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fapangel · 6 years

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Syrian Chemical Retaliation 2 - More Than Cruise Missiles Boogaloo

By now everyone's heard that Syria has once again used chemical weapons against their own civilians, and this time the scale of attack is pretty big. Twitter has been absolutely ablaze today with RUMINT relating to White House meetings and Syrian/Russian forces scrambling about, but one need look no further than Trump's own tweets that name Putin explicitly and promise a “big price to pay” to know that the fecal matter is indeed growing more authentic by the hour. There's been decent evidence that the Syrian regime has engaged in repeated use of CW even after last year's warning from the US, but this attack wasn't only far larger, but also came on the one-year anniversary of the US's retaliatory strike on Shayrat air base; punishment for just such an attack. And if that wasn't enough, this comes only days after Trump announced his desire (and a 6-month timetable) for leaving Syria, now that ISIS is (mostly) licked. It's quite possible this timing was mere coincidence, as the attack achieved a real military goal, scoring a victory for Assad in a months-long struggle with a major enemy force. But all that matters now is appearances, and all things considered it's almost certain that Trump's about to crank Assad's mouth open and force-feed him a heaping helping of FREEDOM. Here comes the airplane!

And it will be airplanes this time - not just cruise missiles.

What's the Goal?

The punitive strike on Shayrat air base was effectively a slap on the wrist; even if it did destroy 20% of the SAAF's operational aircraft. Compared to what we could have done, 60 Tomahawks was a restrained measure, and by targeting the airbase the chemical attack had been launched from, we were sending a message. The message was “this is what we can do with exactly two DDGs and nothing more. Imagine what happens when we get serious. Do not do this again.” Since they've done it again, now we're going to get serious.

This entails punishment. The goal is to make Assad bitterly regret crossing this line by blowing up things he really, really doesn't want blown up - things vital to his regime and its ongoing fight for survival. The target list is extensive and endless - anything from actual Syrian military assets of any sort to important government buildings to vital resources and infrastructure (oil wells, port facilities, etc.) are viable targets.

The target list is expanded by the Syrian war's current ground situation. Last year, the regime's survival wasn't seriously threatened, but it wasn't a sure thing, either. Nowadays the Americans seem set on splitting Syria down the Euphrates, with their Kurdish allies controlling all the major oil fields (i.e. revenue sources) in that area, and after repeated clashes with coalition forces - including the shoot-down of a Syrian Arab Air Force Su-24 and the Wagner group massacre - they've made it clear they intend to keep them, even in the face of concerted Russian-supported efforts to the contrary. This likely prompted the refocusing on long-standing western Syrian rebel strongholds like eastern Ghouta - the land grab is over, now it's about consolidation. In short, the US can inflict a higher level of pain on Assad's regime without seriously endangering its very existence, something that's fairly evidently not in US interests at this time. (It'd be a gift to Iran, who's already set up shop in Syria, and Iran's continuing efforts to control Iraq's new political order is a sharp lesson in what post-Assad Syria would likely look like.) The era of pivotal pitched battles is over, but the slow grinding attrition that remains was painful enough to induce Assad to use CW; ergo, weakening the regime (and lengthening the grind) will sting badly without risk of deciding the whole conflict.

A final consideration is visibility. The reason Assad used chemical weapons is because they're hideously effective and cost-efficient. This is indeed the point of any Weapon of Mass Destruction. This is also why they're terrifying - there's a very strong incentive for any military force to use them frequently; the poorer and more desperate the force, the stronger the incentive. So powerful are they that they're effectively the only counter to themselves; the only good military reason to hold them back is the risk of receiving like attacks in turn. (This kept gas off most battlefields for all of WWII.) Likewise, against those that cannot retaliate in kind, they have been used frequently - see Imperial Japan against China, Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, or even Saddam's gas attacks on Kurds. The only thing keeping the WMD genie in the bottle is, and always has been, the threat of punishment. Letting Assad get away without punishment would indicate to all that no punishment from the US or other major players of the international order will be forthcoming, and then things will get ugly. Thus Assad's punishment has to be something dramatic and memorable. This is worsened by the US's obvious need to avoid deposing Assad - many might conclude (as Assad likely has himself) that since the US cannot afford to remove him, he can use chemical weapons without fear of the ultimate penalty. The punishment must belie that reasoning; must inflict negatives so strong that they blatantly outweigh whatever gain Assad reaped from using WMD. (It's worth noting that Assad's regime and Assad aren't the same thing - if the regime's stable enough to survive without Assad, then he's got a bullseye on his back as we speak.)

