. ... the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 instructed committees at all levels to keep up-to-date lists of employees suitable for particular kinds of work and for promotion within their field. These lists were amalgamated with Sovnarkom's lists of specialists. Coordinated by the party secretariat, they now enabled Stalin to oversee all appointments to responsible positions, not just within the party and state but in all walks of life. This was the start of the nomenklatura system, which in time became the most extensive and tightly controlled system of executive patronage the world had ever seen. With its help the party Central Committee became the control panel of the Soviet Union's ruling class.'

Russia and the Russians, by Geoffrey Hosking

#stalin #nomenklatura #bureaucracy #hierarchy #ussr #party-state #patronage

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ravenkings · 1 year

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one thing i’ve truly never understood about tankies is that like......neither was the USSR at the time it collapsed (and frankly a long time before) nor is the contemporary PRC anything CLOSE to what one would consider “communist.” like with the USSR there was very much a party elite (i.e. the nomenklatura) whose progeny did benefit from the privilege of being associated with said elite (and many of whom frankly stayed part of the elite into the formation of the russian federation when they bought up all the state assets for sale and then became putin’s pet oligarchs.) and like vis-à-vis contemporary china.......................honestly if you think that ANYTHING going on there is in any way, shape, or form moving forwards with “marxist” principles as opposed to some general nationalist-authoritarian ideology with capitalism on hyperdrive then like............idek what to say to you.........

#i just feel like all tankies are stuck in like the year 1968 or something when it comes to looking at current events #and like if you notice VERY very few of them claim much allegiance to current political figures or ideologies #it's all a romanticization of the past..........#politics #text

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argyrocratie · 1 year

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Clan capitalism

Ukraine became independent in 1991 following a referendum in which more than 90% of voters voted in favor.[3] Until 2014, Russia accepted this result and recognized Ukraine’s existence in a sort of regime of “limited sovereignty”. Ukraine was tied to its larger neighbor by economic relations[4] and Russia was able to use its local clients to influence internal political development. The latter has long been turbulent.

The period of economic transition in which Ukraine followed, to some extent, the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, quickly created a new capitalist class. At first, it was composed mainly of “red directors” (i.e., the managerial cadres of the Stalinist regime), and later also of broader layers – from the ranks of the technical intelligentsia, various parts of the state apparatus and the criminal underworld. The 1990s were a true Eldorado for this class, though often quite dangerous for its individual members. Using both legal and extralegal methods, it seized key enterprises and banks, which it either stripped of all assets or concentrated into giant holdings and investment groups. Profits were exported to tax havens. At the same time, it began to take control of the media and politics. Unlike its predecessors in the Stalinist nomenklatura, it also managed to integrate itself into the global capitalist class, at least in terms of the use of its consumption fund (yachts and luxury properties abroad, jets, as well as private investments in international financial markets).

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s real GDP per capita was in steady decline– up until 2000. Average life expectancy decreased from 70.5 (in 1989) to 67.7 years. Non-payment of wages,[5] work in the informal economy, and a decline in purchasing power became everyday realities for the Ukrainian working class. Although the numerous strikes, marches, hunger strikes, and blockades have managed to score some local successes (e.g., the payment of wage arrears, postponement of privatization, etc.), they failed to change the overall course or create a broader movement.

The story so far is not that different from the Russian one.[6] However, the centralization and consolidation that Putin implemented after the Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the ruble (1997–98) never took place in Ukraine. Putin gradually nationalized some energy companies, built a “power vertical”, whose backbone was formed by security service cadres and various personal friends, and subordinated the oligarchs to this structure. The latter has since overseen the distribution of rent derived mainly from fossil fuel extraction. Ukraine’s domestic capitalist class, by contrast, has remained divided into competing “clans” that are tied to specific sectors of the economy and geographic regions.[7] The rivalry between these factions of Ukrainian capital has been the basis of political instability.

The numerous movements of political protest which often also voiced social and welfare demands were always co-opted by a political project of one of the groups – either from the very beginning or gradually. The “Ukraine without Kuchma” (2001–2002) and “Arise, Ukraine!” (2002–2003) protests were directed against President Leonid Kuchma, involved in several scandals, including the murder of a journalist. The “Orange Revolution” (2004–2005) was in response to the electoral fraud of the then prime minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, as well as the suspicious privatization of Ukraine’s largest steelworks in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), in which Kuchma’s brother-in-law was involved along with the former Donetsk gangster, Rinat Akhmetov. The movement “Rise up, Ukraine!” (2013) opposed President Yanukovych and his attempts to consolidate power. Finally, the Euromaidan (2014) was a reaction to his decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. The most successful of these movements, the Orange Revolution, and the Euromaidan, may have led to a change of political leadership, but they did not significantly shake the position of the clans, let alone the clan system as such. Ultimately, they became a means of bringing another faction of the domestic business class to power.

