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girlactionfigure · 5 months

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ISRAEL REALTIME - "Connecting the World to Israel in Realtime"

🔻ROCKETS from LEBANON… short range, Margaliot.

🔻ROCKETS from GAZA… short range, Sderot and surrounds.

▪️FUEL AID… the Political-Security Cabinet approved the War Cabinet's recommendation to allow the minimal addition of fuel necessary to prevent a humanitarian collapse (although per our previous report, fuel aid is NOT making it to those in need or the hospitals but is “disappearing”). Finance Minister Smotrich and Security Minister Ben Gvir objected - voted against.

▪️2 HERO SOLDIERS FALL.. in the fight in Gaza, bringing the toll of the ground offensive to 86.

▪️EGYPT REINFORCES THE BORDER AGAINST GAZANS… Gaza sources: The Egyptians are constructing a third fence on the border with the Gaza Strip to prevent the possibility of Gazans breaking through the fences and entering Sinai territory.

▪️SAMARIA… Tulkarm, heavy IDF bulldozer activity in checking roads for IEDs. Firefights. Shechem (Nablus), firefight, arrests, one enemy car caught fire.

▪️THREATS TO LEBANON… The Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Akhbar newspaper notes this morning that the US and France are issuing threats to Hezbollah and Lebanon, according to which the two choices they face are: Withdrawal of Hezbollah forces (out of South Lebanon) or war. The Lebanese News Agency states that Israel has sent a "dangerous threat" to Lebanon.

Various reports from enemy media that the US, France, UAE, Saudi Arabia are pushing a plan for Hezbollah to get out of southern Lebanon and UNIFIL and the Lebanese army to be empowered, in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from Sheba'a Farms, Kfarchouba and the village of Ghajar.

The head of the Upper Galilee Regional Council Zaltz, to Defense Minister Galant: “(this) brings Hezbollah and its host Iran to a sense of success. He and we know that there is no meaning to an international agreement. How do we know if Hezbollah will comply with the agreement - shall we wait for the next 'October 7'?"

▪️HOW HAMAS FOOLED ISRAEL… The Washington Post: This is how Hamas tried to "put Israel to sleep". Hamas refrained from firing at Israel after the "Guardian of the Walls" operation, and presented the impression that it was interested in calm. Hamas officials provided intelligence on the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (a competitor of Hamas in Gaza) to reinforce the impression that the organization was interested in peace and cooperation.

▪️CHABAD OF GAZA? Chabad Chasidic soldiers, students of the Chabad Yeshiva Chazon Eliyahu in Tel Aviv established the first Chabad house in Beit Hanon in the north of the Gaza Strip. The Chabad House will operate in a special emergency format, and will spread joy and Judaism to all soldiers during the Hanukkah holiday and after, until the final victory.

#Israel #October 7 #Hamas Masacre #Iron Sword #Realtime Updates

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maaarine · 5 months

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news coverage of Cop28 has been emphasizing the importance of the language used in the final agreement

so much so that one is left wondering if people at that summit spent entire days bickering about semantics while islands in the pacific are disappearing off the map because of sea rise

"should we say 'phase-out' or 'transition away', lads? we can't go for brunch until this is settled — come on Saudi Arabia, stop being such a cunt"

The Guardian:

I was reminded of Yanis Varoufakis' account of his meetings with the finance ministers of the eurozone, during the "debt crisis" that sank Greece

it was a constant negotiation over which words to use in communiqués, and it would have made me jump out the window had I been at those meetings

in that story it's Jeroen Dijsselbloem (Dutch finance minister at the time) who's the cunt

Adults in the Room: My Battle with the European and American Deep Establishment (Yanis Varoufakis, 2017)

"Instead of specificity, we were looking for language that was sufficiently ambiguous to satisfy both parties without exposing the rifts that remained between us. At this stage avoiding each side’s red lines was essential if there was to be any progress. Euclid reminded me of the term often credited to Henry Kissinger for this diplomatic technique: ‘constructive ambiguity’. (…) Christine Lagarde intervened. She acknowledged the Greek government’s right ‘to be heard’ and made some polite noises about our debt but without challenging Wolfgang. Thanks to her intervention a new adjective emerged as a possible substitute for ‘amended.’ ‘Would you commit to an adjusted programme?’ I was asked. Thinking on my feet, I decided to be flexible. It was a poor alternative – ‘adjustments’ implied the programme was fundamentally sound, whereas it was because the programme had failed and was impossible to complete that it needed real amendment – but we could accept this new adjective in return for a specific addition to the communiqué. In the spirit of cooperation with the Eurogroup, I said I could recommend to the Greek prime minister that we commit to completing an ‘adjusted programme’ as long as the communiqué also committed the Eurogroup to working with our government to address the humanitarian crisis that was now afflicting our people as a result of the programme. ‘I cannot accept this,’ Jeroen said. ‘The term “humanitarian crisis” is too political!’ ‘There is nothing more political, Jeroen,’ I snapped back, ‘than the attempt to overlook a humanitarian crisis because it would be too political to acknowledge it.’ It was clear that we were at an impasse."