Therefore:

What Are The Targets?

* The targets will not necessarily be strictly military: government buildings, dual-use resources, sources of revenue for the regime, are all valid targets. Russia's vested interest in keeping Assad in power works against them here; even if the US miscalculates and deals the regime's support network lethal blows, the Russians (and Iranians) will have to pony up to avoid losing their significant sunk cost.

* The targets will include infrastructure: Assad's regime has to feel the impact of this punishment for it to be effective; it has to impose consequences in daily life for months after the fact. Power plants, national infrastructure (ports, roads, rails,) are all fair game. This is similar to the strategy shift that produced results against Serbia. This requires fine planning and target selection, as one's splitting the line between imposing privations on Assad's civilian support base and imposing starvation, but the US's intel coalition (“Five Eyes”) is easily up to this task.

* The targets will include key personnel: The best way to pose an existential threat to a regime you can't afford to actually destroy is to kill key decision makers and commanders - though their regime will live on, even the most idealistic and patriotic of commanders tend to take the prospect of a JDAM landing in their lap rather personally. If key military and government officials pay for their complicity in CW usage with their lives, it'll send a strong message to anyone else contemplating their use in the future. This targeting needn't be explicit; it could be spun as collateral damage consequent to striking known military sites, for instance.

Taken all together, this means the US will be heading into downtown Damascus.

What's the Defenses?

I've taken a keen interest in the Syrian air defense network and especially how the ravages of civil war has affected it; but even with constant monitoring, it's hard to say with high certainty what its current state and disposition is. The pre-war Syrian IADS was one of the most impressive in the Middle East; while the usual mixed bag of SA-2s and SA-3s with a few SA-5s was present, the system really stood out for its extensive use of SA-6 Gainful's in fixed, hardened positions. (It might seem silly to use a system with fairly good mobility as fixed emplacements, but the rugged terrain of western Syria constrains effective deployment locations, and the SA-6 outperforms the SA-2/SA-3 even when tethered.) Even then the defenses around Damascus, Syria's capital and most important city, were notably dense. And while the subsequent civil war played merry hell with this extensive network's readiness, the importance (and relative security) of Damascus has ensured that its defenses remain especially robust. This only applies to Damascus proper; the defense-in-depth their network used to enjoy is gone (for instance, the known SAM/EW locations near/south of Daraa, which used to guard Damascas's southern approaches, have been in rebel-held or bitterly contested territory for years now.)

Syria's legacy systems aren't the only threat anymore, however. Scattered reports of Iranian assistance have given way to confirmed aid and equipment transfers from Russia; that Syria now operates some Russian-supplied SA-17s and SA-22 Greyhounds (Pantsir-S1) is well documented at this point. The SA-17 is a vastly upgraded SA-6 (Buk) system firing more accurate missiles at longer ranges, and the SA-22 is one of the best point-defense SHORAD systems around, well-suited to defending high-value point targets against cruise missiles and PGMs.