The lumpen-capitalist competition, in which one or the other faction gained control of the state (and thus preferential access to loans, subsidies and contracts), explains, at least in part, why the state has failed to impose a long-term, viable development plan on the country. On the other hand, this unstable environment also left some room for the development of a resistant civil society, including independent trade unions, activist organizations, and the radical left.[8]

Russia maintained an influence over Ukraine through those sections of the local capitalist class that were materially interested in maintaining close relations – for example, in the interests of their own sales, favorable prices for inputs (especially, but not exclusively, energy inputs), or gas transfer fees. The capital base of this faction was mainly concentrated in the Donbas, the former industrial heartland of the Soviet Union, home to a large Russian-speaking population and the birthplace of the Stakhanovite “movement”. In the 1990s it was the scene of the bloodiest conflicts within the capitalist class, a center of organized crime – but also the epicenter of the tragedy of the “old” working class, especially the miners. Their mass strikes in the late 1980s and early 1990s helped destroy the Soviet regime and win Ukraine’s independence,[9] but after a wave of privatizations, asset stripping and bankruptcies, many found themselves with no jobs or prospects. Between 1992 and 2013, the population of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts fell by 1.7 million, declining at twice the rate of the rest of the country.[10]

- karmína,“the tragedy of the ukrainian working class” (2022)

_ _ _

[3] This was about 76% of all eligible voters. In Crimea, support for independence was the weakest, at around 54% of the vote. Similarly in Crimea’s Sevastopol, which was a separate constituency – 57%. In Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, however, almost 84% of those who voted were in favor of independence. Wikipedia summarizes the results in detail.

[4] As recently as 2013, imports from Russia accounted for 29% of total imports of goods; exports to Russia accounted for almost 23% of Ukrainian exports of goods. By 2020, both indicators had dropped to 11% and 6%, respectively (see oec.world). On the other hand, exports to the EU15 already accounted for a larger share of total Ukrainian exports than exports to Russia in 2002. Thus, the dependence of Ukrainian industry on Russian gas and oil has played a decisive role.

[5] A specific feature of the Ukrainian (as well as Russian) transition was that official unemployment never reached a level close to twenty percent, such as in Poland (2002) or Slovakia (2001). Workers in enterprises that ran into trouble remained formally employed but were not paid – although in many cases they continued to work. Sometimes they received payments in kind instead of cash.

[6] Of course, in many respects it is also reminiscent of the history of other former Eastern Bloc countries, including Slovakia.

[7] The history and structure of the “clans” is described in “The Oligarchic Democracy” by Sławomir Matuszak. See also “The Consolidation of Ukrainian Business Clans” by Viatcheslav Avioutskii.

[8] A peculiar phenomenon of political life in Ukraine was the emergence of a seriesof fake left-wing groups founded around 2000 by the same circle of people. These pseudo-organizations established contacts with foreign “internationals”, mainly of the Trotskyist variety, and lured material aid or money from them. It was enough to write that they identified with their political program and wanted to become a Ukrainian or Russian section. Despite personal meetings, it took three or four years for the foreign donors – delighted by the unexpected growth of the workers’ movement in the former Eastern Bloc – to discover that their “partners” were in fact political hucksters. The scandal had seriously damaged the international reputation of the Ukrainian left, though one may also pause at the credulity of Western leftists.

[9] On earlier strikes by Donbas miners for economic demands and democratization, see the documentary Perestroika from Below (1989). Later strikes had more explicit political demands, including national independence. See the interviews with strike leaders in Donetsk, as well as a brief documentary (with English subtitles). The history of miners’ protest from perestroika to 2000 is summarized in an essay by Vlad Mykhnenko subtitled “Ukrainian miners and their defeat”. See also the recollections of the Dnipro working-class militant, Oleg Dubrovsky, in a 1996 interview (in English), as well as his analysis of the process of privatization of the mining industry (in Russian).

[10] One of the consequences of the disintegration of the mining industry in the Donbas has been the growth of illegal mining in the so-called kopanki. A section of the 2005 documentary, Workingman’s Death, focuses on the phenomenon. The post-apocalyptic landscape of the Donetsk Oblast is depicted in the short documentary, Life After the Mine (2013).

#ukraine #capitalism #communism

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nucifract · 11 months

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Letzte Generation. Jul 2023

Armes Kind. Hineingeboren in Weimar 2.0. Und der gutmütige Alte wird bald nen Hexenschuß haben, wenn er sich weiter so erniedrigt.