#mytxt #environment #yanis varoufakis #adults in the room #book

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catdotjpeg · 2 months

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The U.S. vetoed an Arab-backed resolution in the UN Security Council on Tuesday, which called for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. This is the fourth time Washington has used its power to block the Security Council from bringing an end to the Israeli war on Gaza since October. The resolution was put to vote by Algeria despite the U.S. being expected to strike it down. The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said that Washington was “concerned” the resolution would jeopardize efforts ushered by Egypt and Qatar to bring a deal to pause the fighting and exchange hostages between Israel and Hamas movement. Early in February, mediated talks reached a deadlock when Israel’s war cabinet rejected Hamas’s counter-deal to release hostages in stages over a period of four and half months in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, including national figures serving life sentences. The U.S. veto garnered disappointment in Arab capitals, including allies such as Saudi Arabia, which still hopes the U.S. administration will rein in Israel. “There is a need now more than ever to reform the Security Council to carry out its responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security with credibility and without double standards,” the Saudi foreign ministry said on Tuesday.

Algeria, which put in a draft for the resolution two weeks ago, said silence over Israeli aggression in Gaza was not an option. “This resolution is a stance for truth and humanity, standing against the advocates for murder and hatred,” Amar Bendjama, the Algerian ambassador to the UN, said. “Voting against it implies an endorsement of the brutal violence and collective punishment inflicted upon them [the Palestinians],” he added. Zhang Jun, China’s ambassador to the US, said that “the U.S. veto sends a wrong message, pushing the situation in Gaza into a more dangerous one… the continued passive avoidance on an immediate ceasefire is nothing different from giving a green light to the continued slaughter.” The U.K. had abstained, while 13 members of the Security Council voted in favor. In the past week, the U.S. drafted and circulated another rival resolution that would call for a “temporary ceasefire” and lifting restrictions on supplying humanitarian aid into Gaza, on the condition that Hamas release all the hostages first. It is yet to be scheduled for a vote. The release of Israeli captives has been a constant line in U.S. official statements, yet, on Tuesday, Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said that returning captives was “not the most important thing”, according to The Times of Israel, as Netanyahu’s government is focused on destroying Hamas.

-- From "‘Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’ Day 138" by Mustafa Abu Sneineh for Mondoweiss, 21 Feb 2024

#palestine #usa #algeria #egypt #qatar

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mariacallous · 3 months

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There’s an old saying in Israeli politics that a politician can be dead—or dead and buried. Whether a beleaguered Benjamin Netanyahu belongs to either of these unhappy groups is hard to say, but veteran Israeli political analysts are clear that he now faces the test of his life. Netanyahu must deal with a converging web of controversies and pressures, while also dealing with an increasingly unhappy Israeli public. These include rising frustration from the families of hostages taken on Oct. 7 by Hamas; dissension in the war cabinet; a rebellious right wing; the return of mobilized reservists (traditionally an anti-Netanyahu constituency); and growing strains with the United States—not to mention his ongoing trial for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust in the Jerusalem District Court.

Having presided over the greatest intelligence failure and terror attack in Israel’s history and the bloodiest day for Jews since the Holocaust, Netanyahu may well be entering the twilight of his career. One way or another, it is unlikely that the current Netanyahu-led government will run its full term to October 2026. The average length of an Israeli government since independence is 1.8 years. And Israel, whose politics are fractious during normal times, has just weathered a stunningly abnormal—even traumatic—year, with Netanyahu leading efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary and the Oct. 7 terror surge. Both traumas, his critics charge, were a direct result of Netanyahu’s failed policies.

That is not to say the political demise of Israel’s longest-governing prime minister will be quick. Right now, there are no direct mechanisms to remove him from power. Indeed, Netanyahu has a few more levers to pull, including from a most unlikely quarter: a U.S. president who is aiming to deliver an Israel-Saudi normalization accord before the American elections in November, if Netanyahu plays along.

In January, the Labor Party put forward a no-confidence motion for the government’s failure to redeem the hostages. The vote had no chance, but it signaled the beginning of the return of domestic politics, suspended in the interest of national unity since Oct. 7. Yair Lapid, the head of oppositional party Yesh Atid, talked publicly about holding early elections while former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of the General Staff Gadi Eisenkot, a nonvoting member of the war cabinet, publicly chastised the prime minister for his refusal to prioritize the release of hostages and lack of crisis leadership.

The public is by no means giving up on the war against Hamas. But the twin goals of destroying Hamas’s military organization and freeing the 136 hostages still held are now increasingly at odds with one another. Hamas used time—and its tunnel maze—to frustrate the IDF’s operations; a deal to free the hostages may be looming. That will be a fraught decision point for the prime minister as far-right members of his coalition insist the war must continue while centrists and the center-left push toward a hostage deal involving an extended pause in the fighting.

In this respect, Netanyahu could finally be cornered. As Anshel Pfeffer, perhaps the most astute observer of Netanyahu, has argued, what the prime minister fears the most isn’t the Americans or pressure from the hostages’ families but “losing the majority in the Knesset that took him four years and five election campaigns, including 18 frustrating months out of office, to secure.”

If a hostage deal that necessitates a lengthy cease-fire emerges, far-right Knesset members, notably National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir or Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (especially the former, whose party’s poll numbers have risen), may seek to cement their status as true believers of a maximalist war approach by bolting the coalition.

But if Netanyahu bows to pressure from his right, the looming threat of resignations by Benny Gantz and Eisenkot from the war cabinet remains a distinct possibility. Gantz and Eisenkot, members of the increasingly popular National Unity political alliance, have ramped up their criticism of Netanyahu in recent weeks. Eisenkot said Netanyahu bears “sharp and clear” responsibility for the Oct. 7 attacks. If they do resign, Gantz and Eisenkot could fuel a new wave of protests against Netanyahu and spark other government officials, perhaps even members of Netanyahu’s own party, to step aside.