Long-range options are decidedly lacking - the Syrian's legacy SA-5s still pack impressive range and performance despite their age, but even if they've received significant upgrades from their Russian benefactors, they're unlikely to triumph against American ECM assets. The Russians are highly unlikely to commit suicide by firing on US aircraft, but firing on incoming weapons in defense of their allies is fine. They have two S-400 systems (one at their airbase at Latakia and another recently deployed to their port facility in Tartus,) and an S-300VM battery (purpose-built for cruise-missile intercept) somewhere further east (pinpointing this has been difficult, but RUMINT places it near something important further east in the country, which makes sense.) Unfortunately for Syria, the rugged terrain in western Syria (and around Damascus) limit LOS horizons against cruise missiles even more than normal. The Syrians will benefit from these systems superb radars, since Russia's officially claimed to have integrated their air defense networks together, but they suffer the same LOS issues.

Generally, against cruise missiles SAMs can only defend what they're parked next to - especially in the mountains of Syria. Since Russia's S-400s are parked near bases filled with Russians (which the US won't shoot at anyways,) they're mostly a non-factor. Much more significant is Russia's two A-50 AWACS aircraft, and to a lesser extent their 12 SU-30SM and 4 SU-34s and their superb air-to-air, look-down/shoot-down radars. These assets will provide the Syrians with much better early-warning of incoming cruise missiles; the Syrian EW network had low-level coverage gaps even before the war and now they're terribly pronounced. They may even have time to scramble the SAAF.

The final factor is simple standoff range - simply put, between US standoff weaponry, ECM support, stealth options and the ranges involved in-theater, the Syrians will only be shooting at incoming PGMs, not American warplanes. (Note how last night's attack on T4 airbase in the center of Syria was carried out by Israeli F-15's firing Delilah cruise missiles from over Lebanon.) It's only 150 nautical miles from RAF Akrotiri to Damascus - an F-18 could fire a JASSM or SLAM-ER about thirty seconds after going wheels-up.

In short, this will be mostly a battle between American standoff weaponry and ECM against a mix of legacy Syrian SAM systems and modern Russian SHORAD.

What's the Problem?

Normally, an air campaign like this has to crack the hard nut of a well-woven Integrated Air Defense System, focusing on vital nodes like hostile runways, major radars and long-range SAM systems, and increasingly, vital communication nodes (radio, fiber-optic, etc.) to start unraveling the overlapping defense and degrade it to something the attacking force can then pick apart piecemeal. In this case, there's no real overlapping defense for a multitude of reasons; with each important target guarded by its own contingent of point-defense systems - and what wide-area coverage there is, is Russian, and thus verboten to attack. Worse, the majority of likely targets are in or around Damascus; the SA-17s have the range to provide fairly good area coverage of the city and environs, freeing up any SA-22s (and whatever SA-8s they have left,) for point defense of the most likely high-value targets (or SA-17s themselves.)

Defended cities are a unique challenge to assail from the air, as Berlin, Hanoi and Baghdad have demonstrated. It's primarily a matter of area; cities tend to be big enough to disperse targets (and their AA defenses) enough to increase their survivability, but are compact enough that medium-range systems (SA-6, 11 and 17 included) can cover much if not all the area no matter where they're positioned. Thus defensive firepower is concentrated and overlapping, but attackers can't simply knock a “hole” in the defenses or pick it apart by eliminating key radars or communication nodes (even if they can't coordinate target assignment for best effect, they can all turn on their own radar and shoot at something.) Worse, this relative proximity means that single long-range systems aren't responsible for area coverage; so point-defense systems near high-value targets will almost surely benefit from enemy salvo attrition before their “Hail Mary” defense begins.