Die Schwiegereltern remigrieren gerade nach Frankreich, allerdings nicht zurück nach Paris, das vom Familienclan vollständig aufgegeben wurde. Gerade zur rechten Zeit, das Haus ist verkauft und der Hügel, auf dem es stand, ins Rutschen geraten. Bestimmt schreckliche Folge des Klimas, ihr Katastrophen-Eulen.

Zu den Aufständen in F? Kann ich mich immer wieder nur wundern über die mangelnde Menschenkenntnis meiner Zeitgenossen. Jeder sollte als junger Mensch mal so richtig proletarisch malocht haben. Und zwar nicht als "Bedienung" oder mal ein bißchen im Supermarkt. Sondern so richtige harte Brutaljobs, am besten in der Schwerindustrie, mit PuffPaff und heißem Dampf und Feuer, mit harter Schichtarbeit und richtig Muskeleinsatz. Laut, dreckig, völlige Erschöpfung. So wie ich leuchtendes Beispiel. Ich bin überhaupt ein bemerkenswert toller Kerl.

Mal so richtig in das Leben reinschnuppern, über das sie im Ostblock Lieder gesungen haben, von muskulösen Menschen mit winzigen Köpfen und Hulk-Unterarmen, die aus proletarischen Hemden schauen. Dann hätte man auch gleich eine andere Einstellung zu den feuchten Träumen der Grünen und des linken Flügels der SPD.

Stattdessen muß ich mir aus den Medien das Geheule der kleinen Fettschwanzschafe anhören, die die erste Therapie benötigten, um die eigene Pubertät zu überleben. Mit Körpern, geformt von Nintendo und Dauerbespaßung, trans jeder sexuellen Attraktivität. Unfähig, einen eigenen Gedanken zu denken, totalitäre Anhänger der Opferideologie. Und zweihundert Jahre alter Weiße-Männer-Marxistenscheiße. Zu hunderttausenden durch völlig sinnlose Studiengänge geschoben, häßlich wie das Ende der Nacht, wenn die Müllabfuhr kommt. Dyskalkule Dyslexiker. "Eher nicht so die Leser." Und jeder sollte mal ein paar Jahre im ich sag mal "Whiskeyschmuggel" gearbeitet haben, am besten zusammen mit ein paar Kerlchen wie dem Knaben, der da jetzt in Nantes mit der Schmier aneinandergeraten ist. Und verloren hat, der dämliche Anfänger. Selbst zur Kleinstkriminalität zu blöd. Genauso blöd wie die Entschuldigungsversuche des linken Aluminiums in den Medien.

Die Jugend hat mit Zwanzig schon alle Kontinente gesehen, ein Jahr lang kuhäugig und wiederkäuend im Ausland hockend studiert – keine Ahnung von Latein aber Erasmus, der sich im Grabe dreht. Und ist doch geistig nie aus ihrem Viehstall herausgekommen, weil sie immer in derselben hermetischen Blase hockt. Immer umgeben von freundlich ausgedrückt Gleichgesinnten. Ansonsten wäre allen klar, daß der kleine Algerier in Nantes ein echtes Arschloch war, das nur durch Zufall noch kein Tötungsdelikt im Sündenregister stehen hatte. Und sowieso nicht allzu lange gelebt haben würde. Einer wie ich, der jahrelang mit solchen Kerlchen rumgezogen ist, hat dazu eine klare Meinung. Im Gegensatz zu unserer Nomenklatura, die hart daran arbeitet, alle Antisemiten der Welt nach D zu holen.

Denn ich? Ich kenn sie alle. Die Jugos, die Russkies, die Türken. Und ja, auch die Deutschprolls und die Sintizze:Romanes:Plusplusnusses. Als die Arabs kamen, ging meine "Studienzeit" so langsam zuende.

Meine Conclusio? Da ja Free-Speech sowieso derzeit von den Linken auf den Prüfstand gestellt wird, sage ich hier mal provokant: Ab einem gewissen Body-Mass-Index, ohne mindestens drei Jahre in der Produktion, ohne nachgewiesene soziale Expertise, erworben durch den notariell beglaubigten Kontakt mit allen Schichten und Parallelgesellschaften: Kein Wahlrecht, kein Recht, zu publizieren. Geisteswissenschaftler, zu denen auch die Juristen zählen, müssen sich in einem zusätzlichen fünfjährigen Volontariat bewähren.

Und nächstesmal fragen wir uns dann, was die "Gesellschaft" des zwanzigsten von der "Zivilgesellschaft" des einundzwanzigsten Jahrhunderts unterscheidet.

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