Netanyahu’s political acumen—and sheer will—to stay in power should never be underestimated. But his staying power these days is also a result of the realities of Israel’s political process.

To send him packing, there are several pathways available for the Israeli opposition—all of them problematic. First, there is the vote of constructive no confidence. Modified in 2014 to ensure an alternative government must be proposed, any constructive vote of no confidence requires at least 61 Knesset member votes (out of 120) to enact. Alternatively, the Knesset can pass a bill supported by a simple majority to dissolve itself and move to elections. Right now, there seems to be no appetite in the current Knesset to send the country into yet another election in wartime, much less the votes needed for an alternative governing coalition.

The second mechanism to remove Netanyahu stems from the belief that resignations by Gantz and Eisenkot from the war cabinet, coupled with widespread protests, will serve as the catalysts for a handful of Likud MKs to abandon Netanyahu. But there’s no guarantee that Gantz and Eisenkot will voluntarily resign from their influential posts anytime soon. To them, overseeing Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s decisions, such as preventing further escalation in Lebanon, help blunt the coalition’s far-right actors. Also, Netanyahu still maintains control of his party. The Likud does not have a history of abandoning its leader and devouring its own. The idea that members of Netanyahu’s own party could see a path forward without their leader and drop from the governing coalition remains a long shot.

The third option that could in theory remove Netanyahu is often overlooked but has proved integral to political change after prior national traumas: a state commission of inquiry. Formed by the government or the Knesset State Control Committee, a state commission is highly consequential given its broad investigative powers, such as the ability to call witnesses and recommend resignations. State commissions are led by the president of the Supreme Court, who appoints its members, insulating the process from political interference.

State commissions of inquiry are powerful. After the failures in the leadup to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, relentless public pressure based on findings from the Agranat Commission forced Prime Minister Golda Meir to resign five months after the war ended and just one month after forming the 16th government of Israel following the December 1973 elections. Given the national trauma inflicted by Oct. 7, the creation of a commission of inquiry is a near certainty—the question is when, not if.

But any state commission of inquiry would take months to release its findings. The Agranat Commission took five months to release an interim report (April 1974) and nearly a year and a half to release the final version (January 1975).

Aside from the extended timeline, Netanyahu could seek to modify the creation of a commission of inquiry to shield himself from personal responsibility.

Take the Winograd Commission of 2006, for example. In the aftermath of the much-maligned 2006 stalemate with Hezbollah, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appointed former Mossad director Nahum Admoni to head the committee investigating the government’s management of the war in Lebanon (This later turned into a government commission of inquiry.). Ultimately managed by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd, Olmert was able to evade a state commission by the active president of the Supreme Court (Justice Dorit Beinisch)—a move that may pique Netanyahu’s interest given his well-documented critiques of Israel’s current Supreme Court.

Upon the release of Winograd’s damning findings, protests erupted across Israel calling for Olmert’s resignation. Olmert’s party, Kadima, stood behind him. The Knesset opposition leader at the time—a man by the name of Benjamin Netanyahu—called Olmert unfit to lead, arguing “the government is in charge of the military, and it failed miserably.” Despite relentless pressure, Olmert would survive for two more years, and a vote of no confidence in Winograd’s aftermath was never held.

And then, of course, there’s Netanyahu’s own trial—four years running with no signs of concluding any time soon. It could easily go another year and result in either a conviction or a plea bargain, including Netanyahu’s retirement from politics, to prevent that conviction result. The only certainty is that it will take time. Olmert was indicted in January 2012 over the Holyland affair, convicted on two counts of bribery in March 2014, and began serving a 19-month sentence only in February 2016.

There’s one additional pathway to remove Netanyahu from power; it’s a double-edged sword because it also contains an option for him to remain. Though the path ahead is fraught and uncertain, the Biden administration has embarked on an integrated regional initiative to move beyond the Israel-Hamas war and to stabilize the broader Arab-Israeli arena. Its centerpiece is the administration’s desire—evident well before Oct. 7—to push for an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. The broad outlines involve a sequential series of steps: first, a hostage-for-prisoner release that would lead to an Israeli-Hamas temporary cease-fire lasting months, followed by a Saudi offer to normalize relations with Israel provided the Israelis agree to the creation of a Palestinian state and withdrawal of forces from Gaza. There would also be a package of deliverables to Saudi Arabia, including what is certain to be a controversial mutual defense treaty and help with its nascent nuclear program as well as undefined security guarantees for Israel.

The administration’s logic appears to be that such an offer would certainly break Netanyahu’s coalition. But perhaps Netanyahu, eager to remain in power, would abandon his extremist partners and take part of his Likud party into a new alignment with more centrist partners to do the deal and cement his legacy. If Netanyahu refused the deal, elections would follow, possibly leading to his defeat, and the new government would grab the deal. In the words of Haaretz military correspondent Amos Harel, the deal represents Netanyahu’s “lifeline.”

Who or what replaces him, if things do not work out, is also difficult to predict. The politics of Israel are dominated by the right and center-right, and more often than not, it’s the right wing that has gained from security crises. In 2001, Likud’s Ariel Sharon handed Ehud Barak one of the biggest defeats in Israeli politics following the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the Second Intifada; the 2006 Lebanon War would shake the Israeli electorate’s confidence in Olmert, whose resignation would lead to the beginning of Netanyahu’s long run as prime minister. It seems hard to imagine a resurgence of the center-left. In the latest election cycle, Labor barely reached the Knesset threshold with four seats, and the progressive Meretz did not qualify altogether. This political paradigm has not changed since Oct. 7. If anything, Israeli attitudes have moved further to the right than ever before.