“Salvo attrition” is the big problem here. Cruise missiles are very accurate, smart, and have a fantastic ability to deliver a nasty punch in places you'd never risk a manned aircraft, but they're expensive and heavy; fighters can carry far more bombs than cruise missiles. Last night's Israeli attack on T4 airbase is a perfect example of the math - two F-15Is fired four Delilah cruise missiles apiece, and the Russians claimed that 5 were intercepted, and 3 struck their targets. Assuming the base was defended by an SA-22 Greyhound, that's exactly what one would expect (given the 57E6's twelve mile range and the flight times involved, it'd only be able to shoot once at each incoming. Even great point-defense is still a Hail-Mary pass.) This attrition imposes a minimum round count expended per important target - either to get through and destroy the target, or to destroy the SAM itself. Which is more efficient depends on how many targets the SAM is defending - and how many missiles it can actually engage. This is where the SA-17s prove problematic - their greater range (26nm; about twice the SA-6) is somewhat mitigated by terrain around Damascus, but still affords a longer window to shoot at incoming PGMs and reasonable magazine depth (considering a battery,) and since the radar vehicle is a TELAR (Transporter, Erector, Launcher, Radar,) it can pair with a Greyhound to form a fully self-contained, highly-mobile, layered range point-defense unit.

This mobility further complicates the weapons assignment problem; as target saturation is a key part of breaking through these defenses, and that's obviously time-sensitive. If you don't know where defending SAMs are, you can't know how many will fire on the cruise missiles assigned to any one target - so you've got to fire extra at all targets to guarantee enough make it through. You could simply do Bomb Damage Assessment and re-strike as necessary, but that might be even costlier. Consider the Greyhound again - 5 out of 8 intercepts is a 62.5% intercept rate, so with four remaining missiles, you can expect two or three more intercepts. That means you're firing three more weapons just to soak up the defenses - if they'd been launched with the first salvo, they would've done damage directly to target.

All the above demonstrates why the USN's ability to disgorge 50+ Tomahawks from a single DDG at a moment's notice is so powerful - it can take a lot of cruise missiles to do real work. A lot will ride on drafting an optimal attack plan to maximize damage from the ordinance expended; ensuring that everything the Administration wants destroyed, is destroyed. That's going to ride heavily on three factors:

* Unparalleled ISTAR capabilities,

* Sheer saturation capacity with Tomahawk missiles,

* New purpose-built penetration weapons like MALD-J and especially JASSM.

JASSM Is Kind Of A Big Deal

Usually a tough nut like Damascus is best attacked with overwhelming force; a lot of Wild Weasels firing a lot of HARMs, which can handily engage previously-unknown “pop-up” targets without a problem. Sadly, the HARM/AARGM's 70nm range would require US aircraft to get too close for comfort. The USAF has a new option, however - the JASSM.

The JASSM is an air-launched, fully-stealth-shaped cruise missile. Not low-observable, but stealthed. “Low-observable” aircraft (or weapons) have had their RCS reduced significantly, but not to the point of allowing reliable deep penetration of hostile radar coverage. It mainly describes engineering priorities - stealth platforms place a priority (and a price tag) on achieving minimal RCS. Low-Observable platforms aren't primarily engineered for it, but have still achieved significant reductions without compromising performance, sometimes impressively so (the Rafale is a good example, or the Super Hornet compared to the Hornet.) Even if it makes no impact on actual detection range (say, against a peer adversary with good radars,) LO is still desirable, as a reduced signature makes it harder for radar-guided missiles to lock on.

Naturally, this goes double for the far smaller RCS of a “full stealth” platform like the JASSM. Stealth shaping on cruise missiles is primarily for infiltration; so it can get close to its target without being detected by AWACS aircraft and pounced upon by CAP fighters. But it also benefits the weapon during the actual attack run. Firstly, the weapon can get well inside the theoretical maximum 25nm range (approx. the horizon distance on flat terrain) before being detected. The inverse-square law is a particularly harsh mistress here; it guarantees even a weak radar will pick up even a stealthy missile in the last few miles before impact; but also means that RCS reductions enjoy (almost) exponential effectiveness in decreasing maximum detection range. Exactly how an SA-17/SA-22 vs. JASSM matchup goes weighs heavily on best-guesstimates of comparative capabilities (radar versus supposed JASSM RCS) and the models you use. The best civilian-accessible tool for this that I know of is Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations, both from a mathematical modeling and performance-guesstimate standpoint, and it suggests a maximum detection range of 5-8 miles, which seems pretty reasonable. Once OODA loops (the time required to shout “oh shit” and punch the auto-engage button,) are factored in, this means the JASSM presents defending SAMs far less time to shoot back than a Tomahawk would.