Still, a course correction is coming—most likely a government led by Gantz, more focused on the protection of democracy, civil society, and the rule of law. Gantz’s new coalition would cast aside the counterproductive rhetoric Netanyahu deploys toward the United States, and perhaps would prove more pragmatic on issues pertaining to the conflict with the Palestinians. It’s doubtful if a new government, likely running the ideological gamut from right to left along the lines of the previous Bennett-Lapid coalition, would be able to make core decisions leading to a transformative, conflict-ending agreement with the Palestinians. Still, while it will not offer a quick solution to the elusive problem of the much-too-promised land, a new government might—with leadership changes on the Palestinian side as well—get the region a step closer.

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24news-press-world · 3 years

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Case Study Abstract: Casino Esq., Bruce. “Billion Dollar Middle East Fraud Goes Uninvestigated: Suggestions for Improving UAE Legal and Prosecutorial System in Fraud Cases.” Washington, D.C., 80 pp.

The article provides an independent, legal analysis of the corruption case of Tameer Holding Investments, a company in which Ahmed AlRajhi, current Saudi Minister of Labor, acquired a 75% majority shareholding and which Canadian citizen Omar Ayesh established circa 2003. Whistleblower documents subsequently revealed that upon securing majority control, AlRajhi and brothers orchestrated the expropriation of assets from the company, leading to its effective collapse.

The matter has been in litigation for 13 years, during which 25 court-appointed experts in seven committees have reviewed the details. Several experts were unable to reach conclusions due to abuse of process; yet despite the obstruction, panels issued three reports in favor of Ayesh with awards of 4.2 billion, 6.8 billion and, as recently as November 2020, 1.6 billion UAE dirhams plus penalties, which would amount to approximately half a billion United States dollars. The case is in the appeals process and has been referred to the Dubai Ruler’s Court as of May 2021.

Casino reviews Ayesh’s establishment of Tameer Holding Investments (THI) and the subsequent partnership with Ahmed AlRajhi in two agreements (2005 & 2007). He also introduces whistleblower documents which provide a framework for the analysis (page 9). These were leaked several years after the AlRajhis had begun rejecting Ayesh’s claims of shareholding; and their revelation exposed the premeditated expropriation of assets out of THI.

The AlRajhi conspiracy to defraud Ayesh included a plan to deny the latter’s shareholding, then accept it (p. 19), then deny it, and in 2021 following the virtual completion of extracting assets and rendering THI indebted, acknowledge his shareholding in an ostensibly bankrupt company. Asma Khan, the AlRajhi’s Chief Legal Officer, designed a multi-company structure within the context that “Tameer is intended to die” (p. 16). She provided a lawful façade for a specific fraud scheme to render Tameer valueless through the establishment of shell companies and transferring or “selling” them Tameer assets (p. 20). Federico Tauber, the president of Tameer was given 9 months of broadly scoped power of attorney to rapidly establish several new companies, open bank accounts, transfer bank financing, and complete land transfers to new companies to execute the plan (p. 21).

Casino outlines the complexity of the embezzlement involved by discussing a selection of projects mentioned in the leaked documents. These include 6 plots in the Emirate of Dubai (p. 22), a revenue redirection scheme involving the company’s Imperial Tower (p. 23) and the expropriation of Tatweer shares, a joint venture with the emirate of Umm al Quwain’s government (p. 27). The plan also included one of the company’s landmark projects, Tameer Towers in Abu Dhabi, and was laid out in a presentation detailing a 2022 exit plan to defraud individual buyers as well as Ayesh (p. 25). The TT project garnered regional attention when investors won in arbitration and others refused Tameer management’s “half money” offer; yet even those with court orders have yet to obtain compensation.

The article then details the illegal activity to conceal fraud (p. 28). The revelations include the ease with which an employee of an Abu Dhabi royal apparently used forged identity papers to get a government agency to renew corporate licenses without requisite documents, which allowed the AlRajhis to remove Ayesh as an obstacle to expropriation. The forgery extended to use of backdated and false board resolutions that had AlRajhi employees, including a bewildered human resources staffer, to be “appointed” to the Board and sign resolutions dated before they knew they were assigned (p. 30).

Fraudulent financial reports, representations and financial manipulation are shown to be at the core of the calculated corruption at Tameer (p. 33). Casino analyses leaked documents that demonstrate the AlRajhi brothers were not only aware of, but directed, efforts to evade internal and external audit of Tameer, contrary to Emirati law (p. 34). Even when legal proceedings were in progress, discovery irregularities such as management noncompliance with audit access to IT systems and financial records allowed the AlRajhis to conceal evidence of the fraud (pp. 71, 35).

Corrupting and undermining judicial procedures extended beyond denial of discovery with evidence of threatening potential witnesses (p. 38). Such tactics extended not only to former Tameer employees, but even experts appointed by the court, including the equivalent of a magistrate judge in the United States (p. 39).

In 2018 Ahmad AlRajhi retained external auditor Ali Al Kaitoob to complete financial statements from 2008 to 2016, such a belated procedure itself one of numerous infractions of International Auditing Standards (IAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) given that trade license renewals demand submission of annual audits (p. 43). Irregularities discussed include the fact that the group’s 2008 opening balance did not match the Ernst & Young audited 2007 closing; as well as there being a significant imbalance in the trial balance of 2008; lack of reference made to transfer of plots among related parties (IFRS 24 violation); maintaining an unrevised, year to year provision of liabilities and losses of more than a billion dirhams (IFRS 37 v.); another infraction was the fact the no revenue was “recognized” for delivered projects, and a figure of 3 billion UAE dirhams was registered as liabilities rather than revenue, gross violations of IFRS 15; and accepting transference of Ahmed AlRajhi’s shareholder obligations to a “loan” account (IFRS 32 v.) (p. 45).

Notwithstanding the evidence of corruption detailed in the report, Casino reports that on 25 March 2018, the Court of Appeals adopted the unanimous determination of the five Experts in their report to the trial court in Ayesh vs Tameer deciding in Ayesh’s favor (p. 47). They concluded that Tameer was indebted to Ayesh for an amount of AED 125,852,757.97 (USD $34 million) in addition to AED 4.132 billion (USD $1.13 billion) representing the value of his 25% share in Tameer. The expert report outlined the rationale for their decision as well as the challenges faced in obtaining information to reach their conclusions.

The award was not enforceable; and further litigation ensued in the Ayesh vs. AlRajhi civil case (p. 48) which saw several experts resign, including one under threat. Another was Mustapha al Sheryani, the real estate expert whose impartiality was questionable given that Tameer was in possession of 52 assets when Ayesh departed, yet he only valued a few of those plots. AlSheryani had initially endorsed the expert committee’s preliminary report in favor of Ayesh stating the financial statements were unreliable, that the transfer of assets was done at below fair market value and agreed with Ayesh’s rights at 6.8 billion AED. Yet in the final report, he completely changed his position, now accepting the financial statements previously criticized and considering the asset transfer as commercially sound, even though no new evidence was introduced to justify the suspicious turnaround (p. 49). He then resigned under dubious circumstances during the appeals process, which led to the court seeking to appoint an eighth expert committee, a development that reverted the case back to square one after 13 years of litigation (p. 55).

Casino includes in his analysis matters of direct relevance as well as case studies of comparable crimes. Where the AlRajhis are involved in similar corrupt practices, Casino details the Qatar Scheme: Bridgehouse Capital (“BHC”) The Pearl Island Case (p. 56). He then provides case studies and references such as Enron, the Abraaj Group and Madoff (pp. 62 – 65).

Casino concludes with a review of challenges in pursuing litigation in the UAE and outlines lessons that can be learned from the loopholes which are regularly abused by lawyers and their influential clients (pp. 71 – 75). The judicial process in the UAE has strong merits, yet has also led the US State Department’s Mission UAE to express concern about the prevalence of procedural abuses noting: “Some firms might feel compelled to exit the UAE market as they are unable to sustain the pursuit of legal or dispute-resolution mechanisms that can take months or even years to reach resolution.” Casino concludes that while Dubai has clear goals of equity, its judicial process is open to abuse with limited mechanisms of expediency and accountability (p. 77).

About the Author

Bruce J. Casino is a compliance and white-collar crime expert and a litigator with extensive experience in litigation including white collar defense, False Claims Act, customs duties and customs fraud, export controls, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) matters. Mr. Casino has represented a broad range of individual and corporate clients in compliance and civil and white-collar criminal litigation and investigations matters. He chairs the ABA’s Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Subcommittee. He has served as lead counsel on compliance and white-collar matters for several prestigious companies including Panasonic Avionics Corporation, Booz Allen Hamilton, and Symantec as well as several law firms. He has earned a preeminent rating in the Martindale-Hubbell® Peer Review Ratings, a practitioner-based ranking for attorneys, and is a Fellow of the Litigation Counsel of America, the trial lawyer honorary society.

He is a frequent lecturer on corruption as well as numerous papers on compliance and corruption, including co-authoring works such as “International White-Collar Enforcement, 2016 edition: Leading Lawyers on Preventative Measures, Regulatory Compliance, and Litigation.” He has also served as an adjunct professor at the George Washington University Law School, teaching the university’s course on white collar crime for 14 years. He is a member of and thought leader in the American Bar Association, authoring papers about compliance and international business. He earned his Juris Doctorate from Georgetown University Law Center.

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allthebrazilianpolitics · 1 year

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Brazil seeks Arab investors who want to fund infrastructure projects

With new state governors and a new president, Brazil is expected to become fertile ground for international investors who want to fund infrastructure projects. Gulf nations are well-positioned to take part in that process.

Various reasons make Brazil a good destination for investments at this time. Not only does it need to urgently develop its logistical systems and energy production infrastructures, but its authorities also learned over time that they need to work with public-private partnerships if they want to have access to the necessary funds and stimulate change.

During the World Economic Forum in January in Davos, Brazil’s Finance Minister Fernando Haddad met with Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih and discussed potential partnerships.

“They have investment funds and are paying attention to the calls for partnerships that the Brazilian government, the states and the municipalities will open from now on. That is good because it will make available a significant volume of funds,” Haddad said after the meeting.

#brazil #politics #brazilian politics #arab world #economy #foreign policy #infrastructure #mod nise da silveira #image description in alt

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zvaigzdelasas · 2 years

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[eKathimerini is Greek Media]

Athens is reportedly concerned about the possibility of a further escalation of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean by Turkey via the Tripoli-based government in Libya.

More specifically, Greece, which has yet to appoint an ambassador in Tripoli, is considering the unfavorable scenario whereby the government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli will proceed with the next steps at the United Nations to adjust the outer limits of the Libyan continental shelf as defined in the illegal Turkish-Libyan memorandum that violates Greek territorial rights.