Secondly, once the missile's actually detected and engaged, its vanishingly small RCS will make life difficult for radar-guided interceptor missiles; lowering their pK%, depleting enemy magazines - or, if they don't have time to fire twice, increasing chances of penetration. Projects like CHAMP exist to destroy radars at a few miles range, to eliminate that last-mile gauntlet completely - and there's evidence that simpler single-use explosive pumped EMP bombs are already in use - but one need not speculate on classified warheads, as the JASSM's stealth makes it more survivable, even in the last mile, than a Tomahawk, JSOW or JDAM is.

Then there's the MALD-J. Originally designed as a simple decoy (Miniature Air-Launched Decoy,) the -J mod introduced a powerful offensive jammer. A small, disposable missile can only pack so much jamming output power, but the inverse-square law works in its favor here; being disposable, it can get as close as it pleases; even escorting missile salvos into the combat area. If that's not enough, it's recently gained a secondary kinetic kamikaze attack and more importantly, a two-way network link; allowing operators to exploit it as an offboard sensor platform, redirect its path in flight, and generally make it work “with” similarly networked Tactical Tomahawk missiles to respond to changing situations. The TLAM-D's two-way link allows it to loiter for a time till controllers give it a target, or to switch targets mid-attack if needed - now the MALD-J can provide responsive OECM support as well.

Combined, the JASSM and the MALD-J offer US forces two very, very potent weapons for overcoming the salvo attrition problem; between offensive jamming and passive stealth, their ability to efficiently penetrate and destroy SAM defenses is unparalleled.

What's the Plan?

Now that we understand the problems and the tools, we can see how the planned solution will likely look. Simply put, it entails kicking in the door with JASSMs and MALD-J to open the way for a hellacious torrent of Tomahawk missiles.

The USNI's Fleet and Marine Tracker, (which conveniently updated earlier this afternoon) shows that 5th fleet doesn't have a carrier in the Med right now, and the one in the Gulf (the Roosevelt) was recently withdrawn after several months of anti-ISIS airstrikes. Even without a carrier nearby, there's no shortage of assets and bases nearby for the US to use. RAF Akrotiri is barely 150 miles distant from Damascus, and of course Incirlik in southern Turkey is perfectly positioned as well. With tanker support, a strike from Al Udeid using Strike Eagles isn't hard to contemplate either. The US Bomber force is especially flexible - I believe some B-52s are still forward-stationed at Al Udeid, but a long-range sortie from Diego Garcia or even CONUS isn't impossible, though the required tankers would make it more challenging on such short notice. B-52s can carry 12 cruise missiles (or MALDs) on external pylons (if they're one of the handful with the new Conventional Rotary Launcher, they can carry up to 20.) A B-1B (which can also sortie from CONUS) can carry a whopping 24 JASSMs. Strike Eagles typically carry two.

Then there's recon assets. The usual twitter jewels spotted RC-135 Rivet Joint ELINT aircraft sortieing from Souda Bay to sniff the radio waves near the Lebanese border, but there's also more close-up capabilities to consider. The RQ-170s public reveal - and the more advanced and all-but-officially acknowledged successor, the RQ-180 - provide stealth options for actually infiltrating hostile airspace to scan for SAM units with FLIR and/or GMTI radar. Combined with other options like tiny sub-launched drones, one may presume US target intel will be pretty robust.