Such a move, possibly combined with the parallel launch of exploration by the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO), would constitute an intense escalation to the south of Crete.

Moreover, a few weeks after signing agreements for hydrocarbon exploration, Ankara and Tripoli also inked military cooperation deals. These foresee Turkey promising to train Libyan Air Force pilots.

[Atlantic Council is NATO's primary think tank]

The UAE’s interventionism in Libya goes back to 2011. The UAE viewed Libya as a central battleground for the order of post-revolutionary states after the 2011 Arab uprisings, with the aim of curtailing the role of Islamist parties, like the Muslim Brotherhood, in governance. This policy crystallized as exclusive political and military support for General Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in 2014. To support Haftar’s war effort to counter Islamists and political opponents in Eastern Libya, the UAE balanced between unilateral interventionism and funneling support using Egypt as a proxy, leveraging the Egypt-Libya land border. It also used its soft power in the Elysée, supporting France’s impulse to provide military and diplomatic support for the Libyan general. These efforts boosted Haftar’s international standing while helping him secure control over Eastern and then Southern Libya, as well as Libya’s oil crescent, primarily using UAE-supplied equipment and aerial support.

Emirati military support for Haftar peaked in 2019-2020, attracting negative attention that added to the reputational toll of its involvement in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. During Haftar’s offensive, the UAE conducted hundreds of drone strikes on Haftar’s behalf, supplied him with weaponry and jet fuel, and financed Sudanese mercenaries that fought with his LAAF. Despite this, Haftar’s war effort faced setbacks, prompting Abu Dhabi to re-adjust its foreign policy to pre-empt increased scrutiny over its military adventurism.[...]

Coincidentally, the arrival of the Government of National Unity (GNU) quickly followed Abu Dhabi’s formalization of the Abraham Accords and its increased focus on regional neighbors, such as Israel. In practice, GNU Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbaiba’s emergence in Libya’s political scene dovetailed with Abu Dhabi increasingly exporting a vision of foreign policy that centered around pragmatism, economic stability, and trade partnerships in light of the accords. While the UAE did not change the essence of its foreign policy, its rhetoric contrasted sharply with the former, more muscular approach to foreign policy Abu Dhabi employed.

Though initially uneasy with Dbaiba due to his ties in Libya’s Islamist milieu, the prime minister—who is also not a champion of liberal democracy—eventually secured Abu Dhabi’s acquiescence due to his transactional approaches aligning with Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy shift. Adding to Emirati relief was the fact that Dbaiba did not preferentially empower Islamist actors within his executive. This led to a burgeoning relationship between Abu Dhabi and Tripoli, with Dbaiba seeking to revive Muammar Gaddafi-era deals with the Emirates in the telecommunications, energy, and construction sectors, as well as covertly negotiating Emirati companies’ access to operate free-trade-zones, economic zones, and ports. Conversely, Abu Dhabi’s most notable concession vis-à-vis the GNU has been its quiet scaling down of financial support to pro-Haftar partisan media outlets and TV channels it was suspected of funding, forcing some to shut down.

These developments were also influenced by the fact the UAE was engaging in a fast-paced rapprochement with Turkey that led to boosted economic ties with Ankara. [...] This led it to focus on regional diplomacy, bringing Abu Dhabi closer to Ankara. In Libya, it was, in turn, more pragmatic for the UAE not to compromise its rapprochement with Turkey by doubling down on Haftar or undermining a Turkish-backed Dbaiba.

Instead, the UAE focused on brokering conciliative meetings and shuttle diplomacy between Dbaiba and Haftar’s circles, attempting to manufacture power-sharing arrangements between both. The replacement of Sanalla as National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman—executed by Dbaiba and followed by Haftar lifting his then-blockade on oil ports—is perhaps one of the most notable impacts of this mediation to date.[...]

In choosing not to compromise its rapprochement with Turkey and supporting Dbaiba, the UAE has broken with its long-standing standing partners in Libya: Egypt and France. Since March of this year, the latter have focused on openly undermining the GNU, instead, backing the bid of former Libyan Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha for the post of Prime Minister.[...]

Another concern is that Bashagha’s bid for prime minister is backed by prominent figures of Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood with links to Qatar, the UAE’s regional rival. Lastly, it is also suspected that Abu Dhabi has a personal animosity towards Bashagha, who played a prominent role in countering the Emirati-backed offensive of Haftar on Tripoli in 2019.

27 Oct 22

French website, Africa Intelligence, has reported that Khalifa Haftar is threatening to block oilfields in territories controlled by his forces in order to regain his footing in the struggle for power, saying this is coming from Egyptian pressure.[...]

It added that Haftar's ally Egypt has been pressuring him to take action against an oil deal struck between Tripoli and Turkey, saying that Haftar was caught out when the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity took control of the country's oil sector by reorganizing Libya's Supreme Council for Energy.

26 Oct 22

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girlactionfigure · 19 days

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🔅Thu morning - ISRAEL REALTIME - Connecting to Israel in Realtime

🟨 SUMMARY .. there are many signs of impending Iranian hostile action, and it appears some nations concerned for Israel, and some concerned about Israel’s possible significant response and its potential impact to the region.

BUT, it could be propaganda, an intentional threat/fear campaign on Iran’s part - an effective one if so.

Don’t panic, however some preparations would be wise. Home Front Command -> https://www.oref.org.il/12490-15903-en/pakar.aspx (link only works in Israel - or use a VPN app to connect to Israel)

⚠️RUSSIA - AVOID MIDDLE EAST.. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "We strongly recommend avoiding travel to the Middle East and especially to Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories."

⚠️BIDEN SAYS.. Biden at a press conference last night: “Iran is threatening to launch a significant attack on Israel, but as I told Prime Minister Netanyahu, our commitment to Israel's security against these threats from Iran and its proxies is an ironclad commitment.”

Brett McGurk, Biden's special envoy for the Middle East, spoke with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates requesting that they convey messages to Iran in order to defuse tensions in the region.

⚠️TURKEY TRIED TO HELP? Unofficial sources claim that Tehran rejected Turkey's mediation offer in order to prevent a military confrontation between Iran and Israel.

▪️IRAN, DON’T NEED GPS..The Iranians announce that all their missile systems, developed in 12 years, are not based on GPS navigation, but ‘advanced technology’.

▪️HEZBOLLAH QUIET (ish).. The terrorist organization concluded yesterday with only 2 events, firing anti-tank missiles and rockets at positions in the Har Dov area.

▪️GAZA.. According to the Arab reports, Israel attacked during the night with heavy forces in the vicinity of the Nuseirat camp in the center of the Gaza Strip, an area that has been left alone to date.

HINTS.. Cabinet member Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich: "We have dismantled Hamas' form, we will have to continue to fight terrorism and deepen the operations in Rafah and Deir al-Balach, Nusairat - part of this begins today.”

▪️ARAB RIOTS IN TKAO, BETHLEHEM AREA.. Riots by terrorists in the town of Tkao in the Bethlehem Governorate, the IDF forces respond with measures to disperse demonstrations.

▪️ISRAEL SOCIETY - COUNTER-PROTEST.. The Tikva Forum, made up of (some of the) families of hostages, and the "If You Want" organization will hold a demonstration tonight in front of the Prime Minister's residence in Jerusalem, DEMANDING that the fighting in Gaza CONTINUE until "total victory”.

▪️HOUTHI DRONES AT SHIPS.. US forces have successfully shot down 11 drones launched from areas controlled by the Houthis in Yemen. Two of them were launched over the Gulf of Aden and another one over the Red Sea. No injuries or damage to merchant ships or US and coalition ships were reported.

#Israel #October 7 #Hamas Massacre #Gaza #Israel/HamasWar #Real Time Updates

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mariacallous · 1 year

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Sweden, once a pioneer of feminist foreign policy, is now the first to revoke it. Shortly after the country’s newly elected prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, announced his cabinet on Oct.18, his new foreign minister, Tobias Billstrom, declared the policy’s reversal, saying, “Gender equality is a core value for Sweden and this government, but we will not conduct a feminist foreign policy.”

The reversal in Sweden is in some respects unsurprising. Gender politics often fluctuate with political transitions, and waves of progressive gender equality agendas have historically met barriers and reversals. What is surprising, however, is that the founding nation behind this movement is now at the helm of its attempted undoing.

Like the broader feminist movement, the feminist foreign-policy agenda is the subject of intense debate and cannot be prescriptive for every context; thus, there is no universal consensus as to what it entails. Despite this lack of cohesion, the agenda can broadly be understood as policies that focus a country’s international engagements on gender issues through rhetoric, diplomacy, and development aid, among other vehicles. Underlying this approach is the belief that issues of gender equality shape every dimension of global stability and prosperity, from ensuring that peace deals last to lifting up global economies to protecting global health and beyond.

Sweden’s 2014 implementation of a feminist foreign-policy agenda under then-Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom aimed to put the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights at the center of its global activities. The policy consisted of three R’s: rights, representation, and resources, which directed funding and support toward enhancing women’s position, participation, and wider inclusion in society.

In practice, the adoption of this policy in Sweden led to a notable boost for the country’s aid spending on gender equality efforts abroad, increasing from $2 billion in 2016 to almost $2.7 billion in 2019. This spending helped Sweden finance a large and growing number of gender-focused international development programs and deliver gender-responsive humanitarian assistance to populations in need.

Beyond aid, the feminist foreign-policy agenda has also shaped Sweden’s approach to high-profile diplomatic negations. For example, it was seen as having influenced Wallstrom’s bold criticisms of Saudi Arabia’s record on women’s rights in 2015, which ultimately contributed to the country’s decision to end a long-standing weapons deal with the Persian Gulf state. Under this framework, Sweden also led global initiatives on women’s rights—including when it introduced a resolution at the United Nations Security Council in 2017 to elevate sexual and gender-based violence as grounds for economic sanctions. The policy also led the Swedish government to increase the number of women serving as ambassadors to almost half of all positions.

Sweden’s experience has demonstrated that this approach is more than a rhetorical gesture, and it can meaningfully influence policy outcomes on the world stage. Yet even with its successes, the movement has faced continued criticism from supporters and skeptics alike, with some today calling for a “rethink.” Many have raised concerns about the agenda’s failure to match rhetoric to action and demand a precise vision as well as its lack of accountability to citizens and feminist groups. Others have criticized the movement for failing to incorporate adequately inclusive and intersectional approaches to feminism, suggesting the agenda is steeped in perceived cultural imperialism—although the introduction of Mexico’s feminist foreign policy has helped stunt critiques of the agenda as an export of the global north.

Still, others perceive the use of feminist terminology to be too radical, either because they do not agree with the term or more simply because they worry that the policy can inspire negative reactions or backlash in contexts where the term is not accepted, hampering the potential for programs and policies to take effect or harming intended beneficiaries.