The initial wave will probably involve B-52s and F-15Es from Al Udeid, flying up the Gulf, tanking over Iraqi airspace and launching a mix of MALD-J and JASSM over eastern Syria at safe standoff ranges. The F-15Es might have relocated to RAF Akrotiri; or UK forces from there may participate in a joint strike with low-observable standoff weapons of their own (MBDA Storm Shadow.) USAF Compass Call jamming aircraft will probably support the attack, and Marine F-18s from Incirlik will likely contribute strike mass (missiles) and certainly Growler jamming support (that is, I certainly hope they have some Growlers there, and not Prowlers...) This opening attack will have four main objectives:

* Destroy a significant number of Syrian SAM systems in and around Damascus, focusing on the newest, most capable systems, and ones with the most optimal positioning,

* Destroy crucial C4 nodes to degrade the data cohesion and thus quality of Syrian defensive responses,

* Disable runways at select Syrian bases to prevent them from sortieing CAP fighters to engage follow-on TLAM strikes,

* Stimulate enemy defenses to enable more thorough air defense network degradation during follow-on strikes,

* Outright destroy select priority and/or high-value targets (including key personnel.)

The follow-up attack will come very soon from US Navy assets in the Med; the Donald Cook is rumored to be in attack position as we speak and I expect at least one converted Ohio-class SSGN and its 154 Tomahawks are in the area. The Tomahawks will do most of the real damage; directly striking desired targets as well as performing secondary strikes on newly-identified air defense sites, plus a few suppression strikes on Syrian regime airbases to convince all parties involved that the cool embrace of a sturdy air raid shelter is the best place to be, and not servicing priority targets in an attempt to sortie them. At this point the French and UK forces might add their contributions, if any; their Storm Shadows are better suited to tackling SAM sites than Tomahawks, and they'd be well-used if kept in reserve for follow-on attacks after the first wave stimulates air defenses.

F-22s will likely see use; both as BARCAP (protecting tankers, ELINT aircraft, AWACS, jamming aircraft and other high-value assets that the Syrians might unwisely try to challenge with fighters) and as direct attackers. With the Small Diameter Bomb, the F-22 becomes a deep-penetration fighter-bomber platform armed with low-observable standoff glide-bombs that can penetrate moderately hard targets. The SDB isn't ideal for attacking point-defense SAMs (it's slow and not stealthy, though it is fairly low RCS by simple fact of being small and pointy,) but an F-22 can pack a surprising number of them, making them excellent for saturating SAM defenses. They're also excellent against Hardened Aircraft Shelters, for that matter. Their stealth characteristics also allow them to operate far forward in what'd be denied airspace to any other aircraft; enabling a very aggressive sort of BARCAP, to the point of shadowing hostile fighters and engaging them from close range if they make aggressive motions towards friendlies. I personally believe we'll see more F-22s in strike roles than BARCAP roles, but that all depends on just how many Strike Eagles and B-52s we have forward-deployed in theater right now; information that's not easy to hunt down on the web (for obvious reasons.)

The most difficult part of the strike will be playing cat-and-mouse with Russia's AWACS/EW assets; they've the most capable sensors, we can't simply shoot them down, and the Russians know that and will exploit it. The early warning their aircraft can provide will be of tremendous use to their Syrian allies, so inhibiting it will likewise be critical. I predict a delicate dance of US/NATO jamming aircraft versus Russian AWACs/CAP, with a side helping of targeting spikes from their S-400 batteries to try and rattle morale. (Not that they'll be spooked, because the S-400s' maximum theoretical range is based on the radar-equipped 40N6 missile, which probably isn't operational yet, much less deployed to Syria.)

In Summary

I think we're about to see a demonstration of the balance between higher-end and lower-end capabilities - a relatively small number of advanced weapons opening the door for an onslaught of cost-effective Tomahawks. We're also going to see why ISTAR capabilities are so important, and given the nature of the mission, it's highly likely targets won't be strictly limited to just chemical weapon depots or related infrastructure. It might be, but I predict a Message Will Be Sent.

It's 9PM, and the RUMINT on twitter says I'd better post this before the strikes actually happen and all eight pages of random musing are wasted.

Let's see what happens.

#syria #syriacrisis

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