Sweden’s reversal, however, is less a rebuke of the feminist foreign-policy movement’s goals or strategy than it is a reflection of the country’s current political dynamics, as right-wing politicians attempt to reclaim conservative authority on social and fiscal issues. In his recent announcement, Billstrom claimed the policy reversal was necessary “because labels on things have a tendency to cover up the content.” His point highlights clear schisms in Swedish politics whereby views of the feminist term have, at times, been perceived as too radical.

This shift is undoubtedly a blow to the movement, but it does not necessarily signal its undoing. Because Sweden’s new government has—at least in rhetoric—publicly claimed an interest in upholding policy supporting women’s rights, its hands may be tied when it comes to reversing many of its feminist policies in practice.

Take, for instance, foreign aid. Sweden has long been a leader not only in gender equality foreign assistance but also in foreign aid writ large, committing more than 1 percent of its gross national income (GNI) to these efforts since the mid-2000s. As a result of these commitments, Sweden was ranked the third most generous aid donor country among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries in 2021.

Billstrom’s rebuke of the feminist foreign-policy agenda is swept up in concurrent efforts by the political right to cut Sweden’s aid spending. The new government has announced it aims to freeze its aid spending, reducing its long-standing 1 percent of GNI contributions to a projected 0.8 percent in 2023, which will inevitably lead to cuts in funding for global gender equality programs.

Yet because it promised to remain a leader for global gender equality, the new government must be careful to avoid making specific cuts to gender equality commitments that are not proportional to other reductions. Any shifts in aid spending for these programs could heighten criticisms that the government is hostile to women’s rights, risking backlash from voters.

The legacy of Sweden’s feminist foreign policy may also prompt attention from the new government to the optics of its mostly male leadership. Almost a decade after launching the agenda, women’s representation in global politics still hovers low, with women comprising just 21 percent of government ministers worldwide and only 26 percent of national parliamentarians. Facing public pressure, Sweden, among many countries, has boosted its investments in support for women’s political representation. Activists have urged the government to expand the government’s bureaucratic expertise in issues of political inclusion and for male leaders in particular to bring in greater women’s representation in their own cabinets and parties.

Partly as a product of this investment, Sweden’s new cabinet consists of 24 ministers—13 men and 11 women. Thus, the image of Sweden’s current male foreign minister slashing the country’s heralded former female foreign minister’s feminist project could create problems for the current administration, especially as the world’s attention is locked on the crowds of women and girls defying male authorities in Iran. The perception of this legacy under attack will then likely pressure Billstrom to avoid damaging optics and make the country’s female leadership even more visible in its global engagements on gender equality.

From spending to diplomacy to cabinet composition, the feminist foreign-policy agenda will continue to shape the government’s decision-making at home and abroad—whether Sweden’s leaders like it or not.

But the agenda’s ripple effects won’t stop there.

Sweden’s commitment to a feminist foreign policy in 2014 was met with fanfare from global gender equality advocates and sparked a wave of national commitments to this framework in Canada (2017), France (2019), Mexico (2020), Spain (2021), Luxembourg (2021), Germany (2021), and Chile (2022). Although their impacts are difficult to measure, these endorsements have resulted in a more gender-sensitive approach to the global COVID-19 pandemic response and recovery effort and in enhanced commitments from government to collect sex-disaggregated data to inform policymaking, among other measures.

Given that Sweden was a pioneer of the movement, it’s tempting to look at Sweden’s reversal as a test case for feminist foreign policy elsewhere. But Sweden’s setbacks could counterintuitively strengthen feminist agendas in other contexts. A study my team at the Overseas Development Institute conducted on women’s rights movements and norm changes indicates that perceived threats to gender equality in other countries can provide an anchoring effect for national women’s movements, which are motivated to double down and hold fast to progress in response. For example, the high-profile gang rape of a young girl in New Delhi in 2012 contributed to an explosion of national anti-violence against women campaigns working to maintain and expand existing protections in other countries. It’s possible, however, that Sweden’s changes could also inspire and empower backlash, thus indicating that the full effects of the move could depend on the relative strength of other movements in their national contexts.

Even facing challenges in certain settings, gender equality advocates across the board are broadly benefitting from an improving global consensus on women’s rights. In my research, I have explored how feminist principles are generally expanding over time. In my team’s study of attitudinal change in the World Values Surveys since the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, we found that attitudes that men should hold power and not women have palpably dropped over recent decades. In the mid-1990s, 50 percent of people surveyed globally agreed that “men make better political leaders”—a share that has since fallen to 35 percent. Even in traditionally conservative societies, such as Kuwait, engagement with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women has contributed to norm change as local discourse has gradually absorbed the language of preventing discrimination against women. Rising global solidarity on women’s issues—reflected, for example, in the Qatari foreign minister’s recent disappointment with the Taliban’s retrenchments of women’s rights in Afghanistan—also indicate growing rhetorical consensus on the importance of women’s rights.

Regardless of what happens in Sweden, the feminist foreign-policy movement is far from over. The elevation of feminist issues to the country’s highest-profile international engagements means that attempts to roll back its policies on women’s rights will inevitably meet attention and scrutiny. Traditionally, governments hostile to gender equality issues have been able to shift their approaches under the cover of wider budgetary and strategic changes, but the feminist foreign-policy agenda has forced these decisions into public view. So-called anti-feminist policies are no longer the status quo but rather an exposed choice.

Although the feminist foreign-policy agenda in Sweden can be reversed on paper, its legacy at home and abroad cannot be fully erased.

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